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2In February 2012, as this report was being 
completed, official statistics showed that 
in 2010 UK carbon emissions rose for the 
first time in seven years, driven primarily by 
increased use of gas for heating homes during 
especially cold winter months. We do not 
know how many of the people who turned 
up the heating did so because they could 
afford to and how many had to make sacrifices 
elsewhere. Nor do we know how many stayed 
cold. We do know that no matter their income, 
households faced very different costs to 
achieve the same level of warmth, largely due 
to the varying energy efficiency of their homes.
It is now recognised that before the end of 
the decade something like a revolution in our 
housing stock is required to address this energy 
inefficiency that has been a fact of life for 
too long. This revolution is needed at a time 
when the wider economic picture is, to say 
the least, difficult. The Government’s policy 
framework centres on innovative financing of 
energy saving measures, particularly through 
the ‘Green Deal’ which aims to allow millions 
of homes and businesses throughout the UK to 
make energy efficiency improvements.
But while improving the energy efficiency 
of the housing stock as a whole is a vital 
objective, this must not come at the price 
of leaving our worst remaining homes lived 
in by families on the lowest incomes. Some 
argue there is a tension between fuel poverty 
and climate change policies. Certainly, some 
people live in homes that are too cold and 
making them warmer could increase their 
carbon emissions. But any tension cuts both 
ways. The continuing existence of fuel poverty, 
especially on the potential scale we outline 
in this report, is an obstacle to delivery of 
our carbon objectives as well as a source of 
health problems and a compounding of the 
problem of poverty. This does not mean that 
low carbon efforts should be put on hold 
while fuel poverty is tackled. Quite the reverse. 
But it is clear that the impact of policies on 
those in fuel poverty must be considered so 
that they are not left behind as we make the 
changes needed to meet our carbon emission 
obligations. 
Tackling fuel poverty offers a multiple pay-
off: better living standards and conditions for 
people with low incomes, an improved and 
more energy efficient housing stock, fewer 
winter deaths and reduced costs for the NHS. 
This is no doubt what Parliament had in mind 
when it agreed in 2000, with all-party support, 
that fuel poverty should be eradicated as far 
as reasonably practicable within 15 years. That 
things are moving in the opposite direction 
– on the projections we present here – is 
profoundly disappointing.
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In this context, some may find the focus here 
on measuring the problem an odd priority. 
But understanding the impact of policies and 
expenditure in this area is an essential first 
step to effective action. Flaws in the current 
indicator have distorted policy choices, 
misrepresented the problem and bred two 
drivers of inaction – complacency at times and 
pessimism about the impact of policy at others. 
Improving measurement can focus attention 
on the core problem – recognised in the Warm 
Homes and Energy Conservation Act 2000 – of 
being faced with getting by on a low income 
while being locked-in to unreasonable energy 
costs, including those where people, because 
they are on low incomes, end up paying the 
highest prices.
This report sets out an alternative 
measurement framework which, by separating 
out the extent and depth of the problem 
faced by households, is designed to lend 
itself to better application, improved policy 
development and more effective policy delivery. 
It pinpoints those who, alongside the most 
vulnerable, are priorities for action – those 
most deeply in fuel poverty. It also embeds a 
concern for distributional equity and improving 
standards, with sustained improvements to 
energy efficiency levels the most effective 
long-term approach, by virtually every indicator. 
I hope it will act as an effective driver of action 
in both the short and long term.
In writing this report I have been hugely 
assisted by those who submitted evidence in 
the summer of 2011 and who responded to 
the interim report published in October 2011. 
But it has only been possible because of the 
colossal – and always cheerful – efforts of the 
team that has worked with me on it: Gareth 
Baynham-Hughes, Fern Leathers and Jen 
Offord, who have worked more than full-time 
on it since the review started, and Damon 
Wingfield, Jamie Torrens, Sam Jenkins, Chris 
McKee and Phil James who have also devoted 
considerable proportions of the last year to it. 
The depth of analysis presented here would 
have been impossible without each of them. 
I am also very grateful to the Economic and 
Social Research Council for their forbearance 
in agreeing to adjust the timing of my current 
professorial fellowship, to allow this review to 
take place at the same time.
Not everyone will share each judgement I 
make about the way I believe fuel poverty 
should be measured and it is important that 
those involved in the debate have a chance 
to react to these proposals. But I hope that 
arguments of detail will not divert from the key 
task: tackling a problem which, while larger 
in scale than may would have hoped, does 
have solutions.
John Hills
Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion,  
London School of Economics
March 2012
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AHC After Housing Costs
BHC Before Housing Costs
BRE/Bredem Building Regulations Establishment
CBA Cost Benefit Analysis
CCC Committee on Climate Change
CCS Carbon Capture and Storage
CERT Carbon Emissions Reduction Target
CESP Community Energy Saving Project
CMDs Common Mental Disorders
CRSP Centre for Research into Social Policy
CSE Centre for Sustainable Energy
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6Introduction and overview
1. This report marks the end of the independent 
review of fuel poverty commissioned by Chris 
Huhne MP, then Secretary of State for Energy and 
Climate Change, in March 2011.
2. The terms of reference for the review called, in 
essence, for an examination of three issues:
•	 Whether ‘fuel poverty’ is, in fact, a distinct 
problem, or simply a manifestation of more 
general problems of poverty.
•	 If it is distinct, how it is best measured and 
whether the current approach to doing this 
captures the problems most effectively.
•	 The implications of measurement for the way 
we understand the effectiveness of the range of 
policy approaches to reducing it.
3. Following an extensive review of the evidence 
and consultations with stakeholders and having 
conducted our own detailed analysis, we published 
an interim report in October 2011. This covered 
the first two of these issues, presented our initial 
ideas, and set out a number of questions for 
further consultation. We are very grateful to 
the considerable number of organisations and 
individuals who responded to that consultation 
for their responses and the often very detailed 
attention which they had paid to our analysis and 
consultation questions. While the overwhelming 
balance of the consultation responses supported 
the core arguments presented in the interim report, 
some of them also raised some important issues 
which have helped us develop and refine our final 
proposals.
4. This report presents our final conclusions on 
the issues covered by the interim report. As we 
previously argued in Chapter 4 of the interim 
report, fuel poverty is not only a distinct, but also 
a serious national problem. However, the way in 
which its scale has been measured officially has had 
significant flaws, giving a misleading impression 
both of trends and of the effectiveness of policies 
to tackle it. This is mainly because the official 
indicator is based on comparing the ratio between 
households’ energy spending needs and their 
income against a fixed threshold. This makes it 
unduly sensitive to changes in price levels as well as 
to technicalities within its calculation. The trends it 
reports do not reflect well those in the underlying 
problems, and its definition can encompass 
households that clearly are not poor. Part of the 
difficulty is that while a single indicator, it attempts 
to reflect both the extent and depth of the problem.
5. We therefore propose an alternative approach to 
measurement, focused on the way in which the 
problem is described in the Warm Homes and 
Energy Conservation Act 2000 (WHECA). This 
Act says – correctly, in our view – that we should 
be concerned about individuals in households 
Summary and 
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9. Our analysis sets out the daunting scale of the 
challenge that would remain in 2016 given the 
current policy mix and framework, and official 
expectations for incomes and energy prices. On the 
central projection for our preferred measure, 8.5 
million individuals within 2.9 million households 
will still be in fuel poverty, with an aggregate fuel 
poverty gap of over £1.7 billion, compared to a gap 
of £1.1 billion in 2009. This is a very long way from 
the elimination of fuel poverty that was the aim of 
WHECA and of the 2001 strategy for achieving it.
The problem of fuel poverty
10. We set out in detail in our interim report (Chapters 
3 and 4), the reasons why fuel poverty is a distinct 
and serious problem from several perspectives. 
We have seen nothing in the responses to that 
report which challenges this conclusion. Indeed 
some respondents suggested that our description 
understated its gravity. The issue is of concern:
•	 From a poverty perspective: the households 
with high energy costs living in poverty or on 
its margins in 2009 faced extra costs to keep 
warm above those for typical households with 
much higher incomes adding up to £1.1 billion. 
These costs are largely outside the control of 
those households – given the capital investment 
that would be required to reduce them – except 
through trading off the temperatures at which 
they live against other necessities, exacerbating 
the difficulties faced by all on such low incomes.
•	 From a health and well-being perspective: living 
at low temperatures as a result of fuel poverty is 
likely to be a significant contributor not just to 
the excess winter deaths that occur each year (a 
total of 27,000 each year over the last decade 
in England and Wales), but to a much larger 
number of incidents of ill-health and demands on 
the National Health Service and a wider range of 
problems of social isolation and poor outcomes 
for young people.
“living on a lower income in a home that cannot 
be kept warm at reasonable cost.” In our interim 
report we set out a specific alternative framework 
for measuring fuel poverty, focused both on 
the number of households and people with low 
incomes and high costs and on the depth of 
the problems they face – what we call the ‘fuel 
poverty gap’.
6. In Chapter 2 of this report we explain the final form 
that we suggest this indicator should take. Having 
considered the responses to our interim report very 
carefully, we believe that the framework for the 
indicator as originally designed was broadly correct 
although there was scope for improvement. In 
particular, we have made an important modification 
in terms of how to allow for household size 
and composition when considering what it is 
‘reasonable’ for a given household to have to spend 
on energy in the home.
7. We have also considered the way in which the 
level of the threshold for reasonable costs could 
be set. We have examined a number of alternative 
options and proposals, but have concluded that 
retaining the median contemporary modelled 
energy requirement is the most robust level at 
which to set the boundary between ‘reasonable’ 
and ‘unreasonable’ costs. This decision has a 
number of implications, including the fact that the 
relative nature of our preferred indicator makes 
the literal eradication of fuel poverty extremely 
challenging (although not impossible). We 
discuss the implications of this and of alternative 
approaches below.
8. Using our framework, the main part of this report 
examines the implications of our approach for 
understanding the effectiveness of different policy 
approaches to tackling fuel poverty. It was not the 
remit of the review to produce a master plan for 
doing this. Rather our aim is to allow those who are 
central to the debate over policy both inside and 
outside government to understand what it would 
take to achieve particular aims and what can be 
achieved within particular resources.
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
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low-income households are, but from the particular 
mathematical way in which those needs are 
compared with incomes reported to the survey on 
which the assessment is based. This is to compare 
the ratio between the two with a fixed threshold, 
set at 10 per cent (on the basis of spending 
patterns 24 years ago). The result is an indicator 
that is highly sensitive to factors such as fuel prices, 
the precise assumptions made for what are seen as 
adequate temperatures for people to live at, and 
the incomes reported to a survey that is mainly not 
focussed on income measurement.
14. It is of course a major step to recommend changing 
the indicator used to monitor such an important 
problem. In doing so our motive is not to underplay 
the problem. Indeed it is precisely because the 
gravity of the problem is so great that appropriate 
measurement is important, avoiding feeding either 
misplaced complacency about progress or undue 
pessimism about whether policy is effective and 
focused on the correct targets.
15. Given the problems with the current indicator, we 
recommend that it ceases to represent the official 
indicator of fuel poverty. However, as the alternative 
approach we recommend below uses the same data 
and underlying modelling, it would be desirable to 
continue to publish the results in the current form 
for information purposes for some years at least.
Recommendation 1: The Government should 
change its approach to fuel poverty measurement 
away from the current ‘10 per cent’ ratio indicator.
16. The same data underpinning the current official 
indicator should be used to construct a more 
appropriate framework for the measurement of 
fuel poverty. Specifically we recommend that the 
Government should adopt a new approach based 
on directly measuring the overlap between low 
income and high costs.
•	 From a carbon reduction perspective: not only 
is the energy inefficiency of the homes of those 
living in fuel poverty a direct concern in terms 
of reducing carbon emissions, but fuel poverty 
also acts as a barrier to the implementation of 
other policies to mitigate climate change, since 
those on low incomes are least able to afford any 
increase in prices that may result from them.
11. One implication of this analysis is that the core 
problem from all three perspectives is one of the 
overlap between low income and the energy 
inefficiency of the homes people live in. This is 
precisely the problem described in the Warm Homes 
and Energy Conservation Act 2000 (WHECA), as 
affecting those “living on a lower income in a home 
that cannot be kept warm at reasonable cost.”
Measuring fuel poverty
12. The central task for this review was to examine 
the way in which trends in fuel poverty and 
identification of those at risk from it have been 
measured and to suggest whether there might be 
a better alternative. In Chapter 5 of our interim 
report we set out in detail why we thought that 
the current official indicator – despite having 
important strengths – was flawed as a way of 
understanding both trends in the problem and who 
is at risk from it, and by implication of comparing 
the effectiveness of different policy approaches. As 
one example of these problems, it does not seem 
correct to suggest – as the current indicator does 
– that the scale of fuel poverty was reduced by four-
fifths between 1996 and 2003, nor that it more 
than trebled between 2003 and 2009. Nor does it 
seem correct that some households with moderate 
or even higher incomes are counted as ‘fuel poor’ 
at times when energy prices are high, or that some 
households in poverty and with relatively high 
energy costs are counted as not being fuel poor at 
times when prices are low.
13. These problems arise not from any fundamental 
flaws in the elaborate exercise that is carried out 
each year to establish what the energy needs of 
Getting the measure of fuel poverty 9
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18. This formulation is illustrated by Figure SR.1, with 
the shaded area in the bottom left hand corner 
representing the population that has both low 
incomes and high costs and the length of the 
vertical arrows representing the size of the fuel 
poverty gap for particular households within it.
19. The two key elements within this are the income 
threshold and the ‘reasonable costs’ threshold. We 
proposed a way of setting the income threshold in 
our interim report which has been uncontroversial. 
Indeed, the proposal to measure income after 
housing costs and adjusted for household size and 
composition was widely supported. The threshold 
itself should be set in parallel to the Government’s 
general approach to the measurement of low 
income used in the Households Below Average 
Income series. This should include an allowance for 
each household’s required energy costs, reflecting 
the way in which fuel bills can draw some people 
into poverty.
Recommendation 2: The Government should 
adopt a new indicator of the extent of fuel poverty 
under which households are considered fuel poor if:
•	 They have required fuel costs that are above 
the median level; and
•	 Were they to spend that amount they would 
be left with a residual income below the official 
poverty line.
The Government should count the number of 
individuals in this position as well as the number of 
households they live in.
17. In addition to the ‘headcount’ series affected by 
fuel poverty, an integral part of the assessment of 
the problem should be an indicator of the depth of 
the problem.
Recommendation 3: The Government should 
adopt a new indicator of the depth of fuel poverty 
as represented by the average and aggregate ‘fuel 
poverty gap’, defined as the amounts by which 
the assessed energy needs of fuel poor households 
exceed the threshold for reasonable costs.
Increasing income  
Median
required
energy
costs
Increasing
energy
costs
B
A 
Figure SR.1: Recommended indicators of the extent 
and depth of fuel poverty
Income threshold
Fuel poverty gap
Fuel poverty gap
10
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
much lower than the national average to have to 
spend more than a typical household.
22. Some stakeholders also voiced concerns that setting 
the costs threshold at the level of contemporary 
median required costs created a ‘moving target’ 
problem under which the eradication of fuel poverty 
would become almost impossible. It is certainly true 
that our proposed relative indicator is sensitive to 
the potential problem of low-income households 
being left behind the rest of the population as 
contemporary standards improve, but we view it 
as an advantage that this risk is captured. We have 
considered – and present analysis on – alternatives 
to this approach, including the idea of setting the 
threshold in relation to the energy requirements of 
the best homes. However, we could not find a firm 
basis for such approaches.
Recommendation 5: The Government should 
set the reasonable costs threshold at the level of 
the contemporary median energy requirements 
for the population as a whole. The modelled bills 
for individual households should be adjusted for 
household size and composition – using a specific 
set of adjustment factors – when comparing them 
to this threshold.
23. We recognise that if targets are set on the basis of 
literal eradication of the problem, this is very hard 
(although not impossible) to achieve using a relative 
measure such as the one we propose. We therefore 
provide analysis of measurement approaches based 
on fixed energy standards. These approaches suffer 
from drawbacks, notably the fact that any absolute 
standard runs the risk of becoming out-of-date. 
In addition, standards based simply on energy 
efficiency of homes omit the effects of other cost 
factors such as occupancy patterns and the tariffs 
people pay. We therefore also considered whether a 
satisfactory ‘absolute’ version of the LIHC could be 
constructed. We show the results of this approach 
in Chapter 2 and its Annex, but found it hard to 
produce a consistent time series. It is also rather 
complex to explain.
Recommendation 4: The Government should 
measure incomes for fuel poverty purposes after 
housing costs and adjusted for household size and 
composition. The threshold should be set at 60 per 
cent of median income plus calculated household 
energy requirements.
20. By contrast, the responses to our consultation 
suggested that the way we proposed to set 
the threshold for reasonable costs was more 
controversial. In the light of the comments made, 
we agree that part of our initial proposal – that 
costs should be compared between households 
using the same adjustment factors as for incomes 
– was incorrect. This has the unintended effect of 
identifying too many smaller households as being 
fuel poor and too few larger ones. We discuss this 
set of issues in detail in Chapter 2 and its Annex 
and consider one interesting set of alternative 
proposals based on defining reasonableness in 
relation to energy requirements measured in 
£ per m2 (rather than total costs per household 
adjusted for its type and size). We suggest however 
that making no adjustment for household size and 
composition would also be incorrect. We conclude 
that a specific set of adjustment factors should be 
used reflecting actual spending on fuel by different 
kinds of household with similar living standards. 
These are set out in Table 2.1 of Chapter 2.
21. Some respondents to the consultation also 
argued that our suggestion that the threshold 
for reasonable costs should be based on median 
required spending for all households was too 
unambitious. We are sympathetic to the concerns 
driving this position. However, we cannot see any 
way to establish a firm rationale for a different – 
higher or lower – proportion of median costs than 
the 100 per cent we originally proposed. On the 
one hand this is already a challenging threshold 
– identifying as many households and more 
individuals as having low incomes and high costs 
as the current official indicator on average over the 
last 13 years. On the other, it is hard to argue that it 
is ‘reasonable’ for households on incomes that are 
Getting the measure of fuel poverty 11
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Recommendation 6: The Government should use 
the LIHC indicator and fuel poverty gap as the basis 
for operational target setting. The fuel poverty gap 
in particular gives the best focus on the scale of the 
problem and progress in tackling it. 
26. The result of these proposals in terms of the picture 
they would have shown since 1996 can be seen 
in Figure SR.2. The series showing the extent of 
fuel poverty measured on this ‘Low Income High 
Costs’ (LIHC) basis shows only a small decline 
in the number of households affected over the 
period, contrasting with the dramatic ‘V’ shape 
of the current official series. The two series have 
a very similar average over the period as a whole. 
The number of individuals identified by the LIHC 
indicator has grown slightly over time, as the kind 
of household most at risk has moved towards 
larger ones. In this case the number of individuals 
identified by our preferred indicator remained 
higher in 2009 than those identified by the current 
official series.1
1 As we note in Chapter 2, the number of households identified in this 
way is very similar to that presented in the interim report, but the 
number of individuals is significantly higher as a result of the changed 
way in which we are allowing for household size.
24. The approach that we find most consistent with our 
overall analysis is to use the relative LIHC indicator 
and fuel poverty gap for both measurement and 
objective-setting purposes, while recognising that 
elimination is unlikely to mean literally reducing 
the problem to zero. There is a form of precedent 
for this in relation to the legal requirement to 
eliminate child poverty by 2020 which we explore 
in this report. Whilst the relative approach would 
mean that there may always be some low-income 
households with costs above the median threshold, 
we suggest the key indicator should be the scale of 
the aggregate fuel poverty gap. If this is reduced to 
a low level, then no low-income household can be 
left very far above the threshold.
25. Using the fuel poverty gap in this way would have 
the additional advantages of putting most weight 
on monitoring the depth of the problem and 
focusing attention on tackling the hardship faced by 
those most severely affected. It would not lose its 
relevance over time and would maintain pressure to 
avoid low-income households being left behind as 
the rest of the housing stock is made more efficient. 
It would also provide a bridge between policy 
development and delivery on the ground – which 
we explore below.
Figure SR.2: Number of households and individuals in fuel 
poverty under the proposed LIHC indicator and current 
indicator, 1996 and 2003-2009, England (millions)
0
1
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Source:  Fuel poverty data, 1996 and 2003-2009 (DECC)
20092008200720062005200420032002200120001999199819971996
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Number of households in fuel poverty 
– LIHC indicator
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Technical considerations
29. In the course of this review we have benefited 
greatly from the considerable amount of effort and 
expertise which has gone into assessing the energy 
requirements of different kinds of household. 
There remain, however, three important gaps in the 
available data.
30. First, it is correct that the focus should be on 
energy needs not actual spending, as the latter 
may reflect, for instance, people who spend little 
because they are living in the cold, precisely the 
problem that health concerns mean we want 
to avoid. But – as recent work by the Centre for 
Sustainable Energy and Loughborough University 
has demonstrated – it can be very enlightening 
to compare modelled needs and actual spending 
patterns, precisely to identify which kinds of 
household are in this kind of position. At present, 
it is only possible to do this though econometric 
analysis, embodying assumptions about how the 
patterns revealed by different surveys for spending 
and for need are related. It would be very valuable 
to be able to conduct this kind of comparison for 
the same households. This should become possible 
over the next year using data from DECC’s Energy 
Follow-up Survey.
27. What has driven this trend? The LIHC indicator 
shows the impact of factors that have been pushing 
in opposite directions. The general improvement 
in energy efficiency – even in relative terms – of 
low-income households has tended to reduce fuel 
poverty. However, since 2004, these improvements 
have tended to be offset by rising prices, which 
means that more households on the margins of 
poverty have been pushed below the income 
threshold by their increased energy costs.
28. However, the main effect of changing prices 
over time has been on the depth of fuel poverty 
for those affected by it, as measured by the fuel 
poverty gap, both on average and in aggregate, 
shown in Figure SR.3. These fell in real terms 
between 1996 and 2003, but have both since 
increased, with the aggregate size of the problem 
reaching £1.1 billion by 2009, an average of £414 
for each of the 2.7 million households affected. 
The aggregate fuel poverty gap in 2009 is higher 
– given the adjusted factors we use for setting the 
costs threshold – than it was in 1996, and more 
that three-quarters higher than it was in 2003, 
when fuel prices were at their lowest.
Aggregate fuel poverty
gap (£million)
Average fuel
poverty gap (£)
Figure SR.3: Aggregate and average fuel poverty gaps under 
the proposed LIHC indicator, 1996 and 2003-2009, England
Source:  Fuel poverty data, 1996 and 2003-2009 (DECC)
20092008200720062005200420032002200120001999199819971996
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32. At the same time, we believe there is a need for 
further research to understand the physiological, 
psychological and other impacts of living at certain 
temperatures in order to have confidence in the 
appropriateness of the temperature standards used, 
especially for people vulnerable to these impacts.
Technical Recommendation 3: Once this is 
done the evidence of the health effects of cold 
temperatures should be examined to establish 
whether it implies the need for separate 
temperature standards that allow for the particular 
vulnerability of the elderly and infants, and of some 
groups affected by disability and long-term illness. 
33. A third data gap which we discussed in our interim 
report was that the modelling of the prices paid by 
households can at present only allow imperfectly 
for the ways in which those most at risk of fuel 
poverty may be on worse tariffs than others, that is, 
that the poor may be paying more. Data allowing 
a more direct assessment of the tariffs faced by 
particular households should become available later 
in 2012, as part of the Energy Follow Up Survey. At 
present neither the additional problems that this 
causes, nor the impact of interventions that reduce 
them, can be accurately assessed.
Technical Recommendation 4: Based on data 
available in future, the Government should examine 
the case for a more direct assessment of the tariffs 
actually paid by low-income households within the 
fuel poverty measurement methodology.
34. Another issue of concern in the way fuel poverty is 
calculated is the classification of extra costs benefits 
such as the Disability Living Allowance as general 
income, implying that households entitled to them 
are better off than those who are not, when they 
in fact reflect the requirement for extra income to 
achieve the same standard of living as others.
Technical Recommendation 1: The Government 
should compare data that are due to become 
available in future on actual consumption patterns 
in homes with modelled spending requirements for 
the same households in order to identify the kinds 
of household that are at greatest risk of living at 
low temperatures and to provide information that 
would allow refinement of the way in which energy 
needs are currently modelled.
31. One fact which is already apparent from what we 
know of contemporary spending patterns is that 
even middle and high-income households do not 
spend as much as the modelling of energy needs 
suggests. The most likely explanation of this is 
that contemporary households, even when their 
resources are not especially constrained, do not 
keep their houses at as high a temperature as is 
assumed in the modelling. As we discussed in the 
interim report, the basis for those temperature 
standards is less firm than many have supposed. 
One of the features of the relative approach we 
have proposed for assessing which households 
have high costs is that it is fairly robust to the 
precise temperature standards used (unlike the 
current approach, which is highly sensitive to 
them). However, it would still be preferable if 
the temperature standards used in the general 
modelling reflected those chosen by contemporary 
middle-income households. Unfortunately we 
do not have data on the temperatures at which 
people are living that is more recent than 1991. This 
needs to be addressed and then used to inform the 
modelling of energy needs.
Technical Recommendation 2: The Government 
should reinstate a component to its surveys that 
allows an up-to-date assessment of contemporary 
behaviour in terms of the temperatures of people’s 
homes. The information this provides should 
be used in the development of the fuel poverty 
measurement methodology. 
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one recognises that some households will move 
in and out of fuel poverty as other circumstances 
change, for example with the birth of a child.
37. Bearing in mind these principles, one of the great 
strengths of the framework we propose – and 
of the fuel poverty gap in particular – is that it 
becomes possible to make a bridge between the 
aggregate numbers and trends shown by the fuel 
poverty statistics and the ways in which practical 
policies can be directed on the ground to those 
most at risk. We explore the results of doing this 
in detail in Chapter 3. Several of the findings are 
instructive for policy design. For instance, 90 per 
cent of the fuel poverty gap is accounted for by 
households with low incomes also living in homes 
that have energy ratings of E, F and G.
38. One limitation is that the traditional proxy for low 
income of means-tested benefits receipt accounts 
for only 62 per cent of LIHC households and 62 
per cent of the fuel poverty gap. However we 
show that within this group a small set of physical 
characteristics, which can be ascertained without 
an in-depth physical survey, could account for 
households with more than half the total fuel 
poverty gap. These are having oil, solid fuel or 
portable heating, living in a rural property off the 
gas grid, having solid walls, or being built before 
1945. However, even this most effective set of 
simple proxies would still identify more than twice 
as many households as were actually LIHC, without 
further screening.
39. Identifying the remaining half of the fuel poverty 
gap is much harder, particularly the 38 per cent of 
the fuel poverty gap accounted for by low-income 
households who do not receive benefits. The 
implication is that while relatively simple proxies 
can pick up many of those most at risk in a fairly 
accurate manner, to find the full population at risk 
would need more detailed investigation.2
2 It was beyond the scope of the review to assess the practical strengths 
of different delivery approaches and tools for targeting on the ground. 
Box 3.2 in Chapter 3 and Section 5.2 describe some of the issues raised 
with us. 
Technical Recommendation 5: Government 
should assess whether removing extra cost 
benefits such as Disability Living Allowance from 
the calculation of income in the fuel poverty 
measurement methodology would be appropriate.
Identifying people at risk of 
fuel poverty
35. It is important that the measurement approach used 
by Government to understand fuel poverty can be 
linked through to the way policy interventions are 
designed and targeted at fuel poor households. 
There are certain principles that need to be 
considered in this context. For instance, it would 
be prohibitively expensive – and intrusive – to 
carry out a full property and income assessment 
to understand the fuel poverty status of all 
households. The experience gained from means-
testing in other policy areas also suggests a need to 
avoid devising eligibility criteria which result in sharp 
cliff edges, such as the entitlement to assistance 
that depends on receipt of a narrow range of 
income-tested benefits.
36. In attempting to identify fuel poor households it 
would be naive to suggest that policies aimed at 
removing problems faced (in 2009) by 2.7 million 
households could be dealt with only by treating 
2.7 million homes. In practical terms, a wider group 
will inevitably be targeted, adding of course to 
the cost of tackling the core problem. However, 
this is an area where assistance straying over a 
strict boundary of eligibility should not necessarily 
be seen as a problem – and can be a virtue. If a 
household is helped that is in poverty but has costs 
that are below the threshold, the help given can 
make an important difference to living standards 
and conditions. Similarly, if a household is helped 
that has an income above our threshold, but has 
high energy costs, that can still make a difference 
in terms of national energy efficiency and reduction 
of carbon emissions. Not being too stringent about 
precision targeting makes additional sense when 
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Current policies for tackling 
fuel poverty
43. The current focus of fuel poverty measurement 
has been a single indicator of the extent of the 
problem. Any move away from this poses a 
challenge for those familiar with this evaluation 
approach. This is particularly the case because our 
proposed measurement approach has two key 
novel features. First, we propose a relative approach 
which attempts to track the experience of people 
with low incomes living with high costs compared 
to those with average incomes. Second, we propose 
a measurement of the depth of the problem 
alongside the extent.
44. We show in Chapter 4 in principle how different 
kinds of policy – price-based, energy efficiency-
based or income-based – can affect the number of 
households with different combinations of high and 
low costs and incomes. We also discuss the effects 
of whether interventions are funded by taxes or 
by energy consumers. While tax-funding does not 
generally change the impact of particular kinds of 
intervention, funding from energy consumers can 
increase the fuel poverty gap of those who do not 
benefit from them.
45. A major benefit of the measurement framework is 
that it facilitates a better understanding of the type 
of policies that would benefit particular kinds of 
household and the impact on them relative to all 
other households. It also supports an understanding 
of the lifetime effects of policies. This combination 
means that the LIHC framework can provide a 
helpful tool for policy-makers when considering the 
trade-offs they have to make when shaping policies.
46. A detailed consideration of the existing policy 
framework in Chapter 5 shows that the current 
package of measures acts on all of the three key 
drivers of fuel poverty – prices, energy efficiency 
and income – having a variety of impacts. Figures 
SR.4(a) and (b) summarise the policy position in 
2009, and that planned for 2016, in terms of levels 
40. A further benefit of the LIHC approach is that it 
provides a clear insight into the households which 
should be prioritised for assistance. The use of a 
fuel poverty gap to supplement the headcount 
indicator can provide a way of identifying those 
who are deepest in fuel poverty and therefore a 
priority for action. In this way, assistance can be 
prioritised for those who face the worst trade-offs 
between paying energy bills and other spending 
that can lead to adverse health and social impacts. 
Doing so will also have the biggest impact on 
the aggregate fuel poverty gap. Under a tiered 
approach of this kind the same households would 
remain the focus for interventions however the 
reasonable costs threshold was drawn.
41. Certain groups of people are more vulnerable to 
being fuel poor, because they have higher energy 
requirements. Some of the factors driving these 
higher costs (such as needing to spend more time 
in the home) are captured in the way energy costs 
are modelled and households with vulnerable 
people will be identified as fuel poor. However this 
does not necessarily capture those who are most 
vulnerable to the impacts of fuel poverty and of 
cold homes.
42. The three main groups of people likely to 
experience particularly negative health impacts of 
fuel poverty are the elderly, infants, disabled people 
and those living with long term sickness. 34 per 
cent of fuel poor households contain someone with 
a disability or long-term illness, 20 per cent have 
a child aged 5 or under, and 10 per cent a person 
aged 75 or over. Given their vulnerability to the 
impacts of fuel poverty, these groups are an obvious 
priority for interventions that make it easier to keep 
warm, even if they do not have the very greatest 
fuel poverty gaps.
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of spending on policies acting in some way on fuel 
poverty. The size of the circles represents the scale 
of spending in the two years.
Figure SR.4a: Levels of funding for fuel poverty related 
policies – 2009
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Figure SR.4b: Levels of funding for fuel poverty related 
policies – 2016 (2009 Prices)
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and in the long run ‘rising block tariffs’ (but only 
after the core drivers of fuel poverty had been 
better addressed).
Future trends in fuel poverty
51. Given that we are looking at something that is 
the result of the interaction of a series of different 
factors that do not follow linear trends, we should 
perhaps respect the advice from Sam Goldwyn to 
“never make forecasts, especially about the future.” 
We do, however, attempt to make projections of 
fuel poverty levels in 2016. The results we present 
fully in Chapter 6 cannot be taken as definitive, 
because of specific difficulties in making detailed 
assumptions about employment and income 
changes, as well as uncertainties about future 
incomes and prices. We therefore present different 
scenarios to test sensitivities to future trends in 
fuel prices and incomes. The projections should be 
understood as indications of the broad direction of 
change rather than as precise forecasts.
52. A particular caveat is that our projections are based 
on the 2009 dataset from the English Housing 
Survey. We apply a range of assumptions to 
these data, from sources including the Office for 
Budgetary Responsibility (for income growth) and 
DECC (for fuel price changes). One of the factors 
which matters most for our purposes – but which is 
not an issue for more general predictions of future 
incomes – is the energy efficiency of the homes of 
those experiencing income changes such as from 
becoming unemployed. There is no easy way of 
projecting what the interaction between the income 
and energy efficiency distributions will be. Nor can 
we model the effects of reforms to the structures 
of the tax and benefit systems since 2009. As a 
result, our projections are, if anything, likely to 
be over-optimistic in terms of the numbers with 
low incomes.
53. With those health warnings, Figure SR.5 presents 
our baseline projections for fuel poverty, taking 
into account the projected impact of current and 
47. These policies have two main sources of funding – 
the Exchequer (Warm Front, Winter Fuel Payments, 
for instance, as shown in blue in Figure SR.4) and 
the consumer (CERT and CESP, for instance, as 
shown in red in Figure SR.4). The policies also target 
different types of households. Present policies such 
as CESP, Cold Weather Payments and Warm Home 
Discount are focused on low-income households, 
but not necessarily those with higher than typical 
energy costs in the latter two cases. CERT, ECO and 
Winter Fuel Payments are more widely spread over 
the population. Those receiving assistance under 
CERT and ECO may well have high costs.
48. As shown in Figure SR.4b, the position is expected 
to change by 2016 – the focus of the projections 
we publish in this report – with two principal 
fuel poverty policies expected to be in place, the 
Warm Home Discount and the Affordable Warmth 
element of the Energy Company Obligation (ECO), 
both of which will be funded by all consumers 
through additions to their bills (offset for those 
receiving benefits).
49. We show (in Chapter 5) how the distributional 
impact of the ECO is currently expected to be 
regressive, potentially limiting its impact on fuel 
poverty. In order to remove this regressive effect, 
our (rather unrefined) modelling suggests that a 
much greater proportion of the budget for ECO 
than currently planned – more than half rather than 
about one quarter – would need to be directed 
towards Affordable Warmth.
50. The current fuel poverty package – and the planned 
policies for 2016 – could be supplemented by a 
range of additional policies. While we cannot cover 
these in any great detail, we show that there could 
be a role for policies relating to minimum standards 
of energy efficiency, as recently introduced for 
the private rented sector (although it is clear that 
only aiming for an EPC rating of E will leave many 
private tenants still in fuel poverty). These could also 
include public provision of key related information, 
equity release (but in rather limited circumstances), 
18
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
and incomes the fuel poverty gap will remain 
roughly the same in 2016 as in 2009.
55. Within these projections, the current climate 
change and energy policy package is expected 
to have a small but downward impact on the 
aggregate level of fuel poverty measured by the 
LIHC indicator and on the fuel poverty gap. Policies 
that focus support on LIHC households (such as 
Warm Front, the Affordable Warmth part of ECO 
and, to a lesser extent, Warm Home Discount) are 
expected to improve the relative position of the 
fuel poor and reduce the extent and depth of fuel 
poverty. Conversely, those policies that do not focus 
support on LIHC households (such as FITs and the 
Green Deal Carbon Obligation) are not expected to 
improve the relative position of the fuel poor and 
may increase both the numbers in and depth of 
fuel  poverty.
56. Figure SR.6 compares the ranges of the projected 
number of households in fuel poverty under our 
preferred LIHC indicator with those that would 
future policies since 2009. The figure shows our 
central projections for the numbers of households 
and individuals with low incomes and high 
costs, together with their sensitivity to different 
assumptions about future fuel prices and incomes. 
The figure also presents a similar baseline projection 
of the depth of fuel poverty in terms of the 
aggregate fuel poverty gap. Again, the sensitivity to 
different assumptions is shown.
54. These projections will be profoundly disappointing 
to all those concerned with fuel poverty and aware 
of the serious problems it causes. Far from being 
eliminated in 2016 it will still affect between 2.6 
million and 3.0 million households (containing 
between 7.8 and 8.9 million individuals) when 
measured using our preferred indicator. Our central 
projection is that the key indicator of its scale, the 
fuel poverty gap, will have risen to £1.7 billion, 
compared to £1.1 billion in 2009. The overall 
impact of policy is that this number will be a tenth 
– but only a tenth – lower than it would otherwise 
be. Even in the most optimistic scenario for prices 
Source: Fuel Poverty Review
Figure SR.5: Projected levels of fuel poverty under the LIHC 
indicator and fuel poverty gap, 1996-2016, England 
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such measures do show continuing improvement 
over time against their fixed standards. However, 
on none of them would the number of households 
with low incomes and low SAP be reduced to 
zero by 2016 on our central projection. Taking 
median standards as they were in 2009 there will 
still be 2.3 million low-income households living in 
homes with a SAP level below the standard. Half 
of those households, 1.1 million, will still be below 
the standard reached by the median household 
more than a decade ago. On a higher standard, 
based on the boundary between EPC levels C and 
D, the number will still be 4.7 million households. 
It is particularly disappointing that even against 
these standards, unaffected by energy prices, the 
projections suggest slower progress between 2009 
and 2016 than achieved between 2003 and 2009. 
We also look at the variant of the LIHC indicator 
where the cost threshold is unaffected by general 
energy efficiency improvements. This shows only a 
small fall between 2009 and 2016, with the rate of 
improvement also slower than before 2009.
be shown the current official indicator. The figure 
shows the very great sensitivity of the current 
indicator to energy prices and incomes. With 
the most pessimistic assumptions, by 2016 it will 
class 9.2 million households – 43 per cent of all 
households – as being in ‘fuel poverty’. On the most 
optimistic scenario for prices and incomes, only a 
third as many, 3.1 million households, will be in 
fuel poverty, a reduction of one quarter from 2009. 
On the central projection, 8.1 million households 
will be ‘fuel poor’. The sensitivity of this indicator 
to prices and the way it includes higher-income 
households when prices are high do not seem to be 
helpful characteristics.
57. We believe there are good reasons for using a 
measure which takes account of all the influences 
on household costs and which uses a standard set 
relative to contemporary norms. But we also explore 
potential future trends in the number of households 
living in homes with energy efficiency below 
particular fixed standards. As one would expect, 
Source: Fuel Poverty Review
Figure SR.6:  Projected fuel poverty headcount under the 
LIHC indicator and the current indicator, 1996-2016, England
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as measured by official cost-benefit analysis 
approaches. We distinguish between policies that 
are Exchequer-funded (such as Warm Front) and 
those that are supplier-funded through additions 
to bills (such as Warm Home Discount or ECO). We 
also compare those that are narrowly targeted on 
low-income households with high costs (such as 
Affordable Warmth) or are more broadly targeted 
on all high costs households (such as the Carbon 
Obligation in ECO).
59. For each of these – which between them cover 
all of the main drivers of fuel poverty – we look 
at the short and long-term impacts in 2016 of 
interventions with standardised costs of £500 
million, which allows us to compare and contrast 
Making further progress
58. Against this perturbing background we then go 
on, in Chapter 7, to look at how additional policy 
effort could contribute to tackling fuel poverty. 
We analyse three broad types of interventions: 
policies that tackle energy prices, through delivering 
bill rebates; policies that aim to improve thermal 
efficiency through delivering subsidised insulation 
and heating systems to certain households; and 
policies that act on incomes by delivering direct 
income support. We then test these against a 
number of key criteria: their immediate impact on 
fuel poverty; their long term cost-effectiveness; 
their distributional impact; their impact on carbon 
emissions; and their net associated benefits 
Table SR.1: Summary of archetypal modelling for making further progress in 2016
Archetype
Proportion 
of 
recipients 
that are 
LIHC
(%)
Short term 
change 
in fuel 
poverty 
gap
(£ million)
Life-time 
change 
in fuel 
poverty 
gap 
(£ million)
Total 
change in 
greenhouse 
gas 
emissions 
(MtCO2)
Non 
equity-
weighted 
NPV
(£ million)
Equity 
weighted 
NPV
(£ million)
Supplier-funded, narrowly targeted 
energy efficiency
55 -50 -2,930 -4.92 590 1,900
Exchequer-funded, narrowly targeted 
energy efficiency
55 -70 -2,630 -3.40 310 1,730
Exchequer-funded, broadly targeted 
energy efficiency
18 -20 -680 -3.76 360 860
Supplier-funded broadly targeted 
efficiency policy
13 +20 -390 -6.76 990 1,360
Exchequer-funded rebate policy 28 -70 -70 +0.58 50 600
Supplier-funded rebate policy 28 -40 -40 +0.35 100 490
Increase in means-tested benefits 28 -3 -3 <+0.01 <10 550
Increase in Winter Fuel Payment 10 <-1 <-1 +0.58 60 420
Source: Tables 7.15, 7.16 and 7.17. The impacts of larger interventions would not necessarily be in proportion to those shown for this scale of 
intervention, particularly for those focused on improving energy efficiency. The figures show the impact of interventions with a standardised cost of 
£500 million. 
Note: The figures for the lifetime changes in the fuel poverty gap are not discounted, but those incorporated in the last two columns are.
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Conclusion
62. At the end of this nine-month review of fuel 
poverty we have reached the clear conclusion that 
fuel poverty is a major social problem, causing 
considerable hardship and negative health impacts, 
as well as impeding efforts to reduce carbon 
emissions. It is also widespread. Using the latest 
official data our recommended indicator shows 
that more than 7 million people were affected in 
England in 2009, living in nearly 3 million homes. 
The fuel poor faced costs which were £1.1 billion 
higher than would be the case if their bills were 
at the level faced by typical households (generally 
living in larger homes and with bigger incomes).
63. What is more, we predict a deteriorating, 
and therefore profoundly disappointing, situation 
by 2016. While it is clear that the current policy 
framework is having a positive impact, this is 
limited to a 10 per cent lower fuel poverty gap in 
2016 than we might expect to see in the absence 
of policies. This is far from enough to offset the 
general rate of increase from 2009, so that by 2016 
there could be nearly 200,000 more households in 
fuel poverty and a fuel poverty gap more than 50 
per cent larger.
64. Despite the scale of the challenge, it is our 
hope that this review will help drive forward action 
in future years. Effective action that makes a lasting 
difference will require participation at every level 
of Government, across the private sector and civil 
society. We know from our work on this review 
that the community of people who want to see the 
blight of fuel poverty addressed is dedicated to the 
cause and desperate for progress.
65. We do not expect all of the judgements we have 
reached to go unchallenged. And there should be 
an opportunity for others to debate our proposals. 
Although the degree of support for the overall 
framework was shown to be very strong in the 
consultation, it may be the case, for example, 
that some would prefer to draw the thresholds 
for the indicator in a different way. For us, what is 
the impact of the range of policies on both the LIHC 
headcount and fuel poverty gap indicators, and so 
their cost-effectiveness. Table SR.1 summarises our 
findings.3 The interventions are ordered in terms of 
their lifetime cost-effectiveness in reducing the fuel 
poverty gap.
60. This analysis is, of course, abstract. However it 
allows us to draw some conclusions about the 
relative impact and cost-effectiveness of alternative 
policy approaches. It suggests that policies that 
improve thermal efficiency of the housing stock 
tend to be the most cost-effective. They have 
persisting benefits in reducing fuel poverty, reduce 
greenhouse gases, and have very substantial net 
societal benefits. Narrowly targeted supplier-driven 
policies (such as Affordable Warmth within ECO) 
have the largest effects on fuel poverty, on the 
assumption that suppliers do react to their incentive 
to maximise cost-effectiveness. However, broadly 
targeted supplier-based interventions – while 
being the most effective in reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions – would have much more limited 
effects on fuel poverty, and would worsen it for 
some, because of the impact of higher prices on 
low-income households. Increasing the share of 
Affordable Warmth within ECO would therefore 
have more positive effects on fuel poverty while 
still having favourable effects on greenhouse gas 
emissions and even greater net societal benefits on 
an equity weighted basis.
61. However, upgrading the thermal efficiency of the 
housing stock will be a gradual process. Other 
short-term interventions such as price subsidies 
may therefore need to continue to be part of the 
policy mix. In terms of making the fastest progress 
towards fuel poverty objectives, the analysis shows 
that policies should be focused on LIHC households.
3 The results are explained and explored in more detail in Section 7.4 
of the report. It is explained there that while some of the results are 
‘scalable’ – for example twice the amount spent on rebates or benefits 
would result in a doubling of the NPV and GHG impacts – this is unlikely 
to be the case in terms of the fuel poverty impacts. This is especially 
the case for supplier-driven energy efficiency programmes, where the 
modelling assumes that the most effective interventions are made first. 
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Recommendation 7: The Government – not just 
DECC but also other Departments– should set out 
a renewed and ambitious strategy for tackling fuel 
poverty, reflecting the challenges we lay out in this 
report and the framework we have developed for 
understanding them.
important is that perfectly valid arguments about 
details should not risk losing momentum.
66. In that context, we hope that our work provides 
a new body of evidence to underpin a course 
for effective future action. We believe that our 
measurement framework opens up, for the first 
time, a clear means of identifying and finding those 
affected, understanding who should be the priority, 
assessing the effectiveness of policies, target-
setting, and accountability. This should be of use 
to all parties who want to see progress in the short 
and long-term.
67. Making this happen requires a reinvigorated 
strategy. We believe that the case for this is very 
strong. First, the framework for measurement 
underlying the 2001 strategy is inappropriate and 
does not effectively support policy-making and 
delivery. Second, on current trends and policies, fuel 
poverty will not be eradicated by 2016, however it 
is measured. Third, the context has changed since 
2001, with combating climate change a still more 
urgent national priority, while the economic and 
fiscal crisis leaves more households vulnerable to 
the effects of energy prices that have risen, rather 
than fallen as was assumed in 2001.
68. The Government must decide how to respond 
to this daunting challenge. Within government, 
although DECC has the clearest interest in fuel 
poverty, tackling it cannot be the task of a single 
Department. The problem is one affecting health, 
poverty, communities, and climate change. 
Tackling it successfully will require many parts of 
Government to be involved.
69. Our analysis shows that interventions, targeted 
on the core of the problem, can make a substantial 
difference. We hope that the framework we have 
developed provides some of the tools that will allow 
this to be done most effectively.
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1.1 The independent review 
of fuel poverty
Background to the review
1. In March 2011, Chris Huhne MP, then Secretary of 
State for Energy and Climate Change, announced 
the appointment of Professor John Hills to lead an 
independent review of the fuel poverty definition 
and target.
2. The meaning of the term ‘fuel poverty’ is given in 
the Warm Homes and Energy Conservation Act 
2000 (WHECA) as follows:
For the purposes of this Act, a person is to 
be regarded as living “in fuel poverty” if he is 
a member of a household living on a lower 
income in a home which cannot be kept warm at 
reasonable cost.
3. WHECA establishes a requirement for a strategy 
to be published to lead to the eradication of fuel 
poverty as far as reasonably practicable within 
fifteen years. Because the UK Fuel Poverty Strategy4 
was published in 2001, the date for the eradication 
of fuel poverty as far as reasonably practicable in 
England is November 2016, less than five years’ time.
4 Defra, DTI. (2001). The UK Fuel Poverty Strategy. London: Defra/DTI. 
Available at: http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/what%20we%20do/
supporting%20consumers/addressing%20fuel%20poverty/strategy/
file16495.pdf 
The conduct of the review to date
4. The review’s Terms of Reference are set out in 
Box 1.1. In summary, the review was asked to 
examine the question of fuel poverty from first 
principles, including its causes and impacts, and 
to consider whether the current or alternative 
ways of measuring fuel poverty best assist policy 
formulation and delivery. It was also been asked to 
consider cost-effectiveness of policies in relation to 
the measurement approach taken.
5. Following a call for evidence held in early summer 
2011 and extensive engagement with a wide 
range of stakeholders, the interim report of 
the review was published in October 2011.5 
This focused on the causes and impacts of fuel 
poverty, its distinctive character and options for 
measurement. A consultation on the interim report 
was held, finishing on 18 November 2011, to 
which there were more than 60 responses. The 
review team is indebted to those stakeholders 
who have contributed to this exercise, and the 
range of government departments engaged, for 
the considerable care and attention which those 
responding have given.
5 Hills, J. (2011). Fuel Poverty: The Problem and its Measurement. London: 
DECC and LSE. Available at: http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/11/
funding-support/fuel-poverty/3226-fuel-poverty-review-interim-report.
pdf and at http://sticerd/lse.ac.uk/case (Case report 69)
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•	 Chapter 3 considers the issue of targeting 
policies towards the fuel poor and examines the 
composition of the population with low incomes 
and high energy costs in detail as well as the 
proxies that could be used to find the fuel poor. 
It considers issues relating to those who are 
vulnerable to the impacts of fuel poverty.
•	 Chapter 4 discusses the effect in principle of 
policies designed to tackle fuel poverty under 
the framework of our preferred approach to fuel 
poverty measurement.
•	 Chapter 5 examines policies for tackling fuel 
poverty, including existing ones and others that 
may be used in the future.
•	 Chapter 6 projects forward to 2016, quantifying 
the impact of projected changes in incomes and 
energy prices and of the existing policy package 
for tackling fuel poverty using different indicators 
About our final report
6. The publication of this document marks the 
conclusion of the independent review. This report is 
structured as follows:
•	 Chapter 1 offers a recap of the interim report, a 
summary of the consultation held and an update 
of some of the key evidence on the distributional 
impact of the current climate and energy policy 
package.
•	 Chapter 2 looks at issues raised regarding the 
construction of the Low Income High Costs 
(LIHC) indicator proposed in the interim report, in 
particular how to set the energy costs threshold 
for households with different compositions. It 
concludes by setting out the final version of the 
indicator used as the basis for analysis in the rest 
of the report.
Box 1.1: Terms of Reference
The terms of reference for the review were:
1)  To consider fuel poverty from first principles: to determine the nature of the issues at its core, 
including the extent to which fuel poverty is distinct from poverty, and the detriment it causes.
2)  As appropriate and subject to the findings under (1), to develop possible formulations for a future 
definition and any associated form of target, which would best contribute to:
•	 addressing the underlying causes identified;
•	 helping Government focus its resources (which are set out in the Spending Review for the period 
to 2014-15) and policies on those who need most support;
•	 measuring the cost-effectiveness of different interventions in contributing to progress towards 
any target; and
•	 developing practical solutions, particularly around identification and targeting of households and 
measuring progress resulting from Government action.
The review is independent of Government. The review relates only to fuel poverty as regards England.
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10. Cash income is an imperfect measure of a 
household’s standard of living, although in many 
cases the same amount of cash can translate into 
a similar shopping basket. There is one obvious 
exception – housing – where costs can vary widely 
across the country, having a major impact on 
disposable income. We argue that spending on 
fuel is in a similar category: similar households with 
similar essential requirements (heating, hot water, 
lighting etc.) can find themselves in very different 
positions in respect of their fuel needs. Various 
factors might lock households in to high energy 
costs, of which the most significant are a low 
standard of energy efficiency and a lack of access to 
capital to make the necessary improvements (or to 
move to a more energy-efficient property).
11. Figures show that in 2009 the median required fuel 
bill for couples without children was nearly £1,300 
to achieve a set standard of warmth.6 But a sixth of 
such households would have needed to spend more 
than £1,750 to achieve the same standard and 
nearly one tenth would have needed to spend over 
£2,000 – more than half as much again.
12. In terms of the poverty premium, there are two 
principal considerations: first, whether poorer 
households face higher unit prices for their energy; 
second, whether the fact that poor households 
spend more of their income as a proportion on fuel 
than richer households leads to further negative 
distributional impacts.
13. It is certainly the case that fuel bill payment 
methods and contracts mean that households pay 
different prices for their fuel. There is a widespread 
concern that customers on prepayment meters 
– typically lower-income households, including 
households repaying energy debts – pay higher 
tariffs than those on other tariffs. Recently this 
disparity has started to reduce with prices gradually 
converging with those for standard quarterly billing 
(see Chapter 2 of our interim report). However 
6 As we noted in our Interim Report (Table 2.3), typical households actually 
consume only around 75-80 per cent of the amounts calculated as 
needed to reach the set temperature and energy use standards. Actual 
average bills in 2009 were therefore significantly lower than this. 
including our measure of the depth of the 
problem, the fuel poverty gap.
•	 Chapter 7 examines how effective different 
kinds of policy approach might be in terms of 
their impact on the extent and depth of fuel 
poverty, their cost-effectiveness, their effect on 
greenhouse gas emissions and overall societal 
benefits.
•	 Finally, Chapter 8 offers an overall conclusion.
The whole report and its conclusions are 
summarised in the Summary and Recommendations 
at the front of this volume.
1.2 The review’s interim 
report
Fuel poverty as a distinct problem
7. The interim report examined the question of the 
‘uniqueness’ of the fuel poverty problem – that is, 
the extent to which fuel poverty can be considered 
distinct from income poverty – and concluded 
that fuel poverty is not synonymous with general 
poverty. As well as this, the report also concluded 
that fuel poverty is a serious problem, affecting 
millions of households and individuals in England.
8. There are three over-arching perspectives that lead 
to concern about fuel poverty: poverty; health and 
well-being; and cutting carbon emissions.
The poverty perspective
9. Looking at things from the poverty perspective 
means examining the pressures on household 
budgets caused by a given fuel requirement, 
understanding what creates this requirement, 
how people get locked-in to high fuel costs, and 
considering whether there is a ‘poverty premium’ 
that leads to higher prices for poorer households.
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The health and well-being 
perspective
15. The health and well-being perspective was at the 
heart of much of the original concern about fuel 
poverty and continues to be foremost in the minds 
of many of those agencies and organisations 
working in this field. Among the concerns most 
often discussed is the prevalence of excess winter 
deaths in England (and the UK more generally). 
Since publication of the interim report, headline 
figures on such deaths during the initially very 
cold winter in 2010/11 have been published – 
see Figure 1.1. These show that despite lower 
temperatures than in other recent years, the 
number of excess winter deaths was no higher than 
the average for the last decade.
16. This is evidence that there are many factors 
driving the rate of excess winter deaths. In our 
interim report, we put forward a suggestion that 
some 10 per cent of excess winter deaths could 
conservatively be attributed directly to fuel poverty.9 
As we set out below, some stakeholders argued in 
their response to our consultation that we were too 
conservative in this estimate. There are certainly a 
wide range of estimates of the number of excess 
winter deaths caused by low indoor temperatures 
and by fuel poverty more specifically.10 But even 
our conservative figure implies thousands of deaths 
each year.
17. What is more, mortality is only part of the problem: 
more general morbidity caused by fuel poverty 
is also of real concern. There are specific health 
consequences of exposure to low temperatures, 
relating to cardiovascular problems (at temperatures 
below 12°C) and respiratory problems (at 
temperatures below 16°C) in particular. Low 
temperatures are also associated with diminished 
resistance to infections and the incidence of damp 
9 Own calculation based on evidence from Sir Michael Marmot’s 2011 
report on the impact of cold homes see Marmot Review Team. (2011). 
The Health Impacts of Cold Homes and Fuel Poverty. London: Friends of 
the Earth and the Marmot Review Team.
10 See for example: WHO. (2011). Environmental Burden of Disease 
Associated with Inadequate Housing. Copenhagen: WHO.
both payment methods remain more expensive 
than direct debit, while the cheapest tariffs are not 
universally available – they tend to be offered on-line 
and require payment by direct debit.7 Moving from a 
prepayment tariff to a standard credit or direct debit 
tariff also requires meter replacement, the costs of 
which can be steep and potentially out of reach for 
many households.8 There is evidence that doorstep 
sales had led to some poor households switching 
to more, rather than less, expensive deals at an 
alarming rate (nearly 50 per cent). In this regard we 
welcome the decision of certain energy suppliers to 
suspend door-to-door sales.
14. The higher proportionate spending on fuel by poorer 
households means that fuel bills are essentially 
regressive in nature. Government policies affecting 
the bills people pay can therefore have a different 
impact on low-income households from that on 
better-off households. This distributional impact can 
be both positive and negative, depending on the 
precise policies in question, how they are paid for 
and which households stand to benefit from them. 
Since our interim report was published, which used 
analysis from 2010, the Department of Energy and 
Climate Change (DECC) has updated its analysis 
of the impact of policies on fuel prices and bills. 
We report on this further below (see Section 1.4). 
Some recent Government decisions have affected 
the distributional picture in a positive way, precisely 
because they have changed the way in which 
certain policies are funded and have also improved 
assistance for some of the poorest households. 
However, there remains a large number of low-
income households whose potential contribution to 
policy through their fuel bills outweighs the benefits 
that will accrue to them. The need for Government 
to understand the distributional impact of this set of 
policies is a further essential characteristic of the fuel 
poverty problem.
7 At the time of writing, energy suppliers are considering simplifications 
to tariff structures and Ofgem has recently concluded on a proposal to 
simplify tariff structures.
8 Energy suppliers may levy a charge of more than £100 to replace the 
electricity and gas meters of a prepayment customer, may require 
deposits to be paid (of over £100 per meter) and may make moving to a 
credit meter subject to credit checks.
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the Government should make an urgent effort to 
quantify these costs.
19. Precisely what temperature is needed to avoid these 
ill effects is, however, rather unclear. The 2001 UK 
Fuel Poverty Strategy set minimum temperature 
thresholds at 21°C for the main living room and 18°C 
for other rooms. These standards are embodied in 
the current fuel poverty methodology. It is often said 
that these are the minimum temperatures to which 
houses should be heated to avoid negative health 
impacts and that they are set by the World Health 
Organisation (WHO). In fact, both the evidence and 
the WHO stance are less clear cut. 21°C seems to be 
the mid-point of a temperature range (18°C to 24°C) 
where there was ”no demonstrable risk”, according 
to a WHO review published in 1987.12 From this 
perspective, it is very unhelpful for policy-making that 
data on actual temperatures in homes are now more 
than 15 years old.
12 World Health Organisation (WHO). (1987). Health Impact of Low Indoor 
Temperatures: Report on a WHO Meeting. Copenhagen. World Health 
Organisation. Available at: http://tinyurl.com/3ghblbm 
and mould in the home (also associated with poor 
energy efficiency). Many of these health effects 
are of most concern for the youngest children and 
eldest pensioners.
18. Of course, in addition to the costs of poor health 
to individual people, medical treatment associated 
with cold-related deaths and illness comes at a cost 
to the NHS. At present, we are unaware of a robust 
methodology enabling us to establish a firm link 
between health effects directly attributable to fuel 
poverty and the resulting costs to the health service. 
As a consequence, perhaps the most significant 
gap in our analysis of policies in Chapter 7 is that 
we are not able to quantify the cost savings that 
could be made by the NHS by alleviating fuel 
poverty.11 We agree with those who suggested that 
11 There are studies which have estimated the reduction in risk following 
energy efficiency interventions, for example see Liddell, C. (2008). 
The Impact of Fuel Poverty on Children. Belfast: Save the Children and 
Nicol, S. Roys, M. Davidson, M. Summers, C. Ormandy, D. and Ambrose, 
P. (2010). Quantifying the Cost of Poor Housing. Watford: BRE.
Figure 1.1: Excess winter deaths in England and Wales,
1999/2000-2010/11
Notes: 1) Excess Winter Deaths figures are based on deaths occurring in each period. 
2) Mortality data include non-residents who died in England or Wales. 3) Mean winter 
temperature is calculated using average monthly temperatures from December to 
March.
Source: Office of National Statistics and The Met Office
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20. Beyond physical health, there is evidence to 
suggest links between low temperatures and poor 
mental health, between cold homes and social 
isolation amongst adults and between low indoor 
temperatures and truancy, educational attainment 
and anti-social behaviour amongst adolescents. 
We refer in Section 1.3 below to the views of 
stakeholders relating to certain additional health 
and well-being impacts, including increased fire 
risks, domestic accidents and food poisoning.
The carbon perspective
21. The carbon perspective is also increasing concern 
about fuel poverty. There are two particular issues 
for those whose prime concern is with carbon 
reduction. First, it is important to understand the 
distributional consequences of carbon mitigation 
policies. As explained above, exacerbating fuel 
poverty could be one side-effect of mitigation 
attempts, unless this is offset in other ways, thereby 
representing a barrier to their implementation. 
Second, bringing about the energy efficiency 
improvements needed to meet national objectives 
is likely to require assistance for those with low 
incomes, since they are unlikely to be able to afford 
such measures themselves.
Fuel poverty as an overlap issue
22. In conclusion, the review finds that fuel poverty is 
a distinct problem. It is an issue of concern within 
different policy debates. If progress can be made, 
there is the prospect of a ‘win-win-win’ through the 
contribution to poverty, health and well-being and 
carbon aims. If progress is not made, all three areas 
are damaged.
23. The common problem from each perspective 
results from the overlap between low incomes and 
high required fuel spending. In the light of this, 
the wording of WHECA seems to us to be entirely 
appropriate: we are concerned with individuals in 
households “living on a lower income in a home 
that cannot be kept warm at reasonable cost.” But, 
as set out in our interim report, this is not what the 
current indicator measures.
Measuring fuel poverty
24. At the core of the review’s terms of reference is 
a requirement to turn from an understanding of 
fuel poverty from first principles to a consideration 
of how fuel poverty should be measured. The 
measurement of a phenomenon such as fuel 
poverty is vital to our understanding of how it is 
evolving, how many people are exposed and the 
effectiveness of Government action to address 
it. A good indicator can be used to help identify 
the kinds of people affected by a problem so that 
they can be targeted for support, and to choose 
between different approaches.
The current indicator
25. At present, the official measurement of fuel poverty 
is through the use of a definition set out in the 
UK Fuel Poverty Strategy 2001. This states that a 
household is fuel poor if it would need to spend 
more than 10 per cent of its income to achieve 
adequate energy services in the home. Under this 
approach, data from the English Housing Survey are 
put into an energy use model (known as BREDEM) 
and combined with prices to model a required bill 
for English households. The requirements are taken 
to include space heating, water heating, lights, 
appliances and cooking. In 2009, 56 per cent of 
the average (mean) modelled household bill went 
towards space heating, for which the model sets 
temperature standards (21°C in the main living 
room and 18°C in other rooms, for a certain 
number of hours per day, subject to some variations 
in the case of under-occupied homes).13 The 
remainder of the bill relates to non-heating energy 
requirements which are closely related to the size of 
the home and number of occupants.
13 In the case of under-occupied homes, the model assumes that only 
half the home is heated. Heating patterns used in the model reflect the 
occupation pattern of each home such that the needs of households 
where people spend more time at home are taken into account. A fuller 
description of this model is available in our interim report (pp 98-101) 
and the full model is described in an on-line manual: Fuel Poverty 
Methodology Handbook (2010). London: DECC. Available at: http://
www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/statistics/fuelpoverty/614-fuel-poverty-
methodology-handbook.pdf).
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26. This amounts to comparing a household’s fuel 
poverty ratio, which can be expressed as follows, 
against the 10 per cent threshold:
Income
Required fuel costs (i.e. required usage x price)
Fuel poverty ratio = 
Under the current indicator, income is measured 
before allowing for housing costs and is not 
adjusted for household size or composition.
27. The current indicator’s main strength is that it 
models fuel requirements and does not use actual 
consumption data. This means that households 
whose actual expenditure is low because they 
cannot afford enough fuel to be warm are not 
wrongly considered not to be in fuel poverty; it also 
means that households who have high expenditure 
while wasting energy are not wrongly considered 
to be fuel poor.14 Another strength is that, because 
it is based on a combination of people’s incomes, 
energy requirements and energy costs, it is sensitive 
to some degree to all three.
28. Regardless of how we design the fuel poverty 
indicator, there are ways in which the modelling 
could more accurately reflect households’ costs. 
Modelling of the prices paid by households can 
at present only allow imperfectly for the ways 
in which those most at risk of fuel poverty may 
be on worse tariffs than others – that is that the 
poor may be paying more. Data allowing a more 
direct assessment of the tariffs faced by particular 
households should become available towards the 
end of the year as part of the Energy Follow Up 
Survey. At present neither the additional problems 
that this causes, nor the impact of interventions 
that reduce them, can be accurately assessed.
29. Aside from this problem, there are more 
fundamental weaknesses of the current indicator, 
set out in Chapter 5 of our interim report, that 
undermine its suitability for use as the main 
14 Although we use modelled energy bills for the reasons set out above, it 
is worth noting that this has implications for the way in which certain 
policy interventions aimed at changing household behaviour regarding 
energy use are reflected in the Low Income High Cost Indicator. This is 
discussed further at the end of Chapter 5.
indicator for understanding the impact of 
Government policy on fuel policy or, indeed, for 
helping to develop and deliver that policy. Some 
of our criticisms of the indicator relate to the 
precise way in which it is calculated and some to its 
fundamental, ratio-based form. In the consultation 
on our interim report (see Section 1.3 below) most 
respondents shared our analysis of the weaknesses 
of the indicator.
30. The indicator’s key mathematical feature – a fixed 
threshold of 10 per cent for the share of income 
taken by required fuel costs – is derived from 
an original calculation that in 1988 the median 
household spent 5 per cent of its net income on 
fuel, and that twice this ratio might be taken as 
being ‘unreasonable.’ The factor of twice the 
median level is essentially arbitrary, although it is 
always hard to develop such factors very precisely.
31. One consequence of this formulation is that it is 
possible for households with quite high incomes to 
be classed as being in fuel poverty. Equally some 
households with relatively low required energy 
spending living in highly energy-efficient homes 
may also be counted as fuel poor if they report 
very low incomes to the survey. This does not 
reflect what was suggested by WHECA. A further 
problem is that the indicator is very sensitive to 
technical issues, such as the rate of misreporting of 
low incomes in the survey used, or the particular 
temperature standards used in the calculation.15
32. More seriously for understanding trends, the 
indicator’s form means that it reacts in an unduly 
sensitive way to changes in fuel prices. To be sure, 
any headline indicator of fuel poverty must be 
sensitive to fuel prices. The degree of sensitivity 
under the 10 per cent indicator would, however, 
appear to be excessive, thus distorting trends. We 
argued in our interim report that the extent of fuel 
15 As an expression of this, we calculated that reducing the temperature 
standard for the main living room from 21°C to 18°C would mean nearly 
1 million fewer households would be classed as being in fuel poverty 
in 2009. The interim report also set out how, even in detailed incomes 
surveys, there is mis-reporting of incomes at the lower end. The English 
Housing Survey is not first and foremost an income survey and the 
reliability of its information on the lowest incomes may be affected.
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lowest energy efficiency ratings (E, F and G energy 
efficiency groups). This fell from 4.5 million in 
1996 to 3.0 million in 2009. If this was all that had 
happened, one might expect fuel poverty to have 
fallen over the period and to have done so fairly 
steadily. The explanation of the V shape of the 
official fuel poverty measure lies in the third factor, 
real fuel prices, which fell until 2003 but have 
risen very sharply since. Over the period shown the 
impact of price changes is enough to completely 
mask the underlying changes in poverty and energy 
efficiency for low-income households.
Alternative indicators of fuel 
poverty
Options we have ruled out
35. Of course, no indicator of a problem such as fuel 
poverty is likely to be perfect and other indicators 
may perform worse than the current one. Chapter 
6 of our interim report examined a number of 
alternative approaches.
poverty was understated in the mid 2000s when 
fuel prices were low and that the structural problem 
of poor people locked-in to energy inefficiency 
remained more severe than official figures showed. 
It was not a reflection of the underlying problem 
to suggest that its scale had fallen by four-fifths in 
just seven years from 1996 to 2003. Conversely, 
the speed of deterioration in the problem was 
overstated as prices rose.
33. As shown in Figure 1.2, the current indicator 
describes a V-shaped trend in fuel poverty numbers 
since 1996. Although a few respondents believe 
this is accurate (see Section 1.3), most agree with 
us that this is not a fair representation of the reality 
over this period.
34. Figure 1.2 also shows the three key drivers of 
fuel poverty. First, it shows the number of English 
households in poverty, as conventionally presented 
by the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP). 
This number was relatively constant over the 
period. Second, it shows how many of the homes 
of the poorest 30 per cent of households had the 
Number of households (millions) Index of fuel prices (2005 = 100) 
Figure 1.2: Fuel poverty, income poverty, energy 
efficiency and fuel prices, 1996 – 2010, England 
(except prices – UK data)
Source: Fuel Poverty Statistics (DECC), RPI Fuel & light Index Statistics ONS (scaled to 
real terms) HBAI statistics (DWP)
Note: there have been some changes in the methodology used to calculate fuel poverty 
statistics from year to year, which affect all the time series presented here. See Annex B 
for details of these changes.
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Below is a summary description of these options 
highlighting certain insights, or desirable features, 
they bring, as well as some disadvantages.
36. First, we looked at three variations on the current 
definition:
•	 Measuring income After Housing Costs (Option 
A in Chapter 6 of our interim report).16 We found 
this would help provide a better understanding of 
the impact of fuel prices on household disposable 
income. However, it would have many of the 
same disadvantages as the current indicator, with 
added sensitivity to very low or negative reported 
incomes.
•	 Using a threshold equating to twice the 
contemporary median energy expenditure, 
rather than the fixed 1988 level (Option B). We 
found this would paint a picture of how many 
households have high required spending on 
domestic energy compared to typical households. 
It would also be a relatively stable measure of the 
problem. However, as a ratio indicator it would 
remain affected by many of the problems that 
this causes with the current indicator, in terms of 
which households are identified.
•	 Supplementing the current indicator with a fuel 
poverty gap representing how much lower a 
household’s bill would have to be for it to not 
represent more than 10 per cent of income 
(Option C). The amount for each household 
could be summed to give an aggregate gap 
as well as an individual gap. This approach 
was found to provide an understanding of the 
depth of fuel poverty, alongside the extent of 
the problem. However, basing a fuel poverty 
gap on the current fuel poverty indicator would 
put most weight on observations that may not 
be accurate. If the ratio indicator were used to 
generate an aggregate gap its extreme sensitivity 
to price changes would be compounded.
16 We argued that there would be a need to adjust the 10 per cent 
threshold – to 13.6 per cent – if this approach were taken, so that the 
threshold represented twice median after housing costs expenditure on 
fuel in 1988.
37. Moving away from the confines of the current 
indicator we then considered more radical options:
•	 An after fuel costs poverty approach where a fuel 
poverty line is taken as 60 per cent of median 
income after deducting both fuel and housing 
costs (Option D). This approach would provide an 
insight into the impact of high fuel costs for those 
on the margin of income poverty. However it would 
idenfity nearly all households on a low income 
as being fuel poor, regardless of their energy 
requirements. Essentially this kind of approach is a 
more sophisticated way of measuring poverty, not a 
specific measure of fuel poverty.
•	 Identifying fuel poverty as the combination of 
low income and low energy efficiency measured 
either in absolute or relative terms (Option E). 
This would focus on low-income households and 
exclude relatively well-off households. However, 
the SAP ratings for energy efficiency are only 
an imperfect indicator of required costs and do 
not adequately reflect changes in key drivers 
of fuel poverty such as energy prices, including 
specific prices paid by those on low incomes, or 
occupancy patterns.
•	 Finally, the interim report looked at subjective 
measurement (Option F) of fuel poverty. While 
useful in complementing other more objective 
measures, we found this approach would not 
provide a solid enough guide for policy-making.
Our preferred option – a Low Income 
and High Costs (LIHC) indicator
38. Building on the insights gained from looking at this 
range of options, we developed in our interim report 
a new Low Income High Costs (LIHC) indicator which 
we suggested offers considerable scope for improving 
our understanding of fuel poverty and helping to 
design and deliver more effective policy. It should 
be stressed that our approach includes not only a 
headcount indicator of the number of people affected 
but also a fuel poverty gap indicator to understand the 
depth of the problem at household and national level.
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a) They had required fuel costs that were 
above the median level; and
b)  Were they to spend that amount they 
would be left with a residual income below 
the official poverty line.
This includes those on the margins of poverty who 
are pushed into fuel poverty by their very high 
energy requirements (giving a sloping edge to 
the quadrant of concern, as shown in Figure 1.4 
below).
43. The extent to which people’s incomes fall short of 
a poverty line is sometimes known as the ‘poverty 
gap’. By analogy, the extent to which costs go 
above the reasonable costs line can be considered 
an ‘energy gap’; for those in the bottom-left 
quadrant, this represents a ‘fuel poverty gap’. This 
‘fuel poverty gap’, as shown in Figure 1.4, is an 
integral part of our preferred approach, not merely 
a possible additional measure. Although all the 
households in the shaded area are classed as fuel 
poor, they are not all facing the same degree of fuel 
poverty. The fuel poverty gap, by giving an indicator 
of the depth of fuel poverty, can be used to identify 
those households that may be having to make the 
39. The simplest way of thinking about this indicator is 
illustrated by Figure 1.3.
40. This shows that the households of concern as laid 
out in WHECA are those that have both a lower 
income, that is they fall below an income threshold, 
and required costs above a ‘reasonable level.’ These 
are the households in the bottom left quadrant of 
the figure.
41. All of the households to the left of the income 
threshold are of concern because of their low 
income levels; all of the households above the 
costs threshold are of concern because they have 
high modelled costs, generally reflecting energy 
inefficiency. Compared to the households in the 
top left quadrant, the fuel poor have an additional 
problem of being locked-in to high bills. Compared 
to the households in the bottom right quadrant, 
the fuel poor have an additional problem of 
having a low income.
42. This approach counts directly the number of 
households affected by the problem described 
in WHECA, that is those with a low income and 
with high costs. More precisely, we suggested that 
households should be counted as fuel poor if:
Income threshold
Energy
cost
threshold
Increasing income  
Increasing
energy
costs
Income above 
threshold/lower 
energy costs 
Income below 
threshold/lower 
energy costs 
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Figure 1.3: Fuel poverty defined as the overlap between 
low income and high energy costs
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45. By taking this approach to the income threshold, 
the measure picks up those households who are 
pushed below the poverty line by their high costs. 
This also means that, as prices rise, more fuel poor 
households are identified (and the fuel poverty gap 
for each of them gets worse).
46. Using the data available, we modelled what this 
indicator would have shown for the period 1996-
2009. The results are available in Figure 1.5, which 
also compares the headcount measure in terms of 
numbers of households with the trend under the 
current indicator.
47. As can be seen, the LIHC indicator paints a relatively 
stable picture of the number of households shown 
to be fuel poor; it also shows how the fuel poverty 
gap responds to price changes throughout this 
period, with a substantial increase from 2004 
to 2009.
most difficult (or dangerous) trade-offs regarding 
their fuel bills, and that are the greatest priority for 
action, as we discuss in Chapter 3.
44. As discussed below, the principles of this approach 
were broadly supported by the respondents to 
the interim report. There are however many ways 
in which the thresholds for ‘lower income’ and 
‘reasonable costs’ could be set. In our interim report 
we established illustrative thresholds as follows:
•	 for reasonable costs, we used a threshold of 
the median modelled bill, after adjustment for 
household size and type.17
•	 for income, we used a threshold of 60 per cent 
of median after housing costs equivalised income 
plus the individual household’s adjusted modelled 
bill (this gives the sloping threshold seen in 
Figure 1.4).
17 The bills are modelled under this approach, as before, using the English 
Housing Survey and BREDEM.
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costs
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energy
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Figure 1.4: Calculation of the ‘fuel poverty gap’
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the same adjustment factor for each.19 In Chapter 2 
we examine the implications of this approach in 
light of the consultation responses and propose a 
significant modification to it.
50. A second feature of the cost threshold we proposed 
was that it should relate to costs for the population 
as a whole. This implies that if energy efficiency 
standards improve in general, but not within 
fuel poor homes, the problem of fuel poverty, 
particularly the fuel poverty gap, will worsen as 
they get left behind. This is akin to the relative 
measurement of poverty: as average incomes rise, if 
incomes within the poorest households do not rise, 
poverty is seen to be deepening. The result is an 
indicator which achieves two important aims:
•	 it encourages a virtuous policy cycle where 
energy efficiency improvements are always 
prioritised in lower-income homes to ensure 
standards do not fall behind those of the general 
housing stock improves;
19 See Section B4 of Annex B of the Interim Report. The specific scales used 
were those used by DWP for adjusting After Housing Costs income in its 
Household Below Average Income (HBAI) analysis. 
48. Under this approach, all things being equal, the 
fuel poverty gap and the fuel poverty headcount 
would reduce if the homes of the fuel poor were 
made more energy efficient and/or if their bills were 
reduced in some other way. If energy efficiency 
standards remained unchanged and there were no 
assistance for meeting bills but prices rose, the fuel 
poverty headcount would rise (though more slowly 
than prices) as would the fuel poverty gap (rather 
faster than prices).18
49. There is a technical but significant issue in relation 
to setting a reasonable costs threshold. This is the 
question of ‘equivalisation’ – whether and how 
to allow for household size and type in setting 
the thresholds. Equivalisation seeks, in effect, to 
set all households sizes and types on the same 
basis compared to a standard. What might be a 
‘reasonable’ bill for a large household could be 
‘unreasonable’ for a small one. In our interim report 
we argued that both income and cost thresholds 
should be adjusted for household size. We used 
18 The fuel poverty gap increases slightly faster than prices because more 
people are identified as fuel poor, which means the price change is 
compounded. However, under the LIHC approach these effects are much 
more limited than under the current fuel poverty ratio indicator.
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•	 it hard-wires a concern for the distributional 
impact of policies, since regressive policies 
will tend to worsen the fuel poverty gap (and 
headcount) unless countered in some way.
51. In Chapter 2 we also discuss issues arising from the 
consultation around this relative approach and its 
implications.
52. The advantages of this approach can be 
summarised as follows:
•	 it allows separate calculation of the extent of 
fuel poverty (the fuel poverty headcount) and 
the depth of the problem (the fuel poverty gap) 
rather than conflating them;
•	 calculating the extent of fuel poverty in this way, 
relative to the calculated requirements of the 
mainstream population, is more robust than the 
current approach, both in terms of avoiding data 
problems (linked, for example, to mis-reporting 
of incomes) and sensitivities to technical choices 
(such as the temperature standards included in 
the model);
•	 because the indicator is more stable in terms 
of who is identified as fuel poor it is also 
more stable in assessing the effectiveness of 
interventions and how well they are targeted on 
those at risk of fuel poverty.
•	 the fuel poverty gap allows the impact of some 
interventions to be seen even if they do not bring 
someone across the line and out of fuel poverty;
•	 the impact of interventions that only affect 
incomes without taking a household across 
the threshold would reduce the depth of 
conventional poverty, but not of fuel poverty;
•	 there are some households with very low 
reported incomes currently classed as fuel poor 
even though they live in very energy-efficient 
homes; if they do indeed have such low incomes, 
they are a very high priority for assistance to take 
them out of deep poverty, but it is not clear that 
their energy bills are at the core of their financial 
problems.
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1.3 Responses to the 
consultation
53. The interim report asked for views on the analysis 
and the conclusions we reached. We received over 
60 submissions in response and are grateful to all 
those who responded for taking the time to do 
so.20 In this Section we summarise the responses 
20 The full list of respondents to the consultation is set out in the Annex to 
this chapter. 
received. Thereafter, in Chapter 2 we consider their 
implications for the precise form of LIHC indicator 
we propose.
Causes and impacts of fuel poverty
54. The consultation asked whether respondents 
agreed with the conclusion that the core problem 
of fuel poverty was the one described in the Warm 
Homes and Energy Conservation Act 2000. It also 
In concluding our interim report we argued that fuel poverty is indeed a distinct and serious problem that 
deserves and requires attention, as recognised by Parliament in its adoption of WHECA. The Act captures, 
in our view correctly, the core of the problem as the overlap between low income and high costs.
We argue that fuel poverty is a priority for a range of coinciding concerns, including poverty 
alleviation, health and well-being, energy efficiency and carbon saving:
•	 we calculated that the fuel poverty gap in England in 2009 was £1.1 billion, representing the excess 
costs faced by households in or on the margins of poverty who are living in low-standard homes;
•	 living in cold homes has a series of physical and mental health impacts leading to ill health (whose 
costs the Government should make an urgent effort to quantify) and deaths as well as social 
impacts;
•	 for carbon reduction reasons it is essential that the energy efficiency of the whole housing stock 
is improved, but those on low incomes in the worst housing can neither afford the immediate 
investment needed nor afford later repayments without additional help.
While the priority must be action to address these issues, there is also a need for good measurement. 
Despite some strengths – especially its basis in a modelled assessment of household energy 
requirements – the current indicator suffers from serious weaknesses.
We believe that an alternative approach to measuring fuel poverty, drawing on the insights we 
obtained from considering a range of other approaches, would be to focus attention directly on those 
households with both low incomes and high costs.
Looked at in this way, the underlying problem of fuel poverty did not almost disappear in the early 
2000s, but nor has progress been reversed as rapidly as suggested by the current indicator.
While there are many ways in which thresholds for income and costs might be set, a relative approach 
of the kind we proposed in our interim report would have a number of technical advantages, create 
pressure towards constantly improving energy efficiency standards, and hard-wire a concern for 
distributional impacts into policy-making and delivery.
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asked whether Chapter 3 of the interim report set 
out a comprehensive analysis of health and well-
being impacts associated with fuel poverty.
55. Respondents agreed that the problem of fuel 
poverty was that described in the Warm Homes 
and Energy Conservation Act 2000, that is a person 
living in a household that cannot keep warm at 
reasonable cost. Respondents also generally agreed 
that the causes of fuel poverty were those set out 
in Chapter 2 of the interim report: a combination 
of low income, energy inefficiency and energy 
prices. However some gave greater weight to 
energy inefficiency caused by the inefficiency of 
the housing stock or maintained that increasing 
energy prices were the dominant factor in causing 
fuel poverty.
56. With few exceptions responses also welcomed the 
report’s conclusion that fuel poverty was a serious 
issue and distinct from income poverty.
57. In terms of the impacts of fuel poverty, it was felt 
that the review had identified the main sources of 
evidence and had usefully set out both the range of 
health and non-health impacts, particularly as these 
related to morbidity and mortality.
58. A few respondents highlighted further evidence 
which they argued should be taken into account 
(although one respondent noted and accepted the 
rationale for only using evidence based on national 
level research). Two responses highlighted the link 
between fuel poverty and increased fire risks in the 
home, while others highlighted the hygiene and 
other impacts when people/households are faced 
with unreasonable costs.
59. The interim report highlighted that the basis for 
the recommended temperature standards was 
less clear-cut than had previously been supposed. 
In response, some argued this should not lead 
to changes to the standards. One response 
put forward a suggestion that temperature 
standards should instead be 19 degrees, while 
another response counselled caution at drawing 
conclusions from evidence which ranged from spot 
temperatures to 24 hour averages.
60. Responses also welcomed the recognition of those 
who were particularly vulnerable to fuel poverty and 
called for the final report to examine these in more 
detail. We take this idea forward in Chapter 3.
61. A few responses also highlighted the detrimental 
effect of debt caused by fuel poverty, which was 
less well understood but, they suggested, should be 
considered in more detail.
Assessment of the current 
definition and options for an 
alternative
Current definition
62. The consultation requested views on our analysis of 
the strengths and weaknesses of the current fuel 
poverty indicator. The majority of responses agreed 
with our assessment of the current definition. It was 
recognised that the original decisions on where to 
set the threshold were essentially arbitrary and also 
that its form meant the indicator was very sensitive 
to those assumptions (in particular energy prices). 
However some felt that our critique was subjective 
in places, or that the weaknesses identified were 
not of sufficient scale to warrant being a cause 
for concern. While many agreed that the current 
measure was overly sensitive to energy prices, one 
or two disagreed and felt this was an important 
feature of the definition that should be retained.
63. One of the weaknesses of the current measure 
identified by the interim report was that it counted 
people as fuel poor who were relatively well off. 
Many respondents agreed that this was a flaw as 
such households were not a priority for assistance.
64. One response did not support the assessment in the 
report of the issue of under-reporting of incomes 
and thought our concern was unwarranted.
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was actually happening on the ground, and the 
indicator would lend itself to proxies being used to 
identify households at risk more easily.
69. Others however felt that the LIHC indicator was 
just as complicated as the current definition, and 
therefore was not an advance on the current 
situation. This echoed a feeling among several 
responses that the LIHC indicator would be 
impossible to use on the ground. Chapter 3 looks 
at this issue, discussing the development of proxies 
and ways of targeting to identify the fuel poor.
Thresholds
70. The interim report explained how we set two 
thresholds needed for our indicator: the costs 
threshold and the income threshold. In the report 
we recognised that other approaches for fixing 
these thresholds were possible and sought views 
on this.
Income
71. In our report, we established the income threshold 
as the conventional equivalised after housing costs 
poverty line plus a household’s equivalised modelled 
energy bill.
72. Those that commented agreed that using the DWP’s 
Households Below Average Income poverty line as 
the basis for the threshold was the right approach. 
They also agreed with allowing for each household’s 
fuel costs (as well as its housing costs) to give a 
better sense of disposable income. One response 
preferred the ‘Minimum Income Standards’ 
approach in principle but demonstrated how this in 
fact matched very closely the income threshold we 
had set and captured the same households to a very 
large extent.
Energy Costs
73. In our interim report, we set the energy costs 
threshold as the median equivalised modelled cost. 
This was more controversial. Many respondents 
agreed with the concept of using a relative 
Modifications and alternative 
approaches
65. Respondents did not tend to comment in detail 
on our assessment of the alternative options and 
no-one put forward any completely new options. 
One variant of the current definition was considered 
by a small number of respondents, that is retaining 
the current official indicator of fuel poverty but 
modifying it to introduce an income threshold.21 
Some respondents proposed an important variant 
on the LIHC approach – see below.
66. There was widespread support for income to be 
measured After Housing Costs, as this was a much 
more accurate measure of disposable income 
(though respondents did not suggest that this was 
the only modification that needed to be made). 
One response suggested that food costs should be 
reflected as this was also essential expenditure.
67. Many felt that a low income low SAP measure 
captured the crux of the problem (as well as 
being what people on the ground tended to use 
as a proxy for fuel poverty), but agreed with our 
assessment that, while it got closer to the WHECA 
definition, it did not capture the impact of changing 
energy prices or the differing heat requirements 
that households have (for example those who are in 
the house all day).
The Low Income High Costs 
approach
68. The consultation requested views on the new 
approach to measurement of fuel poverty set out 
in Chapter 7 of the interim report, the Low Income 
High Costs (LIHC) indicator. Respondents generally 
agreed with the overall approach of focusing on the 
combination of high energy costs and low income 
on the basis that this more accurately measured 
the core of the problem. Some felt that this way of 
measuring the problem was more in line with what 
21 We set out briefly in the Annex to Chapter 2 why we do not favour this 
approach which would address only one of the weaknesses with the 
official definition that we identified in Chapter 5 of our interim report.
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threshold – what matters is where households are 
in relation to others. But others objected to this, 
on the basis that it would become too stringent 
over time, making eradicating fuel poverty nearly 
impossible. Alternatively others felt it implied too 
low a threshold due to the poor energy efficiency 
of the current housing stock in the UK, leading to 
a high median bill which, even at 2009 prices, was 
likely to be out of reach for many.
74. A few respondents were concerned that a relative 
measure based on median fuel costs would not 
reflect the impact of changing energy prices on 
households expenditure. As energy prices increased, 
households could be spending a significantly larger 
proportion of their income on energy but, as they 
lived in relatively energy-efficient homes, they 
would not be counted as fuel poor despite the 
change in their circumstances. This was argued to 
be a weakness.
75. Respondents proposed other approaches to setting 
an energy cost threshold. One of these was based 
on a calculation of unit fuel costs, measured in 
£ per square metre. We refer to this further in 
Chapter 2 and examine it in the Annex to that 
Chapter. Among other responses, the details varied, 
although a number of responses suggested setting 
a threshold on the basis of the fuel requirement of 
the most energy efficient homes.
Equivalisation
76. The LIHC indicator uses thresholds for both incomes 
and costs that are adjusted for household size 
and composition, or ‘equivalised’. This is on the 
basis that larger families need more cash income 
to have the same standard of living as smaller 
ones, but at the same time, the level of costs that 
may be ‘reasonable’ for a large household may 
not be so for a small one. As with the level of the 
thresholds, we acknowledged that there could be 
different ways of approaching this. The concept of 
equivalising income using the factors applied by 
DWP was generally felt to be the right approach. 
While few respondents commented specifically 
on equivalising fuel bills, those that did argued 
that using the same OECD income factors was 
inappropriate. Doing so overstated the additional 
expenditure required for each additional person in a 
household and resulted in the measure identifying 
more single person households as having high 
costs. On reflection we agree that the OECD income 
factors do not accurately reflect how heating, 
space and other energy requirements vary between 
households, and are grateful for the alternative 
suggestions put forward. We explore this in detail in 
Chapter 2.
Implications for Government policy
77. Several respondents expressed concern that 
the LIHC approach would unjustifiably favour 
income-based policies over energy efficiency 
ones. Conversely a couple of respondents felt the 
opposite was true. They also expressed concern 
that this would put carbon reduction targets and 
fuel poverty policies in conflict with one another. 
One reason for this perception could be a lack 
of confidence in how the threshold and policies 
would interact – after all, the approach set out is 
very different from anything previously used. We 
examine this series of issues in Chapters 4 and 7 
explaining how different kinds of policies affect the 
problem measured in this way.
Other issues
Fuel poverty gap
78. In general, responses to the consultation welcomed 
the inclusion of an indicator of the depth of 
poverty to supplement a measure of the extent. 
This was felt to be a useful addition to a headcount 
measure, and could be useful in identifying groups 
which should be a priority for assistance as well 
as the types of measures that might be needed. 
Respondents did not comment in detail on the fuel 
poverty gap, though a couple commented that they 
were unsure how this would work in practice.
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1.4 New evidence
81. In the interim report, we noted that there were 
various reports due to be published which would 
either update the existing evidence base, or which 
would be of relevance to the review but were 
not available in time to be included in the interim 
report.
Distributional impact of 
Government climate and energy 
policies
82. In Chapter 2 of our interim report, we considered 
the impact of Government climate and energy 
Use of the term ’fuel poverty’
79. Several responses to the consultation and the 
original call for evidence expressed the view that 
the term ‘fuel poverty’ was not accurate or (more 
frequently) that there was a stigma associated with 
it that was unhelpful, particularly in relation to 
take up of policies on the ground. Some suggested 
alternatives such as ‘energy precariousness’ or 
‘affordable warmth’, but it was acknowledged 
that coming up with an alternative was not 
straightforward.
Responses to the consultation varied from quite brief responses to detailed assessments of the 
proposed LIHC measure. The assessment of the causes and impacts of fuel poverty was felt to be 
comprehensive, though a few responses felt we had omitted some relevant evidence on the impacts. 
Our assessment that the Warm Homes and Energy Conservation Act definition of fuel poverty 
continued accurately to describe the problem was welcomed. In general there was a large degree 
of support for the principles of our proposed framework that focused on the overlap between low 
incomes and high energy costs. However the responses to some of the detailed questions that arise 
under such an approach were more mixed. Our proposed approach to setting the income threshold 
was supported, but the approach to the costs threshold was more controversial, particularly in 
relation to its adjustment for household size, and how its level is set. We explore these issues in more 
detail in Chapter 2.
Counting individuals or households
80. The interim report put forward the view that we 
should be measuring the number of individuals 
who are caught by fuel poverty, rather than just 
the number of households. Only a few respondents 
commented on this proposal. Those that did 
generally felt this made sense and was more in 
line with the way other poverty indicators worked. 
However, one respondent had some reservations 
about this approach suggesting that this would 
create incentives to target alleviation measures at 
multi-person households, regardless of whether or 
not they were vulnerable, because this would have 
the greatest impact on reducing numbers.
policies on energy prices and consumer bills. We 
summarised data, published by DECC in 2010, on 
the scale of the impact and explained that more 
recent data should be available by the time of our 
final report. The following section summarises the 
Government’s latest analysis.
Impact on prices
83. A number of policies, such as the Renewables 
Obligation, the EU Emissions Trading System, Feed-
In Tariffs, and carbon reduction initiatives such as 
CERT and CESP, increase costs for energy suppliers 
who are expected to recoup them through higher 
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85. In December 2011, the Committee on Climate 
Change (CCC) published its own assessment of the 
impact of the cost of meeting carbon budgets on 
electricity and gas prices.24 Its assessment is similar 
to that of DECC in relation to electricity: a price of 
17.8p/KWh in 2020. For gas, the CCC projects a 
price of 4.7p/KWh in 2020 – the same as the DECC 
projection.
Impact on bills
86. However, prices translate through to bills as a 
function of the amount of energy used. Because 
certain policies have the effect of reducing energy 
demand, the scale of policy impact on bills can be 
mitigated, Some policies – such as Warm Front, 
Feed-In Tariffs and CERT – improve the energy 
efficiency of dwellings to reduce bills. Others help 
consumers to use energy more efficiently – such 
as better billing and smart meters. Finally, others 
– principally the Warm Home Discount – offer a 
direct fuel subsidy for eligible households. For those 
households who receive these benefits, there are 
considerable reductions in bills. What matters is the 
net impact of higher prices and of the measures 
they finance.
24 Committee on Climate Change (2011). Household Energy Bills – Impacts 
of meeting carbon budgets. London: CCC.
energy prices. Of course, not all climate and energy 
policies are funded in this way, and since the 2010 
assessment of the impact of policies on prices and 
bills was published, a number of decisions have 
been taken that change the overall picture. For 
example, the Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI) will 
now be funded through general taxation rather 
than through a levy on energy suppliers; funding 
options for the Government’s Carbon Capture 
and Storage (CCS) commitments are also being 
considered as an alternative to an additional levy. 
The Government has also announced a major 
reform of the electricity market which it believes will 
lower prices in the long term by increasing certainty 
for investors and thereby reducing the cost of 
capital and other costs.22
84. DECC’s 2011 assessment of the impact on prices is 
as set out in Table 1.1. As before, the assessment 
reflects on the prices of energy with and without a 
package of policy measures. It shows that DECC’s 
central projection implies that the package of 
policies increases the price of gas by 7 per cent and 
the price of electricity by 27 per cent by 2020.23
22 The Government expects to legislate for electricity market reform in the 
current Parliament.
23 The policy package that is anticipated to contribute to these price 
increases by 2020 consists of: Feed-in-Tariffs, Electricity Market Reform, 
the Renewables Obligation, the Carbon Price Floor, the EU Emissions 
Trading Scheme, Smart Meters, Warm Home Discount, and the Energy 
Company Obligation. Some of these are anticipated to affect both gas 
and electricity prices (such as the ECO), while others will likely only affect 
electricity prices (such as the EU ETS). Current policies such as CERT and 
CESP will come to an end before 2020 and therefore no longer affect 
energy prices.
Table 1.1: Estimated impact of energy and climate change policies on average household energy prices 
(including VAT)
Prices (pence/KWh)
Gas Electricity
2011 2020 2011 2020
Estimated average price without policies 3.9 4.4 13.0 14.4
Estimated impact of policies 0.2 0.3 1.9 3.9
Estimated average price with policies 4.1 4.7 14.9 18.3
Impact on baseline (%) 5 7 15 27
Source: Annual Energy Statement DECC (2011) 
Note: 2010 prices.
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cent higher than it would be without policies. If 
product policies were also included as part of the 
policy package, energy bills would be 7 per cent 
lower in 2020 with the policy package compared to 
bill levels without the package. If product policies 
were also included as part of the policy package, 
electricity bills would be 16 per cent lower in 2020 
with the policy package compared to bill levels 
without the package.
89. As we noted in our interim report, the average 
bill impact is rather different from the impact for 
different individual households since there are 
both winners and losers under the policies.26 DECC 
has estimated the impact of the policy package 
at different points in the income distribution. The 
analysis assumes that different households will 
get access to different policies, depending on the 
dwelling they live in (only homes with a cavity wall 
can receive cavity wall insulation under CERT, for 
example), whether they fulfil a policy’s eligibility 
criteria (such as receiving a qualifying state benefit 
to receive a Warm Home Discount rebate), or 
whether they have the characteristics of an ‘early 
adopter’ household (some households, typically 
26 See Section 2.4 of the interim report.
87. The latest DECC assessment attempts to quantify 
the overall net impact. For our own analysis, we 
adopt the same approach as in our interim report 
in relation to product policies. That is, we include 
the impact of these policies in the baseline, rather 
than alongside other climate and energy policies. 
This is because the savings from these policies 
should occur irrespective of the level of gross costs 
that are added to energy bills. This means that 
the overall impact of the policy framework looks 
rather different under our analysis than under the 
Government’s analysis. As we noted in our interim 
report, regardless of how the impact of product 
policies is presented, it is clear that such policies 
can have a very significant impact on the overall 
bills faced by households, especially in terms of 
electricity bills.
88. Figure 1.6 shows the estimated impact of policies 
on average domestic energy bills in 2020 broken 
down by policy type. We use four categories: 
supplier obligations, renewable energy, low carbon 
generation and other.25 It shows that by 2020, the 
average domestic energy bill is expected to be 4 per 
25 The groups can be understood as follows: Low carbon generation – 
CCS Levy and EU ETS; Renewable energy – RHI, RO and FITs; Supplier 
obligations – CESP, CERT, ECO; Other – better billing, smart meters and 
energy security.
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Figure 1.6: Estimated impact of policies on average domestic energy bill in 2020
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insulation, renewable energy or bill rebate measure.
91. Even for those households who get no direct 
benefits from the policy package the picture has 
improved compared to the 2010 assessment. 
Whereas the 2010 analysis suggested bill levels 
could be more than 2 per cent higher as a 
proportion of income on average for the poorest 
households receiving no measures, the 2011 
analysis suggests this impact is now barely 0.2 per 
cent of income. Essentially the average upward 
effect on bills for these households shown in Figure 
1.7 is offset by the assumed impact of products 
policies, that is that appliances and other products 
will be more efficient than they would be without 
regulation.
92. The overall impression given by the latest DECC 
analysis is therefore of an improved situation 
when considered from a fuel poverty perspective. 
Nevertheless it should be remembered that the 
majority of households will be on the line of the 
graph relating to households receiving no benefits. 
Indeed, some 65 per cent of households will fall 
into this category. The overall picture is positive 
because of the large scale of benefits that accrue 
with higher incomes, are assumed to be more likely 
to take up new technologies, such as renewable 
energy measures or Feed-in-Tariffs). Importantly the 
way DECC has undertaken this analysis includes 
improvements in appliance efficiency as a result of 
‘products policy’ within the analysis.
90. There has been a major change compared 
with the 2010 analysis in the overall distributional 
impact, as shown in Figure 1.7. This mainly reflects 
the introduction of the Warm Home Discount, 
changes to the assumed structure of ECO and the 
decision to switch to Exchequer funding for the 
RHI and CCS. This is to be welcomed from the 
perspective of tackling fuel poverty since there 
is, of course, a strong correlation between fuel 
poverty and income levels under any indicator. The 
latest figures suggest that the net impact of all the 
policies together on the poorest households is, 
on average, beneficial by 2020. These households 
could see average reductions, measured as a 
proportion of income, of more than 2 per cent. 
Households with the lowest tenth of incomes could 
see bills that are the equivalent of more than 5 
per cent of their income lower than they would 
otherwise be, if they benefit from at least one 
Equivalent income decile group
Bottom 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Top
Figure 1.7: Estimated impact of policies (including product 
policies) on average domestic fuel bills as a percentage of 
income in 2020, UK 
Household receives no
insulation, renewable
energy or rebate measures
Household receives at least
one insulation, renewable
energy or rebate measures
Average of all households
in each category
-6.0%
-5.0%
-4.0%
-3.0%
-2.0%
-1.0%
0.0%
1.0%
Source: Estimated impacts of energy and climate change policies on energy prices 
and bills: November 2011. (DECC)
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to the winners. It is also worth underlining that this 
analysis includes benefits from a range of policies 
including products policies. Furthermore, the picture 
in 2020 is coloured by the impact of policies that 
are being phased out but whose benefits will 
continue to accrue into the future (for example, 
CERT comes to an end in 2012, but the effect 
of the measures whose installation it led to will 
continue to be felt in 2020).
93. Later chapters will look at the impacts of specific 
policies including future policies. For example, in 
Chapter 5 we consider the distributional impact 
of a range of policies, including the forthcoming 
Green Deal and ECO (see Box 5.2). Our projections 
(Chapter 6) and work on the impacts of particular 
types of policies (Chapter 7) also illustrate the 
distributional – and fuel poverty impact – of current 
and future policies.
94. Another important consideration is the scale of 
energy bills faced by different households across the 
income distribution. As can be seen in Figure 1.8, 
energy bills fall as a proportion of income as income 
rises. This is to be expected. There are at least two 
important implications. First, energy bill increases 
are likely to have a regressive effect overall. Second, 
energy requirements are most likely to squeeze out 
other spending – or be squeezed by other spending 
– at the lower end of the income scale.27
95. The Committee on Climate Change (CCC) 
publication of December 2011 on the cost of 
meeting carbon budgets also considers the likely 
level of domestic fuel bills in 2020. Its calculations 
are focused on the vast majority of energy 
customers, that is dual fuel customers, and are not 
therefore directly comparable with the DECC figures. 
In addition the CCC does not provide direct analysis 
of the different impacts on income decile groups.
96. The CCC finds that the typical duel fuel customer 
can expect a household bill of £1,250 in 2020 
compared to a bill of £1,060 in 2010 (both figures 
are in real 2010 prices). The CCC suggests that 
this includes £130 per household for measures to 
support low-carbon investments and around £60 
for supporting energy efficiency improvements 
in homes. The CCC goes on to suggest further 
reductions could be delivered by enhancing 
the markets for energy efficient appliances and 
reducing gas use through further insulation and 
27 See for instance Beatty, T., Blow, l and Crossley, T. (2011) Is there a heat 
or eat trade off in the UK? London: Institute of Fiscal Studies. 
Source: Estimated impact of energy and climate change policies on energy prices 
and bills: November 2011. (DECC)
Figure 1.8: Energy bill as a percentage of disposable 
income in 2020 with and without energy and climate 
change policies by equivalised income group
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Understanding fuel expenditure: 
fuel poverty and spending on fuel
100. The interim report also noted the need for better 
information on the relationship between actual 
fuel expenditure and modelled requirements. 
Since the interim report was published, the Joseph 
Rowntree Foundation, the Centre for Sustainable 
Energy (CSE) and Consumer Focus have published 
the results of a project aiming to get a better 
understanding of consumer’s expenditure on fuel.28
101. The study draws on a range of data including 
the Living Costs and Food Survey and the English 
Housing Survey (EHS) and uses actual spending 
from the former to estimate actual consumption 
for households recorded in the EHS. Actual bills 
can then be estimated for households in the EHS.
102. The study suggests that households in general 
consume substantially less than their ‘required’ 
bill suggests. On average, households consume 
only around two-thirds of what they are calculated 
to need.
103. In understanding under-consumption, the report 
points to three main groups. People on low 
incomes are more likely than average to have 
consumption much lower than need (even though, 
on average, they do not have high needs), as 
are single person households. The other group 
is the highest income tenth of households. They 
are likely to under-consume relative to calculated 
need in part due to their relatively large dwellings. 
Single person households of any age are more 
likely to under-consume than any other groups, 
particularly if they are on low incomes or in hard 
to heat homes. Families with children are found 
to be least likely to under-consume in these terms. 
However, and as we noted in our interim report, 
there is considerable variation in consumption 
within income groups so that there are also 
households whose actual consumption is much 
higher than calculated need. 
28 The full report can be found at: http://www.cse.org.uk/downloads/file/
understanding-fuel-expenditure.pdf
heating controls such that the total bill in 2020 is 
£1,085. This would be very similar to the CCC’s 
figure for bills in 2010 of £1,060 (again, both 
figures are in real 2010 prices).
97. Although the CCC does not focus its analysis 
on impacts of prices and bills on different types of 
household, it does refer to the needs of households 
for whom electricity is the main heating fuel. 
It argues that such households could be more 
exposed to price rises and that the Government 
should develop policies to protect such vulnerable 
households. It says:
This could be through greater targeting of these 
households for energy efficiency measures [...] or 
renewable heat measures [...]. Tax revenues from 
the carbon price could allow such measures without 
negatively impacting the fiscal balance.
98. This analysis of the distributional impact of prices 
and bills supports the conclusion we drew in 
our interim report that the distributional impacts 
of policy design and delivery need to be fully 
understood and quantified. Only through rigorous 
assessment of these impacts can future policies be 
drawn up and delivered that have the desirable 
impact of assisting those households in fuel poverty.
99. We discuss in Chapters 2, 4 and 5 how our 
preferred indicator of fuel poverty would help to 
embed a concern for distributional impact into 
policy-making. We also discuss in Chapters 5, 6 and 
7 how decisions on new policies, specifically the 
Green Deal and Energy Company Obligation, affect 
this picture and how, without care and attention, 
such policies could lead to further marginalisation 
of some of the most vulnerable and most deeply 
fuel poor households in England. Finally, given 
that it has been suggested that energy suppliers 
should be required to pass on the costs of policies 
on a consumption basis – in order to encourage 
further energy efficiency and to ensure that those 
who waste energy pay the price of their excessive 
consumption – we consider in Chapter 4 what this 
would mean for fuel poverty.
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households participating in the EHS that give their 
permission. DECC is also recording information in 
temperatures in the home and actual tariffs as part 
of the Energy follow up survey.
104. The study’s findings usefully confirm what was 
already suspected regarding required and actual 
spending, as well as giving more information 
on the types of households that are likely to 
under-heat their homes. However, because data 
have to be combined from different surveys 
for spending and energy requirements the 
approach still cannot compare the two for the 
same households, which is what is really needed. 
It will be interesting to observe the results of 
work DECC currently has underway that may 
support these findings. A project is underway to 
match actual metered energy consumption for 
gas and electricity to modelled consumption for 
The updated DECC analysis supports the conclusion we drew in our interim report that the 
distributional impacts of policy design and delivery need to be fully understood and quantified. We 
discuss in Chapters 2, 4 and 5 below how our preferred indicator of fuel poverty would help to 
embed a concern for distributional impacts into policy-making.
Taking into account some new policies, such as the Warm Home Discount and the current design 
of ECO, DECC’s 2011 distributional analysis presents a much more positive pattern on average than 
its 2010 analysis. However, significant numbers – indeed a majority of low-income households – are 
shown as making small losses, even taking into account the benefits of products policies. We discuss 
in later chapters how new policies could play into this picture and how, without careful design, such 
policies could lead to further marginalisation of some of the most vulnerable and most deeply fuel 
poor households in England.
Finally, a recent Centre for Sustainable Energy study confirmed that actual consumption of energy 
tends to be significantly lower than modelled requirements and pointed to three groups in particular 
where this was the case: those on a low income, single person households and those with the highest 
tenth of incomes. We look forward to the outcome of the DECC work currently underway which will 
use data from actual bills to investigate this further.
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Chapter summary
In this chapter we have recapped the conclusions of our interim report, which found that:
•	 Fuel poverty is a distinct and serious problem from a number of perspectives, including poverty, 
health and carbon reduction, that deserves and requires attention.
•	 The Warm Homes and Energy Conservation Act 2000 correctly captures the core of the problem as 
the overlap between low income and high energy costs.
•	 The current official indicator, based on required energy spending exceeding a threshold of 10 per 
cent of income, has some strengths but also has serious weaknesses including its undue sensitivity 
to energy prices and the way it identifies which households are fuel poor.
Our interim report therefore put forward an alternative approach which focused on the overlap 
between high energy costs and low income, supplemented by a fuel poverty gap to measure the 
depth of fuel poverty as well as its extent.
Responses to the consultation on the interim report welcomed our review’s evidence on the causes 
and impacts of fuel poverty and our confirmation of the core problem as being people living in 
households that both have both low incomes and face higher than reasonable costs to keep warm. 
Following from this there was support for the basic structure of our Low Income High Costs measure 
and the introduction of a fuel poverty gap. The income threshold was also supported, but some 
expressed concern regarding the way in which the cost threshold had been set, and how energy 
bills had been adjusted to take account of the size and composition of households. These issues are 
therefore explored in further detail in Chapter 2.
New evidence relevant to the review has been published since the interim report. Of most significance 
is the analysis of the distributional impacts of DECC policies published in the Annual Energy 
Statement 2011. This showed that the net distributional impacts of policies had improved compared 
to the previous year’s analysis. We look in later chapters at the distributional impacts of specific future 
policies including the Green Deal and ECO.
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Recommendations
1. The Government should change its approach to fuel poverty measurement away from the current 
‘10 per cent’ ratio indicator.
2. The Government should adopt a new indicator of the extent of fuel poverty under which 
households are considered fuel poor if:
•	 They have required fuel costs that are above the median level; and
•	 Were they to spend that amount they would be left with a residual income below the official 
poverty line.
The Government should count the number of individuals in this position as well as the number of 
households they live in.
3. The Government should adopt a new indicator of the depth of fuel poverty as represented by the 
average and aggregate ‘fuel poverty gap’, defined as the amounts by which the assessed energy 
needs of fuel poor households exceed the threshold for reasonable costs.
4. The Government should measure incomes for fuel poverty purposes after housing costs and 
adjusted for household size and composition. The threshold should be set at 60 per cent of 
median income plus calculated household energy requirements.
Technical recommendations
1. The Government should compare data on actual consumption patterns in homes that are due 
to become available in future with modelled spending requirements for the same households 
in order to identify the kinds of household that are at greatest risk of living at low temperatures 
and to provide information that would allow refinement of the way in which energy needs are 
currently modelled.
2. The Government should reinstate a component to its surveys that allows an up-to-date assessment 
of contemporary behaviour in terms of the temperatures of people’s homes. The information this 
provides should be used in the development of the fuel poverty measurement methodology.
3. Based on data available in future, the Government should examine the case for a more direct 
assessment of the tariffs actually paid by low-income households within the fuel poverty 
measurement methodology.
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1. This chapter looks in more detail at some of the 
elements of the Low Income High Costs (LIHC) 
approach. Section 1.3 above set out the response 
to our consultation on the interim report. One area 
where we requested views and which provoked the 
greatest amount of debate was in relation to energy 
costs. There were two main issues: first, having 
equivalised income, whether and how to equivalise  
energy costs in order to take account of what it 
is reasonable for households of varying size and 
composition to spend on keeping warm and other 
energy needs; and, second, how to then set the 
energy costs threshold.
2. We examine these issues in Sections 2.1 and 2.2 
below. In Section 2.3 we explore the precise form of 
LIHC indicator to be used. Section 2.4 then picks up 
on this and considers how this should relate to the 
form of any target used.
3. Elements of the discussion in this chapter are rather 
technical so some readers may wish to move directly 
to the section summaries. More detailed discussion 
can be found in the Annex to this Chapter.
2.1 Equivalisation of energy 
costs
4. The examination we have conducted during the 
course of our review of the current fuel poverty 
methodology revealed that the issue of income 
equivalisation – that is, adjusting household 
incomes for composition – had been under 
discussion for some time.29 It became clear that 
equivalisation would also be an important issue 
in the context of our LIHC indicator. As explained 
above, the indicator we have developed equivalises 
not only the income side of the equation, but also 
the modelled bills. In effect this means different 
cost thresholds for households of different size and 
composition. This element of the indicator has been 
the subject of some debate since our interim report 
was published.
Why adjust for household size and 
composition?
5. The decision to consider income on an equivalised 
basis reflects the fact that people with different 
household sizes need different resources to attain 
equivalent standards of living.30 The requirements 
do not simply increase in proportion to the number 
of people in the household, because there are 
economies of scale, and households do not need as 
much income for each additional child as they do 
for each additional adult.
29 The Sefton and Chesshire peer review conducted in 2005 did not 
recommend equivalising incomes within the current methodology. It is 
known that there is a divergence of views on this issue. 
30 This argument has not been disputed in relation to the low income 
high costs indicator. It is more questionable whether it applies within 
the existing 10 per cent indicator. For what it is worth, we believe it is 
right not to equivalise incomes under the current indicator, where the 
comparison is with unadjusted costs. When looking at the ratio between 
costs and income, making the same adjustment for household size 
and composition to both the top and bottom of the fraction would, of 
course, give the same result as the current calculation.
Adjustments to the 
Low Income High 
Costs indicator
CHAPTER 2 
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instance, share living space, and so their space 
heating requirements will not be twice those of 
a single person. What is needed is an adjustment 
process that is somewhere between the fixed and 
the per capita approach.
How to adjust for household size 
and composition?
10. The solution we proposed in the interim report (for 
reasons set out in its Annex B.4) was to use the 
same adjustment factors for required energy costs 
as we were using to adjust incomes, that is the 
DWP’s after housing costs income equivalisation 
factors (themselves adapted from factors used by 
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development). This suggestion was, however, one 
of the most disputed elements of our proposals 
within the consultation responses.
11. A number of stakeholders argued that this led to 
too low a threshold for small households relative 
to that for large ones and so meant that the 
indicator would be more likely to count single 
person households as having high costs, and 
therefore being in fuel poverty, than large ones. In 
the words of one respondent, it implied a “charter 
for under-occupation.” This led to a proposal from 
some stakeholders for the measurement approach 
to focus on unit costs, measured in £ per m2, 
rather than total costs. At the same time, the same 
stakeholders acknowledged that adjusting modelled 
bills is an important part of the calculation for the 
LIHC indicator given the desire to compare across all 
household types within a common framework.
12. In the light of these reactions we have reconsidered 
our approach to energy costs. We accept that there 
are problems with using equivalisation factors that 
are not specific to spending on domestic energy. 
We recognised in our interim report that specific 
equivalisation factors could be desirable (see Section 
B4 of Annex B of that document) but could not see 
a straight-forward way of delivering them. We have 
now been able to look at this again and we set out 
here how we have undertaken this exercise.
6. Based on overall consumption needs and patterns, 
the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) has 
developed a series of equivalisation factors for 
income which, after allowing for housing costs, 
suggests that a single person needs only 58 per 
cent of the income of a couple in order to have the 
same standard of living. A couple with one child 
under 14 is deemed to need 120 per cent of the 
income of a couple without children to achieve the 
same standard of living.
7. Taking an example, in 2009/10 the after housing 
costs poverty line was £214 per week, based on a 
couple without children. But for a single person, 
that value was £124 – that is, 58 per cent of £214. 
In this case, the absolute levels of income are very 
different but are deemed to lead each household to 
have an equivalent standard of living. In this way, 
equivalisation helps order each household in the 
country by what their income means in terms of 
the standard of living they can afford. In principle 
this is clearly right and the way we defined a ‘low 
income’ threshold within the interim report was 
not controversial.
8. Within our indicator, we take the further step of 
equivalising the modelled bill for each household. 
The rationale for doing this is similar: we want to 
be able to understand what it is ‘reasonable’ or 
‘unreasonable’ for each household to spend on 
energy given their household composition and 
given that we are focusing, by definition, on those 
with low incomes.
9. The reason why the poverty line (in terms of 
unadjusted income) is higher for a larger household 
than for a small one is that the large one will 
have to spend more on each consumption item to 
achieve the same standard of living. This will – at 
least to some extent – apply to its energy needs 
as to other items such as food. This suggests, as 
we argued in the interim report, that it would be 
wrong to use the same energy cost threshold for 
different sizes and types of household. But it is 
also clear that energy needs do not rise directly 
in proportion to household size: a couple will, for 
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with incomes near the overall median, and 
therefore similar living standards. The result is a new 
set of equivalisation factors as set out in Table 2.1.
17. We discuss the effects of this change in Section 
2.3 below, but it has a number of important 
implications. Perhaps the most significant is that it 
changes the composition of those households with 
low income and high costs. Our original version of 
the indicator found 2.7 million households to have 
low incomes and high costs in 2009, representing 
some 4.8 million individuals. This compared to 
4.0 million households and 7.4 million individuals 
under the current 10 per cent indicator. This new 
version of the indicator also identifies 2.7 million 
households as having low incomes and high costs. 
However, because the new way of setting the 
energy costs threshold is more likely to count large 
households as having high costs, those households 
contain 7.8 million individuals. We discuss this 
further below.
18. As referred to above, some stakeholders proposed 
an alternative to equivalisation based on 
measurement of unit costs. This proposal measures 
unit costs, in £ per m2, rather than total costs 
adjusted for household size. The case for doing 
this centres around the fact that, on average, unit 
fuel costs are fairly similar between households of 
different size and composition, with typical variation 
from the average for couples with two children 
being only 3 to 5 per cent (and no more than 
10 per cent). This could be a fairly straight-forward 
approach but, as we discuss in the Annex to this 
13. If energy needs were like all other requirements 
within a household’s (non-housing) expenditure, it 
would indeed be ‘reasonable’ for a single person 
to be spending 58 per cent of a couple’s spending. 
But within the calculation of the equivalisation 
scales, different elements within a basket of goods 
will make different contributions. Some will not 
have economies of scale for most households (for 
example, bread and milk) while others will (for 
example, a wide range of household items, from 
carpets to vacuum cleaners).
14. Within the sphere of energy requirements, there is 
a mix. It does not cost more to heat the bedroom in 
a one-bedroom flat occupied by two people rather 
than one person. But a couple will use more hot 
water. In addition, a tipping-point is reached where 
more people need more space. There is therefore 
a difference between typical energy requirements 
given a particular dwelling and specific energy 
needs given a particular household. This means 
that, while the DWP’s income factors might not be 
appropriate, it would equally be wrong to assume 
that energy costs do not need to be adjusted.
15. As an alternative to the use of DWP’s income 
factors, we have developed an approach to the 
equivalisation of modelled bills that reflects the 
modelled spending requirements of each household 
type, based on the data from the English Housing 
Survey. This allows us to account for the fact that 
different sizes and types of household will have 
different energy requirements. However, it is also 
important to remember that there is considerable 
variation in energy requirements within those 
household types. For example, those on high 
incomes may live in different types of homes and 
have different energy efficiency standards compared 
with those on lower incomes. For this reason, 
we base our equivalisation factors only on those 
households in each group that have an income that 
is near the overall median income.
16. As explained in the Annex to this Chapter we have 
approached this problem by looking at modelled 
spending patterns in different types of households 
Table 2.1: Proposed new cost equivalisation factors 
for fuel bills
Household type Factor
Couple with dependent children 1.15
Couple without dependent children 1.00
Lone parent 0.94
Single person 0.82
Other multi-person household 1.07
Source: Calculations by the Fuel Poverty Review based on 
English Housing Survey (2009)
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Adjusting incomes for household size and composition has a clear and familiar logic. Adjusting bills 
in a similar way is a new approach but one with a similar purpose. When attempting to understand 
the reasonableness of costs, some kind of adjustment for household size and composition is 
necessary. We accept that the factors used in the calculations presented in the interim report were 
not appropriate and that specific adjustment factors for energy costs are needed. We have therefore 
derived new factors which we believe address this problem, while retaining the important advantages 
of the overall approach.
Chapter, it has certain downsides, particularly that 
it makes no allowance at all for the number of 
people in the household, and the fact that people 
can find it hard to move. This could lead to some 
unexpected treatments of, for instance, those who 
lose a household member (e.g. on the death of 
a partner). Much of the variation seen under this 
approach is due to household size. This measure 
has a much weaker correlation with SAP than 
our preferred approach. On balance we therefore 
prefer our original approach, but with the adjusted 
equivalisation factors shown above. However, we 
include some detailed consideration of the pros and 
cons of a unit costs approach – and a comparison 
to the equivalisation method we propose – in the 
Annex to this Chapter.
Section 2.2: Setting the 
energy costs threshold
20. Having taken a decision on how best to assess costs 
for particular households within our fuel poverty 
matrix, we now need to discuss where to draw the 
threshold for reasonable costs.
The proposal in the interim report
21. Our proposal was to set a threshold equivalent to 
the median equivalised modelled bill – that is, the 
level of costs where 50 per cent of all households 
have lower bills and 50 per cent of households have 
higher bills. This changes over time: given the trend in 
energy efficiency improvements we would expect the 
bill to fall over time, offset by increases in prices (and 
in other factors that affect modelled assumptions). 
19. Against this background, we therefore adopt for 
the purposes of the remainder of this report an 
approach to our LIHC indicator which is as follows:
•	 The overall structure of the indicator is as 
we developed it in the interim report and as 
described in Chapter 1;
•	 The income threshold is set as proposed in the 
interim report by adding equivalised bill values to 
the standard after housing costs poverty line (of 
60 per cent of median AHC income).
•	 However, the factors used to adjust for 
household size and composition when comparing 
energy requirements with the threshold are 
those shown in Table 2.1, relating specifically to 
energy spending.
As already explained in Chapter 1, the basis for 
taking the median modelled threshold is a desire to 
understand energy requirements across all households 
throughout England by comparison to contemporary 
norms, in this instance as represented by the overall 
median. In essence, this is equivalent to saying that it 
is unreasonable for low-income households to have to 
pay more to keep warm than typical households on 
much higher incomes.
22. The median modelled bill is fundamentally driven 
by two factors: energy requirement (an expression 
of energy efficiency and needs) and energy prices. 
The overall energy efficiency of the English housing 
stock is therefore a primary driver of the level of the 
median bill. If our housing stock were more energy 
efficient, the median modelled requirement would 
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25. One consequence of choosing the median is 
that across the whole housing stock half of all 
households will always have lower than typical costs 
and half will have higher than typical costs. In the 
very long term, average energy efficiency might 
reach such a high level that it would no longer be 
meaningful to consider fuel poverty in this way. 
For example, if every home were between SAP 90 
and SAP 100, finding half the population to have 
higher than typical costs would not be so important 
– and indeed their related fuel poverty gaps 
would become very low. At such a point in time, 
the distinction between fuel poverty and general 
poverty, as described in the review’s work to date, 
might have disappeared. We are, however, a very 
long way from that point.
Other options
26. The question of thresholds was discussed in some 
detail in some of the consultation responses to our 
interim report and we consider some of the issues 
raised here.
27. The issues raised reflect three kinds of concern:
a. Some respondents believe that what matters is 
the absolute level of spending that households 
require, not their position relative to other 
contemporary households. With the relative 
approach we advocate, a general increase in 
fuel prices will result in a greater fuel poverty 
gap and will pull in some more households 
falling below the income threshold, but it 
would not push households with below median 
required costs above the cost threshold. With an 
absolute threshold, price changes would have 
a much more dramatic effect on the headcount 
numbers.
b, Others argue that suggesting that it is 
‘reasonable’ for low-income households to 
spend as much as a median household on a 
much higher income is not right and so the 
threshold should be set at a lower level. In 
other words, a median spending threshold is 
too high.
be much lower than its 2009 value of £1,270.31 
Setting the threshold at the median does not mean 
that any household with lower requirements is 
of no concern, nor that it is acceptable for there 
to be so many homes in England with relatively 
low energy efficiency. Rather, the median is an 
appropriate level of spending for comparative 
purposes. Any household above that threshold has 
requirements that are above contemporary norms.
23. In terms of the risk of certain households falling 
behind these norms, the selection of the median 
as our threshold means that any homes where 
energy efficiency is not improved, or where there is 
a change from year-to-year in needs, for example 
because of entering retirement and spending longer 
at home, could be shown as deeper in fuel poverty. 
Capturing this risk is an advantage of our indicator: 
if the homes of richer households are improved 
faster than the homes of poorer households, fuel 
poverty will get worse. Although the same logic 
suggests that a deterioration in efficiency levels in 
richer households would apparently ‘improve’ fuel 
poverty, recent trends are for the reverse and for 
energy efficiency to improve overall (by an average 
of 1 SAP point per year32). There is also a significant 
policy push for this to continue to be the case 
through the Green Deal, regulation of new building 
standards and other initiatives.
24. Similarly, the operation of the median means that, 
with general improvements across the housing 
stock, new households could fall into fuel poverty 
for the first time. This would be because they  
were not keeping up with contemporary norms of 
energy efficiency. This has been criticised by some 
stakeholders, who by implication favour a more 
absolute standard in terms of energy efficiency 
(as discussed further below). However, for policy 
purposes, it seems to us that it is important to know 
which homes across the whole housing stock are 
falling behind and so should be targeted through 
future policy interventions.
31 Modelled bills are significantly higher than actual spending on average, 
as discussed in Chapter 1 and in Table 2.3 of our Interim Report.
32 See Figure 2.6 in the interim report.
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32. One way of avoiding this scenario, which is counter-
intuitive for some, would be to set an absolute 
threshold at a given level of costs (adjusted only for 
general inflation). As energy prices changed relative 
to other prices and modelled bills for households 
went above this fixed threshold, more households 
would be faced with ‘unreasonable’ costs and, 
assuming they are poor, would be identified as 
being in fuel poverty.
33. Taking the previous example, the threshold could 
be set and fixed over time at £1,200, the median 
level for Year 1. In Year 2, both household A and 
household B would be fuel poor, with costs above 
this level.
34. It becomes immediately apparent that this approach 
would make the measurement of fuel poverty 
very sensitive to prices. This might be in tune with 
some people’s expectations, but it has implications 
for the reliability of any indicator. For a start, rapid 
increases in prices would lead to rapid increases 
in the number of fuel poor households, changing 
not only the measured scale of the problem, but 
also the types of household affected. This would 
have implications for the chances of success when 
using policy delivery proxies, and would add to the 
target group for policy interventions a group of 
households with better than currently typical energy 
efficiency. It is this kind of extreme sensitivity to 
price changes which is one of the major drawbacks 
to the current official indicator.
35. There is also a significant issue in choosing which 
level of prices to pin the threshold to. As a measure 
of the significance of this choice, we have modelled 
the impact of fixing the reasonable costs threshold 
at the median level, as measured in £s, for both 
2004 and 2009. The results are shown in Table 
2.2. As can be seen, fixing the threshold at the 
median bill for 2004 (£674) would lead to a fuel 
poverty headcount (in terms of both individuals and 
households) in 2009 that is double what it would 
be if the 2009 threshold (£1,270) were used. The 
trends painted by each measure are rather different, 
with the number of households in fuel poverty 
c. Others – including some of the same 
respondents – argue, however, that over time 
a threshold linked to contemporary typical 
spending requirements will, in fact, become 
too low, as overall energy efficiency improves, 
reducing the median spending requirement as 
it does. This ‘moving target’ problem makes 
complete eradication of fuel poverty very 
difficult. As an alternative, some respondents 
advocate setting the threshold as some ratio 
(greater than 1) of the spending requirements 
of households in more energy efficient homes. 
Over time, as it is hard to improve the efficiency 
of the already-best homes rapidly, such a 
threshold would be easier to beat, making 
eradication of fuel poverty more feasible.
28. We now look in turn at each of these options.
Option (a): Fixing the threshold at an 
absolute level of costs
29. We look first at an approach to threshold setting 
that would reflect the concern set out in (a) above.
30. One of the consequences of adopting a relative 
approach to the threshold for reasonable costs 
is that it moves over time and in parallel with 
energy prices changes. Therefore, as prices change, 
unless other factors have an over-riding impact, a 
household with ‘reasonable costs’ could be faced 
with a bill that is higher in absolute terms than a bill 
that was previously considered ‘unreasonable’ for 
another household.
31. For example, assume that the median costs 
threshold is £1,200 in Year 1. Household A has a 
modelled bill of £1,150, found to be reasonable. 
Household B has a modelled bill of £1,250, found 
to be unreasonable. Now assume that prices go 
up across the board by 10 per cent in Year 2. The 
threshold would rise to £1,320. Household A’s 
bill would be £1,265, still ‘reasonable’, because 
it is below the median level, but higher than 
Household B’s bill for the previous year which 
was ‘unreasonable’.
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poverty gap measured against a 2004 absolute 
threshold would increase five-fold and against a 
2009 threshold would increase more than ten-fold.
38. We therefore believe that an absolute approach 
of this kind, involving the fixing of a reasonable 
costs threshold in £s, irrespective of current energy 
costs should be avoided. There is a separate issue, 
however, of whether some form of indicator using 
a threshold that is unaffected by general energy 
efficiency improvements could be used. We discuss 
this further under Option (c) below.
Option (b): A lower threshold than the 
contemporary median
39. Turning now to the issue reflected in (b) above – 
in other words, that the median threshold is too 
high – some respondents argued that the median 
modelled bill in 2009 (at £1,270) was not, in fact, 
an acceptable level of costs and that instead the 
cost threshold should be reduced, with 60 per 
cent of median requirements being one proposal. 
This would in some sense parallel the approach 
taken in setting the official poverty line. It is shown 
conceptually in Figure 2.1.
more than doubling over the period 2004-2009 
under a 2004 threshold but increasing more than 
twelve times over the same period against a 2009 
threshold.
36. It is hard to develop a rationale for preferring 
one baseline year over another so this choice 
would ultimately be arbitrary. It should also be 
remembered that any reference year would 
increasingly lose relevance to the situation on the 
ground. For example, the level of fuel prices seen 
in the mid-2000s may well not be experienced 
again. If fuel prices are permanently higher for all 
households, judging their reasonableness against 
an outdated baseline seems perverse. At the least, 
there would need to be some form of periodic 
rebasing of the threshold.
37. Further, a fuel poverty gap measure would be 
extremely sensitive, to the extent that its value 
as a measure of the depth of fuel poverty would 
be damaged as it would be overwhelmed by the 
impact of price changes rather than responding 
discernibly to other factors such as improvements in 
the housing stock. Again this was a major problem 
with applying a fuel poverty gap measure alongside 
the current indicator, as set out in our interim report 
(see Section 6.3 of that document). As Table 2.2 
above shows, between 2004 and 2009, the fuel 
Table 2.2: Number of fuel poor households and individuals under the Low Income High Costs indicator using 
different absolute thresholds for reasonable costs, 1996, 2004, 2009, England
Threshold Number of households Number of individuals Aggregate fuel poverty gap
1996 2004 2009 1996 2004 2009 1996 2004 2009
Median equivalised 
fuel bill 2004 3.8 2.7 5.7 9.7 7.3 15.1 1.5 0.7 3.5
Median equivalised 
fuel bill 2009 0.5 0.2 2.7 1.2 0.6 7.8 0.2 0.1 1.1
Source: Fuel poverty data, 1996, 2004 and 2009 (DECC)
Note: The income threshold used in both cases is 60 per cent of median equivalised after housing costs income plus each individual households’ 
modelled fuel bill.
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it is reasonable for households on incomes that are 
much lower than the national average to have to 
spend more than a typical household.
42. It should also be noted that setting a threshold at a 
lower than 100 per cent of contemporary median 
costs would make the stringency of the threshold 
and hence the difficulty of eradicating the problem 
even greater over time, making the issues described 
in paragraph 27(c) even harder.
43. In addition it is important to note that even for 
those who favour a lower threshold, households 
with costs above 100 per cent of the median would 
still be the top priority for action: they would still 
have the greatest fuel poverty gaps against a lower 
threshold. The issue is not whether their problems 
should be tackled first, but whether others should 
be tackled as well.
44. We do not therefore see any firm grounds for moving 
away from a threshold based on 100 per cent of 
the median, if that is used as the basis for assessing 
reasonable costs. However there is a separate 
issue about what this implies about changes in the 
threshold over time, which we now turn to.
40. Such an approach would, of course, count many 
more households as having low incomes and high 
costs. Indeed, rather than there being 2.7 million 
households counted as being in this category (when 
100 per cent of the median is used), 5.5 million 
households would be classed in this category. 
This amounts to 95 per cent of all low-income 
households.
41. Views will inevitably vary of what represent 
‘reasonable costs’ and with them the number and 
proportion of low-income households whose energy 
requirements are seen as being of greatest concern. 
For those pressing hardest for the greatest scale 
of action, a low threshold might be seen as most 
appropriate. For those balancing policy concerns 
competing for limited public resources with action 
in this area, a higher threshold than we have 
proposed might be seen as more appropriate. We 
find it hard, however, to establish a firm rationale 
for a different – higher or lower – proportion of 
median costs than the 100 per cent that we have 
used. On the one hand this is already a challenging 
threshold – identifying as many households as 
having low incomes and high costs as the current 
official fuel poverty measure on average over the 
last 13 years. On the other, it is hard to argue that 
Increasing income  
Increasing 
energy costs
Figure 2.1: Fuel poverty as the overlap of low income 
and high costs with the costs threshold set at 60 per cent 
of median
60 per cent of 
median required
energy costs
Median required
energy costs
Costs
threshold
Income
threshold
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median modelled bill of £1,270. This concept is 
shown in Figure 2.2.
47. Although this is a relative measure in one sense, it 
is an absolute measure in another. This is because 
the median bill of the best performing 5 per cent is 
likely to change only as a function of prices rather 
than general efficiency improvements, which are 
more likely to happen in other parts of the housing 
stock. It might currently count the same proportion 
of households as having high costs as using 100 
per cent of the median, but over time the threshold 
would be expected to fall less rapidly.
48. The effect of this kind of approach is to reduce the 
‘moving target’ problem as existing fuel poverty is 
tackled. This could be welcome for policy-makers 
and it would make it easier to completely eradicate 
fuel poverty. This is because, compared to the use 
of the median bill as a threshold, it is easier to affect 
the distribution of household energy efficiency so 
that no homes are several times worse than the 
best homes.
49. However, there are two broad problems with this 
approach. First, a reference group must be defined, 
Option (c): A threshold that changes less 
rapidly than the median over time
45. Another kind of alternative proposed to us was 
aimed at reducing the ‘moving target’ problem 
as described in paragraph 27(c) above. Against 
a threshold based on the contemporary median, 
it is very hard to literally eradicate fuel poverty 
as this requires all low-income households to be 
in the least expensive half of homes. A proposal 
intended to reduce this problem would be to set 
the threshold as a multiple (greater than 1) of the 
energy requirements of the most energy efficient 
properties identified in some way.
46. There would be many ways of doing this, capturing 
more or fewer households. One might take the 
median bill of the best performing 5 per cent 
homes and set a threshold that is twice that value. 
As it happens, in 2009, twice the median modelled 
bill of the best 5 per cent of homes33 generates 
a threshold of £1,266, which is very close to the 
33 Here, ‘best’ means most energy efficient as measured by SAP. When 
taking a measure against a very small sample, such as just 5 per cent of 
the stock, there might of course be problems of robustness and great 
sensitivity to the way in which the non-heating elements of modelled 
energy requirements were derived.
Increasing income  
Increasing 
energy costs
Figure 2.2: Fuel poverty as the overlap of low income 
and high costs with the costs threshold set at 200 per cent 
of the median bill of the best 5 per cent of homes
Median bill of 
best 5 per cent
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median bill of 
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there was no improvement in poorer households, 
there might be no difference in the number 
of households counted as fuel poor under this 
approach. In other words, there would be no effect 
if poor households fell behind contemporary norms. 
While this may seem appropriate for some, this 
feature seems undesirable, leading us to continue 
to prefer the simpler option of basing the threshold 
on contemporary median costs as we originally 
proposed.
51. We recognise that a decision to retain our originally 
proposed threshold has implications for the use of 
the LIHC framework, in particular in terms of target 
setting. This is because it is very hard – though not 
impossible – to eliminate fuel poverty completely 
using a relative measure. This is something we 
return to in Section 2.4 below.
as well as the factor to be applied to the group’s 
requirement. These are essentially arbitrary choices. 
Should the reference group be the best 5 per cent, 
or 10 per cent or 30 per cent? Should the factor 
applied to that group’s requirements for threshold 
setting be 100 per cent, 150 per cent or 200 per 
cent? These two go hand in hand – the lower the 
median bill used as a starting point, the higher the 
factor one might expect to be applied. But again 
we cannot see a firm basis for these important 
judgements other than what they lead to in terms 
of the number and type of households identified as 
fuel poor.
50. The second problem – perhaps as significant – is that 
it would not show the distributional benefits that 
a moving threshold would. If all richer households 
were to improve their energy efficiency standard, but 
In our interim report we proposed a reasonable costs threshold based on the median bill, as a 
measure of contemporary standards against which to judge the relative position of the fuel poor. This 
confers one advantage of particular value: it captures the risk of fuel poor households falling behind 
improvements we expect to see more generally in the housing stock.
This is not the only choice. Some stakeholders have argued for an absolute threshold – adopting a 
fixed threshold for energy costs that is only adjusted over time for general inflation. However, this 
would be highly sensitive to fuel price changes, amplifying some of the problems with the current 
indicator. Others argued that the median threshold was too high and therefore not ambitious 
enough. This led to calls for the threshold to be much lower, based on a proportion (less than 1) of 
the median bill. Others argued the threshold we proposed would become too low over time, making 
literal eradication of fuel poverty very difficult. In this chapter we have considered options following 
from these points, but have not found a firm basis for them.
We therefore continue to believe that the most appropriate reasonable costs threshold is the 
contemporary median modelled bill. While this choice is not the only justifiable one, we believe it best 
represents the problem of fuel poverty, as seen from first principles. It is also the least arbitrary of the 
approaches we have considered.
This decision, alongside the decision on equivalisation set out in Section 2.1, combine with our 
definition of the low income threshold to give us our core indicator of the extent of fuel poverty:
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2.3 What the final version of 
the LIHC indicator shows
52. The discussion above (supplemented by the 
detailed analysis presented in Parts B and C of 
the Annex to this Chapter) leads us to conclude 
that the fundamental form of the LIHC indicator 
should be as set out in the interim report, but with 
an important modification to the way in which 
we allow for household size and composition 
when examining whether required costs exceed 
the threshold. We now turn to an explanation of 
what this implies for our understanding of fuel 
poverty from 1996 to 2009, including noting 
where the results differ from those presented in the 
interim report.
54. It can be seen that the trends under the two 
versions of the LIHC indicator are very similar. 
In general, the new indicator gives very slightly 
lower numbers of fuel poor households than the 
previous version. This contrasts starkly with the 
53. Figure 2.3 shows the number of fuel poor 
households under three indicators: the current 
official indicator, the LIHC indicator used in our 
interim report and the LIHC indicator with new 
equivalisation factors.
Figure 2.3: Number of households with low incomes and 
high costs, 1996 and 2003-2009, England (millions)
20092008200720062005200420032002200120001999199819971996
Current indicator
Interim report LIHC indicator
Proposed LIHC indicator
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Source: Fuel poverty data, 1996 and 2003-2009 (DECC)
Continued
Households should be considered fuel poor if:
•	 they have required fuel costs that are above the contemporary median level; and
•	 were they to spend that amount, they would be left with a residual income below the official 
poverty line.
Central to this approach is the way in which it allows the calculation of the fuel poverty gap, both to 
indicate the depth of the problem affecting individual households and to show how its overall scale is 
changing over time.
The implications of this approach for target-setting are explored in Section 2.4.
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Figure 2.4: Number of individuals with low incomes and 
high costs, 1996 and 2003-2009, England (millions)
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Source: Fuel poverty data, 1996 and 2003-2009 (DECC)
Figure 2.5:  Individuals in fuel poverty (under the final 
report LIHC indicator) by household type, 1996-2009, 
England (millions)      
Source: Fuel Poverty Review  
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V-shaped trend described by the current 10 per 
cent indicator. As before the average number of 
households classed as fuel poor over the period 
as a whole would be very similar to the current 
official indicator.
55. However, the picture for individuals is different 
from households, as shown in Figure 2.4. The two 
versions of the LIHC indicator give relatively stable 
assessments of the number of fuel poor individuals 
over time, but at very different overall levels. The 
new version of the indicator actually suggests 
more individuals were fuel poor in 2009 than the 
current indicator.
56. The reason for this is the way in which the different 
indicators capture different types of household. 
Part B of the Annex to this Chapter gives the 
compositional breakdown for the new indicator 
for 2009. Further analysis, presented in Figure 
2.5 shows that different types of household have 
moved in and out of fuel poverty since 1996.
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57. This figure suggests that increasing fuel poverty 
within families with children offset declining fuel 
poverty since 1996 within pensioner couples and 
single person households.
58. Since it is a crucial part of our indicator, it is 
important to understand the impact of the new 
approach to equivalisation on our fuel poverty 
gap. The results of our modelling are shown in 
Figure 2.6.
59. It can be seen that although the aggregate fuel 
poverty gap was slightly lower under the new 
version of the indicator than under the original 
version in 1996, the total gap shown for 2009 is 
now very similar (£1.1 billion). This is because the 
average fuel poverty gaps of the larger households 
that have become more prevalent over time are 
greater than those of the smaller households that 
they have replaced.
The revised version of our indicator gives the same overall account of fuel poverty since 1996, albeit 
with changes to the composition of fuel poor households. It suggests that in 2009 some 2.7 million 
households had both low incomes and faced higher-than-median costs, down only slightly from the 
2.8 million households in the same position in 1996. The average level of fuel poverty over the period 
remains as shown in the current official indicator, but without the dramatic fall between 1996 and 
2003.
However, changes in the way we are adjusting for household size and composition means that more 
individuals – some 7.8 million – were fuel poor in 2009 than in 1996. This is higher than the number 
of people considered to be living in fuel poverty by the current official definition of fuel poverty.
At the same time, the aggregate fuel poverty gap in 2009 is shown to be £1.1 billion. This value is 
broadly unchanged from the level identified in our interim report, despite the changes made to the 
details of the calculation. This – in some ways the best indicator of the scale of the problem we face 
– is greater in real terms than it was in 1996 and has increased by three-quarters compared to what it 
was in 2003, when fuel prices were at their lowest.
Aggregate fuel poverty
gap (£million)
Average fuel poverty
gap (£)
Figure 2.6: Proposed LIHC indicator – Aggregate fuel 
poverty gap, 1996 and 2003-2009, England (2009 prices)
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that “as far as reasonably practicable persons in 
England and Wales do not live in fuel poverty” and 
to do so, by dint of the publication of the UK Fuel 
Poverty Strategy in 2001, by 2016.
65. In Chapter 6 we look at projections for how far we 
might be towards that objective by 2016 given our 
current starting point and the current policy mix.
66. During the review, several stakeholders raised the 
concern that, with a threshold for ‘reasonable 
costs’ based on the median energy requirements 
of contemporary housing, literal eradication of 
fuel poverty would be impossible or at least very 
difficult. This is because the relative approach 
creates a moving target under which it would be 
very hard to squeeze all the property lived in by 
low-income households below the threshold. This 
is true. However, as we saw in Section 2.2, a range 
of other approaches put to us for dealing with 
this also have problems. In our view, they are less 
satisfactory as a way of measuring the problem 
described by the WHECA.
67. In approaching this, there is an analogy with 
debates around poverty in general. Under the 
2010 Child Poverty Act four different indicators 
are used to monitor whether child poverty is being 
eliminated, as required by the Act:
•	 The proportion of children living in households 
with low income where the standard is measured 
in relative terms, changing over time as median 
incomes change (the target level is less than 10 
per cent);
•	 The proportion of children living in households 
with low income where the standard is fixed in 
real terms (the target level is less than 5 per cent);
•	 The proportion of children living in households 
with both low income measured in relative terms 
and material deprivation defined by reference to 
a fixed list of particular items (the target is less 
than 5 per cent);34
34 Material deprivation is a measure of a given household’s ability to afford 
a list of particular items, compiled to reflect items linked to deprivation 
measured in the past.
2.4: Target setting under the 
LIHC approach
60. The terms of reference for the review asked us 
to develop “possible formulations for a future 
definition and any associated form of target” in 
the light of our findings of the nature of the issues 
at the core of the problem of fuel poverty. It is not 
for the review to say what that the level of such 
targets should be for any particular date: that is for 
government and Parliament.
61. What does follow from our analysis, however, is 
that the form of any target should be based on the 
LIHC framework as first described in our interim 
report and subsequently developed in this Chapter. 
If, as we contend, this is the best way of capturing 
the essence of the problem, it follows that this is 
the best way of monitoring progress, of judging the 
effectiveness of policy interventions and of setting 
targets for those policies.
62. The form of target should therefore be based 
on looking at both the extent of the problem 
as measured by the number of households and 
individuals with low incomes and high costs (against 
the thresholds described in Section 2.2) and its 
depth as measured by the associated fuel poverty 
gap. Progress is being made if the numbers with 
low incomes and high costs and the value of the 
aggregate fuel poverty gap are being reduced.
63. As Section 2.3 showed, there has only been very 
limited progress since 1996 in these terms. The 
number of households with LIHC was only slightly 
lower in 2009 than it had been in 1996 and the 
number of individuals was slightly higher. The fuel 
poverty gap did fall up to 2003, but its 2009 value 
of £1.1 billion was just over 75 per cent higher than 
in 2003.
64. There is, however, one factor of major concern to 
many of those with the greatest interest in this area. 
That is that the 2000 Warm Homes and Energy 
Conservation Act commits governments to ensure 
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•	 Looking at the number of people who have 
low incomes and high costs as measured by our 
framework and the associated fuel poverty gap, 
but using a threshold for costs which is fixed 
according to today’s energy efficiency standards, 
rather than changing over time.
•	 Looking at the number of people who have 
low incomes and high costs as measured by our 
framework and the associated fuel poverty gap, 
using our preferred relative threshold for costs, 
but accepting that ‘elimination’ would mean 
reducing them – particularly the fuel poverty gap 
– to very low levels, rather than literally to zero.
72. We look at the first two of these indicators in some 
detail in Part D of Annex 2. The first – Option A 
there – was considered within our interim report: 
a low income low fixed SAP measure.36 As can be 
seen in Figure A2.7 in Part D of Annex 2, if the 
fixed SAP threshold were taken at the median level 
for the housing stock in 2009, with the income 
threshold set at 70 per cent of median income, the 
number of households affected fell from 4.7 million 
in 1996 to 4.0 million in 2003 and to 2.8 million in 
2009 itself. That fixed standard would be just below 
55, virtually the same as the boundary between 
energy performance certificate ratings of D and 
E and, as it happens, the level currently used for 
Warm Front eligibility.
73. Such an approach has the virtue of being simple 
and straight-forward, including the fact that there is 
no reason in principle why it should not be reduced 
to zero. It does, however, have two drawbacks. 
The first is the problem with absolute measures in 
general already referred to above, that over time 
they become irrelevant. If, as a country, we really 
are to meet the carbon reduction targets we have 
set ourselves, we shall have to do better in the 
medium term than a SAP level of 55 for the whole 
housing stock. Second, as we argued in the interim 
report, energy efficiency by itself only measures part 
of the problem.37 As such, an ideal indicator should 
36 See Section 6.5 of the interim report.
37 This was a conclusion supported by most respondents to our 
consultation.
•	 The proportion of children living in households 
that are persistently poor, defined as living in 
relative poverty for at least three of the last four 
years.35
68. In principle, there is no reason why the proportion 
of households identified by the second and third 
indicators could not be reduced to zero, or at least 
very close to it, as overall living standards rise. Few 
people in Britain today have incomes that would 
be below a fixed poverty line that would have been 
seen as appropriate in, say, the 1950s and few 
households lack the kind of amenities (such as hot 
and cold running water) that were the focus of 
policy then.
69. But exactly for that reason, this kind of 
indicator will become out of date. Only a few 
people would argue that there is no longer poverty 
in Britain today because people are not poor 
compared to the standards of the 1950s, or that 
no-one is deprived because virtually all houses have 
indoor WCs. That is why most attention has been 
paid in Britain and elsewhere in Europe to the first, 
relative, indicator.
70. However, even the most egalitarian 
Scandinavian countries have not reduced relative 
poverty to zero. Accordingly, the targets set for 
the first measure have been formulated as being 
sufficient, in effect, to reduce child poverty levels to 
what at one point were formulated as the ‘best in 
Europe’ (taken in the Child Poverty Act as reduction 
to single figures).
71. In interpreting what might be taken as 
eradication within the field of fuel poverty, one 
could adopt a similar approach, by:
•	 Looking at the number of households that both 
have low incomes and live in energy-inefficient 
homes (as measured by a fixed standard).
35 The target for the persistence indicator is to be defined in secondary 
legislation at a future point. The persistence of fuel poverty, for its part, 
is hard to measure. Longitudinal surveys allowing this to be done would 
be welcome, but expensive.
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76. The final option is rather different. This is to 
use the relative LIHC numbers and fuel poverty gap 
not just as the most appropriate indicators of the 
problem of fuel poverty at any one time, but also 
for any target involving elimination. However, as 
with the relative child poverty target, we would 
have to recognise that elimination is unlikely to 
mean literally reducing the problem to zero. We do 
not have equivalent data for other countries that 
would allow us to say what might constitute ‘being 
the best in Europe’ in the case of fuel poverty. 
However, a target could be set for the aggregate 
fuel poverty gap in particular that would mean 
that although there might be some low-income 
households whose energy requirements were above 
the contemporary median – as that is very hard 
to avoid – they could not be very far above the 
contemporary median.
77. On balance, it is this third option that is most 
consistent with our overall analysis. It puts most 
weight on monitoring the depth of the problem 
and so focuses attention on tackling the problems 
of those most severely affected. It would not lose 
its relevance over time and would maintain pressure 
to avoid low-income households being left behind 
as the rest of the housing stock is made more 
efficient. By the same token, although some might 
see today’s median as too unambitious a reference 
point, the threshold would become tighter over 
time. In this way, improving homes that are not the 
top priority today (because their costs are just below 
the threshold) would have to become a focus for 
policy in future.
78. If this approach were followed, defining what 
would constitute a sufficient degree of elimination 
would be an intensely political decision. In making 
it, those responsible might want to note that the 
fuel poverty gap measured as we proposed was 
around £800 million in 2000 when the Act was 
passed and hit its lowest point to date in 2003, 
when it was around £630 million. Any target 
would by implication have to be a fraction of those 
numbers and therefore a massive improvement on 
the 2009 fuel poverty gap of £1.1 billion.
also capture whether low-income households pay 
higher prices for energy than others. It should also 
allow for variations in occupancy patterns and 
other needs between different households. This is 
exactly what the complex energy costs assessment 
underlying both the current official indicator and 
our proposed LIHC measure does.
74. The second approach we look at (Option B in Part 
D of the Annex to this Chapter) is therefore to look 
at a variant of the LIHC indicator with a fixed costs 
threshold. This could be based on energy efficiency 
and hence median required costs in 2009, with 
no changes made thereafter as general energy 
efficiency standards rise. As can be seen in the 
Annex, following this approach suggests that the 
number of households with low incomes and high 
costs fell from 3.2 million in 2006 to 2.7 million in 
2009. For technical reasons resulting from changes 
in methodology, there is a discontinuity in the 
numbers that can be produced for earlier years, 
but there would also have been a fall of 0.9 million 
between 1996 and 2004.38
75. Again, there is no reason in principle why such an 
indicator should not be reduced to zero. Doing 
so would be far from easy, as highlighted by our 
projections in Chapter 6. This approach would also 
be consistent with our preferred indicator in terms 
of what it measures, capturing all the elements that 
low SAP by itself does not. A data series compiled 
in this way could be used to supplement the 
headcount and fuel poverty gap indicators provided 
by our preferred relative indicator. However, as 
before, it has the problem that it would over time 
become less relevant to contemporary standards. 
Further, its derivation is not straightforward. Unlike 
the relative LIHC measure, it is rather sensitive to 
technical changes in the methodology by which 
energy requirements are assessed – which is why 
there is a discontinuity in the historic series we can 
produce for this report.
38 This discontinuity could be addressed by re-working the historical series 
to reflect changes to the methodology.
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79. There are two important factors that might 
be taken into account when considering the 
appropriateness of this approach. The first is set 
out in Chapter 3 below: any regime for targeting 
resources on the problem of fuel poverty is bound 
to be approximate. With any practical approach to 
tackling fuel poverty there will be some households 
who are assisted that do not come into a strict 
definition of what fuel poverty means. In reality, 
policies have to have a broad spread and cannot 
be designed to adhere narrowly to precisely drawn 
boundaries. So, while it is true that this approach 
would allow some low-income households to 
remain fuel poor whose requirements were close 
to, but just above, the contemporary median, 
other beneficiaries from policy interventions would 
include some low-income households whose 
requirements were below the threshold. Put simply, 
the policy instruments at any government’s disposal 
are not so fine-tuned as to allow design without a 
margin of error in either direction.
80. Second, being driven by a desire to adopt 
an approach to fuel poverty measurement that is 
compatible with literal eradication of the problem 
seems to us to risk encouraging the adoption of 
perhaps the least satisfactory of all targets: one set 
at a low, unambitious level measured against an 
absolute threshold that ceases to bear any relevance 
to contemporary conditions. Many would feel – and 
we would agree – that an attachment to delivering 
real and significant progress against a target 
that reflects a measurement approach that best 
describes the nature of the fuel poverty problem is a 
much more appropriate way forward.
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This Section attempts to deal with one of the most contentious and difficult aspects of the current 
fuel poverty problem: how to set targets given that the legislation says that ‘no-one’ should be 
affected.
In some respects, this is an issue that is outside the terms of reference of the review, which focused 
on the form of target to be applied, rather than the scale of ambition. This is appropriate because 
only Parliament and directly accountable Ministers can take such decisions.
But we recognise that our preferred indicator of the extent of fuel poverty would make literal 
eradication of fuel poverty very challenging. There are ways of overcoming this difficulty and the child 
poverty targets offer some insight into possible options. We have examined two ways of setting an 
alternative – absolute – threshold, but neither approach is entirely satisfactory.
After detailed analysis, we believe the right approach remains that targets should be formulated 
against the two core elements of the LIHC approach: a count of the number of households and 
individuals affected and the fuel poverty gap, which identifies the depth of the problem. Where a 
target is to involve ‘elimination’, a target could be set for the aggregate fuel poverty gap in particular 
that would mean that although there might be some low-income households whose energy 
requirements were above the contemporary median – as that is very hard to avoid – they could not be 
very far above the contemporary median.
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Chapter Summary
We have given considerable thought to a range of issues relating to the Low Income High Costs 
indicator before deciding on its final form. This has included reconsidering our approach to 
equivalisation and ultimately adopting new factors for this element of the calculation. We have also 
considered, as set out in the Annex to this Chapter, a variant proposed by stakeholders based on 
unit costs.
We have also re-examined the way the level of the threshold for reasonable costs is set but continue 
to believe that the contemporary median modelled bill is the most appropriate level. Other options 
require more arbitrary judgements to be made. However wherever the threshold is set, the same 
households with the largest fuel poverty gaps would remain the priorities for action.
We have also considered the way in which the threshold develops over time. Although the relative 
nature of our preferred indicator makes the literal eradication of fuel poverty extremely challenging 
(though not theoretically impossible) we believe there are advantages to this approach, not least in 
terms of ensuring a focus on improvements in lower-income households as well as richer ones.
We have considered whether two options for setting some form of absolute threshold would be 
appropriate, but we find these approaches less satisfactory than our preferred relative approach.
Our remit was to suggest a form for any target, not to prescribe the level of such a target. We believe 
that the two elements of our framework, the number of households with low incomes and high 
costs and the associated fuel poverty gap, are the appropriate measures. Where a target is to involve 
‘elimination’ – as required by WHECA – a realistic approach would be to set a target for the aggregate 
fuel poverty gap to be reduced to very low levels, so that although there might be some low-income 
households whose energy requirements were above the contemporary median, they could not be very 
far above it.
Recommendations:
1. The Government should set the reasonable costs threshold at the level of the contemporary 
median energy requirements for the population as a whole. The modelled bills for individual 
households should be adjusted for household size and composition – using a specific set of 
adjustment factors – when comparing them to this threshold.
2. The Government should use the LIHC indicator and fuel poverty gap as the basis for operational 
target setting. The fuel poverty gap in particular gives the best focus on the scale of the problem 
and progress in tackling it.
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1. We argued in our interim report that a good 
indicator of the fuel poverty problem should help 
identify fuel poor households and target policies 
in their direction. Having set out the final version 
of our indicator in Chapter 2, we turn now to the 
question of finding the fuel poor.
2. This Chapter first considers principles for finding 
and targeting the fuel poor, including administrative 
factors, the pros and cons of constructing a tightly-
focused approach and the role of the fuel poverty 
gap. It then moves on to consider the specific 
targeting implications of the Low Income High 
Costs (LIHC) indicator. It does this by examining the 
detailed composition of fuel poor households in 
2009 in relation to a range of dwelling, household 
and similar characteristics. Having identified such 
characteristics in principle, we consider whether 
they can be used in practice, through the use of 
proxies, to help target fuel poverty policy and, if 
so, how effectively. We also touch briefly on the 
tools that can be used for targeting fuel poor 
households, in Box 3.2.
3. We then consider how the LIHC approach can 
provide a framework for identifying the households 
that are a priority for action. Thereafter we consider 
additional factors relating to the most vulnerable 
households – those containing people aged over 
75, children under 5 and long-term disabled people 
– and how to identify these groups.
3.1 Principles for targeting
4. Before considering precisely who is fuel poor and 
how they can be found and assisted, it is helpful to 
discuss a number of general principles involved in 
targeting.
5. First, it must be remembered that all targeting 
will involve a degree of administrative burden, 
particularly in terms of collecting the data needed. 
In principle, a detailed household and building 
sample survey followed by sophisticated modelling 
work is required to establish how many and which 
types of households have low incomes and high 
costs at a national level. It would be prohibitively 
expensive – and intrusive – to carry this out for all 
households. Instead, those working to tackle fuel 
poverty – government agencies, local government, 
energy suppliers and voluntary organisations – 
use simpler proxy indicators to try to find the 
households in need of assistance. Some people 
identified through rough and ready proxies fall 
outside the strict boundaries of the definition we 
have proposed. It would be naive to suggest we 
can tackle the full scale of fuel poverty – 2.7 million 
households under our LIHC indicator in 2009 – by 
treating only 2.7 million homes. In practical terms, a 
wider group will inevitably be targeted. This means 
that tackling the core problem will cost more than 
it would if we had perfect information on incomes 
and energy requirements at all times.
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10. Aside from these considerations, there are two 
additional principles worth stressing which flow 
from our choice of indicator. First, the fact that the 
indicator is relatively stable over time means that 
policy-makers could establish ways of identifying 
and targeting that would hold from year to year. 
This contrasts to a degree with the current indicator 
of fuel poverty whose sensitivity to prices means 
that new and different kinds of household are 
pulled into or pushed out of fuel poverty with every 
price change.
11. Second, a reliable fuel poverty gap measure would 
give a clear indicator of the types of household that 
are priorities for assistance. This brings an entirely 
new perspective to targeting, opening up avenues 
for assisting priority cases as well as measuring 
the impact on them. In this way, finding the most 
straight-forward ways of targeting groups with 
the highest average fuel poverty gaps and which 
account for the largest proportions of the aggregate 
gap could lead to considerable progress.
12. Later in Section 3.4 we discuss further the 
implications for targeting of the LIHC approach.
6. However the area of energy costs and energy 
efficiency is one where straying over a strict 
boundary of eligibility should not necessarily 
be seen as a problem. For example, helping a 
low-income household that has costs that are 
just below the threshold may not immediately 
address fuel poverty but will make an important 
difference to the lives of those who find high 
energy costs difficult to deal with. Similarly, if a 
high-costs household is helped that is not low-
income, but is just above the income threshold, this 
intervention will still make a difference in terms of 
national energy efficiency and reduction of carbon 
emissions.
7. Being relatively relaxed about the fact that some 
people on the wrong side of a given threshold may 
receive assistance makes even more sense when 
one considers the reality that people’s situations 
change frequently over time, for example as they 
move in or out of employment, as they have 
children or as they move home.39 Perfect targeting 
of those at risk of fuel poverty this year would still 
leave others in fuel poverty next year. Therefore 
any policies which address a wider group of homes 
than are occupied by fuel poor households at one 
particular time is very likely still to help to tackle the 
problem in the long term.
8. Experience from other policy areas also suggests 
caution in attempting to draw precisely targeted 
systems. This is discussed in Box 3.1.
9. The implied lesson is that it is best to avoid sharp 
‘cliff edges’, such as entitlement to assistance which 
depends on receipt of a narrow range of income-
tested benefits. From this perspective too, a degree 
of imprecision in targeting may be desirable rather 
than undesirable.
39 See, for example: Sefton, T. (2004). Aiming High – An evaluation of the 
potential contribution of Warm Front towards meeting the Government’s 
fuel poverty target in England. CASE report 28. CASE: London. Also Hills, 
J. McKnight, A. and Smithies, R. (2006). Tracking Income: How Working 
Families’ Incomes Vary Through the Year. CASE report 32. CASE: 
London. Also Jenkins, S. (2011). Changing Fortunes: Income Mobility 
and Poverty Dynamics in Britain. Oxford University Press: Oxford
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Box 3.1: Welfare reforms and means-testing
The pension reforms of the last few years have been designed, with all-party support, to reduce the 
extent to which people are affected by means-testing in old age, which creates disincentives for people 
to save towards their own retirement. The Universal Credit reforms being introduced by the current 
government are also designed to smooth out some of the worst of the ‘poverty trap’ and disincentives to 
work for those of working age and on low incomes. Measures that involve tight means-testing for other 
kinds of assistance work to undermine these reforms, despite their immediate attraction in reducing 
costs.
As an example, an intervention that reduced someone’s energy bills by £400 per year – a typical fuel 
poverty gap in 2009 – would be worth £8 per week to them. If they already faced an effective marginal tax 
rate of 72 per cent (which many on the margins of poverty will as a result of income tax, national insurance 
contributions and tax credit withdrawal), they would need an increase in gross income of nearly four times 
this – £29 per week – to offset this benefit if an income increase meant loss of entitlement to this help. In 
turn, this would require an increase in earnings of more than one quarter for a lone parent working for 16 
hours at the minimum wage. Many tenants have even higher effective marginal tax rates, as can be seen in 
Figure 3.1.
If the intervention were seen as equivalent to a capital grant worth thousands of pounds, and its value 
compared with the income change across a single year, the effective marginal tax rate could work out at 
much more than 100 per cent.
As always, it is not that people are necessarily in a position to make such calculations or would even 
actually respond directly to the disincentives involved if they could, but putting people in a position 
where they are no better off – or even worse off – if they ‘do the right thing‘ by increasing earnings has 
more general corrosive effects.
Source: DWP Tax Benefit Model, April 2010 
(see: http://research.dwp.gov.uk/asd/index.php?page=tbmt)
Figure 3.1: Marginal deduction rate for a hypothetical 
tenant couple with two children and no childcare costs 
where the head of the family works 30 hours a week, 
(2009-10)
Gross earnings (£ per week)
Marginal Deduction Rate
Note: The marginal deduction rate is the effective marginal tax rate faced by a person on their earnings, given effects of direct taxation and the 
withdrawal of mean-tested benefits. Rent is assumed to be £209 per week and Council Tax £27 in this example. 
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SAP/Energy Performance Certificate 
rating
15. Figure 3.2 below shows the breakdown of 
households within the income/costs matrix by SAP, 
or, more specifically, Energy Performance Certificate 
(EPC) rating. The distribution shows how the energy 
efficiency rating of a property is a clear factor in 
driving high costs. As might be expected, almost 
no properties with an energy performance rating 
of A, B or C have costs above the median energy 
costs threshold. The few that do have this level of 
efficiency and have costs above the threshold are to 
be found close to the threshold as it is currently set, 
and so have very low fuel poverty gaps (although 
this could change over time as the energy efficiency 
of the housing stock improves).
16. We can also see that a very large proportion of 
dwellings with ratings of E, F or G are fuel poor. 
The analysis in Table 3.1 confirms that properties 
with an F or G rating in particular have very high 
costs, with an average fuel poverty gap of £767 per 
property. Between them, F and G rated properties 
account for more than half of the total fuel poverty 
gap. Taken together with E rated properties, the 
most energy inefficient homes in England account 
for 90 per cent of the aggregate fuel poverty gap 
and for three-quarters of fuel poor households.
3.2 Characteristics for 
targeting
13. One of the attractions of the LIHC approach is the 
way in which it provides a bridge between the 
aggregate numbers and trends shown by the fuel 
poverty statistics and the ways in which practical 
policies can be directed on the ground to those 
most at risk. Our approach to measuring fuel 
poverty offers this advantage in part because it 
provides an understanding of the characteristics 
shown by households in different parts of the 
income and costs matrix. In effect, our approach 
to measurement opens up an understanding of 
the distribution of different types of households 
by income and required energy costs that in 
turn can lead to the development of a successful 
approach to targeting those households in the fuel 
poverty quadrant.
14. This section examines in detail a range of relevant 
characteristics – which may relate to households, 
dwellings or other factors – starting with energy 
efficiency characteristics. Box 3.2, at the end of the 
next section discusses some practical approaches 
to targeting on the ground, although we have not 
been able to consider these in great detail.
Attempts to target fuel poor households for policy interventions involve trade-offs. Precise targeting 
would require administratively burdensome screening, while the use of proxy indicators means 
that households who are not strictly identified as fuel poor would be eligible for policies. However 
the latter outcome is not necessarily undesirable since eligibility criteria which include households 
on the margins of fuel poverty are still likely to help address the problem of fuel poverty in the 
long term, either by helping those households whose energy costs are just below the threshold 
and who may become fuel poor over time, or by helping those who are just above the income 
threshold but who are still facing high costs. The experience gained from means-testing in other 
policy areas also suggests a need to avoid devising eligibility criteria which result in sharp cliff edges, 
such as entitlement to assistance which depends on receipt of a narrow range of income-tested 
benefits. Finally, the use of the LIHC indicator would have two further strengths when considering 
targeting. The relative stability of the headcount indicator should allow ways of targeting that are 
consistent from year to year, while the fuel poverty gap helps identify households that are a priority 
for assistance. 
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17. Table 3.1 provides more of the detail underpinning 
Figure 3.2, including the proportion of LIHC 
households that have a given EPC rating. The 
table also shows the proportion of all low-income 
households (both high and low costs) with a given 
rating. The table also shows the fuel poverty gap 
relating to each rating.40
40 We adopt a similar presentational approach for other  
characteristics in Tables 3.2 to 3.8 below. Additional information  
is available in our on-line Annex, which can be found at:  
www.decc.gov.uk/hillsfuelpovertyreview
Table 3.1: Distribution of fuel poor households by EPC rating, with fuel poverty gaps, 2009, England
  ABC D E FG Total
Proportion of all households that are found in this group (%) 14 38 34 14 100
Proportion of households in this group that have LIHC (%) 1 8 18 24 13
Proportion of individuals in this group that have LIHC (%) 3 11 21 27 15
Proportion of LIHC households that have this EPC rating (%) 2 23 48 28 100
Proportion of low-income households that have this EPC rating (%) 17 39 30 14 100
Fuel poverty gap – aggregate (£ million) 6 119 416 575 1,116
Proportion of aggregate fuel poverty gap accounted for by this group (%) 1 11 37 52 100
Average fuel poverty gap – per LIHC household (£) 140 194 323 767 414
Source: Fuel Poverty Data 2009 (DECC)
Figure 3.2: Distribution of households by EPC rating, 
2009, England
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Source: DECC Fuel Poverty Data 2009.
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Wall type
22. The wall type of the property is a significant factor 
in whether a household is fuel poor (Table 3.5). 
Non-cavity wall properties (which are predominately 
solid wall) make up 45 per cent of the fuel poor 
and more than half of the aggregate fuel poverty 
gap despite only representing around 30 per cent of 
properties in general.
Property type
23. More than two thirds of fuel poor households 
live in either terraced or semi-detached properties 
(Table 3.6). Along with detached properties these 
make up 86 per cent of the fuel poverty gap. 
Detached properties, perhaps unsurprisingly, have 
the largest fuel poverty gap (£788).
Age of property
24. The age of the property is also a very significant 
factor in driving high energy costs, with older 
properties having greater fuel poverty gaps, linked 
again to features such as solid walls (Table 3.7). 
Houses built before 1945 make up two thirds of 
the aggregate fuel poverty gap. These properties 
also account for over half of the fuel poor, despite 
accounting for just over a third of properties 
nationally.
Heating system
25. The heating system within the property also 
has a clear impact on the depth of fuel poverty. 
This is expected given the link between heating 
systems and EPC ratings and our previous EPC-
related findings. Homes with fixed room heating 
or portable heating have very high fuel poverty 
gaps. Although such households do not make up a 
large proportion of households that are fuel poor, 
they account for a disproportionate share of the 
aggregate fuel poverty gap. Table 3.8 also shows 
that a relatively large proportion of households with 
either fixed room heating or portable heating are 
fuel poor.
18. It can therefore be seen that any low income 
household living in an E, F or G rated property 
has a high probability of being in fuel poverty. 
Households in band D properties account for nearly 
all of the rest of the fuel poverty gap. However, on 
average, low-income households occupying band 
D properties have fuel costs below the current 
median level. We discuss below in Section 3.3 the 
characteristics of the households with a Band D 
rating that are also fuel poor.
Other characteristics
Rurality
19. Rural households make up 20 per cent of LIHC 
households, which is similar to the proportion of 
rural households nationally. However the depth of 
fuel poverty in rural households is much greater: 
rural LIHC households have an average fuel poverty 
gap of £622 compared to a gap of £362 for urban 
properties (Table 3.2).
On and off gas grid
20. Linked to this, as can be seen in Table 3.3, being off 
the gas grid also drives high costs, with an average 
fuel poverty gap for such dwellings of £705. Those 
properties that are both off the gas grid and in rural 
areas face some of the highest fuel poverty gaps of 
all, at nearly £800.
Payment method
21. The distribution of fuel poor households by 
payment method (Table 3.4) shows that fuel 
poor households are reasonably evenly split, with 
28 per cent using prepayment meters, 33 per cent 
paying by standard credit and 38 per cent by 
direct debit. One quarter of all households using 
prepayment meters are fuel poor, compared to 
less than one in ten of those paying by direct debit 
and one in six of those paying by standard credit. 
The fuel poverty gaps for those using pre-payment 
meters are smaller, however, than for those using 
other methods.
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27. Table 3.10 shows how the composition of the fuel 
poor under the LIHC indicator breaks down using 
the Index of Multiple Deprivation scale. As might 
be expected the most deprived areas account for 
a higher proportion of fuel poor households, with 
the 40 per cent most deprived areas accounting for 
more than half of LIHC households, but only 43 per 
cent of the fuel poverty gap. However, the table 
also shows that LIHC households are found across 
the whole deprivation scale, with a third of the fuel 
poverty gap found in the least deprived 40 per cent 
of areas, making the Index a very approximate tool 
for targeting purposes.
Tenure, region and area deprivation
26. Across tenures, although a high proportion of 
households in social housing have low income 
(52 per cent), less than a third of these also have 
low cost (16 per cent). This is probably explained 
by the greater average energy efficiency of social 
housing (in 2009 the average SAP rating of the 
social housing stock was 61 compared to an 
overall average for all housing of 53). Nevertheless, 
there are 585,000 social tenants (or about one 
in six social tenant households) in fuel poverty 
in 2009 under our indicator. In terms of regional 
distribution, the LIHC indicator finds that London 
households account for a greater proportion of fuel 
poor households than the official indicator. Table 
3.9 shows that London households are only slightly 
less likely to be fuel poor than others, although 
they do appear to be less deeply in fuel poverty on 
average, with a considerably lower average fuel 
poverty gap than other regions. There is a relatively 
even split between the broad regions in terms of 
the fuel poverty gap, so that region by itself would 
not be an effective targeting tool.
Table 3.2: Distribution of fuel poor households by rurality, with fuel poverty gaps, 2009, England
  Rural Urban TOTAL
Proportion of all households that are found in this group (%) 20 80 100
Proportion of households in this group that have LIHC (%) 13 12 13
Proportion of individuals in this group that have LIHC (%) 14 16 15
Proportion of LIHC households that have this rurality (%) 20 80 100
Proportion of low-income households that have this rurality (%) 15 85 100
Fuel poverty gap – aggregate (£ million) 338 778 1,116
Proportion of aggregate fuel poverty gap accounted for by this group (%) 30 70 100
Average fuel poverty gap – per LIHC household (£) 622 362 414
Source: Fuel Poverty Data 2009 (DECC)
Getting the measure of fuel poverty 77
CHAPTER 3 FINDING THE FUEL POOR
Table 3.3: Distribution of fuel poor households by rurality and gas grid connection, with fuel poverty gaps, 
2009, England
  on grid 
urban
on grid 
rural
off grid 
urban
off grid 
rural
TOTAL
Proportion of all households that are found in this group (%) 74 13 6 7 100
Proportion of households in this group that have LIHC (%) 13 10 10 18 13
Proportion of individuals in this group that have LIHC (%) 16 11 12 19 15
Proportion of LIHC households with a given rurality and 
connection to the gas grid (%)
75 10 5 10 100
Proportion of low-income households with a given rurality 
and connection to the gas grid (%)
77 10 7 6 100
Fuel poverty gap – aggregate (£ million) 713 127 65 211 1,116
Proportion of aggregate fuel poverty gap accounted for by 
this group (%)
64 11 6 19 100
Average fuel poverty gap – per LIHC household (£) 352 457 519 795 414
Source: Fuel Poverty Data 2009 (DECC)
Table 3.4: Distribution of fuel poor households by electricity payment method, with fuel poverty gaps,  
2009, England 
  direct 
debit
pre 
payment
standard 
credit
Total
Proportion of all households that are found in this group (%) 60 14 26 100
Proportion of households in this group that have LIHC (%) 8 25 16 13
Proportion of individuals in this group that have LIHC (%) 10 30 20 15
Proportion of LIHC households that have this payment method (%) 38 28 33 100
Proportion of low-income households that have this payment method (%) 40 29 31 100
Fuel poverty gap – aggregate (£ million) 457 253 406 1,116
Proportion of aggregate fuel poverty gap accounted for by this group (%) 41 23 36 100
Average fuel poverty gap – per LIHC household (£) 443 330 453 414
Source: Fuel Poverty Data 2009 (DECC)
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Table 3.5: Distribution of fuel poor households by wall type, with fuel poverty gaps, 2009, England
  Other (mostly 
solid walls)
Cavity 
wall
Total
Proportion of all households that are found in this group (%) 30 70 100
Proportion of households in this group that have LIHC (%) 19 10 13
Proportion of individuals in this group that have LIHC (%) 22 12 15
Proportion of LIHC households that have this wall type (%) 45 55 100
Proportion of low-income households that have this wall type (%) 33 67 100
Fuel poverty gap – aggregate (£ million) 581 535 1,116
Proportion of aggregate fuel poverty gap accounted for by this group (%) 52 48 100
Average fuel poverty gap – per LIHC household (£) 479 361 414
Source: Fuel Poverty Data 2009 (DECC)
Table 3.6: Distribution of fuel poor households by property type, with fuel poverty gaps, 2009, England
 
Bungalow
converted 
flat
purpose 
 built 
flat Detached terraced
semi-
detached Total
Proportion of all households that are 
found in this group (%) 9 4 15 17 29 26 100
Proportion of households in this group 
that have LIHC (%) 11 15 4 10 16 15 13
Proportion of individuals in this group 
that have LIHC (%) 13 17 5 12 19 18 15
Proportion of LIHC households that 
have this property type (%) 8 5 5 14 36 32 100
Proportion of low-income households 
that have this property type (%) 8 5 2 9 35 24 100
Fuel poverty gap – aggregate (£ million) 87 41 28 301 343 316 1,116
Proportion of aggregate fuel poverty 
gap accounted for by this group (%) 8 4 2 27 31 28 100
Average fuel poverty gap – per LIHC 
household (£) 386 338 217 788 352 366 414
Source: Fuel Poverty Data 2009 (DECC)
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Table 3.7: Distribution of fuel poor households by age of property, with fuel poverty gaps, 2009 England
pre 
1919
1919 
– 1944
1945 
– 1964
post 
1964
Total 
Proportion of all households that are found in this group (%) 21 17 20 42 100
Proportion of households in this group that have LIHC (%) 19 18 14 6 13
Proportion of individuals in this group that have LIHC (%) 22 23 16 8 15
Proportion of LIHC households with this property age (%) 31 25 23 21 100
Proportion of low-income households with this property age (%) 22 17 22 39 100
Fuel poverty gap – aggregate (£ million) 473 278 180 185 1,116
Proportion of aggregate fuel poverty gap accounted for by 
this group (%) 42 25 16 17 100
Average fuel poverty gap – per LIHC household (£) 557 417 297 323 414
Source: Fuel Poverty Data 2009 (DECC)
Table 3.8: Distribution of fuel poor households by heating system, with fuel poverty gaps, 2009, England
  Central 
heating
Fixed 
room 
heating
Portable 
heating
Storage 
heater
Total
Proportion of all households that are found in this group (%) 90 3 0.1 7 100
Proportion of households in this group that have LIHC (%) 12 27 43 12 13
Proportion of individuals in this group that have LIHC (%) 15 29 32 15 15
Proportion of LIHC households that have this heating  
system (%) 15 29 32 15 15
Proportion of low-income households that have this  
heating system (%) 87 6 0.3 7 100
Fuel poverty gap – aggregate (£ million) 89 4 0.1 6 100
Proportion of aggregate fuel poverty gap accounted for by 
this group (%) 891 136 8 81 1,116
Average fuel poverty gap – per LIHC household (£) 80 12 0.7 7 100
Fuel poverty gap – per LIHC household (£) 380 871 978 432 414
Source: Fuel Poverty Data 2009 (DECC)
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Table 3.9: Distribution of fuel poor households by Government Office region, with fuel poverty gaps,  
2009, England
  SW SE LON WM EM EE YH NW NE Total
Proportion of all households that are 
found in this group (%) 10 16 14 10 9 11 10 14 5 100
Proportion of households in this group 
that have LIHC (%) 11 8 12 16 16 11 12 14 15 13
Proportion of individuals in this group 
that have LIHC (%) 12 10 17 21 19 13 16 16 19 15
Proportion of LIHC households that are in 
this region (%) 9 10 14 14 11 10 10 16 6 100
Proportion of low-income households 
that are in this region (%) 9 12 17 12 9 9 10 14 6 100
Fuel poverty gap – aggregate (£ million) 120 128 125 144 130 127 105 162 74 1,116
Proportion of aggregate fuel poverty gap 
accounted for by this group (%) 11 11 11 13 12 11 9 14 7 54
Average fuel poverty gap – per LIHC 
household (£) 479 459 332 390 446 491 385 383 430 414
Source: Fuel Poverty Data 2009 (DECC)
Table 3.10: Distribution of fuel poor households by Index of Multiple Deprivation, 2009, England
 
Index of multiple deprivation scale  
(1 = most deprived)
  1-2 3-4 5-6 7-8 9-10 Total
Proportion of all households that are found in this group (%) 20 20 20 21 20 100
Proportion of households in this group that have LIHC (%) 18 14 12 10 8 13
Proportion of individuals in this group that have LIHC (%) 24 18 14 11 9 15
Proportion of LIHC households that are in this IMD group (%) 29 23 20 16 12 100
Proportion of low-income households that are in this IMD  
group (%) 33 24 18 15 10 100
Fuel poverty gap – aggregate (£ million) 246 235 262 223 151 1,116
Proportion of aggregate fuel poverty gap accounted for by  
this group (%) 22 21 23 20 14 100
Average fuel poverty gap – per LIHC household (£) 317 383 487 504 462 414
Source: Fuel Poverty Data 2009 (DECC)
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One of the clearest characteristics of fuel poor households highlighted by the compositional 
breakdown of the LIHC indicator is their low energy efficiency ratings. Properties with an E, F or G 
EPC rating are lived in by 75 per cent of LIHC households, accounting for 90 per cent of the fuel 
poverty gap. Other key characteristics include:
•	 Rurality: rural households are deeper in fuel poverty with an average fuel poverty gap of £622, 
compared to £362 for urban properties.
•	 Connection to the gas grid is also important, with off-grid properties having higher costs. 
Households that are both off the gas grid and located in rural areas have the highest fuel poverty 
gaps of all, at nearly £800.
•	 Although fuel poor households are generally evenly distributed between the different payment 
methods, one in four households using a prepayment meter are fuel poor compared to fewer than 
one in ten households on direct debit.
•	 The characteristics of the property are also useful guides to the likelihood of a households being 
fuel poor. Non-cavity wall properties (the majority of which are solid wall) make up 45 per cent of 
the fuel poor households, compared with just over 30 per cent of households nationally.
•	 Terraced, semi-detached and detached properties together make up 86 per cent of the aggregate 
fuel poverty gap, with detached properties having the highest average fuel poverty gap at £788.
•	 The 38 per cent of properties built before 1945 make up two-thirds of the aggregate fuel 
poverty gap.
•	 On the LIHC basis, fuel poverty is spread fairly evenly between regions, including London, while it is 
only weakly concentrated in areas of general deprivation.
However no one characteristic by itself can be used to identify fuel poor households. The next 
section goes on to look at how these characteristics can be used in combination. An online Annex 
details additional information about the distribution of households by different characteristics. This is 
available at: www.decc.gov.uk/hillsfuelpovertyreview
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3.3 Proxies for targeting
28. Understanding the characteristics of fuel poor 
households is a first step to identifying them on the 
ground. However, we need to use this information 
to examine which specific proxies can be used to 
screen households most effectively. This is because, 
on their own, the characteristics identified in 
the previous section are only part of the picture. 
For example, we have seen how under the LIHC 
framework it is very likely that a low income 
household living in an E, F or G rated home will be 
fuel poor. This is a helpful insight – but it does not 
in itself tell us how to identify such households in 
practice. How could prospective installers of energy-
efficiency measures know where the low energy 
efficiency homes are and which ones are lived in by 
households below the income threshold?
Figure 3.3: Distribution of households by whether or not 
they are receiving means-tested benefits, 2009, England
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Source: DECC Fuel Poverty Data 2009.
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costs. These ‘false positives’ are shown in Figure 3.3 
by orange dots outside the LIHC quadrant. Black 
dots outside the LIHC quadrant represent ‘true 
negatives’, some of whom, of course, have low 
incomes and some of whom have high costs (but 
not both).
Combining low income and energy 
efficiency proxies
The benefits group
30. Proxies for energy efficiency have hitherto not been 
easily found – instead, agents on the ground tend 
to conduct some kind of property assessment. 
For example, eligibility for Warm Front, given the 
new SAP-related criterion, is confirmed through a 
physical property survey.
31. The framework explored above gives a way of 
analysing the extent to which the use of different 
characteristics as proxies for low-income households 
and high costs can lead to identification of the 
target groups, perhaps as the first stage in a 
screening process. For instance, the first five lines of 
Table 3.11 show a simple set of proxies for energy 
Low income proxies
29. One obvious starting point is to consider proxies 
for low income. The most commonly used proxy is 
receipt of means-tested benefits. This is not without 
its pitfalls. Our analysis shows that in 2009 only 62 
per cent of LIHC households were on means-tested 
benefits.41 These households also accounted for 
62 per cent of the aggregate fuel gap. Figure 3.3 
shows all households receiving benefits (the orange 
dots) and households not receiving benefits (the 
black dots). The 62 per cent of LIHC households 
on means-tested benefits – ‘true positives’ (i.e. the 
households we want to target, and are identified 
through using this proxy) – are represented by 
the orange dots within the LIHC quadrant. 38 
per cent of LIHC households were not on means-
tested benefits – these ‘false negatives’ (i.e. the 
households we are trying to target, but who are 
not identified by using this proxy) are represented 
by the black dots within the LIHC quadrant in the 
figure. At the same time, 72 per cent of those on 
these benefits did not have low incomes and high 
41 Our analysis has been based on the list of means-tested benefits for 
which information is available to DECC within the results of the English 
Housing Survey.
Table 3.11: Cumulative targeting rates for households receiving means-tested benefits, by property 
characteristics, 2009, England
No of 
households
No of 
LIHC 
households
Proportion 
of fuel 
poverty gap 
(%)
LIHC 
households 
in this 
group as 
proportion 
of all such 
households 
(%)
Proportion 
of LIHC 
households 
accounted 
for by 
these 
households 
(%)
Rate of 
false 
positives 
(%)
Oil/solid fuel fired system 186 109 9 59 4 41
OR fixed room/portable heating 372 208 17 56 8 44
OR rural off grid 536 272 20 51 10 49
OR solid wall 2,108 923 42 44 34 56
OR pre-1945 2,765 1,171 51 42 43 58
With all other EFG properties 3,454 1,441 59 42 53 58
Source: Fuel Poverty Data 2009 (DECC)
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accounting for 51 per cent of the fuel poverty gap. 
However, in total 2.8 million households would be 
identified by this limited, possibly initial, screening.
34. The orange dots in Figure 3.4 illustrates the 
households captured by this targeting approach. 
Comparing this with the distribution of all 
households shown in Figure 3.3 indicates how well 
these households are concentrated on the core of 
the problem.
35. One immediate conclusion is that it would be 
unreasonable to expect using any simple proxies of 
this kind to have a high ‘hit rate’ in terms of finding 
LIHC households without also accepting that this 
can only be achieved while also identifying a larger 
number of homes which are not strictly within the 
LIHC definition.
36. A second conclusion is, however, that given that 
only 62 per cent of LIHC households receive the 
means-tested benefits used here, accounting for the 
same proportion of the fuel poverty gap, finding 
more than half of the fuel poverty gap through this 
fairly simple screening is potentially quite helpful. 
efficiency which, when combined with benefit 
receipt, would identify households accounting for 
approximately half of the total fuel poverty gap, 
while keeping the rate of identifying ‘false positives‘ 
as low as possible.
32. The approach used here has been to layer certain 
dwelling characteristics on top of eligibility for 
means-tested benefits. The characteristics in 
question – type of fuel, rurality, connection to the 
gas grid, wall type and age of property – are all easy 
to identify by simple inquiries without a complex 
physical survey of the property in question.
33. The rate of false positives – households that are 
identified by this process but do not, in fact, have 
low incomes and high costs – is a minimum of 41 
per cent. This applies in the case of households 
receiving means-tested benefits with an oil or 
solid fuel fired heating system. Such households 
account for only 9 per cent of the total fuel poverty 
gap and 4 per cent of fuel poor households. If 
the characteristics are widened to include the first 
five of the characteristics shown in Table 3.11, 1.2 
million fuel poor households could be covered, 
Figure 3.4: Distribution of households identified using the 
proxies in Table 3.11, 2009, England
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benefits and living in E, F, or G rated properties. 
These are shown by the black dots in Figure 3.4. 
Our analysis shows that this would capture 59 per 
cent of the fuel poverty gap and 53 per cent of 
all LIHC households. The false positive rate would 
not change. This kind of information could be 
useful when weighing up the pros and cons of the 
screening that would be needed to collect such 
specific information.
Low-income households not receiving 
benefits
39. We need to look beyond the benefits group to 
uncover the remaining 38 per cent of the fuel 
poverty gap – and, indeed, of LIHC households. 
If there were a way of identifying low-income 
households who are not on means-tested benefits 
that had low income – which would require more 
detailed income screening – a similar approach could 
be taken to the one used above. Table 3.12 shows 
how much of the remaining total of LIHC households 
and the fuel poverty gap would be accounted for 
by low-income households who are not receiving 
means-tested benefits sharing the same range of 
property characteristics as those used above.
In addition, Figure 3.4 suggests that a proportion 
of the ‘false positives’ are actually quite close to the 
cost and income thresholds, so there would still be 
benefits from assisting them, if they were not ruled 
out by a second stage of screening.
37. Since the proportion of the fuel poverty gap 
accounted for by households receiving means-
tested benefits is 62 per cent, using this set of 
characteristics allows us to find five-sixths of the 
aggregate fuel poverty gap accounted for by 
households on means-tested benefits without 
additional information.
38. Finding 51 per cent of the fuel poverty gap and 
43 per cent of LIHC households in the way set 
out above still leaves 49 per cent of the gap and 
57 per cent of households unidentified. Some 
of the remaining fuel poverty gap is accounted 
for by LIHC households eligible for means-tested 
benefits, but not displaying any of the other 
above characteristics. The final line of Table 3.11 
therefore shows what could be added if some kind 
of mechanism (such as an address-specific energy-
efficiency database) allowed us to identify precisely 
all remaining households receiving means-tested 
Table 3.12: Targeting rates for low-income households not receiving means-tested benefits, by property 
characteristics, 2009, England
No of 
households 
(thousands)
No of LIHC 
households 
(thousands)
Proportion 
of fuel 
poverty 
gap (%)
LIHC 
households 
in this 
group as 
proportion 
of all 
households 
(%)
Proportion 
of LIHC 
households 
accounted 
for by these 
households 
(%)
Rate of 
false 
positives 
(%)
Oil/solid fuel fired system 92 89 6 97 3 3
Or rural off grid 146 130 9 89 5 11
OR Fixed room/portable heating 
(no central heating)
215 180 12 83 7 17
OR solid wall 862 539 24 63 20 37
OR pre 1945 1,105 686 30 62 25 38
OR SAP EFG 1,443 902 36 63 33 37
Source: Fuel Poverty Data 2009 (DECC)
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method (pre-payment meter) and, as with E, F and 
G households, whether they are receiving benefits. 
The first two characteristics could identify a further 
5 per cent of the fuel poverty gap, most – allowing 
for some overlap – of those missing from the 
bottom lines of Tables 3.11 and 3.12.
44. However the rate of false positives is far higher within 
this group of households. For instance, 26 per cent 
of lone parent households in homes with a SAP 
rating of D are LIHC, but this is only some 190,000 
households in total. If we add SAP D households that 
pay for their electricity by pre-payment meter, and all 
SAP D households on benefits, this allows us to reach 
473,000 households, equivalent to nearly a fifth of 
all fuel poor households and 8 per cent of the fuel 
poverty gap. Indeed, by looking at these three simple 
proxies, we are able to capture nearly three quarters 
of the fuel poverty gap that is accounted for by SAP D 
households.
45. On this first attempt we have, however, not been 
able to identify simple characteristics that would 
allow us to identify a large number of Band D 
fuel poor, without also capturing a large number 
of other households, without more detailed 
information or wider screening.
40. Our analysis shows that with such detailed income 
information, and by using the same five energy 
efficiency proxies as before, we could reach a 
further 30 per cent of the aggregate fuel poverty 
gap for all households with a false positive rate of 
less than 40 per cent.
41. Our analysis also shows that targeting LIHC 
households that do not receive benefits is extremely 
difficult without additional information on incomes. 
Using the five property characteristics alone with no 
further income information, 7.5 million households 
would have to be screened order to find 686,000 
additional households in fuel poverty.
Less energy inefficient homes
42. A quarter of LIHC households and a tenth of the 
fuel poverty gap are accounted for by households 
in properties with ratings better than E, the majority 
of these being D-rated properties (although only 
27 per cent of low-income households in D rated 
homes are LIHC).
43. Table 3.13 shows some characteristics for these 
households that would be the most promising 
as a way of identifying them. These are the type 
of household (lone parents), electricity payment 
Table 3.13: Cumulative targeting rates for LIHC households in SAP Band D, by household characteristics, 
2009, England
Cumulative effects
Number of 
households 
(thousands)
Number 
of LIHC 
households 
(thousands)
% of fuel 
poverty gap 
accounted 
for
LIHC 
households 
in this 
group as 
proportion 
of all 
households 
(%)
Proportion 
of LIHC 
households 
accounted 
for by these 
household 
(%)
Rate of 
false 
positive 
(%)
Lone parents 739 190 3 26 7 74
OR electricity pre-payment 1,745 322 5 18 12 82
OR means-tested benefits 3,052 473 8 16 18 84
Source: Fuel Poverty Data 2009 (DECC)
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Box 3.2: Practical tools for targeting
For on the ground delivery of interventions, practical techniques are needed to identify households 
at risk. While we did not have the scope to examine these in detail, evidence submitted to the review 
touched on important issues about how this can be done. Issues raised included:
•	 Data-matching: one feature of some interventions is that they rely on households taking the 
initiative in order to receive help. For reasons including a sense of social stigma this means that 
uptake can be limited. Data-matching schemes can help to get round these low take-up rates, by 
identifying households to receive a benefit automatically. This is the approach used by DECC and 
DWP to find households eligible for the Warm Home Discount. While this approach has been very 
effective at identifying eligible households for this particular policy, extending it to other means-
tested benefits would not necessarily be straightforward, requiring for instance, legislation and 
raising issues of privacy and data protection.
•	 Area-based approaches are also commonly used by energy companies and other delivery bodies to 
target assistance. Specific geographic areas are identified, based on certain characteristics e.g. the 
concentration of households receiving means-tested benefits. While this approach – as with CESP 
– has been felt to be effective, it is not completely successful (for example concerns have been 
raised about whether this approach is appropriate for rural areas). The analysis in Table 3.10 above 
suggests that standard measures of area deprivation are not very effective in identifying areas of 
concentrated fuel poverty. It might be possible to use other characteristics, such as the energy 
efficiency proxies discussed in Section 3.3, to identify areas with a high concentration of properties 
‘at risk’ of fuel poverty. Any area-based approach means making trade-offs, for example between 
the cost-effectiveness advantages of tackling a whole street but including many households who 
may not be fuel poor (but who could make a contribution to the costs).
•	 Technological innovation also offers opportunities that may assist with targeting. Thermal imaging 
can be used to target energy inefficient homes, identifying heat loss from particular areas (which 
may indicate high costs). A recent project carried out by East Hertfordshire District Council used 
thermal imaging to identify households that would benefit from either free or subsidised insulation. 
Identification rates were of the same order as door to door canvassing. Smart meters are another 
innovation that might prove useful, either through the information the meters provide (though 
subject to the limitations set out above for data-matching) or through the opportunities provided 
by installation of the meters, which could be used to give energy efficiency advice to customers, or 
assess the energy efficiency of the property.
•	 We discuss in Chapter 5 the role of Energy Performance Certificates – and in particular the value of 
easy public access to such data on property energy efficiency.
•	 Finally, there are ways in which fuel poor households can be found which draw on other interactions 
between them and, for instance, the health system. Health-based referral schemes have been shown 
to be effective, including because of the relationship of trust between patient and GP. Pilot schemes 
are underway in several locations and their usefulness in being able to identify those vulnerable to 
the impacts of fuel poverty should be considered and best practice shared.
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47. Conceiving of the problem of fuel poverty in this 
way has a number of benefits. First, it should help 
drive assistance to those households who face 
the worst trade-offs between energy and other 
spending that can lead to the adverse health and 
social impacts which we considered in detail in our 
interim report.
48. Second, it creates an incentive for Government and 
those delivering policy to ensure that sustainable 
improvements are made to the homes of those 
households in the deepest fuel poverty, because 
this will have the biggest impact on the aggregate 
fuel poverty gap. As prices rise and the fuel poverty 
gap increases, the cost of making sustainable 
improvements – as opposed to alleviating fuel 
3.4 Prioritising assistance
46. A further advantage of the LIHC approach is that 
it provides a clear insight into which households 
should be prioritised for assistance. Leaving aside 
issues of vulnerability to the next section, the 
people facing the deepest problems are those with 
the biggest fuel poverty gaps. As set out in Figure 
3.5, it is possible conceptually to add layers within 
the fuel poverty quadrant of the costs/income 
matrix, which would help a tiered approach to 
targeting. Especially given the reasonably strong 
correlation between a household’s position on the 
costs line and its SAP, this approach corresponds 
broadly to the banded approach adopted for EPCs.
Understanding the core characteristics of LIHC households is a first step to identifying them on the 
ground. However we need to use this information to examine which proxies can be used to screen 
households more effectively. One limitation is that the traditional proxy for low income of means-
tested benefits receipt accounts for only 62 per cent of LIHC households and 62 per cent of the fuel 
poverty gap. However we show that within this group a small set of physical characteristics, which 
can be ascertained without an in-depth physical survey, could account for households with more 
than half the total fuel poverty gap. These are those having oil, solid fuel or portable heating, living 
in a rural property off the gas grid, having solid walls, or being built before 1945. However, even this 
most effective set of simple proxies would still identify more than twice as many households as were 
actually LIHC, without further screening.
Identifying the remaining half of the fuel poverty gap is much harder. Finding all households on 
benefits living in other E, F and G rated properties would take the total of the fuel poverty gap 
accounted for to 59 per cent, leaving 3 per cent of LIHC households who receive means-tested 
benefits unidentified (i.e. with homes that are neither E, F or G rated, or without any of the physical 
characteristics screened for).
Beyond this, 38 per cent of the fuel poverty gap is accounted for by low-income households who do 
not receive benefits. Finding them would require more detailed screening of incomes. If this could 
be done, the same range of five property characteristics could identify LIHC households accounting 
for a further 30 per cent of the fuel poverty gap, and other E, F and G properties for a further 6 per 
cent (which, along with the proportion of the fuel poverty gap that could be identified through a 
combination of means-tested benefits and energy efficiency proxies, would account for over 90 per 
cent of the fuel poverty gap in total). The majority of the rest of the fuel poverty gap is accounted 
for by the D-rated properties, but we could not find a simple way of identifying which of them were 
most at risk. 
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But even if this were done, the same households 
would be identified as having the greatest fuel 
poverty gaps. Lower cost thresholds imply that a 
larger number of households are affected by fuel 
poverty, but imply that the same households are the 
worst-affected and should be priority targets for 
assistance.
50. Of course, any threshold will leave a group of 
households just the ‘wrong’ side of it, so this is 
a problem however one is set. But one group of 
households of particular concern to stakeholders is 
those on low incomes with costs only slightly lower 
than the median modelled bill. Such households 
are not considered to be fuel poor under our 
framework but may still have bills that, given their 
low incomes, are not easy to pay. We set out the 
rationale for not identifying these households as 
‘fuel poor’ in our interim report (see pages 141-143 
in particular). WHECA defines households that are 
fuel poor as those that are low income and cannot 
be kept warm at reasonable cost. We believe this 
definition reflects the core problem of fuel poverty.
poverty through price policies or rebates on 
bills – remains the same. Take, for example, two 
households with similar income levels but different 
fuel poverty gaps – one representing very deep 
fuel poverty (a gap of, say, £800) and the other 
less deep fuel poverty (a gap of, say, £200). If both 
households received the same energy efficiency 
measure that lifted them out of fuel poverty at a 
cost of, for example, £3,000, the pay-off in fuel 
poverty gap terms would be £600 greater for 
the household with the higher gap. We consider 
cost-effectiveness of a range of policies in detail 
in Chapter 7, but already we can see that using 
the fuel poverty gap in this way could support 
cost-effective targeting of those most deeply in 
fuel poverty.
49. It should also be noted that this layered approach 
leads to similar results in terms of which households 
are the greatest priority wherever the fuel costs 
threshold is drawn. As we saw in Section 2.2, some 
of those responding to our consultation advocated 
setting, for the short term at least, a lower costs 
threshold than the median costs level we have used. 
Increasing income  
Low fuel poverty gaps –
least severe fuel poverty
Increasing
energy
costs
Figure 3.5: Fuel poverty severity bands within the Low 
Income High Costs approach
Higher fuel poverty gaps –
more severe fuel poverty
Highest fuel poverty gaps –
most severe fuel poverty
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51. Here it is important to remember the effects of the 
relative threshold which we concluded in Chapter 
2 should be the basis for defining ‘high costs’. Over 
time, we expect the energy efficiency of the stock 
overall to improve, and so the threshold will tend to 
fall, bringing in households which would currently 
be below the threshold. For us and, we believe 
for the vast majority of stakeholders, the priority 
households for immediate help are those deepest 
in fuel poverty – subject to considerations of 
vulnerability which we turn to in the next section. 
However, as overall standards improve and the 
worst problems are addressed we would need to 
turn to those that currently would be lower priority. 
The relative framework we suggest encourages this.
52. Secondly we showed in Section 3.1, that precision-
targeting of the fuel poor is extremely difficult and 
that all policies are therefore likely to have positive 
impacts on some households who are currently 
below the threshold (see Figure 3.4). Viewed in this 
overall context, some low-income households with 
costs just below the threshold are likely to receive 
assistance in any case, and others would be in line 
for assistance from fuel poverty policies in future.
The use of a fuel poverty gap to supplement the headcount indicator can provide a way of identifying 
those who are deepest in fuel poverty and therefore a priority for action. In this way, assistance can 
be prioritised at those who face the worst trade-offs between paying energy bills and other spending 
that can lead to adverse health and social impacts. Doing so will also have the biggest impact on the 
aggregate fuel poverty gap. Under a tiered approach of this kind the same households would remain 
the focus for interventions however the reasonable costs threshold was drawn.
3.5 Fuel poverty and 
vulnerability
53. In our interim report we explored the impacts 
of living in cold homes and two broad types of 
vulnerability – that is, vulnerability to being fuel 
poor and vulnerability to the effects of exposure to 
cold temperatures.
54. Certain groups of people are more vulnerable to 
being fuel poor, because they have higher energy 
requirements. For example, the elderly and those 
suffering from long term illness or disability may 
be more likely to spend more time in the home, 
leading to higher than average energy costs. This 
is to some extent allowed for in the way costs 
are modelled. However, this does not necessarily 
capture those who are most vulnerable to the 
impacts of cold homes.
55. In our interim report we showed evidence that there 
are strong associations between certain illnesses, 
some of which prove fatal, and cold homes. 
Additionally, certain groups of people are more 
likely to suffer from bad health as a result of living 
in low temperatures. Of the thousands of excess 
winter deaths each year, the overwhelming majority 
of these occur amongst the elderly. The elderly 
are also at greater risk of suffering from non fatal 
adverse health consequences as a result of spending 
time in low temperatures as are, to a lesser extent, 
younger children and those suffering from long 
term illness or disability based on the research we 
detailed in our previous report.
56. We discuss three issues below: whether the 
temperature standards used in the fuel poverty 
calculations should be different for certain groups; 
what properties of those identified by the LIHC 
indicator fall within particular vulnerable groups; 
and whether ‘extra costs benefits’ such as Disability 
Living Allowance should be included in income 
assessments.
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59. As far as the general temperature standards are 
concerned it would be helpful to revisit these when 
more data on temperatures and actual spending 
patterns are available.42 The general temperature 
standards could then be brought into line with 
contemporary behaviour (and average modelled 
bills would be brought more closely into line with 
actual spending patterns). However, once this 
was done, it would also be important to examine 
whether there is sound evidence of the health 
effects of cold temperatures that could be used to 
allow for the particular vulnerability of the elderly 
and of infants (and of some groups affected by 
disability and long-term illness) to the impact of cold 
temperatures to be reflected in higher standards for 
the temperatures used for those households.43
The distribution of vulnerable 
households in the costs/income 
matrix
60. Pending such developments, one would still argue 
that vulnerable households should remain priorities 
for action, even if they did not have the largest fuel 
poverty gaps. To indicate what this implies, Table 
3.14 shows the distribution of particular types of 
42 For instance, from the results of the Energy Follow-Up Survey and 
DECC’s current pilot exercise to match actual spending data to modelled 
requirements for individual households.
43 This examination might also reflect on the impact of high summer 
temperatures on the health of vulnerable people and the way in which 
any identified need for cooling during that time should be picked up in 
the fuel poverty methodology.
Temperature requirements
57. Our interim report found that there was less firm 
basis for the specific temperatures used in the 
BREDEM model for assessing household energy 
requirements than many suppose. We also found, 
more broadly, a lack of evidence about the impacts 
of specific temperatures on health. The limited 
evidence regarding the temperatures to which 
people, whose spending is not constrained, heat 
their homes suggests that these may be significantly 
lower than the 21°C temperature standard used 
for the main living room within the fuel poverty 
calculations. In general, the temperature standard 
may be set too high given contemporary behaviour. 
This suggests the need for more and better 
information about the temperature standards that 
those families who do not face particular energy 
spending constraints generally achieve.
58. Part of the strength of the proposed LIHC 
indicator and threshold related to median energy 
requirements is that it is much less sensitive to these 
assumptions than the current 10 per cent indicator. 
However, the size of the fuel poverty gap measured 
is affected by the assumptions.
Table 3.14: Distribution of vulnerable households by type under the LIHC matrix, England, 2009
Contains a person 
with a long-term 
illness or disability
Contains a 
person over 75
Contains a 
person under 5
Number of households in this group 6,278 2,441 2,740
% of all households in this group 29 11 13
Number of LIHC households in this group (000s) 917 269 530
% of households in this group that are fuel poor 
under LIHC
15 11 19
% of LIHC households in this group 34 10 20
Source: Fuel Poverty Data 2009 (DECC)
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about the way in which its inclusion leads to 
understatement of the proportion of disabled 
people who have low incomes.45 The effect of this 
would not necessarily be to change the overall 
number of households classed as fuel poor, but it 
would change their composition.
Older people and infants
63. Compared to the current official indicator, a smaller 
proportion of households including someone over 
75 years are captured by the LIHC indicator (11 per 
cent compared with 34 per cent). This is because 
over 75s have comparatively higher incomes under 
the LIHC indicator. One reason for this is the 
decision to use AHC income: many older people 
will have lower housing costs compared to other 
households because they tend to own their houses. 
It is also the case that the use of equivalisation 
factors under this indicator results in fewer ‘under-
occupiers’ being shown as fuel poor. We believe this 
is the correct approach for the reasons set out in 
Chapter 2 and Part B of its Annex and is consistent 
with responses to our consultation.
64. Nonetheless, 10 per cent of households with low 
incomes and high costs contain a member aged 75 
and over (Table 3.14). Given their vulnerability to 
low temperatures they are an obvious priority for 
action that makes it easier for them to keep warm.
65. Equally, around two-fifths of households classed as 
fuel poor under the LIHC measure contain children 
(Table A2.8), and one-fifth children under 5. This 
is a higher proportion than suggested by the 
current fuel poverty indicator, which we believe 
has understated the problem of fuel poverty for 
many families with children, as also highlighted in a 
recent report by Save the Children.46
45 For further analysis, see Hills, J. Brewer, M. Jenkins, S. Lister, R. Lupton, 
R, Machin, S. Mills, C. Modood, T. Rees, T. and Riddell, S (2010). An 
Anatomy of Economic Inequality in the UK: Report of the National 
Equality Panel. London: CASE. Box 7.3, p189-192.
46 Save The Children (2012). Rising Energy Costs: The Impact on Low 
Income Families. London: Save The Children. Available online at: 
http://www.savethechildren.org.uk/sites/default/files/docs/Rising%20
energy%20costs%20briefing.pdf
vulnerable groups across the income/costs matrix. 
The vulnerable groups shown are:
•	 Households including someone over 75 years;
•	 Households including someone aged under 5 
years; and
•	 Households including someone with a long-term 
illness or disability.
Of the 2.7 million households identified as LIHC 
in 2009, 54 per cent have one or other of these 
characteristics.
Long term sick or disabled people
61. Inclusion of Disability Living Allowance (DLA) in the 
calculation of household income under the fuel 
poverty methodology has been the subject of some 
debate. The rationale for entitlement to DLA is that 
those with long-term illnesses or disability require 
a higher income to achieve the same standards 
of living as others and it is therefore intended to 
cover the additional costs incurred as a result of 
disability or illness. However classifying DLA as 
general income for measuring fuel poverty implicitly 
assumes that its recipients are better off than those 
who do not receive it. Groups such as Macmillan 
Cancer Support therefore argue that this calculation 
does not accurately reflect the true disposable 
income of those suffering from long term illness or 
disability.44
62. Given the potential consequences of this 
calculation, Government (perhaps through the Fuel 
Poverty Methodology Group) should assess whether 
extra costs benefits such as DLA should be excluded 
from the assessment of household income used 
to measure fuel poverty. Our starting point is that 
removing DLA from the income calculation would 
be appropriate, reflecting more general arguments 
44 National statistics for the prevalence of fuel poverty at a particular date 
are of limited use in identifying households whose circumstances change 
rapidly due to illness, for example cancer patients. It is systems for 
providing support on the ground that need ways of rapidly channelling 
support and assistance to those who heating needs have changed 
suddenly for this kind of medical reason. 
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Certain groups of people are more vulnerable to being fuel poor, because they have higher energy 
requirements. Some of the factors driving these higher costs (such as needing to spend more time in 
the home) are captured in the way energy costs are modelled and households including vulnerable 
people will be identified as fuel poor. However this does not necessarily capture those who are most 
vulnerable to the impacts of fuel poverty and of cold homes.
The three main groups of people likely to experience particularly negative health impacts of fuel 
poverty are the elderly, infants, disabled people and those living with long term sickness. 34 per cent 
of fuel poor households contain someone with a disability or long-term illness, 20 per cent have 
a child aged 5 or under, and 10 per cent a person aged 75 or over. Given their vulnerability to the 
impacts of fuel poverty, these groups are an obvious priority for interventions that make it easier to 
keep warm, even if they do not have the very greatest fuel poverty gaps.
A related issue is the temperature standards that are used within the current model to calculate 
energy requirements. When more data are available on the temperatures at which households that 
are not constrained in what they can spend are actually living, these standards should be revisited to 
see whether they can be brought into line with contemporary behaviour (helping to bring average 
modelled bills more closely in line with actual spending patterns). Once this was done, it should be 
examined whether there is sound evidence of the health effects of cold temperatures that implies the 
need for separate standards that allowed for the particular vulnerability of the elderly and of infants 
(and of some groups affected by disability and long-term illness).
Another issue of concern in the way the fuel poverty methodology is calculated is the classification 
of extra costs benefits (such as the Disability Living Allowance) as general income, implying that 
households entitled to them are better off than those who do not, when they in fact reflect the 
requirement for a higher income to achieve the same standard of living as others. Government should 
assess whether removing extra costs benefits from the income calculation would be appropriate. 
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Chapter Summary
Targeting fuel poverty interventions involves trade-offs, with precise targeting not possible and not 
necessarily desirable. Experience from other kinds of means-testing suggests the need to avoid very 
closely defined systems and ‘cliff edges’ such as entitlements that rest on a narrow range of benefits. 
It would be naïve to think a problem affecting 2.7 million households could be addressed by offering 
assistance only to that number.
We have used the LIHC framework to examine what kinds household and dwelling characteristics are 
associated with being at risk of fuel poverty. For example, any low-income household living in an E, F 
or G rated home is highly likely to be fuel poor, and such households account for 90 per cent of the 
fuel poverty gap. However, no single characteristic, or proxy, can be expected to pinpoint fuel poor 
households with total accuracy.
In looking at which characteristics are most helpful to focus on when screening for households at 
risk the fuel poverty gap provides a helpful tool. For example, using a combination of means-tested 
benefits receipt and certain dwelling characteristics – oil/solid fuel heating system, rural off gas grid 
properties, solid walls, pre-1945 construction – just over half of the 2009 fuel poverty gap could be 
found (although more than twice as many households as were actually fuel poor would be identified 
by this first round of screening). One major constraint is that only 62 per cent of fuel poor households 
and 62 per cent of the fuel poverty gap is accounted for by households receiving means-tested 
benefits. Finding the rest would require more detailed screening of income levels.
The fuel poverty gap can be used to identify the households that are deepest fuel poverty and so 
are a priority for assistance, but it is important to consider vulnerability to the impacts of cold indoor 
temperatures. The groups of most concern are the elderly, children under 5 and people with a long-
term illness or disability. 
Technical recommendations
1. Once data on contemporary temperatures in people’s homes is available, the evidence of the 
health effects of cold temperatures should be re-examined to establish whether it implies a need 
for separate temperature standards to allow for the particular vulnerability of the elderly and 
infants, and of some groups affected by disability and long-term illness.
2. Government should assess whether removing extra costs benefits such as the Disability Living 
Allowance from the calculation of income in the fuel poverty measurement methodology would 
be appropriate.
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1. Having established our overall approach to the 
LIHC indicator, and considered who is fuel poor 
under this approach, we turn now to the issue 
of understanding how both our extent (numbers 
of people affected) and depth (fuel poverty gap) 
indicators would reflect the impact of different 
kinds of policies. An understanding of the 
theoretical impact provides preparation for an 
exploration of the potential impact of particular 
policies in later chapters.
2. The impact of a given policy depends on three key 
factors: its type; the kind of household targeted; 
and its source of funding. We first examine the 
impact of three broad types of policy – price-
based, energy efficiency-related and income-based. 
These sections include stylised examples of policies 
with different kinds of targeting. In Section 4.4 
we discuss how the source of funding – taxes or 
consumer bills – would affect the net results of any 
of these policies. The examples in Sections 4.1 to 
4.3 take no account of the funding implications.
4.1 Price-based policies
3. The Government could introduce policies designed 
to reduce the price paid by households for their 
energy. Such policies could lead (depending on their 
scale) to changes in the median bill and therefore 
an interaction with the position of households 
relative to the income threshold. This would imply 
some kind of effect on fuel poverty as measured by 
the LIHC indicator. Those households seeing lower 
bills and therefore reduced costs under the LIHC 
approach would have lower fuel poverty gaps (or 
move further away from the costs threshold if they 
already had lower costs). Any fuel poor household 
that did not see lower bills as a result of such 
policies would instead face an increase in its fuel 
poverty gap (as it would be further away from the 
cost threshold). The overall effect would depend on 
the balance achieved between these two outcomes. 
Policies to reduce prices and/or bills for poorer 
households specifically would be expected to bring 
some of them out of fuel poverty, reducing both 
headcount and fuel poverty gap indicators.
4. Policies falling into this category could also include 
rebates on energy bills (such as the current Warm 
Home Discount). It is possible to consider a discount 
of this kind to be equivalent to an income transfer. 
As such, its effect under the LIHC framework would 
relate to a household’s poverty status i.e. whether 
they are in poverty or not and, if so, how deeply. 
Taking a pure economics view, households receiving 
the rebate might ‘rationally’ consider it to be a 
boost to income that could actually be spent on any 
household expenditure. However, there is evidence 
to suggest that households receiving such payments 
do not always behave in this way, particularly where 
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forward and that some policies will affect non-fuel 
poor households. In this particular case, there is, 
of course, some advantage in helping low-income 
households meet the cost of their fuel bills, even if 
they do not have higher than typical costs.
7. A transfer such as this would only have a one-
off impact on fuel poverty unless repeated. This 
has implications for cost-effectiveness which are 
considered in Chapter 7.
a direct association with fuel has been made.47 For 
the analysis in later chapters we treat rebates as 
reductions in bills.
Example 1
5. The first example reflects the type of policy 
represented by the Warm Home Discount. This 
policy is focused on low-income households 
through the use of benefit proxies. The effect of this 
type of policy – without allowing for the fact that 
this particular policy is funded by a levy on customer 
bills – can therefore be represented as shown in 
Figure 4.1.
6. This type of instrument would tend to reduce 
levels of fuel poverty (both extent and depth). 
Some assistance is given to people outside the fuel 
poverty quadrant. We discussed in Chapter 3 the 
fact that targeting the fuel poor is not straight-
47 As explained further in Chapter 5, in 2011 the Institute for Fiscal Studies 
found that, in general, an income increase of £100 would lead to an 
increased spend on energy services of £3. The same report found that 
every £100 paid in Winter Fuel Payments led to an increased spend on 
energy services of £41.
Rising income  
Rising
costs
Figure 4.1: Impact of bill rebate targeted at low-income 
households
Effect on cost threshold
It would tend to fall a little.
Effect on income threshold
None, although it would intersect the 
cost threshold in a different place.
Effect on measure of extent of fuel poverty
The number of households would tend
to fall 
Effect on the fuel poverty gap
The aggregate gap would tend to fall.
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effects. A programme focused on low-income, 
energy-inefficient households would lead to 
reduced levels of fuel poverty, both in numbers 
and in the fuel poverty gap. By contrast, a 
programme that saw energy inefficiency tackled 
principally in richer homes would see fuel poverty 
increase, both in headcount and fuel poverty 
gap terms as the relative standard of low-income 
households deteriorated.
11. The implications of this were discussed briefly 
in Chapter 2 above. While some stakeholders 
see the last effect as a problem of the proposed 
indicator, we believe this feature should be seen as 
an advantage because it would show fuel poverty 
rising if energy efficiency improvements left low-
income households falling behind.
Example 2
12. A policy such as the Carbon Emission Reduction 
Target (CERT) represents an energy efficiency 
improvement policy that is targeted on those 
households requiring efficiency improvements. 
The priority and super priority groups mechanisms 
exist to ensure that the policy is delivered across 
the income distribution. The effect of this policy 
(again, we have not allowed for the fact that this 
specific policy is funded by a levy on bills) can be 
represented as shown in Figure 4.2.
4.2 Energy efficiency-based 
policies
8. A policy to improve energy efficiency standards 
would be expected to have an impact on the costs 
threshold (by improving median SAP and therefore 
lowering median modelled costs). The costs 
threshold would therefore intersect the income 
threshold at a different point.
9. The position of individual households would 
depend on whether or not they benefited from 
the measures deployed. Any households receiving 
assistance would move upwards within the 
framework of our indicator. Fuel poverty gaps for 
those fuel poor households assisted (measured 
in £s) would fall, reflecting the reduction in 
their energy requirements. A sufficiently large 
improvement in efficiency would obliterate the fuel 
poverty gap by taking the households out of fuel 
poverty, potentially on a sustainable basis.
10. An energy efficiency programme focused on the 
worst housing in general would have the effect 
of both shifting the median and benefiting those 
households who receive assistance. By extension, 
the relative position of those households not 
receiving the benefit would however worsen. 
In this way, energy efficiency programmes that 
improve overall standards have ambiguous 
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Rising income  
Effect on cost threshold
It would tend to fall.
Effect on income threshold
None, although it would intersect the 
cost threshold in a different place.
Effect on measure of extent of fuel poverty
Ambiguous, reflecting the overall 
income balance of households with 
high costs that receive assistance.
Effect on the fuel poverty gap
As for the measure of extent, with 
the largest fuel poverty gaps likely 
to be reduced.
Rising
costs
Figure 4.2: Impact of an energy efficiency improvement 
policy targeted at energy inefficient households
13. As can be seen, this type of policy would tend to 
lower bills for high-cost households, in that way 
tending to reduce fuel poverty and lowering fuel 
poverty gaps. However, the outturn in practice would 
depend on the precise way in which different types 
of household with high costs (fuel poor and non-fuel 
poor) were assisted as there would also be some 
effects on the median bill and so the cost threshold.
14. Energy efficiency improvements would represent a 
long-term change in household circumstances. This 
has implications for cost effectiveness which are 
considered in Chapter 7.
Example 3
15. A policy such as Warm Front represents an energy 
efficiency policy that is targeted on those low-
income households with low energy efficiency. The 
effect of this policy – which is tax-payer funded, 
although we have not allowed for this here – can 
be represented as follows:
16. Because of its focus on households in the fuel 
poverty quadrant, this policy would lead to 
reductions in the fuel poverty extent and depth 
indicators (with only limited effects on median bills 
and the cost threshold).
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4.3 Income-based policies
17. Policies increasing incomes would move households 
benefiting from them to the right of the diagram 
showing the LIHC framework. If all households 
received the same benefit, the median would 
change but the distribution around it would remain 
broadly the same. An income-based policy focused 
on poorer households would improve their position 
relative to the median (unless more than half of 
households benefited). Depending on their level of 
costs, this could move them out of fuel poverty. The 
aggregate fuel poverty gap would fall both because 
some households were removed from fuel poverty 
altogether but also because some would be moved 
to only just below the income threshold.
Example 4
18. The next example focuses on the incomes of low-
income households, such as a general increase in 
benefit levels or increasing the take up rates of 
benefits to which people are already entitled. The 
effect of such a policy might expected to be as shown 
in Figure 4.4.
19. Under such a policy, there would be no change to 
the costs threshold, although the income threshold 
could be increased a little (if some middle-income 
households benefited). This policy could reduce fuel 
poverty by pushing households in the fuel poverty 
quadrant to the right-hand side of the income 
threshold. Where this happened, fuel poverty gaps 
would be eliminated. There would also be some 
reduction in the fuel poverty gap as a result of 
pushing some households towards the leading edge 
of the fuel poverty quadrant (since the fuel poverty 
gap is the shortest vertical distance to the ‘edge’ of 
the fuel poverty quadrant).
20. As with the Warm Home Discount, such payments 
would need to be continued, or their impact would 
only be one-off. See Chapter 7 for consideration of 
implications for cost-effectiveness.
Example 5
21. The final example, shown in Figure 4.5 reflects 
a policy – such as Winter Fuel Payments, if they 
are classed as an income supplement – which 
directs income support to a large number of 
Rising income  
Rising
costs
Figure 4.3: Impact of an energy efficiency policy targeted at 
low-income households with low energy efficiency
Effect on cost threshold
It would tend to fall a little.
Effect on income threshold
None, although it would intersect the 
cost threshold in a different place.
Effect on measure of extent of fuel poverty
The number of households would fall.
Effect on the fuel poverty gap
The aggregate gap would fall.
Getting the measure of fuel poverty 101
CHAPTER 4 PRINCIPLES FOR TACKLING FUEL POVERTY
eligible households regardless of income. In the 
case of those payments, there is, of course, an 
age qualification. 
22. This policy would leave the cost threshold 
unaffected. The income threshold could see an 
increase, depending on the rate of changing 
incomes across the whole population. As with 
Example 4, the extent and depth of fuel poverty 
would fall through some households being pushed 
over the income threshold (or into the leading edge 
of the fuel poverty quadrant).
Rising income  
Rising
costs
Figure 4.4: Impact of an income improvement policy 
targeted at low-income households
Effect on cost threshold
This would remain the same.
Effect on income threshold
None (unless some middle income
households benefited.
Effect on measure of extent of fuel poverty
The number of households could fall.
Effect on the fuel poverty gap
The aggregate gap could fall.
Rising income  
Rising
costs
Figure 4.5: Impact of a non-means tested income support 
measure
Effect on cost threshold
It would remain the same.
Effect on income threshold
This would tend to increase.
Effect on measure of extent of fuel poverty
The number of households could fall.
Effect on the fuel poverty gap
The aggregate gap could fall.
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4.4: The effect of funding 
source on the impact of 
policies
23. These stylised examples have looked at the effects 
of different kinds of policy without specifically 
allowing for how they could be funded. However, 
the funding route could also affect fuel poverty 
measured under our proposed indicators. The 
overall impact of a given policy depends on the 
balance of these effects. In other words, the net 
effect reflects the type of policy in question, the 
type of households targeted and the type of 
funding used.48 We allow for these effects in our 
investigation of the relative impacts of different 
types of policy in Chapter 7.
24. Beyond voluntary expenditure by individual 
households (including expenditure that is 
incentivised through policy) there are two main 
sources of funding: the Exchequer and levies on 
energy bills. We look at these here.
Tax-funded policies
25. Assuming that funding were provided through 
direct taxation (e.g. income tax) – and assuming 
that we are considering new policies which add to 
the tax burden rather than displacing other tax and 
spend – the impact of funding policies in this way 
would be as follows:
•	 there would be no impact on the reasonable 
costs threshold;
•	 median income would be affected and the 
income threshold for the low income high costs 
indicator would therefore change.
48 Another reason for excluding the effect of funding from our stylised 
examples above is the fact that the net effect of different policies 
changes over time. One reason for this is that certain policies have 
effects that last longer than the policies themselves. So, while the costs 
of levy-funded policies are assumed to be passed on only during the 
operation of the policies themselves – for example, five years in the 
case of CERT – the benefits accrue well beyond this period (the lifetime 
of insulation measures delivered under CERT is taken to be 20 years). 
This means that the net effect of a given policy in a given year could be 
different from the same policy in a different year.
26. The effect could be slightly different for indirect 
taxation (e.g. VAT) depending on the goods and 
services which gave rise to it. In the case of taxation 
raised on goods and services other than domestic 
energy the impact would be the same as for direct 
taxation. On the other hand, increasing the level of 
taxation charged on domestic energy would have 
an impact on the reasonable costs threshold.
27. Data from the Office for National Statistics (ONS)49 
suggest that, measured against gross incomes, 
general tax increases would affect households 
approximately in proportion to their income, 
although they would be a slightly higher proportion 
for both the poorest and richest fifth.50 Given this, 
the overall distribution of household income would 
be unlikely to change. Broadly speaking, a fuel poor 
household before the increase in taxation would 
be fuel poor afterwards; similarly a non-fuel poor 
household would probably remain outside fuel 
poverty. In other words, tax-funded measures have 
a roughly equi-proportional impact on net incomes 
and therefore this type of funding would not affect 
the extent indicator under the LIHC approach.51
Policies funded by energy 
consumers
28. This range of funding sources could include 
increased VAT on energy spend, a carbon tax, or 
the impact on bills of the wide range of policies 
currently funded through levies on energy suppliers 
whose costs are assumed to be passed through to 
consumers.
49 ONS Statistical Bulletin, 19 May 2011, The effects of taxes and benefits 
on household income. London: ONS.
50 At the very bottom of the income scale, people pay little or no income 
tax. However, they contribute through indirect taxation on spending 
(typical spending patterns mean that such households would be 
expected to pay indirect tax equivalent to quite a high proportion of their 
income). At the very top of the income scale, people pay much higher 
levels of income tax, with rather less paid (as a proportion) through 
indirect taxation.
51 The reasoning in paragraph 27 above also implies that certain types 
of tax funding – for example the imposition of additional VAT on fuel 
or a carbon tax – might not have this impact because they would be 
levied in a way that reflected energy consumption. We briefly consider 
hypothecation of tax revenue for energy efficiency or other fuel poverty 
related policies in Chapter 5. Such hypothecation would alter the fuel 
poverty impact of tax-funded schemes.
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31. Where a new policy were funded through a levy 
where costs were passed on to consumers on a 
‘poll’ basis, each customer would face the same 
‘standing cost’ for the policy. This approach would 
affect both the reasonable costs and income 
thresholds. It would shift more households into fuel 
poverty and aggregate fuel poverty gaps would rise 
because of the change at the margins (in relation to 
the income threshold).
32. Under any policies, it is also important to remember 
that the overall picture over time will also be 
affected – perhaps more affected – by other 
changes taking place elsewhere across the whole 
economy. Of primary importance are changes in 
income levels and energy prices – although the 
trend of improvement in the housing stock is also 
an important background factor. In Chapter 6 we 
look at what could happen to fuel poverty levels 
as measured under the LIHC indicator (including 
the fuel poverty gap) over the next few years, 
taking account of potential changes in these three 
background factors. Our analysis compares this 
to projections of fuel poverty under the official 
indicator. Chapter 6 includes details of specific 
assumptions we make about these factors, drawing 
on published projections by DECC and the Office of 
Budget Responsibility and our own analysis.
29. These ways of raising funding would increase bills 
for consumers, but would also have an impact on 
both the reasonable costs threshold (as median bills 
would rise) and on the income threshold (as its level 
rises for those with greater bills). Taken in isolation 
from the impact of any measures funded, this 
would be expected to raise both the fuel poverty 
headcount and fuel poverty gaps. The precise 
impact would, however, depend on the way in 
which the costs were passed on and the degree of 
those costs.52
30. For example, a policy that was funded in a way 
linked to consumption (e.g. a carbon tax) would 
tend to increase fuel poverty gaps since fuel poor 
households have high modelled costs. Also some 
more households on the margins of poverty would 
be pulled into fuel poverty by their increased costs. 
This same effect would be expected where a policy 
were funded through a levy with costs recouped on 
a consumption basis. This effect is discussed further 
in Chapter 5 in relation to rising block tariffs.
52 Note that the measurement framework shows the effects on households 
if they consumed the amount shown by modelling to meet their needs. 
Where households actually prioritise other needs – and live at low 
temperatures – the effects on their actual spending will be less. What the 
framework shows is the increase in the costs that would be needed to 
reach the standard level of warmth.
Chapter Summary
In this chapter we show in principle how different kinds of policy – price-based, energy efficiency-
based or income-based – can affect the number of households with different combinations of high 
and low costs and incomes. We also discuss the different effects of interventions funded by taxes 
and those funded by energy consumers. While tax-funding does not generally change the impact of 
particular kinds of intervention, funding from energy consumers can increase the fuel poverty gap of 
those who do not benefit from them.
A major benefit of the measurement framework is that it facilitates a better understanding of the 
type of policies that would benefit particular kinds of household and the impact on them relative 
to all other households. It also supports an understanding of the lifetime effects of policies. This 
combination means that the LIHC framework can provide a helpful tool for policy-makers when 
considering the trade-offs they have to make when shaping policies.
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1. We now examine the suite of more specific policy 
interventions that are in place, or could be put in 
place, to tackle fuel poverty. The first section in 
this Chapter looks at the Government’s current 
policy package (including those policies – such as 
the Green Deal – that are under development). The 
second section examines other policy approaches 
that have been proposed as potentially important 
additions (or alternatives) to the existing policy 
framework. There is also a brief discussion of those 
policies which could help alleviate fuel poverty 
through changing behaviours. The Chapter is 
intended to set the discussion of interventions 
to tackle fuel poverty in a practical context. It is 
beyond the scope of the Review to comment on the 
many crucial issues that surround implementation 
of policies on the ground.
2. Chapter 6 looks at projections of the extent and 
depth of fuel poverty taking into account the 
current policy package. Chapter 7 looks at the 
potential impacts of variations to the current 
policy package of different kinds, indicating their 
cost-effectiveness within the framework we 
have developed.
5.1 The current fuel poverty 
policy package
3. Government policies affect each of the drivers of fuel 
poverty: improving the thermal efficiency of dwellings, 
improving incomes and reducing energy costs. We 
discuss each of these in turn. 
Thermal efficiency
4. The main focus of fuel poverty policy to date has 
been to improve the thermal efficiency of dwellings 
for low income and vulnerable households. The 
Warm Front Scheme is perhaps the best known of 
the current suite of fuel poverty policies, although 
it is currently being wound down. In operation 
since 2000, the policy provides Exchequer-funded 
grants for heating and insulation improvements 
to households receiving particular income-related 
benefits and living in properties that are poorly 
insulated and/or do not have a working central 
heating system. To date, around £2.8 billion 
has been spent through the Scheme, which has 
resulted in around 2.3 million households receiving 
assistance, at an average of some £1,200 per 
household. According to the 2010/11 Warm Front 
Annual Report53, assistance through the scheme 
resulted in an average SAP improvement of 27 
points, from 32 to 59. In the 2010 Spending 
Review, the Government announced a reduction 
in the level of funding for Warm Front for two 
years, after which time the Scheme would close. 
Funding was £369 million in 2009/10, £345 
million in 2010/11 and £110 million in 2011/12 
(supplemented by £20 million from the Department 
of Health as announced in late 2011).
53 http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/11/funding-support/warm-
front/2747-warm-front-annual-report-2010-2011.pdf
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the ‘hit rate’ (i.e. the proportion of households 
that were eligible for support under the Scheme 
that were classed as fuel poor under the current 
indicator) for Warm Front was found to be very low 
(around 14 per cent in 2004). But this reflected the 
fact that, at a time of low prices, the indicator of 
fuel poverty reported only limited numbers of fuel 
poor households. Had the official indicator reflected 
more closely the number of households facing 
high costs, in relative terms, the targeting under 
Warm Front would have appeared to be much 
better – e.g. our calculations suggest that the Warm 
Front fuel poverty ‘hit rate’ in 2004 under the LIHC 
indicator would have been twice as high, around 
28 per cent.
8. For its part, the Decent Homes programme has 
resulted in a significant improvement in the thermal 
efficiency of the stock of Local Authority housing. In 
2000, the then Government set a target to ensure 
that all homes met a set standard of ‘decency’ by 
2010 (where the criteria for the standard are based 
around: meeting the current statutory minimum 
standard for housing; being in a reasonable state 
of repair; having reasonably modern facilities and 
services and providing a reasonable degree of 
thermal comfort). Local Authorities were required 
to set out a timetable under which they would carry 
out improvement work to their housing stock in line 
with the conditions set out in the standard.
9. As a result, there has been very significant public 
investment in improving the quality of Local 
Authority housing over the course of the last 
decade. Since 2001, around £3.7 billion has been 
invested in improving the thermal efficiency of the 
social housing stock (this is not all as a result of 
Decent Homes) resulting in around 844,000 Local 
Authority dwellings receiving insulation and around 
1.2 million receiving a new or replacement heating 
system.56 This is reflected in the average SAP rating 
of Local Authority housing – which increased from 
50 in 2001 to 60 in 200957.
56 http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/Statistics/fuelpoverty/2184-fuel-
poverty-monitoring-indicators-2011.pdf
57 See the English Housing Survey headline report, 2011.
5. Several factors suggest that Warm Front has been 
an effective tool for tackling fuel poverty. First, the 
measures delivered by the scheme – predominantly 
low-cost insulation and gas heating systems – are 
among the most cost-effective in terms of increasing 
household SAP and reducing energy bills (as was 
shown by the analysis presented in Chapter 2 in the 
interim report). Second, the measures are targeted 
at those households we consider to represent the 
core of the fuel poverty problem – low-income 
households in low SAP dwellings.54 Finally, the 
policy is funded by the Exchequer. As we discussed 
in Chapter 4 this funding approach is generally less 
regressive than policies that are funded through a 
levy on energy costs. We would expect, therefore, 
that Warm Front would have a positive impact on 
the Low Income High Costs (LIHC) indicator, both 
in terms of headcount and the fuel poverty gap. 
We compare the effectiveness of this broad kind of 
approach with others in Chapter 7.
6. In the past, Warm Front has been criticised for 
helping too many households who did not need 
assistance. For example, in their most recent 
examination of the Scheme, the National Audit 
Office (NAO) suggested that the use of benefit 
entitlement to determine who is eligible for Scheme 
grants had resulted in inefficient targeting of 
resources.55
7. As we have already seen in Chapter 3, targeting 
policy is not straight-forward and the use of proxy 
indicators (e.g. receipt of a means-tested benefit) 
will always result in some non-fuel poor households 
being eligible for support. However, in the case of 
the NAO criticism of the Warm Front Scheme, we 
believe that the use of a flawed indicator of fuel 
poverty is a significant factor. For example, when 
prices were low in the middle of the last decade, 
54 For the majority of the time it has been in operation, Warm Front 
assistance has been available to households that were receiving of one 
of a number of means-tested and non means-tested benefits. Since 
2011 new and tighter eligibility criteria have been applied, whereby a 
household needs to be in receipt of one of a number of means-tested 
benefits (non means-tested benefit recipients are no longer eligible) 
and in a household with a SAP rating lower then 55 (which is applied 
through a SAP assessment of the dwellings of applicant households). 
55 http://www.nao.org.uk/publications/0809/the_warm_front_scheme.aspx
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income households, this increase in energy costs 
represents a relatively regressive means of funding 
a policy (by comparison to a policy that is funded 
through general taxation).
14. As was shown through the discussion of 
distributional impacts in Chapter 1, these policies 
create groups of ‘winners’ (who receive energy 
efficiency measures) and ‘losers’ (who pay for the 
policy through higher prices but would receive 
no measures). The key thing from a fuel poverty 
perspective is to ensure that an equitable share of 
measures is directed at low-income and vulnerable 
households. Achieving this would mean meeting 
the dual objectives of reducing carbon emissions 
while ensuring that the poor are not left behind. 
The key to this kind of success is policy design. 
The EEC, CERT and CESP all incorporate elements 
that help to ensure that lower-income households 
receive a share of the energy efficiency measures 
that are delivered through the scheme. For example, 
EEC and CERT have so-called ‘priority groups’ of 
low-income and vulnerable households in which 
energy suppliers are required to deliver a specified 
proportion of the overall effort whilst CESP is 
targeted at areas that score highly on the Index of 
Multiple Deprivation.
15. As explained in principle in Chapter 4, the impact of 
supplier obligations on fuel poverty (as defined by the 
Low Income High Costs framework) depends on:
•	 the overall size of the obligation (which 
determines the level of costs passed through to 
energy bills);
•	 the types of measures installed through the 
obligation; and
•	 the targeting of measures (specifically the 
balance between measures delivered to high 
income and lower income households).
16. An obligation that targeted measures mainly at 
lower-income households would be likely to result 
in a reduction in fuel poverty (although this would 
depend on the net impact of the higher bills due to 
10. We would expect that a policy such as Decent 
Homes that uses Exchequer funding to make 
improvements to the thermal efficiency of low-
income households will have had a positive impact 
on the Low Income High Costs indicator – both in 
terms of the headcount and the fuel poverty gap.
11. Improvements to the thermal efficiency of 
dwellings have also been driven through a series 
of statutory obligations that have been placed 
on energy suppliers. These obligations include 
the Energy Efficiency Commitment (EEC), 
Carbon Emission Reduction Target (CERT) 
and Community Energy Saving Programme 
(CESP). The primary objective of these measures 
is to reduce carbon emissions in the household 
sector. Energy companies have met their obligations 
largely by delivering energy efficiency measures to 
households, thereby helping to reduce their energy 
costs.
12. These policies have resulted in significant spending 
on energy efficiency measures in the household 
sector. The Government estimates that CERT – 
which started in April 2008 and is due to finish at 
the end of December 2012 – drives some £1 billion 
of annual expenditure across all households. In 
turn, CESP is expected to deliver £0.35 billion of 
expenditure in deprived areas over the 39 months 
of the policy, about £110 million per year (CESP 
runs from the beginning of September 2009 until 
the end of December 2012).
13. One of the arguments for delivering policies 
through this type of obligation is that Government 
expects energy companies will wish to minimise 
the cost of meeting targets, thereby leading to 
cost-effective delivery of objectives.58 At the same 
time, it is assumed that energy suppliers recoup the 
cost of delivery through higher energy prices on all 
households. Since energy expenditure makes up 
a large proportion of overall spending for lower-
58 Although without careful criteria-setting this can lead to ‘game-playing’ 
and relatively ineffective measures being deployed. A commonly cited 
example is delivery by suppliers of low-energy light-bulbs to their 
customers, a practice ruled out from April 2011.
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on fuel poverty overall because lower-income 
households are left behind but contribute to 
its cost.
19. The Government is currently developing policy 
proposals to encourage the take up of renewable 
heat in the domestic sector. A Renewable Heat 
Incentive (RHI) for the non-domestic sector – 
which provides a continuing Exchequer-funded 
subsidy for the installation and running of 
renewable heat – was launched by DECC in 2011. 
The Government also launched the Renewable 
Heat Premium Payment (RHPP) in 2011. This 
was said to be short-term provision of support 
for domestic renewable heat put in place while 
Government worked up a more substantial proposal 
for the future. The operation of the RHPP is also 
designed to assist Government in the development 
of the evidence base on the performance of the 
technologies.
20. Like micro-generation technologies, the installation 
of a renewable heating system – such as a ground 
or air source heat pump – improves household 
SAP. In general, these technologies are less 
effective in reducing household energy costs 
than a conventional gas system (although the 
comparison can be much more favourable for 
those off the gas grid) and tend to be more costly 
to install. It is unlikely, therefore, that renewable 
heat technologies would be taken up in large 
numbers by low-income households unless there 
were generous subsidies to cover the up-front costs. 
That being the case, renewable heat measures are 
unlikely to make a significant contribution towards 
reducing fuel poverty in the immediate future.
21. The Green Deal and Energy Company 
Obligation (ECO) will be the Coalition 
Government’s primary policy for improving energy 
efficiency, including in the domestic sector. At the 
time of writing, the Government is consulting on 
secondary legislation and hopes to launch the policy 
in Autumn 2012.
22. Several elements of Green Deal will have an impact 
on domestic energy efficiency. These include:
cost pass-though and the impact of the measures 
that are delivered), while an obligation that focused 
support mainly on better-off households could 
result in a worsening of fuel poverty.
17. Improvements to the thermal efficiency of the 
household stock will also be driven by those policies 
that have been put in place (or will be introduced 
in the near future) to make progress towards the 
UK’s renewable energy target. Small-scale Feed-
In Tariffs (FITs) were introduced in 2010 and are 
available for households that install and use small 
scale renewable electricity generation technology. 
The sorts of measures supported through FITs policy 
– which include wind, solar photovoltaics, anaerobic 
digestion and domestic scale micro-Combined Heat 
and Power – do increase household SAP ratings 
and reduce household energy costs. However, the 
up-front cost of measures can be high and the 
impact of some measures can be relatively modest 
compared to some other heating and insulation 
measures (as was shown in Chapter 2 of the interim 
report). Under the FITs scheme, households that 
install micro-generation renewable electricity receive 
a payment from their energy supplier for each unit 
of electricity that they generate and use. Energy 
suppliers recoup the costs of the policy through 
higher energy prices.59
18. While any household can qualify for support 
under the policy it is not well-tailored to poor 
households and, in practice, take up is likely to be 
predominantly in high-income households. This 
is because they are more likely to be able to have 
access to capital to be able to cover the up-front 
costs of the measure.60 That being the case, the 
policy is likely to have a small but negative impact 
59 The future generosity of the scheme is currently unclear. The 
Government held a consultation in late 2011 on the level of FITs subsidy 
for solar PV that led to legal action whose final outcome is unknown at 
the time of writing.
60 However, some companies use a business model for solar PV sometimes 
known as ‘rent-a-roof’. Under this model, a company puts up the 
capital required for a solar installation on a householder’s roof. Typically 
the household would benefit from the electricity generated but the 
company would receive all of the income from the FIT. Such an approach 
may mean that some lower-income households benefit from these 
technologies but to a much lesser extent than those putting in the 
capital themselves. 
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specified in terms of a SAP-based reduction 
in energy costs – in other words, a reduction 
in the costs of meeting a specified level 
of thermal comfort). It is envisaged that 
suppliers will meet this obligation by 
providing fully-subsidised heating and 
insulation measures (predominantly new 
and replacement gas central heating) to 
eligible households.
23. Under Green Deal Finance, providers will offer 
energy efficiency retrofits to householders. Where 
the retrofit can meet the Green Deal’s ‘Golden Rule’ 
– which says that the expected financial savings 
from the measure must be at least equal to the 
cost attached to the energy bill (and is effectively 
a test for cost-effectiveness) – the investment will 
be made at no upfront cost to the customer. The 
provider will in effect make the finance available, to 
be paid back over up to 25 years by the electricity 
bill payer through a charge on his or her electricity 
bill. Based on current prices and expected savings, 
the charge should not exceed the value of the 
savings enjoyed by the householder, so that the 
householder pays less or at least no more in total 
for energy than he or she would have done without 
the measures being installed. If prices were to 
rise, savings would be greater because each unit 
of energy saved would have a higher value, but if 
prices fell, savings would be lower.
24. Where the Golden Rule cannot be met – which is likely 
to be the case for a large number of energy efficiency 
measures, including most solid wall insulation – then 
an energy supplier may be able to provide some ECO 
subsidy to help co-finance improvements (which 
would allow that supplier to count the full carbon 
saved towards its carbon obligation). ECO will 
therefore play a role in maximising the potential of the 
Green Deal finance mechanism.
25. Energy suppliers are expected to recoup the costs 
of the ECO through higher energy prices. The scale 
of the policy will therefore affect the level of costs 
passed through to consumers. The ECO will be 
specified in terms of outcomes (i.e. an aggregate 
a. minimum energy efficiency standards for the 
Private Rented Sector;
b. a new financial instrument (‘Green Deal 
Finance’) that allows householders to upgrade 
the thermal efficiency of their home at no up-
front cost, with investment paid back through 
electricity bills (at the same time as the cost 
savings accrue); and
c. an Energy Company Obligation that places 
two obligations on energy suppliers:
i. a carbon obligation: energy suppliers will 
be required to make a specified amount of 
carbon savings in the household sector. As is 
the case under existing supplier obligations 
such as CERT, energy suppliers will meet 
this obligation by delivering energy 
efficiency measures – predominantly solid 
wall insulation (SWI). It is envisaged that 
energy suppliers will meet their ECO carbon 
obligation by co-financing measures with 
Green Deal finance (i.e. the energy supplier 
will pay part of the up-front cost of the 
measure, with the household covering the 
remaining cost through Green Deal Finance). 
It is proposed that energy suppliers will be 
able to count the full carbon score (towards 
compliance with their obligation) of an 
energy efficiency measure even where a 
proportion of the costs is financed through 
Green Deal Finance.61
ii. an ‘Affordable Warmth’ obligation: this 
will be an obligation on energy suppliers 
to make a specified energy bill reduction 
in a set of low-income and vulnerable 
households (where the obligation is 
61 On the face of it, this would seem to introduce a bias towards 
households able to make a financial contribution to measures and 
towards properties that are close to meeting the Golden Rule. In turn, 
and to the extent that higher-income households (with higher energy 
consumption) are more likely to be able to meet the Golden Rule, this 
could reinforce the importance of some kind of distributional mechanism 
(to ensure an equitable share of the carbon objective is met within 
lower-income households) as well as of the Affordable Warmth element 
of ECO. At the time of writing, the Government is considering the 
responses to its consultation on the Green Deal and ECO which explicitly 
sought views on this issue.
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26. The DECC Green Deal consultation document and 
Impact Assessment63 proposed that that some 25 
per cent of the ECO (which would equate to around 
£325 million per year) should be for the delivery of 
the Affordable Warmth objectives. As mentioned, 
Government expects energy suppliers to meet 
these objectives primarily through the installation 
of insulation and new and replacement gas central 
heating systems to households that are receiving 
particular means-tested benefits. These measures 
would increase the thermal efficiency of dwellings 
(and reduce energy costs) and would also drive a 
net reduction in carbon emissions (further detail 
of the expected impact of the Affordable Warmth 
obligation on carbon emissions measured in 
different ways is set out in Box 5.1).
63 http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/consultations/green_deal/green_
deal.aspx 
reduction in carbon emissions and in household 
energy costs) rather than in terms of an amount 
of expenditure. However, the Government has 
estimated that the ECO at the current proposed 
scale will cost energy suppliers around £1.3 billion 
per annum,62 contributing to the impact we see 
on bills in 2020 set out in Figure 1.6. The level 
of cost associated to ECO is similar to the cost of 
the current range of supplier obligations; DECC 
therefore suggests that the Green Deal and ECO are 
unlikely to result in an increase in prices compared 
to the current situation.
62 The Government has stated its intention that the ECO will operate for 
ten years, however funding arrangements have only been confirmed 
for the current Spending Review period (i.e. up 2014/15). For more 
details see: http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/11/consultation/green-
deal/3603-green-deal-eco-ia.pdf
Box 5.1: Carbon impact of installing heating systems through the Affordable 
Warmth obligation
As set out in the DECC consultation on the Green Deal and ECO, it is currently assumed that the 
Affordable Warmth obligation will be met predominantly through the installation of new and 
replacement gas central heating systems. Installing a new gas system in a home that previously had no 
heating system means that the household switches from using a ‘secondary’ heating source – most likely 
to be relatively inefficient plug-in electric heaters – to using gas. From the household’s perspective, the 
move results in a net reduction in household carbon emissions. For instance, heat is now being produced 
in the house by directly using gas in an efficient boiler, rather than the gas being used in a distant power 
station, generating electricity that is subject to substantial transmission losses.
The national picture is, however, complicated by the carbon accounting framework. A move away from 
electric heating reduces emissions from electricity generation. This is a sector that is included in the 
EU Emissions Trading System and these ‘traded sector’ emissions are capped at an EU level. As such, a 
reduction in emissions in UK power generation – while good for the UK in that it reduces the number of 
EU allowances that need to be purchased by UK generators – does not reduce carbon emissions overall. 
This is because a reduction in emissions from UK generation means, all things being equal, that another 
installation in the EU can increase its emissions by the same amount – the so-called ‘waterbed effect’.
On the other hand, the emissions from domestic gas use are not included in the EU Emissions Trading 
System – they are not capped in the same way as emissions from electricity generation. An increase in 
gas usage resulting from a move to gas central-heating represents an increase in emissions in this ‘non-
traded sector.’ In turn this makes it more difficult for the UK to meet its carbon budgets.
On one level, it may appear that there is a conflict between Affordable Warmth and carbon objectives. 
However, seen from an ‘end-user’ perspective, the shift from electricity to gas drives a net reduction in 
carbon emissions. This creates the ability for emissions caps to be further reduced. Moving away from the 
‘static’ analysis of traded and non-traded emissions means that the there need be no ultimate conflict 
between Affordable Warmth and carbon objectives.
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28. Flowing from the discussion in Box 5.2, it is clear that 
the key questions from the fuel poverty perspective in 
relation to the Green Deal and ECO are: how many 
households with low incomes and high costs stand 
to benefit from the Green Deal and what are the 
implications of households with high incomes and 
high costs being the main focus of policy.
27. The remaining ECO subsidy, some £950 million per 
annum, is intended to work alongside the Green 
Deal Finance mechanism for delivery of solid wall 
insulation.64 The Government is consulting on the 
need for some form of a distributional safeguard to 
ensure that the delivery of SWI measures is spread 
across households in an equitable way. At the time 
of writing, the Government has not concluded its 
assessment of the need for such a safeguard. An 
assessment of the distributional impacts of the 
current proposal for Green Deal and ECO is set out 
in Box 5.2.
64 In a recent letter to DECC, the Committee on Climate Change criticised 
the narrow focus of the Green Deal ECO. They argued that low levels 
of uptake of loft and cavity wall insulation would create a problem 
for meeting carbon budgets and mitigating bill impacts and said that 
‘the Government should consider including full potential for loft and 
cavity wall insulation in the ECO’. See: http://www.theccc.org.uk/news/
latest-news/1134-ccc-expresses-concern-about-green-deal-proposals-20-
december-2011
Box 5.2: The distributional impact of Green Deal and ECO
Figure 5.1 shows how the proposed Green Deal and ECO – based on a 25 per cent share of the funding 
for Affordable Warmth and 75 per cent for carbon objectives – is expected to affect the energy costs 
across households in 2020. There is a group of households that receives measures (and that therefore 
sees a reduction in energy bills – particularly where households receive fully subsidised measures 
through the Affordable Warmth obligation) and a significantly larger group of households that does not 
receive measures but pays the costs of the policy through higher energy prices (thereby facing higher 
energy bills).
Source: Distributional Impacts Model for Policy and Strategic Analysis
Figure 5.1: Distributional impacts of Green Deal and ECO 
in 2020
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that, while fuel poor households have high 
modelled energy requirements, the reality is that 
budgetary constraints are likely to mean they have 
relatively low actual consumption. Their actual 
energy bill is the starting point for the Green Deal. 
Where a household is significantly under-consuming 
energy relative to need, is likely to take greater 
comfort as the thermal efficiency of the home is 
improved. This means that, for many low-income 
households, there is less potential to make savings 
to repay a Green Deal charge. Making Green Deal 
finance work for these households (i.e. ensuring 
that the Golden Rule is met) would require energy 
suppliers to subsidise a greater proportion of the 
up-front costs. This would be likely to make fuel 
poor households less attractive to energy suppliers 
29. On the face of it, the Green Deal mechanism is not 
tailored to meet the needs of the fuel poor. It was 
shown in Chapter 2 of our interim report (and also 
in a recent study undertaken by Loughborough 
University and the Centre for Sustainable Energy66) 
65 For simplicity in the absence of more complex modelling, we have 
assumed an equal level of subsidy per household under ECO, and have 
calculated this broadly as around £2,600.  We have then estimated the 
impact of a different approach to targeting by redistributing a number of 
households receiving measures in higher income decile groups to lower 
income decile groups.  We have done this until the average impact for 
households in the three lowest income decile groups is at or close to 
zero.  We have then multiplied the number of households redistributed 
from higher income groups receiving measures to the lowest three 
income decile groups receiving measures (around 150,000 per year from 
2013 to 2020) by the value of £2,600.  This gives a total of £390 million 
per year in addition to the current level of the ECO envelope targeted 
at lower income groups. Accounting for the existing 25 per cent for 
Affordable Warmth, this would broadly translate into at least 56 per cent 
of the current ECO envelope being targeted at low-income groups.
66 http://www.consumerfocus.org.uk/files/2011/10/Understanding-fuel-
expenditure.pdf 
Box 5.2: The distributional impact of Green Deal and ECO (continued)
As can be seen, it is expected that households at the bottom end of the income range will, on average, 
see an increase in their energy bill as a percentage of disposable income whereas richer households see 
little change.
For the poorest tenth the average net loss is equivalent to 0.3 per cent of disposable income. This is both 
regressive and has a limiting effect on the contribution the package can make to reducing fuel poverty. 
The distributional outcomes of Green Deal and ECO would change were a greater amount of the overall 
support focused at low-income households. A more equitable distribution of the costs and benefits 
of ECO would mean those in the lowest three income decile groups breaking even on average – as is 
already broadly the case for the highest income decile groups. Although it is very difficult to model how 
this scenario could be brought about, our best estimate is that to remove the regressive effect more 
than half of the spending under ECO would need to be targeted towards the fuel poor, rather than 
a quarter.65
However, encouraging low-income households to take up measures under the carbon obligation would 
be likely to require greater (or even full) subsidy. This follows from the fact that lower-income households 
tend to use small amounts of energy relative to need and a presumption that they will take greater 
levels of comfort. Therefore the improvement in distributional outcomes is not costless. It also means 
that, for a given level of overall expenditure, the policy would deliver fewer measures and abate fewer 
GHG emissions.
A focus on low income households would also be expected to reduce the extent and depth of fuel 
poverty. We return to this issue in Chapter 6 when we look at the expected impact of the current policy 
package on fuel poverty outcomes. In Chapter 7 we look at the scale of impacts on fuel poverty of 
interventions that are either narrowly focused (such as Affordable Warmth) or broadly focused (such as 
the Carbon Obligation).
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the interim report, the existence of a cohort of 
marginalised households – the fuel poor – is actually 
a barrier to the deployment of carbon mitigation 
policies. At some point, the argument could be 
made that their isolation is too high a price to pay 
for reducing emissions.
33. We believe that the solution is to tailor policies 
effectively so that the poor will more than keep 
pace with the general improving trend rather than 
falling behind. A Green Deal policy that leads to 
the worst remaining homes being lived in by poor 
people could not be considered a success. It is a 
major positive feature of the indicator we propose 
that it would provide an incentive to develop policy 
in a way that takes account of the impact on fuel 
poor households. It is also important to stress the 
importance of also looking at the fuel poverty gap 
here. This may show a reduction in the aggregate 
depth of fuel poverty even if the headcount 
measure shows that the pace of improvement in 
fuel poor households is not fast enough to improve 
the position of all lower-income households relative 
to richer ones.
Improving incomes
34. There is a range of means-tested and non means-
tested benefits that are aimed at increasing 
household incomes – receiving any of these benefits 
increases household income and reduces the 
likelihood of a household being fuel poor. The level 
of benefits, and whether those who are entitled 
to them receive them, are obviously key influences 
on whether people have low incomes to start with, 
as is whether people are in, or can move out of, 
situations where they need them. However, the 
two key benefits that are fully or partially aimed 
specifically at supporting households with high 
energy costs are the Winter Fuel Payment and Cold 
Weather Payments.
compared to higher-income households and could 
result in their being excluded from the Green Deal.
30. The Government expects some fuel poor 
households to be assisted through the installation 
of solid wall insulation under ECO. Where this 
happens, this would have the effect of reducing 
fuel poverty. The biggest doubt here is about the 
scale of expenditure within the ECO on this set 
of households. The Government’s decision on 
distributional questions is pivotal.
31. On balance, a successful Green Deal programme, 
accompanied by an ECO that spends a relatively 
small amount of its total available funding on 
the fuel poor, would be expected to increase 
fuel poverty under our proposed measurement 
framework. This is because it would lower the 
median bill by reducing the costs of a number of 
high income high costs households, many of whom 
would move across the high costs threshold. This 
would make the plight of those people in homes 
that have been untreated relatively worse. Chapter 
6 shows the projected impact of the ECO in 2016. 
Chapter 7 adds further significant analysis relating 
to this question, based on modelling the effects of 
different kinds of approaches to fuel poverty.
32. The interaction set out in the preceding paragraph 
has been criticised for putting fuel poverty and 
carbon mitigation policies into tension. In fact, a 
tension between fuel poverty and carbon mitigation 
has always existed. Lower-income households 
will tend to ‘take-back’ a larger proportion of 
the potential saving from efficiency measures in 
higher temperatures – which is desirable as many 
currently under-heat relative to need, suffering 
health and other consequences – which will reduce 
the potential to finance costs through energy 
bill savings. There is also a risk that, as efficiency 
standards improve as a whole, poorer households 
get left behind. As we argued in Chapter 4 of 
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than age – that only 26 per cent of WFP recipients 
are fuel poor on the basis of the current indicator 
and 10 per cent are fuel poor on the basis of the 
LIHC definition. This suggests that the policy is an 
inefficient means of making progress against this 
particular objective. However, the WFP may be seen 
by many as serving other objectives as well (e.g. 
in providing a pension top-up). As we discussed in 
Chapter 3, there are adverse side-effects of tight 
targeting and means-testing that also need to be 
taken into account in policy design.
38. The Cold Weather Payment (CWP) is a benefit 
paid directly by the exchequer to qualifying 
individuals, when the temperature is predicted to 
fall below 0°C for a period of seven days or more. 
The payment is £25 per week of cold weather. It is 
designed to act as an emergency measure for those 
in the eligible group so that they are able to heat 
their homes during extreme cold. The cost to the 
Exchequer on a yearly basis is unpredictable as it is 
based on weather and can vary heavily from year to 
year – for example, only around £4 million of CWPs 
were paid in 2007/08 whilst around £431 million 
were paid during the cold winter of 2009/10.68
39. CWPs are made to individuals who receive one 
of a number of means-tested benefits – including 
Pension Credit, Income Support, income-based Job 
Seeker’s Allowance and income related Employment 
and Support Allowance who meet other eligibility 
criteria (such as those who have a child under 5). 
The policy is, therefore, relatively well targeted at 
low-income households. At the same time it takes 
no account of required energy costs (and is paid 
to ‘high cost’ and ‘low cost’ households alike). 
Overall it is likely to be better targeted as a measure 
to alleviate fuel poverty than the Winter Fuel 
Payment.69
68 An increase in the weekly payment from £7.50 to the current level of 
£25 also accounted for some of this increase.
69 Although it is important to note that neither the Cold Weather Payments 
nor the impact on heating costs of the cold weather that trigger the 
payments are reflected very accurately in the fuel poverty statistics – 
either under the current or the proposed LIHC indicator. This is because 
modelled need for heating is based on a standard climate, rather than 
the actual temperatures experienced in any particular year, while CWPs 
are unlikely to be collected in the income section of the EHS.
35. The Winter Fuel Payment (WFP) is a non means-
tested benefit paid directly into the bank account 
of all households with a member aged 60 or over. 
It is labelled as a payment to help the elderly to 
meet their fuel bills. Payments are made in winter, 
when fuel bills are at their highest. In 2011/12, 
eligible households received a payment of £200 
per year (with households with a member over 80 
years of age receiving £300 per year) and the policy 
is expected to cost around £2.1 billion making it 
significantly larger than the proposed scale of the 
ECO initiative.
36. In spite of its name, the WFP is paid as an open 
cash transfer and there is no requirement to spend 
any part of it on energy. That being the case, one 
might expect households to treat the Winter Fuel 
Payment as an increase to household income and 
therefore to increase their spending across all 
components of consumption. However, a recent 
study by the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) 67 
suggested that the labelling of the benefits as a 
payment to help with energy costs has a remarkable 
impact on the way in which the money is spent. 
Their estimates suggest that the observed group 
spent around 41 per cent of Winter Fuel Payment 
on energy (which compares with an expected 3 per 
cent if the household were to treat the WFP strictly 
as an increase in income). This finding suggests 
that even loosely earmarked transfer payments can 
potentially play an important part in reducing the 
extent of under-heating (and avoiding some of the 
health impacts associated with cold houses) among 
low-income households.
37. To the extent that this benefit moves some 
households across the income threshold, we would 
expect the WFP to reduce the extent of fuel poverty 
under the LIHC indicator. However, the overriding 
concern with the WFP relates to poor targeting 
and limited value for money from a fuel poverty 
perspective. It is striking – although perhaps not 
surprising given the lack of any targeting other 
67 Beatty, T, Blow, L, Crossley, T, O’Dea, C, (2011). Cash by Any Other 
Name? Evidence on Labelling from the UK Winter Fuel Payment. London: 
Institute for Fiscal Studies.
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incomes are measured. However, it also reflects the 
fact that the scheme eligibility criteria do not take 
account of the thermal efficiency of dwellings.  As 
such, some low-income people in quite thermally-
efficient dwellings will receive support under 
the policy.
42. The rebates for the WHD are paid for by energy 
suppliers, who are expected to recoup costs 
through higher energy prices. The impact of the 
policy on energy bills is different for households 
receiving a rebate (and whose bills are therefore 
reduced) from the impacts on those who do not. In 
Chapter 7 we examine the balance between these 
effects for this kind of intervention. The fact that 
WHD payments are targeted entirely at low-income 
households means that it is less regressive than the 
energy efficiency obligations (i.e. EEC, CERT, CESP) 
where only a proportion of the benefits accrue to 
low-income households. As such, we expect the 
Warm Home Discount to reduce both the extent 
and depth of fuel poverty in the years in which it 
operates, but, unlike capital investment, its effects 
are temporary. We discuss the issue of the duration 
of benefits from different types of interventions in 
more detail in Chapter 7.
Reducing energy costs
40. The Government launched the Warm Home 
Discount (WHD) in 2011 to provide direct energy 
bill support to a set of low-income households. 
Broadly speaking, this policy requires energy 
suppliers to provide energy bill rebates (of £120 
in the first year) to a ‘core group’ of low-income 
pensioners (identified through a data-matching 
mechanism) and a ‘broader group’ of low-income 
households. Eligibility criteria for this second group 
are determined by energy suppliers, subject to 
guidelines set out in law. The policy is currently due 
to run from April 2011 until the end of March 2015 
and requires energy suppliers to give discounts 
totalling £1.1 billion over the lifetime of the policy, 
averaging £275 million per year.
41. The Warm Home Discount is relatively well targeted 
at fuel poor households. For example, in the first 
year of the policy, around 70 per cent of core group 
households are fuel poor based on the current 
indicator (but only around 25 per cent based on 
the LIHC indicator).  The relatively lower proportion 
of fuel poor households receiving the WHD under 
the LIHC indicator is partly a result of incorporating 
housing costs and equivalisation into the way 
This section has looked at the range of policy interventions that are either in place or are being put 
in place. Figure 5.2 summarises this, reflecting the policy position in 2009 and the current expected 
scenario for 2016. Each circle in the figure represents a particular policy, with its size determined by 
the scale of expenditure on the policy. The placing of each circle reflects the extent to which different 
policies are targeted at low-income households as well as their link to household energy efficiency. It 
can be seen that there is a mixture of targeting towards the fuel poor with policies such as CESP, Cold 
Weather Payments and Warm Home Discount (and Warm Front to a lesser extent) being more focused 
on low-income households and CERT, ECO and Winter Fuel Payments being more widely spread over 
the population. In Chapter 6 we show the projected impact of individual policies over the next few years 
against different indicators of fuel poverty.
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Figure 5.2: Levels spending on fuel poverty related policies in 2009 and 2016 (2009 prices)68
(a) 2009
Warm 
Front 
£0.37bn 
Cold Weather 
Payments 
£0.21bn 
Public 
investment in 
LA Housing 
£0.44bn Community 
Energy Saving 
Programme 
£0.10bn 
Not linked 
to fuel 
Taxpayer-funded
Consumer-funded
efficiency  
Direct impact 
on fuel 
efficiency 
Eligibility linked to 
income 
No direct link 
to income 
Winter Fuel 
Payments 
£2.80bn  
Carbon 
Emissions 
Reduction Target 
£0.82bn 
(b) 2016
Not linked 
to fuel 
efficiency 
Direct impact 
on fuel 
efficiency 
Eligibility linked to 
income  
No direct link 
to income 
Taxpayer-funded
Consumer-funded
Warm Home 
Discount 
£0.29bn 
Cold Weather 
Payments 
£0.07bn 
ECO  
(Affordable Warmth)  
£0.32bn 
Winter Fuel 
Payments 
£1.62bn  
ECO  
(Carbon Saving) 
£0.91bn 
 
70 The size of each bubble is internally consistent for 2009 and 2016 respectively. All funding flows are expressed in real 2009 prices. This means that policies 
that are fixed in cash terms (such as the Winter Fuel Payment) will have a lower value in 2016 than in 2009 due to the effects of inflation.
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it remains necessary to focus on the standards of 
existing houses.72 In terms of Building Regulations, 
the same February 2012 consultation seeks views 
on amendments relating to existing dwellings, 
particularly in terms of so-called consequential 
improvements. This relates to whole house energy 
efficiency improvements that could be required 
when building works take place, for example 
when an extension is added. The consultation links 
this idea with the Green Deal policy which is one 
mechanism for obtaining the finance required for 
such improvements.73
47. Beyond Building Regulations, other legislation 
relating to minimum standards exists in the form 
of the Energy Act 2011. This introduces minimum 
standards within the existing stock in the private 
rented sector. For more information, see Box 5.3. 
The Government is currently consulting ahead of 
passing secondary legislation in 2012 to give full 
effect to the provisions in the Act.
48. Extending beyond the private rented sector, it is 
possible to envisage the development of policies 
to require the fulfilment of minimum standards in 
homes under all kinds of tenure. For example, in 
the owner occupier sector, a requirement could be 
introduced that, at the time of sale/purchase, home 
owners would need to improve energy efficiency to 
a given EPC level, or to do so before the next time 
the property was sold.74
72 See DECC. (2012). Energy Efficiency Deployment Office Evidence Brief. 
London: DECC.
73 The details of this approach are naturally beyond the scope of the 
review. The consultation is available at: http://www.communities.gov.uk/
documents/planningandbuilding/pdf/2077834.pdf 
74 Various commentators have published proposals along these lines. See, 
for example, Boardman, B. Achieving Zero: delivering future-friendly 
buildings. January 2012. Environmental Change Institute, University 
of Oxford. Available at: http://www.eci.ox.ac.uk/research/energy/
achievingzero/achieving-zero.pdf 
5.2: Other policy approaches
43. We turn now to consider other policies that could 
potentially help to tackle fuel poverty, many of 
which were raised through the call for evidence 
or consultation on the interim report. As before, 
the policies are arranged across the three drivers: 
improving the thermal efficiency of dwellings, 
improving incomes and reducing energy costs.
Thermal efficiency standards and 
information
44. The preceding discussion showed that existing 
thermal efficiency policies rely on one of two forms 
of funding – the Exchequer or consumer bills. Other 
potential policy approaches tap into additional 
sources of finance within the realm of discretionary 
expenditure by households.
45. An important suggestion put forward in evidence 
sent to the review is the establishment of minimum 
standards for domestic energy efficiency. The 
main objective sought is to drive up standards 
across all types of housing by legislating for 
minimum standards. Such legislation would add to 
costs for home owners, landlords and tenants.
46. There is a Government commitment that, from 
2016, all new homes will meet zero carbon 
standards (the date is 2019 for new non-domestic 
buildings). A consultation was launched in February 
2012 relating to proposed changes to Part L of 
the Building Regulations intended to facilitate the 
transition to zero carbon standards from 2016.71 
However homes yet to be built could make up 
only one third of the housing stock by 2050, so 
71 The Government’s definition of zero carbon includes an allowance for 
off-site carbon abatement.
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future costs of compliance. Of course, the overall 
low efficiency of the current stock would mean 
that a considerable proportion of sales could be 
affected by a standard that reached a high level 
of efficiency, and so regulation would affect many 
buyers and sellers.
50. A more modest step in this direction would be 
for there to be much more routine availability and 
prominence to EPC ratings within both owner-
occupied and rental housing markets. Already, 
land registry data on the sales price history of 
residential property is available on-line. There is no 
obvious reason why the classification of EPC that 
accompanies each sale should not be available 
alongside this. Similarly, from 2008 landlords are 
obliged to provide an EPC for new tenants, as well 
as for prospective tenants on request.75 Again, as 
75 See: http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/planningandbuilding/
pdf/866773.pdf 
49. Some see minimum standards as a vital – if not 
the most important – way of bringing about the 
scale of improvement needed across the housing 
sector. There is a case for this, although we cannot 
examine it in much detail here. Broadly speaking, 
regulating in this way for improvements in the 
housing stock has the clear advantage of being 
enforceable. However, there are costs that need 
to be taken into account. In the owner-occupied 
sector, costs would be added for the purchaser. 
This might in turn be reflected in the purchase price 
offered, with the seller effectively picking up the 
costs of structural energy inefficiency. This could be 
seen as correcting a market failure in which house 
prices are insufficiently related to long-term running 
costs. From a carbon reduction perspective, there is 
considerable advantage in the most energy-efficient 
housing stock fetching a premium on the property 
market – and encouraging the retention of value 
for energy efficiency investments by reducing the 
Box 5.3: Minimum standards in the private rented sector (PRS)
Energy efficiency standards in the PRS tend to be lower than other sectors – it has the highest proportion 
of F and G rated homes of all sectors. In 2009, some 18 per cent of households in this sector were SAP F 
or G, compared to 6 per cent in the social housing sector and 16 per cent in the owner-occupied sector. 
Under the LIHC approach 32 per cent of fuel-poor PRS households have a SAP rating of F or G compared 
to 30 per cent of fuel-poor owner occupiers.
One of the main reason for lower standards is the existence of a range of barriers to making efficiency 
improvements in this sector, primarily the fact that the cost of improvements fall to landlords while the 
benefits accrue to tenants. This rationale led to the inclusion in the Energy Act 2011 of provisions stating 
that landlords cannot refuse consent for reasonable requests for energy efficiency improvements from 
tenants that can be financed through the Green Deal and that properties let to domestic tenants from 
2018 must meet a minimum energy efficiency standard (currently an E rating) or to have received all 
reasonable energy efficiency improvements that can be financed through the Green Deal or ECO (even if 
the property remains below an E rating).
We looked at EPC ratings – and specifically the likelihood of households with low EPC ratings being fuel 
poor – in Chapter 3. The evidence presented within that Chapter suggested that, while eliminating F 
and G rated dwellings in the PRS would make a significant contribution, a threshold set at the level of an 
EPC E rating would still leave many households in the PRS in fuel poverty. In addition, the ‘golden rule’ 
requirement for Green Deal finance could still leave many properties below an E rating, unless it were 
supplemented by what are effectively grants from ECO. 
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standards policy would help lift some fuel poor 
households out of fuel poverty, given sufficient SAP 
improvements. Fuel poverty gaps would also fall. 
Chapter 3 showed how closely fuel poverty within 
our LIHC framework relates to low energy-efficiency 
standards and how this relates to housing tenure.
Equity release
52. A further option for tapping finance is equity 
release, whereby people who own all, or a large 
proportion, of their property, use the value of their 
home to raise income or capital which can then 
be spent on improving the energy efficiency of the 
property. There are two broad models for equity 
release, as explained in Box 5.4.
53. In relation to energy efficiency improvements, the 
suggestion is that property owners might release 
with other property information, it would be very 
helpful if such information could be accessed freely, 
including on-line.
51. From a fuel poverty perspective, the important 
questions in relation to this kind of policy are: 
what happens to fuel poor households under 
such policies and what is the general effect across 
the whole housing stock? The answer to the first 
question is complicated by the fact that a fuel 
poor household might move out of a home and 
be replaced by a household that is not fuel poor. 
Similarly, a family may move into fuel poverty, 
at least transitionally, by occupying an energy-
inefficient home for the first time.76 However, it is 
reasonable to assume that in general a minimum 
76 This is one reason why the National Housing Federation urged, in its 
response to our consultation, a continuing focus on improving social 
housing: such properties are likely only to pass between low-income 
households, meaning that the properties can more easily be ‘fuel poverty 
proofed’.
Box 5.4: Common forms of equity release
Lifetime mortgages
In this case a lender provides a regular income or lump sum payment that is repaid with interest at a 
future date, normally the death of the property owner. The owner retains full title to the property. Interest 
accumulates quickly because it is compound, that is, it is paid on both the amount borrowed and on the 
interest. The fact that the interest on the amount released will compound over what can be a long period 
of time means that the amount that needs to be paid back can be significantly higher than the amount 
borrowed. However, such mortgages often come with a negative equity guarantee meaning that the 
amount owed to the lender cannot exceed the value realised for the property when sold.
Home reversion agreement
Under such schemes a property owner agrees to sell a share in his or her home to a reversion company. 
The owner is allowed to stay in the property long-term, sometimes for a nominal rent. When the 
property is sold, usually on death, the reversion company obtains its share. The remaining value in the 
property remains part of the estate. This type of product can suffer from an ‘adverse selection’ problem. 
If the reversion company obtains its share of the property soon after the agreement is made, because 
of the owner’s death, the financial arrangement offered poor value for money for the householder. This 
may mean such agreements are most attractive to individuals that are in good health with a long life 
expectancy. However, such clients are likely to be the least attractive to the home reversion company 
because of a potentially prolonged period of zero return on its investment. As a result the terms may 
be set in a way that is unfavourable for those with more typical health and life expectancy. In addition, 
uncertainty about future house prices at the time of reversion make this a risky investment for the 
company, adding to the costs it is likely to charge to take the risk on. 
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These include (on the demand side) a lack of 
understanding and concern about the costs of 
the products as well as the potential impact that 
releasing equity could have on household benefit 
entitlement. The document also explained the 
most common uses of equity release which, at 
that time, did not include funding for energy 
efficiency improvements.78 The striking results of a 
pilot scheme that investigated the potential for use 
of equity release amongst low-income asset-rich 
households are set out in Box 5.5.
56. Given our remit, we have not considered any of 
the obstacles to the use of equity release in detail. 
There could in principle be a role for equity release 
for energy efficiency improvements. An advantage 
of equity release over other forms of borrowing is 
that there is no requirement for the borrower to 
make any kind of repayment during the period of 
the loan. Under both forms of equity release, the 
loan is only repaid at the end, in a single payment, 
normally as part of winding up an estate. This 
release. Its 2009 report is available at: http://www.ship-ltd.org/uploads/
shipdocfinal3.pdf 
78 Evidence suggests that equity release is used as a source of income 
for low income households and a source of capital for lifestyle 
improvements (SHIP report 2009). 
equity from their homes in order to provide the 
capital required for investments such as solid wall 
insulation or new heating systems. The question 
that arises in the context of the review is whether 
equity release offers a realistic option for funding 
measures that would reduce fuel poverty.
54. There were, in 2009, more than 600,000 owner 
occupiers in fuel poverty (based on the LIHC 
indicator) who owned their property outright. In 
addition, there were almost 800,000 more owner 
occupiers with an outstanding mortgage, some 
of whom could have paid-off enough of their 
mortgage – and fulfil the other eligibility criteria – 
to be able to make use of an equity release product.
55. Equity release schemes already exist on the market 
but are considered by many to be an expensive 
way of providing an income boost or lump sum 
payment compared to other types of borrowing. 
The overall size of the market suggests there is a 
number of demand and supply-side factors limiting 
the widespread use of this kind of financial product. 
In a document published in 2009, Safe Homes 
Income Plans set out many of these obstacles.77 
77 SHIP – Safe Home Income Plans – is the primary trade body for equity 
Box 5.5 Piloting equity release for low-income households
The Joseph Rowntree Foundation (JRF) wanted to investigate whether older, income-poor but asset-rich 
homeowners would use some of the value of their home to improve their quality of life (e.g. to fund 
additional help at home or works to the property).79 They were interested in whether it was possible to 
overcome some of the key barriers to uptake (i.e. value for money, minimum required draw-down and 
impact on benefit entitlement) could be overcome through the combination of a bespoke product and 
partnership with a trusted intermediary.
Three London Local Authorities agreed that they would signpost low-income, older homeowners to the 
new product. Each authority involved a wide range of external parties in the project – including voluntary 
organisations, housing services and health services – in all, some 250 people received training.
After 18 months, there were only twenty enquiries about the new product. The Local Authorities involved 
reported that (among other things) the deeply embedded negative perception of equity release products 
amongst the potential client group was acting as a powerful constraint on uptake. 
79 http://www.jrf.org.uk/sites/files/jrf/equity-release-schemes-full.pdf
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cold during the winter and given the practicability 
for people to only heat half their home. The 
adjustment is not made in Scotland when assessing 
its level of fuel poverty, for instance. Whatever 
conclusion one draws on these points, it is clear 
that whether or not dwellings are appropriately 
sized for the requirements of their occupants is 
an important factor in determining household 
energy costs.
60. Under-occupancy is a growing trend in England, 
particularly for pensioner households. The most 
recent official fuel poverty statistics suggest 
that there were 6.9 million ‘under-occupying’ 
households in England in 2009 and Figure 5.3 
shows that the proportion of under-occupied 
households has risen very rapidly from around 23 
per cent in 2003 to around 32 per cent in 2009.80 In 
this context a household is considered to be ‘under-
occupied’ if there are one or more extra bedrooms 
than required for homes without dependent 
children (under 18 years) or there are two or more 
extra bedrooms than required for homes with 
dependent children. Additionally, to be considered 
under-occupied, a property must also have surplus 
floor area.81
61. Such a definition is, of course, a matter of opinion. 
Some households will greatly value spare bedrooms 
for visiting children and grandchildren, for instance. 
Nonetheless, the increasing phenomenon is a 
concern from a fuel poverty perspective not least 
because a lack of space efficiency can compound 
the effect of energy inefficiency.
62. Under the current official indicator of fuel poverty, 
46 per cent of households in fuel poverty in 2009 
were under-occupiers. This compares to 28 per cent 
under the LIHC headcount indicator.
80 DECC. (2011). Fuel Poverty Monitoring Indicators 2011: Annex to the 
Annual Report on Fuel poverty Statistics 2011. DECC: London. Available 
at: http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/statistics/fuelpoverty/2184-fuel-
poverty-monitoring-indicators-2011.pdf
81 For a full explanation of the methodology for calculating under 
occupancy, see: DECC. (2010). Fuel Poverty Methodology Handbook. 
DECC: London. Available at: http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/
statistics/fuelpoverty/614-fuel-poverty-methodology-handbook.pdf
contrasts with, for example, the Green Deal finance 
mechanism which requires an ongoing repayment. 
On the face of it, therefore, this approach might be 
more attractive to low-income households who, in 
return for an agreement to a bill a long way down 
the line, could see living costs reduced in the short-
term and on a lasting basis.
57. However, as well as public suspicion about these 
products, a further concern with the use of equity 
release for fuel poverty relates to social equity. 
Existing supplier obligations (and, in future, 
the Energy Company Obligation) could fund or 
part-fund energy efficiency measures within the 
homes of non-fuel poor households. Funding for 
this partial or full subsidy comes in part from the 
fuel poor via their energy bill. It could be seen as 
unfair for income-rich asset-rich householders to 
benefit from subsidy while income-poor asset-rich 
householders were expected to fund their own 
improvements.
58. While there is theoretical scope for equity release 
to be used by fuel poor households to reduce their 
costs, the market for equity release is currently small 
and complex and without major intervention it is 
unlikely to provide a particularly fruitful avenue for 
a substantial reduction in fuel poverty. Only about 
18 per cent of those who are fuel poor according to 
our LIHC indicator – or about 500,000 households 
– are owner-occupiers aged 60 or more, and even 
for them, in many cases the terms of equity release 
products currently on offer may not provide the 
best value for money. Only some 170,000 LIHC 
households are outright owners aged over 75 for 
whom terms may be somewhat more favourable.
Occupancy patterns
59. Looking beyond investment in the thermal efficiency 
of dwellings, one major cause of high energy costs 
is under-occupancy. The fuel poverty methodology 
assumes a ‘half-house’ heating regime for under-
occupiers. There are some arguments concerning 
the appropriateness of this approach, given the 
possible repercussions of keeping half of a home 
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Improving incomes
65. The most important influences on the incomes of 
the currently fuel poor are levels of employment 
and income from work for those of working age, 
and levels of benefits and their take-up by those 
entitled to them more generally. The first two 
are, of course, major national issues, but in this 
context the rate of under-claiming of benefits is 
also significant – the Department of Work and 
Pensions estimates that some £6.9 billion to 
£12.7 billion worth of benefits went unclaimed 
compared to a total of £38.1 billion claimed in 
2008-09.82 This represents take-up by expenditure 
in the range of 75 to 85 per cent. Our analysis of 
which households report the lowest incomes and 
have high costs within the English Housing Survey 
suggests that many could be entitled to benefits 
they are not receiving (assuming they are not under-
reporting income).
82 DWP (2010), Income Related Benefits: Estimates of Take-Up in 2008-
2009, London: DWP. Available at: http://research.dwp.gov.uk/asd/
income_analysis/jun_2010/0809_Publication.pdf
63. Downsizing may be a viable option for some 
people. Moving to a more appropriately sized 
property could make it easier for people currently 
under-occupying properties to keep warm by 
reducing the amount of energy required to heat 
the home adequately. Downsizing can also increase 
disposable income because other living costs are 
reduced (e.g. council tax, utilities bills etc). It could 
therefore have a major effect on fuel poverty status. 
Equivalently, some households may have space 
within their home that could be used by lodgers of 
some kind, offering an alternative route to reducing 
costs by sharing them.
64. However, the costs of down-sizing can be 
significant. The cost of moving house tends to 
amount to several thousand pounds, and involves 
significant disruption, which is why many avoid it, 
even though there would be financial gains. Equally, 
taking in lodgers may be an unattractive option 
for some.
Note: A household is under-occupied if there are one or more extra bedrooms than required for homes without dependent children (under 18) or there 
are two or more extra bedrooms than required for homes with dependent children. A property must also have a surplus floor area.
0
10
20
30
40
50
20092008200720062005200420032002200120001999199819971996
Source: Fuel poverty indicators, 2009 (DECC)
Figure 5.3: Percentage of all households that are 
under-occupied, 1996-2009, England (%)
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show there was an average increase in benefits of 
almost £1,900, an aggregate increase in annual 
income for their target group of £11 million.83 
These figures suggest that ensuring that households 
are claiming all of the benefits to which they are 
entitled could be an important component of any 
fuel poverty strategy. We will return to the issue of 
benefits, and the contribution that they could make 
in tackling fuel poverty, in Chapter 7.
Reducing energy costs
68. A policy that is often raised in the context of fuel 
poverty is rising block tariffs (RBTs). The majority 
of current energy tariffs charge a lower unit price 
for consumption up to a given threshold, after 
which the unit prices increases to a higher level. 
The effect is that low-use consumers pay a higher 
average cost per unit of energy than high-use 
83 http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/11/funding-support/warm-
front/2747-warm-front-annual-report-2010-2011.pdf
66. This suggests that benefit entitlement checks 
may have a part to play in tackling fuel poverty. 
Benefit entitlement checks have been used by 
several schemes and organisations, such as Warm 
Front and energy companies, to help customers 
increase their incomes. A benefit entitlement check 
essentially comprises a survey to establish whether 
or not a household is claiming all the benefits to 
which it is entitled. As well as increasing the income 
of a household, benefit entitlement checks may also 
result in the household becoming eligible for energy 
efficiency schemes which use receipt of a means 
tested benefit as eligibility criteria.
67. Benefit entitlement checks have in some cases 
proved to be an extremely effective way of 
increasing the income of those in low income 
households. For example, in 2010/11, the Warm 
Front scheme identified over 6,000 unclaimed 
benefits amongst around 32,000 benefit 
entitlement checks carried out that year. Figures 
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there is on average a correlation between low 
income and low consumption.
72. We know that many of the households in the 
bottom left quadrant under the LIHC indicator 
will have quite low levels of actual energy usage 
(because they are under-heating relative to 
need). This means that, on average, low-income 
households are likely to see a reduction in actual 
energy bills from a rising block tariff. However, we 
saw in Chapter 2 of the interim report that there 
is a significant number of low-income households 
that do use large amounts of energy – because 
they prioritise energy expenditure over other 
consumption. As a result, these households would 
see an increase in actual energy costs from a move 
to a system rising block tariffs.
73. Seen from the perspective of our indicator, we 
would not expect the median bill to alter very 
much under a system of RBTs. Households with low 
energy requirements would be likely to see their 
required costs reduced under such a measure and 
would therefore have a lower bill as a proportion 
of the median bill. Households with high energy 
consumers, for whom the higher initial unit price 
is spread over a large amount of consumption. At 
least some energy suppliers would argue that the 
higher initial rate is an efficient way for them to 
cover their fixed costs.
69. RBTs reverse this structure so that the initial block 
of consumption is charged at a lower unit price 
than the subsequent block – that is, the price of 
energy rises with consumption. In essence, the idea 
is to provide a disincentive for energy waste at the 
same time as reducing costs for low consumption 
households.
70. Figure 5.4 provides a graphical representation of 
the differences between rising block tariffs and the 
current tariffs on the market. It shows how standard 
tariffs are more expensive than RBTs at low levels of 
consumption with RBTs becoming more expensive 
for those with higher consumption levels.
71. Some of those giving evidence to our review 
suggested that RBTs would be a more equitable 
way for energy companies to recover costs because 
Consumption (kWh)
Source: Fuel Poverty Review
Figure 5.4: Conceptual representation of rising block and 
standard tariffs
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households with higher costs would be drawn into 
fuel poverty by the higher tariff. This is shown in 
Figure 5.5.
requirements would be likely to see their costs 
increased, which would increase their fuel 
poverty gap. At the margins, some higher-income 
Rising income  
Rising
costs
Figure 5.5: Conceptual representation of the impact of 
RBTs under the low income high costs indicator
Effect on cost threshold
It would tend to remain the same.
Effect on income threshold
None.
Effect on measure of extent of fuel poverty
The number of households would tend 
to rise a little.
Effect on the fuel poverty gap
The aggregate gap would tend to rise.
74. In 2009, the Committee on Climate Change (CCC) 
commissioned BRE to look into the impact of 
RBTs. The resulting report found that as the fuel 
poor (under the official definition) tended to have 
higher than average energy costs, the introduction 
of such a tariff would result in higher average 
bills for fuel poor households with little impact 
on the number of households in fuel poverty 
overall.84 They concluded that fuel poverty would 
need to be addressed through energy efficiency 
and other policies before this type of policy could 
be introduced. Whilst this study was based on 
the official definition, it is clear that the same 
conclusion would hold for the LIHC indicator.
75. A move to RBTs would represent a major 
intervention in the competitive energy market. The 
effects of such an intervention, both on the market 
itself and particularly on low-income households 
would need to be well understood before it were 
84 http://downloads.theccc.org.uk/Rising%20block%20tariffs%20and%20
fuel%20poverty_051009FINAL.pdf
undertaken. For example, the impact on the general 
level of energy prices is not clear – for example, 
a move away from the current structure could 
increase the risk of energy companies being unable 
to cover the fixed costs of supply, which would be 
expected to increase prices.
76. The idea of a lower rate on the first units of 
consumption is intuitively appealing. However, it is 
clear that moving to a system of rising block tariffs, 
while beneficial for some, would cause significant 
‘collateral damage’ to households with high energy 
usage and/or high energy requirements. As such, 
we agree with the conclusions of the CCC that 
fuel poverty should be addressed through more 
targeted energy efficiency measures before any 
move to rising block tariffs could be made. Once 
this is done, RBTs would emerge as a more clearly 
progressive strategy.
77. Other considerations of tariffs are relevant to this 
review. In our interim report we highlighted that 
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80. In principle, a more transparent and simpler market 
has the potential to bring benefits to low-income 
and fuel poor households for reasons we discussed 
in section 2.3 of our interim report. Moves to 
simplify the supply market are, therefore, to be 
welcomed.
81. Finally, it is possible for Government to influence 
energy prices through taxation – the most obvious 
lever being to change the rate of VAT on domestic 
energy use. VAT is currently levied on domestic 
energy at a rate of 5 per cent87 (which compares 
with a rate of 20 per cent for most other goods 
and services). The lower rate of VAT on domestic 
energy use is generally a progressive policy because 
low-income households tend to have lower energy 
usage. Compared to a scenario where VAT is 
charged at 20 percent, this means that that the 
current VAT treatment of energy results in fewer 
fuel poor households and lower fuel poverty gaps. 
However, it is clear that the low rate of VAT on 
energy use also benefits higher-income households. 
As such, it could be argued that the low rate of 
VAT on domestic energy use is an expensive (and 
inefficient) policy in terms of supporting low-income 
and fuel poor households.
82. This speaks again of the potential tension – 
irrespective of the approach to fuel poverty 
measurement that is adopted – between, on the 
one hand, the Government’s objectives to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions and, on the other, 
to tackle fuel poverty. An efficient strategy for 
reducing GHG emissions would be for households 
to pay the full carbon cost associated with the 
energy that they consume. For domestic gas and 
other off-gas heating fuels (i.e. coal, LPG, oil 
but excluding electricity), which currently do not 
face a carbon price that is commensurate with 
their carbon intensity, this would suggest that 
an increase in the level of VAT (or equivalently a 
‘green tax’) would be a sensible strategy. However, 
this would hit the fuel poor and low-income 
households hardest.
87 5 per cent is the EU minimum level for fuel duty. Member States are free 
to increase rates above that minimum rate. 
households pay (significantly) different prices for 
the energy they consume depending on the tariff 
they are on. For instance, if the households with the 
lowest three-tenths of incomes had paid the lowest 
tariffs (the fifth percentile within each payment type 
and region) then fuel poverty under the current 
indicator would have been 15 per cent lower in 
2009.85 Conversely, if these households had paid 
the highest tariffs (the ninety-fifth percentile for 
each group) then fuel poverty would have been 7 
per cent higher than officially calculated.
78. Recent years have seen a proliferation in the tariffs 
offered by companies. This provides a significant 
barrier to consumers wishing to find the best deal 
and, as a result, many households either do not 
engage with the market or do not achieve a better 
deal when they do. Ofgem has found that profit 
margins for so-called ‘sticky’ customers are higher 
than for ‘mobile’ customers.86 The risk of ending up 
on a worse tariff following a switch is highest for 
pre-payment meter customers.
79. As a response to this situation, there have been 
many calls for tariff simplification. Most recently 
Ofgem published a proposal to simplify the tariff 
structure (and, therefore, to facilitate greater 
customer switching) as a result of their ongoing 
investigation into the retail market. Their proposals 
consist primarily of splitting the market into 
‘standard’ and ‘non-standard’ tariffs. For each of 
the standard tariffs, Ofgem propose to set the 
standing charge with the supplier then setting a 
single unit price. Furthermore, energy suppliers 
would be limited to one standard tariff per payment 
method. The market for non-standard tariffs would 
more closely resemble the current market, although 
there would be some additional restrictions placed 
on suppliers in order to encourage customers to 
engage with the market – for example, there would 
be rules about the duration of contracts.
85 Based on a comparison with the figures generated where average tariffs 
are used. 
86 http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Markets/RetMkts/rmr/Documents1/RMR_
FINAL.pdf
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The impact of behavioural change
85. As we have discussed in both our interim report 
and within this report, fuel poverty is defined on 
the basis of modelled energy costs. That is, the 
amount that a household would need to spend 
in order to maintain a satisfactory heating regime 
and cover energy required for water heating, 
lighting and appliances. We argued in Chapter 
5 of the interim report that the fact that actual 
energy expenditure can be affected by constrained 
resources or profligacy means that a focus on 
modelled energy costs is appropriate when thinking 
about fuel poverty.
86. The fact that fuel poverty is based on a modelled 
energy requirement means that the energy use 
behaviour of the householder does not impact 
on modelled energy requirements and, therefore, 
will not affect whether a household is fuel poor or 
not.90 This is true for both the current indicator and 
the proposed LIHC indicator (as both use the same 
modelled assessment of household energy costs).
87. However, in terms of people’s actual welfare, 
people’s behaviour, and whether they actually make 
the most appropriate use of their energy can be 
very important indeed. One of the issues for those 
concerned with public health is whether people 
keep themselves warm enough, particularly older 
people in the winter91. Avoiding activities that 
waste heat and energy can make a large difference 
to people’s bills, as well as their impact on carbon 
emissions. Health advice and energy advice and 
assistance are therefore very important parts of 
the services offered by those concerned with fuel 
poverty . How this is done most effectively, and the 
potential impact of interventions on both health 
and energy consumption were beyond the scope of 
this review, however.
90 Although, of course, average behaviours are captured to some extent in 
terms of modelled non-heating costs.
91 It is also important to keep cool enough in the summer.
83. In theory, it might be possible to vary the level 
of VAT for different levels of consumption (i.e. a 
lower rate up to a specified consumption threshold) 
or for different types of household (i.e. the low 
rate is only applied to lower income households). 
However, there are some obvious limitations to 
both approaches – e.g. varying VAT based on 
consumption would replicate the impact of a rising 
block tariff while charging the lower rate only for 
low-income households would be administratively 
complex (i.e. it would require energy companies 
to charge different rates for different households 
depending on their circumstances or it would 
require some form of VAT rebate for low-income 
households – both of which would be very 
cumbersome)
84. An alternative approach to protecting low-income 
households from higher VAT on energy could be 
to hypothecate88 the additional tax revenue into 
programmes designed to alleviate some of the 
negative distributional impacts of the tax increase. 
As a general rule, hypothecation is not a feature of 
the UK Government’s approach to tax and spend.89 
Advocates of the hypothecation of the revenue 
from higher VAT on energy (or carbon taxes) for 
energy efficiency measures argue that this could 
increase the public acceptability of such taxes while 
also delivering major benefits to the economy and 
the effort to reduce carbon emissions. From a fuel 
poverty perspective, the impact of hypothecation 
could be positive, depending on the tax that has 
been levied and on the way in which the funds are 
used. However, revenue raised from consumption of 
energy (e.g. carbon taxes and increased VAT) could 
be more regressive than measures funded from 
income-based taxation.
88 Hypothecation means reserving a revenue stream for a particular type of 
expenditure (in this case, energy efficiency).
89 See, for example, a recent House of Commons Library Standard Note 
available at: www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN01480
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Chapter Summary
There is a broad range of policies currently in place – or that could potentially be implemented – to help  
tackle fuel poverty. These policies span the three drivers of fuel poverty: thermal efficiency (e.g. Warm 
Front, Green Deal); incomes (e.g. Winter Fuel Payments) and energy prices (e.g. Warm Home Discount). 
Current policies are mainly funded from either the Exchequer or through energy suppliers (both of which 
spread the costs of policies over all households) although it may be possible to unlock other sources of 
funding by getting households to pay directly for energy efficiency improvements.
Policies vary in terms of the types of households they target for support. Policies such as CESP, Cold 
Weather Payments and Warm Home Discount are focused on low-income households. Eligible 
households are therefore likely to fall below the income threshold under the LIHC indicator and may 
also have high costs. CERT, ECO and Winter Fuel Payments are more widely spread over the population. 
Those receiving assistance under CERT and ECO may well have high costs. Winter Fuel Payments go to 
households with older members irrespective of income or energy efficiency. 
This chapter has looked at the potential distributional effects of the proposed balance between 
‘Affordable Warmth’ and the Carbon Obligation within ECO. With only 25 per cent going to Affordable 
Warmth, the package would be regressive overall. We cannot calculate precisely what the balance would 
need to be to avoid this, but it appears that over half of ECO would need to go to Affordable Warmth to 
do this. We look more at the implications of this balance in terms of the projected impact on fuel poverty 
in Chapter 6 and potential impact of alternatives in Chapter 7. 
While we cannot cover implementation issues in any detail this Chapter has also covered a number of 
points related to current debates:
•	 We have seen that minimum standards policies (as recently introduced for the private rented 
sector) can be used to unlock additional funding and overcome delivery barriers. But it is clear the 
target EPC rating of E, even if it were achieved, would leave many private tenant households still in 
fuel poverty.
•	 Public provision of information on the energy efficiency rating of housing, such as on-line provision 
of EPC ratings alongside sales price data, could help drive up standards.
•	 Equity release for energy efficiency might also tap into a new source of funding. However it 
would seem to be appropriate for only a small number of fuel poor households, as well as raising 
questions of social equity by comparison with assistance under ECO.
•	 In terms of energy prices, simplified retail energy markets could increase customer participation and 
bring benefits to the fuel poor.
•	 Rising block tariffs (RBTs) have been proposed as a more radical change to the structure of energy 
tariffs. RBTs would be broadly progressive, but they would marginalise a large number of low-
income and high-use households and could well worsen fuel poverty unless offset in other ways. 
We agree with the Climate Change Committee that fuel poverty should be better addressed before 
any move to RBTs is made.
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Chapter Summary (Continued) 
•	 Policies that aim to help households make best use of energy through behavioural change can be 
very important for both health and welfare. However, how this is done most effectively, and the 
potential impact of such interventions were beyond the scope of this review.
We examine the net impact of current policy choices in the near future in Chapter 6. And in Chapter 7 
we examine the cost-effectiveness of different policy approaches.
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1. We now turn to the outlook for fuel poverty over 
the medium term. This Chapter sets out a series 
of projections of how we expect the extent and 
depth of fuel poverty, measured in different ways, 
to change between 2009 and 2016. The projections 
reflect both underlying changes in the key drivers 
of energy prices and incomes and the impact of 
Government policies.
2. We first discuss the assumptions underpinning our 
projections and then set out projected levels of 
fuel poverty as measured by the Low Income High 
Costs (LIHC) indicator, showing the contributions of 
particular factors to these changes, and making a 
comparison with other indicators. Such projections 
are inevitably subject to considerable uncertainties 
and methodological limitations (including an 
inability to capture additions to the housing stock, 
DIY efficiency improvements such as loft insulation 
carried out and funded by the householder, 
changes to unemployment after 2009 and changes 
to the structure of the tax and benefit system). 
We therefore also explore some sensitivities in the 
analysis, in particular to the evolution of incomes 
and energy prices.
3. It should be noted that due to the complexity of the 
analysis we show projections only for 2016, not for 
intermediate years after 2009. Some of the main 
factors driving the changes – such as part of the 
increases in fuel prices – have already occurred and 
their impacts will affect levels of fuel poverty earlier 
than a linear trend would suggest.92
6.1  Modelling assumptions
4. The projections are based on the 2009 English 
Housing Survey (EHS) dataset, with the projected 
level of fuel poverty in future years estimated based 
on assumptions and current official expectations 
about future changes in household incomes, energy 
prices and the thermal efficiency of the housing 
stock. We describe below the key assumptions we 
have made for each of these factors. A list of all our 
assumptions as well as a technical description of the 
modelling methodology are set out in the Annex to 
this Chapter.
Growth in household incomes
5. For the growth in household incomes, the 
projections use assumptions consistent with those 
used in the Office of Budget Responsibility (OBR) 
Outlook Report published in November 2011.93 
The OBR suggests there will be real terms falls in 
disposable income and earnings in the immediate 
future and only modest growth thereafter. Applying 
these assumptions to the 2009 EHS dataset 
suggests that median household incomes will be 
92 Note also that the fuel poverty measurement methodology uses data for 
two years, so the ‘2009’ baseline figures are, in fact, based on 2008 and 
2009 data.
93 See: http://budgetresponsibility.independent.gov.uk/economic-and-fiscal-
outlook-november-2011/
Projections of trends 
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alongside the 2011 Annual Energy Statement.96 
These predict continued strong growth in 
energy prices in the medium term – driven by a 
combination of fossil fuel prices, by the costs of 
transmission and distribution and by pass-through 
costs for suppliers associated with Government 
policies. The estimates suggest that between 2011 
and 2016 domestic electricity prices will increase 
in real terms by 18 per cent and domestic gas 
prices will increase in real terms by 28 per cent. 
This comes on top of a real increase of 23 per cent 
for electricity prices and 28 per cent for gas prices 
between 2009 and 2011.97 The price of other fuels 
(i.e. coal, heating oil & LPG) is assumed to track 
fossil fuel prices. The projections for these are based 
on DECC assumptions.98 In Section 6.2, we show 
the sensitivity of the projections to a range of fossil 
fuel price assumptions.
The impact of Government policies 
on energy bills
9. The impact of rising energy prices should be 
alleviated somewhat for those households receiving 
support from the Government through its policy 
package. Chapter 5 set out in detail the current 
policy package and also described the key policies 
that are under development. We expect certain 
elements of the current package to remain in 
place over the course of the Spending Review 
period (including Winter Fuel Payments, Cold 
Weather Payments and Warm Home Discount). 
However, the Government’s policy approach to 
delivering improvements to the thermal efficiency 
of the housing stock is in a period of transition. 
Within the next few years, CERT, CESP and Warm 
Front will come to an end and will be replaced 
96  See: http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/11/about-us/economics-social-
research/3593-estimated-impacts-of-our-policies-on-energy-prices.pdf
97 Based on a combination of the Quarterly Energy Prices (see: http://www.
decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/statistics/publications/prices/prices.aspx) and 
‘The estimated impact of energy and climate change policies on energy 
prices and bills: November 2011’ (see: http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/
decc/11/about-us/economics-social-research/3593-estimated-impacts-of-
our-policies-on-energy-prices.pdf)
98 See: http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/about/ec_social_res/
analytic_projs/ff_prices/ff_prices.aspx
3.3 per cent higher in 2016 in real terms than in 
2009, after housing costs.
6. Our projections imply that in 2016 there will be an 
increase of 8 per cent in the number of households 
with incomes below our income threshold, but 
nearly all of this is accounted for by rising fuel costs. 
Apart from this effect the projections involve little 
change in relative poverty. This is somewhat out 
of line with other (and more sophisticated) income 
forecasts, many of which suggest there will be 
a significant increase in relative poverty over this 
period. For example, recent work by the Institute 
of Fiscal Studies94 (IFS) suggests that relative child 
poverty is expected to rise from 19.7 per cent in 
2009 to 22.2 percent in 2015. Working age relative 
poverty amongst adults without children is forecast 
to increase from 17.1 per cent in 2009 to 18.5 
per cent in 2015. We explore the reasons for this 
divergence in the Annex to this Chapter.
7. It is worth noting here that there is no robust 
way in which a change in unemployment can be 
reflected in the EHS dataset.95 Furthermore, detailed 
modelling of changes to the tax and benefits system 
is complex (and beyond the scope of this report 
as well as the data available in the EHS). Both of 
these factors suggest that the income assumptions 
that are used in our fuel poverty projections will, 
if anything, overstate the likely growth in incomes 
that will be experienced by poor households. As 
a result, our baseline projections are likely to be 
over-optimistic in terms of the future trends in fuel 
poverty rates as they may understate the size of the 
‘at risk’ group.
Growth in energy prices
8. For energy prices, the projections use assumptions 
for electricity and gas prices that are consistent 
with the DECC central price projections published 
94 For more details see: http://www.ifs.org.uk/comms/comm121.pdf
95 The problem is that there is no information available about the energy 
efficiency standards of households that we know have been affected by 
rising unemployment since 2009.  We cannot therefore judge the extent 
to which their standards correspond to either the energy efficiency 
characteristics of unemployed households in 2009 or a random cross-
section of employed households in that year.
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demolished. This churn in the housing stock 
could have an impact on the level of fuel poverty, 
depending on the types of dwelling constructed 
and the types of people who live in them (e.g. if 
new energy-efficient homes are predominantly for 
higher-income people and low-income households 
do not benefit from better stock filtering down, 
this could worsen fuel poverty under the LIHC 
indicator)99. However, this kind of impact is not 
captured under the projections in this Chapter.
by the Green Deal and the accompanying Energy 
Company Obligation.
Limitations to the modelling
10. The fact that the projections are based on the 2009 
EHS means that the housing stock is effectively 
frozen at this point in time. In reality there will 
be some churn in the housing stock as some 
new (usually more energy-efficient) dwellings 
are constructed and some existing properties 
To project the level of fuel poverty to 2016 we need to make a large number of assumptions and 
apply them to the 2009 EHS. This is not a straightforward process and our baseline projections 
are, if anything, likely to be over-optimistic (i.e. they may under-estimate the number of fuel poor 
households) because of specific difficulties in making detailed assumptions about employment and 
income changes. In any case, there are considerable uncertainties and methodological limitations to 
the projections which can be made. They should therefore be understood as indications of the broad 
direction of change rather than as precise forecasts.
6.2 Projections of the 
LIHC and fuel poverty gap 
indicators
11. Figure 6.1 shows the baseline projections for fuel 
poverty to 2016 based on the LIHC indicator. It 
should be remembered that we do not project 
figures for intermediate years between 2009 and 
2016, and the price rises already experienced by 
2011 mean that the numbers will not, in fact, 
follow a linear trend. The upper panel shows the 
headcount indicator of households and individuals 
affected. The lower panel shows the associated fuel 
poverty gap. The ‘without policies’ projections show 
the expected baseline in the absence of the climate 
and energy policies. The figures suggest that the 
number of households that are in fuel poverty will 
increase from 2.7 million in 2009 to 3.0 million by 
2016 (an increase of more than 10 per cent). This 
change is mainly driven by rising energy prices,  
 
which draw some additional households into fuel 
poverty.100
12. The ‘with policies’ projection shows the aggregate 
impact of the climate and energy policy package.101 
This suggests a projected increase from 2.7 million 
in 2009 to 2.9 million in 2016. The effect of the 
policy package in total is a small reduction in 
the fuel poverty headcount from what it would 
otherwise be – reducing the number of fuel poor 
households by around 150,000 households in 2016. 
The number of individuals affected will rise from 
7.8 million in 2009 to 8.5 million in 2016, taking 
account of the impact of policies. Analysis of how 
different policies account for this overall effect is set 
out in Section 6.3.
99 This is another example of the benefits of a relative approach to fuel 
poverty measurement which should be effective in tracking whether 
general improvements across the housing stock pass low income 
households by.
100 See Section 6.4 for a comparison of this result with the expected result 
under the current official indicator.
101 This includes only policies that are in place or those that have been 
planned to a sufficient degree of detail. The policy package therefore 
includes the following: better billing, CCS demonstration, CERT, CERT 
extension, CRC, CCA, CCL, CESP, EMR, EU ETS (inc. CPF), FITs, Green 
Deal and ECO, products policy, RHI, RO, smart metering and WHD. 
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will result in a reduction in the fuel poverty gap 
of around one tenth from this, or £0.18 billion in 
2016. Measures directed at fuel poor households 
(e.g. Warm Front, Warm Home Discount and 
the ECO Affordable Warmth Obligation) are 
expected to offset the impact of higher energy 
prices. Nonetheless, the fuel poverty gap will, on 
this central projection, reach £1.7 billion in 2016, 
compared to £1.1 billion in 2009, £0.7 billion in 
2004 and £1.0 billion in 1996 (at 2009 prices).
13. The lower panel of Figure 6.1 shows the baseline 
projections for the fuel poverty gap. The ‘without 
policies’ projection suggests that the aggregate 
gap will increase substantially from £1.1 billion in 
2009 to around £1.9 billion in 2016 (an increase 
of nearly 75 per cent). This is driven primarily by 
rising energy prices, resulting in more fuel poor 
households (as set out above) and large increases in 
modelled energy costs for those households above 
the costs threshold. The ‘with policies’ projection 
suggests that the climate and energy policy package 
Source: Fuel Poverty Review. See Annex 6 for the full list of sources for the 
calculations for this and all subsequent charts in this chapter unless otherwise stated.
Figure 6.1a: Baseline projections of the number of 
households in fuel poverty under the LIHC indicator with 
and without the effects of policies included, 1996-2016, 
England, (millions)
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Figure 6.1b:  Baseline projections of the aggregate fuel 
poverty gap under the LIHC indicator with and without 
the effect of policies included, 1996-2016, England 
(£bn, 2009 Prices)
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14. These future projections are inherently uncertain. 
As such, for both the headcount and fuel poverty 
gap indicators we estimate a series of projections 
with different income and price assumptions. This 
helps us understand how sensitive our ‘central’ 
projections are to changes in the underlying 
assumptions.
15. The extreme points of these ‘sensitivity’ projections 
are scenarios that are based on:
a. Low growth in income and high growth in 
energy prices: low income growth and high 
growth in energy prices will both put upward 
pressure on fuel poverty. This scenario gives a 
sense of the upper-bound for the headcount 
and fuel poverty gap projections.
b. High growth in income and low growth in 
energy prices: high income growth and low 
growth in energy prices will both put downward 
pressure on fuel poverty. This scenario gives a 
sense of the lower-bound for the headcount 
and fuel poverty gap projections.
16. The high and low energy prices projections are 
taken from DECC high and low price scenarios – 
these assume an oil price of $114.9 per barrel in 
2016 (2011 prices) in the central scenario versus 
$99.5 per barrel in the low scenario and $124 
per barrel in the high scenario.102 For incomes, 
the projections are based on the high and low 
assumptions that were published by the Office 
for Budget Responsibility in their November 
2011 Outlook report. The impact of Government 
policies, in terms of what is delivered, does not vary 
between scenarios. More details of the assumptions 
that have been used in the high and low projections 
are set out in the Annex to this Chapter.
17. Figure 6.2 shows the sensitivity projections against 
the LIHC headcount and fuel poverty gap indicators. 
As can be seen in the upper panel, in the least 
optimistic scenario the number of households 
affected will rise a little further (still around 
3.0 million). In the most optimistic scenario, the 
numbers will fall slightly from their 2009 level, to 
around 2.6 million. The observed movement in the 
number of fuel poor households is mainly driven by 
changes in energy prices.
102 For more details see: http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/11/about-us/
economics-social-research/2933-fossil-fuel-price-projections-summary.pdf 
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Source: Fuel Poverty Review
Figure 6.2a: Sensitivity projections for the number of 
households and individuals fuel poverty under the LIHC 
indicator, 1996-2016, England (millions) 
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Figure 6.2b: Sensitivity projections for the aggregate fuel 
poverty gap under the LIHC indicator, 1996-2016, England
(£ billions, 2009 prices)
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18. The lower panel of Figure 6.2 shows the sensitivity 
projections for the fuel poverty gap. As we would 
expect the fuel poverty gap is very sensitive to 
movements in energy prices and (to a lesser extent) 
to changes in incomes. This is reflected in the 
projections, which suggest that the fuel poverty gap 
could range between £1.1 billion and £1.9 billion 
in 2016.103
19. It is important to reiterate that this sensitivity to 
prices within the fuel poverty gap is desirable. It 
shows how much deeper fuel poverty can become 
for affected households as prices change. It also 
points towards the priorities for action – those 
with the largest fuel poverty gaps – with a bigger 
prize for successfully delivering assistance to them 
at no extra cost (at least in the case of thermal 
efficiency measures).
These projections will be profoundly disappointing to all those concerned with fuel poverty and 
aware of the serious problems it causes. Far from being eliminated in 2016 it will still affect between 
2.6 million and 3.0 million households (containing between 7.8 and 8.9 million individuals) when 
measured using our preferred indicator. Our central projection is that the key indicator of its scale, 
the fuel poverty gap, will rise to £1.7 billion, compared to £1.1 billion in 2009. The overall impact of 
policy is that this number will be a tenth – but only a tenth – lower than it would otherwise be. Even 
in the most optimistic scenario for prices and incomes the fuel poverty gap would remain roughly the 
same in 2016 as in 2009.
6.3 The impact of policies 
under the LIHC and fuel 
poverty gap indicators
20. We saw in the previous section that the ‘with 
policies’ projections suggest that the climate and 
energy policy package is expected to reduce the 
number of fuel poor households by 150,000 
households – and the fuel poverty gap by £0.18 
billion – in 2016. The upper panel of Figure 6.3 
shows how this aggregate impact breaks down 
across different policies. There are a number of 
points that are worth noting:
a. the impact of measures installed under Warm 
Front and CESP reduces the level of fuel poverty 
in 2016. While these policies are due to finish by 
the end of 2012/13, measures installed through 
CESP and Warm Front will continue to have an 
103 The aggregate gap always changes somewhat more quickly – up and 
down – than prices because it is the product of either higher prices 
applied to more fuel poor households or lower prices applied to fewer 
fuel poor households.
impact on household energy bills into the future 
(e.g. a new heating system is assumed to have a 
lifetime of 12 years).
b. CERT results in a small increase in the number of 
fuel poor households under the LIHC indicator. 
This is because CERT is targeted at households 
across the income distribution. As such, the 
policy does not improve the relative position 
of fuel poor households, because their costs 
have not been reduced as much as those of 
households who are not fuel poor. We discuss 
below the fuel poverty gap, which will help 
to reflect the impact of policies like CERT on 
energy costs of fuel poor households.
c. The figures suggest that the ECO Affordable 
Warmth Obligation will reduce the number 
of fuel poor households in 2016. While the 
obligation is funded through energy suppliers 
(which means an increase in the reasonable 
cost threshold) the measures delivered through 
this element of the scheme will be targeted at 
low-income households in energy-inefficient 
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poverty. However, the impact of the WFP is 
relatively modest compared to the resources 
devoted to the policy (only 20,000 households 
will be removed from fuel poverty as defined by 
the LIHC indicator as a result of approximately 
£2 billion of expenditure each year).
g. The impact of ‘other’ policies will  mainly be 
to increase energy prices across all households 
(although CWPs do provide some support to 
low-income households). As such, the impact of 
this broad group of policies will be to increase 
the reasonable costs threshold and draw more 
households into fuel poverty.
21. The baseline projections presented in Section 6.2 
suggest that the policy package will reduce the 
aggregate fuel poverty gap by £0.18 billion in 
2016. The lower panel in Figure 6.3 shows how the 
estimated change in the fuel poverty gap in 2016 
breaks down across different policies. The results 
suggest that:
a. CESP, CERT and Warm Front will reduce the fuel 
poverty gap. This is driven by the fact that all 
of these policies improve the thermal efficiency 
of fuel poor households (and therefore reduce 
modelled energy costs) and in 2016 will also 
no longer be exerting any impact on energy 
prices as a result of energy suppliers recouping 
the cost of the policies. It is notable that CERT 
will reduce the fuel poverty gap significantly, 
even though it will slightly raise the number of 
fuel poor households. This indicates that CERT 
leads to the installation of many cost effective 
measures across a broad range of households.
b. The Affordable Warmth Obligation will result in 
an increase in energy prices for all households 
as energy suppliers recoup the cost of the 
policy (which increases the fuel poverty gap). 
However, the policy will concentrate support on 
households that are fuel poor (which will reduce 
the fuel poverty gap). The results suggest 
that the latter effect will dominate, driving a 
reduction in the fuel poverty gap.
dwellings.104 The aggregate impact of the policy 
will, therefore, be to reduce the number of 
households in fuel poverty.
d. Conversely, the ECO carbon obligation and 
Green Deal Finance will result in an increase in 
the level of fuel poverty, although taken as a 
whole the effect of the ECO is to reduce fuel 
poverty. The policy will deliver energy efficiency 
improvements which reduce the reasonable 
cost threshold. However, because the measures 
are targeted at households across the income 
distribution, the relative position of fuel poor 
households will not improve. Adding to that, 
the impact of higher energy prices caused by 
the policy increase the number of fuel poor 
households. As discussed in Chapter 5, the fuel 
poverty and distributional impacts of the Green 
Deal would improve if a larger proportion than 
is currently proposed of the measures delivered 
by the policy were targeted at LIHC households. 
We will examine this kind of impact further 
in Chapter 7 where we compare narrowly 
targeted (i.e. focused on LIHC households) and 
broadly targeted (i.e. focused on all high-cost 
households) energy efficiency policies.
e. The Warm Home Discount will draw some 
households into fuel poverty through the 
increase in the reasonable costs threshold. 
However, the rebates are targeted 
predominantly at low-income households, 
which means that the policy will shift a greater 
number of households above the reasonable 
costs threshold and resulting in a net reduction 
in fuel poverty.
f. Households receiving the Winter Fuel Payment 
see an increase in their income. For a few 
households, this is sufficient to move them 
across the income threshold and out of fuel 
104 We need to exercise some caution when comparing the impacts of 
policies such as CERT and CESP (where we are measuring the energy 
saving benefits of measures that were installed in the past, but do not 
take account of the costs of these measures) and policies such as the 
Green Deal (where we are taking account of both the costs and benefits 
of the policy). The issue of the comparability of the ‘gross’ and ‘net’ 
impacts of policies is discussed further in the Annex to this Chapter. 
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Figure 6.3a: Breakdown of the impacts of the climate and 
energy policy package on fuel poverty based on the LIHC 
indicator in 2016 (headcount of households)
Source: Fuel Poverty Review
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Figure 6.3b: Breakdown of the impacts of the climate and 
energy policy package on fuel poverty based on the LIHC 
indicator in 2016 (fuel poverty gap)
Source: Fuel Poverty Review
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households – many of whom are fuel poor. As 
such, the policy is expected to result in a small 
reduction in the fuel poverty gap.
e. The Winter Fuel Payment will also result in a 
modest reduction in the aggregate fuel poverty 
gap. This is driven by households being removed 
from fuel poverty (or moving into the ‘leading 
edge’ of the fuel poverty segment) as a result of 
receiving the benefit.
f. The policies included as ‘other’ will result in 
higher energy prices and, as a result, drive a 
significant increase in the fuel poverty gap.
c. The Green Deal Carbon Obligation will also 
increase energy costs and will deliver some 
measures to fuel poor households. However, 
unlike the Affordable Warmth obligation, 
the measures delivered will be spread across 
all households. As such, the prices effect is 
expected to dominate, are leading to a small 
increase in the fuel poverty gap at this time 
(although see Chapter 7 for a calculation of 
the lifetime effect of this kind of policy). As 
with the headcount indicator, the net effect 
of ECO taken as a whole is to reduce the fuel 
poverty gap.
d. The rebates paid through the Warm Home 
Discount are mainly targeted at low-income 
The climate change and energy policy package is expected to have a small but downward net impact 
on the aggregate level of fuel poverty measured by the LIHC indicator and on the fuel poverty gap. 
Policies that focus support on LIHC households (such as Warm Front , the Affordable Warmth part 
of ECO and, to a lesser extent, Warm Home Discount) are expected to improve the relative position 
of the fuel poor and reduce the extent and depth of fuel poverty. Conversely, those policies that do 
not focus support on LIHC households (such as FITs and the Green Deal carbon obligation) are not 
expected to improve the relative position of the fuel poor and are expected to increase both the 
number and depth of fuel poverty.
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(or 3 per cent lower) than if the impact of policies 
were not taken into account. As we argued in the 
interim report and in Chapter 1, the sensitivity 
of this indicator to prices and the way it includes 
higher-income households when prices are high do 
not seem to be helpful characteristics. At the same 
time, policy impacts are masked. In this case the 
reduction – albeit a very modest 10 per cent – in 
the fuel poverty gap shown in Figure 6.1 seems a 
more realistic measure of the impact of policy.
Low income low fixed SAP indicator
24. We discussed in Chapter 2 (and explored in more 
detail in the Annex to that Chapter) options 
suggested by some of the points made to us in the 
consultation on our interim report that an absolute 
standard should be used for measuring energy 
efficiency. While we have argued that our preferred 
indicator has more helpful features, Figure 6.5 
compares what the level of fuel poverty under 
various low income low fixed SAP indicators suggest 
for the period between 1996 to 2009 and projected 
to 2016.105 There are three lines shown:
105 SAP levels for 2016 have been projected as part of the overall projections 
methodology. As the projections do not allow for new build dwellings, 
increases in annual average SAP levels are likely to be faster in reality.
6.4 Comparison with other 
indicators
22. In this section we examine what the projections 
imply for the number of households classed as 
being in fuel poverty using other indicators (the 
current official indicator, an absolute variant of the 
LIHC indicator and a low income low fixed SAP 
indicator) by comparison with the projections for 
the LIHC indicator.
10 per cent indicator
23. Figure 6.4 compares the range of the projected 
number of households in fuel poverty under 
our preferred LIHC indicator with the range that 
would be shown by the current official indicator. 
It shows the very great sensitivity of the current 
indicator to energy prices and incomes. With 
the most pessimistic assumptions, by 2016 it will 
class 9.2 million households – 43 per cent of all 
households – as being in fuel poverty. On the most 
optimistic scenario for prices and incomes, only a 
third as many, 3.1 million households, will be in 
fuel poverty, a reduction of one quarter from 2009. 
On the central projection, 8.1 million households 
will be fuel poor. This is 230,000 households fewer 
Source: Fuel Poverty Review
Figure 6.4:  Baseline projections of the number of 
households in fuel poverty under the LIHC and current 
indicators 1996 to 2016 (millions)
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projection. Taking median standards as they were 
in 2009 there will still be 2.2 million low-income 
households living in homes with a SAP level below 
the standard. Half of those households, 1.1 million, 
will still be below the standard reached by the 
median household more than a decade ago. On 
the higher standard, the number will be 4.7 million 
households. It is particularly disappointing that 
even against these standards, which are affected 
by energy efficiency improvements and income 
changes but not by energy prices, the projections 
suggest slower progress between 2009 and 2016 
than between 2003 and 2009.
•	 a low income low SAP measure based on 
median SAP as it was in 2009 (around 55).
•	 a low income low SAP measure based on median 
SAP as we have estimated it to have been in 
2000 (around 46).
•	 a low income low SAP measure based on 
the boundary between EPC levels C and D as 
suggested by some stakeholders (this is 68.5).
25. As we would expect, these measures do show 
continuing improvement over time against their 
fixed standards. However, on none of them would 
the number of households with low incomes and 
low SAP be reduced to zero by 2016 on our central 
Source: Fuel Poverty Review
Figure 6.5: Baseline projections of the number of 
households in fuel poverty under various low-income 
low SAP indicators 1996-2016, England (millions)
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on this basis back to 1996, so there is a break 
in the series between 2003 and 2006. It is also 
rather complex to derive. Looking forward the 
central projection is for a small fall in fuel poverty 
between 2009 and 2016, but only from 2.7 million 
to 2.5 million households. Only on the most 
optimistic assumptions will there be a fall by 2016 
approaching the rates seen between 1996 and 
2003 or between 2006 and 2009.106
106 The reduction in the absolute threshold measures would be greater 
between 2009 and 2016 if new build dwellings were included in our 
projections.
Absolute variant of the LIHC 
indicator
26. Finally, Figure 6.6 compares the number of 
households with low incomes and high costs 
against an absolute standard (which is unaffected 
by improvements in the energy efficiency of all 
homes including those on higher incomes). For the 
reasons we discussed in Chapter 2 and its Annex 
it was not possible to construct a consistent series 
This section has looked at what the projections of fuel poverty by 2016 would imply using other 
indicators. On the current 10 per cent indicator the range given by the sensitivity analysis suggesting 
levels of between 3.1 million households in 2016, a fall compared to 2009, and 9.2 million 
households (43 per cent of all households) with a central projection of 8.1 million, double 2009 
levels. This illustrates the sensitivity of the current indicator to energy prices, but also shows that even 
in the most optimistic case the numbers in fuel poverty would only fall by a quarter by 2016.
We have also shown what trends would be using indicators based on the number of low-income 
households with homes below a range of fixed SAP standards. Even in the least demanding case 
more than 1 million households would remain in very energy-inefficient homes in 2016 and in all 
cases progress is projected to be much slower after 2009 than before. Against an absolute variant of 
the LIHC indicator, the central projections show a very small fall by 2016.
Source: Fuel Poverty Review/EHS
Figure 6.6: Projections of fuel poverty under an absolute 
variant of the LIHC indicator, 1996-2016, England
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Chapter Summary
To aid an understanding of the position we are in, this Chapter has presented projections for 2016 of 
what could happen to fuel poverty within our preferred framework. Such projections are inherently 
uncertain, so we show the effects of a range of assumptions for energy prices and income growth. 
Because of limitations to the modelling possible using the source data, these projections are, if 
anything, likely to be over-optimistic about the scale of the problem.
Using our preferred indicator, between 2.6 million and 3.0 million households would still have low 
incomes and high costs in 2016. Our central projection is that the fuel poverty gap would have risen 
by half to £1.7 billion from £1.1 billion in 2009. Only on the most optimistic price assumptions would 
this key indicator remain constant.
Without the policy measures we have allowed for the fuel poverty gap would, however, have been 
nearly a tenth greater. The most significant contributors to this positive impact are CERT, Warm Front 
and the Affordable Warmth component of the Green Deal.
Using the same range of assumptions the level of fuel poverty measured by the current official 
indicator would be between 3.1 million and 9.2 million households, with a central projection of 
8.1 million.
Alternative indicators based on absolute standards show reductions in the number of low-income 
households with energy efficiency or costs below fixed standards. However, in each case progress is 
projected to be slower after 2009 than before it.
These results are profoundly disappointing for all those concerned with the problems we have 
explored in this report and our interim report. They suggest that there is no plausible definition of fuel 
poverty under which it would be eliminated by 2016 given current official projections for incomes, 
prices and the impacts of the current policy package. On our preferred key measure, the fuel poverty 
gap, low-income households would face costs of £1.7 billion each year to keep their homes warm 
and cover other energy needs above the costs faced by typical families, compared to £1.1 billion 
in 2009.
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1. In Chapter 5 we examined the current fuel poverty 
framework in detail before turning, in Chapter 
6, to consider its impact on fuel poverty by 2016 
(alongside the impacts of changing fuel prices and 
incomes). Those projections set out how – unless 
energy prices develop in the most favourable way 
– fuel poverty is likely to be higher in 2016 than it 
was in 2009. This Chapter therefore now provides 
further analysis under our framework of how 
additional policy effort could contribute to tackling 
fuel poverty.
2. Our intention is to give a guide to the potential 
effects of interventions based on lessons from 
existing policies. Setting out a detailed strategy for 
tackling the fuel poverty problem is beyond our 
remit. Instead we provide evidence on the scale of 
what might be achieved through different types of 
intervention. Different readers inside and outside 
Government will have different priorities for action. 
Our aim is to provide all involved in future decision-
making and discussion with analytical insight into 
the trade-offs that might be involved.
3. Drawing our inspiration from the current policy 
package – which contains interventions aimed at 
addressing each of the three main drivers of fuel 
poverty – we consider broad policy ‘archetypes’. 
Although these can be considered analogous 
in some respects to existing policies, no direct 
comparison can be made. The archetypes are:
a. Energy prices: two policies that deliver direct 
energy bill support to particular low-income 
households;
b. Thermal efficiency: four policies that deliver 
subsidised insulation and heating systems 
to certain households in energy-inefficient 
dwellings; and
c. Incomes: two policies that deliver direct income 
support to particular kinds of households.
4. The next three sections discuss each of these in 
turn. For each of the archetypes, we consider the 
impact that a given level of expenditure (set at £500 
million per year to allow for comparison) would 
have in terms of fuel poverty and greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions.107 Using the 2009 Fuel Poverty 
and English Housing Survey (EHS) database 
projected forward to 2016, we measure the impact 
of our archetypes on fuel poverty in relation to both 
the headcount shown by the low income high costs 
(LIHC) indicator and the fuel poverty gap. Through 
cost-benefit analysis, we also make quantitative 
assessments of the range of societal impacts of 
107 It is important to note that most of the results presented in this chapter 
are not scalable – i.e. an intervention that spent £1 billion per year 
would not necessarily result in an impact that was twice as large as an 
intervention that spent £500 million per year. This issue of ‘scalability’ is 
discussed further in Section 7.4.
Making further 
progress
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each of the policies.108 Broadly speaking, the 
impacts we show quantify the stylized effects we 
described in Chapter 4.
7.1 Energy price archetypes
5. The energy price archetypes consist of the provision 
of direct energy bill support for low-income 
households. The modelling that follows assumes 
that:
a. All households that receive a means-tested 
benefit109 would be eligible for support under 
the policy. Based on the data within the 2009 
EHS there are around 5.7 million households in 
this group in England.
b. Each eligible household would receive a rebate 
on its electricity bill of around £90 per year. The 
policy has a total subsidy cost of £500 million 
per year.
c. Energy suppliers would be able to locate all 
eligible households in order to pay the rebate. 
Chapter 3 discussed the difficulties in targeting 
support. In practice, it would be extremely 
challenging for energy suppliers to be able 
successfully to reach all eligible households. 
Extending data-matching powers might help 
with this although – as can be seen through the 
experience of the Warm Home Discount and 
the preceding Energy Rebate Scheme – this is 
an imperfect targeting mechanism. In addition, 
there are practical considerations around the 
reform of the benefits system that are likely 
to constrain a significant expansion of data-
matching powers in the short term.
108 As discussed in Chapter 1, in the absence of a robust methodology for 
doing so, we have not attempted to account for possible savings to the 
NHS in this analysis. Ideally for assessing different archetypes it would be 
helpful to have a full analysis of their short and long run distributional 
implications. We were not able to do this on a consistent basis for the 
different approaches in the time available.
109 Households where one or more occupants are claiming the main 
or any sub-component of Pension Credit, Income Support, Income-
based Job Seekers Allowance, Working Tax Credit, Child Tax Credit & 
Housing Benefit.
6. We consider two different sources of funding. 
First, a supplier-funded scheme (in this way, this 
archetype broadly resembles the current Warm 
Home Discount policy) where energy suppliers are 
assumed to recoup the costs of the funding through 
higher energy prices (for gas and electricity). In 
reality, there is no way of knowing exactly how 
these costs would be passed on to energy bills. 
However, the modelling assumes that the costs of 
the policy would be recouped entirely from domestic 
customers and through an increase in energy prices 
for all customers. Second, an Exchequer-funded 
scheme where costs would be met directly from 
public expenditure (requiring an increase in the level 
of direct and indirect taxation).110
7. Basing eligibility for support on receiving a means-
tested benefit means that the policy would be 
targeted at households likely to be poor rather than 
fuel poor (i.e. there would be some households in 
very efficient dwellings that would receive support). 
While this can be viewed in a positive light from a 
poverty perspective (as the majority of households 
receiving a benefit would be low income), it would 
reduce the cost-effectiveness of the policy from a 
fuel poverty perspective.
8. More precise targeting of the fuel poor could 
be achieved through the addition of an energy 
efficiency threshold to the eligibility criteria (e.g. 
households would be eligible for a payment if 
they were in receipt of a means-tested benefit and 
lived in a low-SAP dwelling). However, we saw 
in Chapter 3 that there would be difficulties in 
targeting these households in practice. It is also the 
case that making receipt of a rebate conditional on 
living in an inefficient home could have the perverse 
effect of making it unappealing for a household 
to incur the effort and expense of upgrading the 
energy efficiency of their home, even when it would 
be cost-effective to do so (although it could be 
argued that this could act as a spur to action by 
110 The Annex to this Chapter sets out information about the assumptions 
we have made in terms of the way policy costs are shared between 
households. We discussed in Chapter 4 the different effects of the two 
funding approaches in principle. 
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Fuel poverty impacts
10. Figure 7.1 shows the proportion of households 
receiving support under the prices archetypes that 
would be LIHC as well as the proportions that 
would be in other quadrants of our matrix. The 
assumed targeting of support is the same across 
both archetypes – i.e. all households receiving a 
means-tested benefit would receive an energy bill 
rebate – so the single set of figures describes the 
distribution of beneficiaries across both policies. 
authorities to reduce the need for such transfers). 
We do not model this possibility.
9. We show impacts relative to the 2016 ‘with policies’ 
baseline projection (as set out in Chapter 6) and 
assume that the archetype is implemented in 2016 
for a single year. This is a somewhat unrealistic 
scenario, as in reality a rebate would be likely to be 
paid on continuing basis, but serves to illustrate in 
a straightforward way the relative strengths and 
limitations of each policy approach.
Table 7.1: Short-term fuel poverty impacts of the energy prices archetype, 2016, England
Effect of policy 
on the number 
of Households in 
fuel poverty (000s 
households)
Effect of policy on 
aggregate  
Fuel poverty gap 
(£ million)
2016 central projection (inc. climate and energy policies) 2,860 1,700
Supplier-funded rebate policy -110 -40
Exchequer-funded rebate policy -110 -70
Source: Fuel Poverty Review
High-incomeLow-income
37% 22%
28% 13%
Low
costs
High
costs
Figure 7.1: Distribution of households that would receive 
support under the energy prices archetype, 2016, England
Source: Fuel Poverty Review. Please see Annex 7 for the full list of sources
for this and all subsequent figures and tables in this chapter, unless
otherwise noted.
Getting the measure of fuel poverty 147
CHAPTER 7 MAKING FURTHER PROGRESS
and the fuel poverty gap in 2016. However, the 
Exchequer-funded policy would appear to be more 
effective in terms of reducing the fuel poverty gap. 
This is because the Exchequer-funded policy would 
offer a less regressive funding option, with a smaller 
proportion of the overall costs coming from low-
income households (who typically pay less tax in 
absolute terms than wealthier households).
13. The results suggest that the supplier-funded policy 
would have a smaller impact on the fuel poverty 
gap – the policy is shown to reduce the fuel poverty 
headcount by around 4 per cent but to reduce the 
fuel poverty gap by just 2 per cent. This is because 
of the way in which the costs of the policy would 
be borne by households. Energy suppliers would 
be expected to increase the price of energy in order 
to recoup the £500 million cost of the policy. This 
increase in the unit price of energy would mean 
that a larger absolute share of the costs of the 
policy would be borne by high-cost households 
compared to a policy that is funded through 
taxation (which would result in a larger absolute 
share of the costs of the policy being borne by high-
income households).
14. It is important to understand that these fuel 
poverty impacts would not be persistent. 
Households would only be removed from fuel 
As we would expect (given that the policies would 
be targeted at households receiving means-tested 
benefits), the majority (two-thirds) of households 
supported through the policy would have low 
incomes, but the policies would target both ‘high 
cost’ and ‘low cost’ households. Indeed the majority 
of beneficiaries would have below-median costs.
11. Table 7.1 shows the impact that the different price 
archetypes would have on fuel poverty indicators 
in 2016. As was shown in Chapter 4, a policy that 
directly reduces energy bills would have a number 
of impacts on the LIHC indicator. First, households 
that received a rebate would see a reduction in 
their energy costs. To the extent that recipient 
households were captured by the LIHC indicator, 
this would reduce both the number of households 
in fuel poverty and the fuel poverty gap. Second, 
depending on its funding source, the policy could 
have an effect on the reasonable costs and income 
thresholds, bringing some additional households 
into fuel poverty. At this level of spending, the 
policy could reduce the number of households in 
fuel poverty by around 100,000 and reduce the fuel 
poverty gap by £40 million-70 million.
12. The modelling results show that both the supplier 
and Exchequer-funded policies would be expected 
to reduce the number of fuel poor households 
Figure 7.2: Short-term fuel poverty impact of the supplier-
funded archetype by household type, 2016, England
Source: Fuel Poverty Review  
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17. In this case, the term ‘subsidy’ refers to either 
Exchequer or energy supplier funding. In the case of 
a publicly-funded policy, the total subsidy refers to 
the amount that would need to be raised through 
taxation in order to fund the policy objectives. In 
the case of a supplier-led scheme, the total subsidy 
is the amount that energy suppliers would be 
expected to recoup through energy bills.
18. For comparison with the results of other kinds 
of intervention, Table 7.2 sets out how the 
prices archetypes would score against the cost-
effectiveness indicators. The results suggest that 
the Exchequer-funded archetype would be more 
cost-effective against both – removing more 
households from fuel poverty for a given cost. As 
was seen in the previous section, this reflects the 
fact that funding policies through taxation results 
in LIHC households paying less of the costs than if 
funds were raised through obligations on energy 
suppliers. Note that because of the broad spread of 
benefits and their one-off nature, each £500 million 
spent would only reduce fuel poverty gaps over the 
long-term by between £40 million and £70 million, 
that is, by the first year impact only.
poverty in the year in which the rebates were paid. 
A persistent impact would require rebates to be 
paid every year, implying an ongoing expense (in 
this case, £500 million per year).
15. Figures 7.2 and 7.3 show how the fuel poverty 
impacts of these archetypes would be spread 
between household types. The reductions in fuel 
poverty would be greatest amongst lone parent 
families, although we would see a net reduction 
across all household types.
Cost-effectiveness
16. To compare what would be delivered by different 
policy approaches for a given level of expenditure, 
we have developed a range of cost-effectiveness 
indicators. These are: (a) lifetime reduction in 
fuel poverty numbers per £500 million of subsidy 
(household-years); and (b) lifetime reduction in fuel 
poverty gap per £500 million of subsidy. See Box 
7.1 for further description of the cost-effectiveness 
indicators.
Figure 7.3: Short-term fuel poverty impact of the 
Exchequer-funded archetype by household type,
2016, England
Source:  Fuel Poverty Review
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Box 7.1: Cost-effectiveness indicators
Cost-effectiveness indicators provide a means of comparing the costs of the different ways of 
delivering a specific outcome (and, specifically, of identifying the lowest cost way of doing so). There 
are undoubtedly many considerations when assessing a policy’s desirability, including key barriers such 
as issues of practicality and legality (and policies may also have other aims beyond those considered 
here). However, cost-effectiveness indicators are a helpful tool because they provide a common basis 
on which to compare policies which are otherwise difficult to contrast.
In terms of interventions targeted at alleviating fuel poverty, the output of interest is the ‘lifetime 
change in fuel poverty’ (or ‘lifetime change in the fuel poverty gap’). It is important to consider the 
lifetime change because some interventions (e.g. energy efficiency and heating measures) would have 
persistent impacts on the households. Note that in doing this we do not discount the value of future 
fuel poverty gap reductions. In the full cost-benefit analysis we also present values of total effects 
discounted in the normal way.
For example, consider the illustrative case of £500 million spent on rebates versus £500 million spent 
on heating systems. This could allow the delivery of:
•	 5 million energy bill rebates of £100 per household; or
•	 200,000 new heating systems (assuming a cost of £2,500 per system) which could reduce modelled 
household energy costs by £600 per year for the lifetime of the systems.
Assuming that a new heating system lasts for 12 years, the gross lifetime reduction in the fuel poverty 
gap per £500 million spend on each policy would:
•	 Rebates: £500 million
•	 Heating systems: £1.4 billion (200,000 systems x 12 years x £600 reduction per year, undiscounted)
This assumes that both policies could be perfectly targeted at LIHC households. With such 
assumptions, heating systems would be a significantly more cost-effective option for reducing fuel 
poverty than a policy of continuing subsidies.
Table 7.2: Cost-effectiveness of the energy price archetypes, England
Lifetime change in 
fuel poverty (000s 
household-years)
Lifetime change in 
the fuel poverty gap 
(million)
Supplier-funded rebate policy –110 –40
Exchequer-funded rebate policy –110 –70
Source: Fuel Poverty Review
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impacts would only occur in the year in which the 
rebates were paid – both energy consumption and 
GHG emissions would revert to previous levels once 
the policy finished.
Cost-benefit analysis
21. The final analytical tool that we apply to our 
archetypal policies is an overall assessment of costs 
and benefits. Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) draws 
together economic, social and environmental 
aspects in order to determine the net impact of 
a policy on society. CBA estimates and monetises 
the aggregate costs and benefits of a policy and 
expresses them as a Net Present Value (NPV). A 
positive NPV implies that the benefits of a policy 
exceed the costs while a negative NPV implies that 
costs exceed benefits. The cost-benefit analysis that 
follows has been carried out using HM Treasury 
Green Book Guidance112 and DECC Appraisal 
Guidance.
22. When undertaking conventional cost-benefit 
analysis, it can be difficult to reflect certain factors, 
including social and distributional considerations. 
This is clearly an important issue when considering 
the costs and benefits of policies in the field of 
fuel poverty. For example, charging a tax on low-
income households in order to fund tax cuts for 
high-income households would be viewed neutrally 
by conventional cost-benefit methodology because 
this is a transfer of resources and does not in itself 
give rise to economic costs or benefits. However, 
most people would view this as a highly regressive 
112 http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/green_book_complete.pdf
Greenhouse gas impacts
19. Table 7.3 shows the estimated impact of these 
policy archetypes on greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions. It is difficult to assess accurately how 
different types of households would react if they 
received an energy bill rebate. The elasticities used 
in the analysis (i.e. the values used to reflect the 
responsiveness of household energy demand to 
changes in income or energy costs) are based on 
empirical estimates adjusted to reflect our view 
that demand is likely to be more responsive in 
households receiving a benefit (which would be 
a highly visible addition to their energy bill) than 
in households not receiving a benefit (who would 
experience a small increase in their energy or tax 
burden that would be more difficult to identify). 
Further discussion of the elasticities used in the 
analysis and what these elasticities mean for the 
results is set out in the Annex to this chapter.
20. We have made the estimates in Table 7.3 
consistent with DECC Appraisal Guidance on the 
measurement and valuation of energy and GHG 
impacts.111 The results suggest that both policies 
would increase carbon emissions in 2016 – the 
supplier-funded archetype would increase emissions 
by 0.35 million tonnes of CO2 (MtCO2) while 
the Exchequer-funded archetype would increase 
emissions by 0.58 MtCO2. These increases would 
take place in the traded sector (i.e. the parts of 
the economy covered by the EU Emissions Trading 
System) and in the non-traded sector. The GHG 
111 http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/statistics/analysis_group/122-
valuationenergyuseggemissions.pdf
Table 7.3: Lifetime impact of the energy prices archetypes on greenhouse gas emissions, England
Impact on greenhouse gas emissions (MtCO2)
Traded sector Non-traded sector Total
Supplier-funded rebate policy 0.09 0.26 0.35
Exchequer-funded rebate policy 0.16 0.42 0.58
Source: Fuel Poverty Review
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transfer and, as such, one that is welfare-reducing. 
The impact in distributional equity terms associated 
with transfers can be captured in cost-benefit 
analysis through the use of ‘equity weightings’. This 
technique applies weights to the transfers paid and 
received by different households where the weight 
varies according to household income – with higher 
weights used for lower income households. The 
basic rationale is that an extra pound gives more 
benefit to a household that is poor compared to a 
household that is relatively well-off. The application 
of equity weighting to the cost-benefit analysis 
helps to give a better sense of the distributional 
impacts of the prices archetypes. A fuller discussion 
of the CBA methodology can be found in the 
Annex to this Chapter.
23. Table 7.4 sets out the estimated NPVs of the prices 
archetypes. The results suggest that, for both 
policy archetypes, the aggregate benefits would 
exceed the costs. For example, the NPV results 
without equity-weighting for the supplier-funded 
policy suggest a net benefit of £100 million. The 
NPV should be seen as additional to the initial 
expenditure. That is, an expenditure of £500 million 
results in £600 million in gross benefits. The equity-
weighted NPVs are significantly higher than the 
conventional NPV estimates, reflecting the fact 
that these policies would make payments to low-
income households. As expected, the less regressive 
Exchequer-funded policy shows a higher equity-
weighted NPV.
Table 7.4: Net Present Values of the energy prices archetypes, England (2011 prices)
Net present value (£ million, 
discounted)
Equity-weighted net present 
value (£ million, discounted)
Supplier-funded rebate policy 100 490
Exchequer-funded rebate policy 50 600
Source: Fuel Poverty Review
We have modelled Exchequer and supplier-funded prices archetypes, both of which would target 
energy bill rebates to a group of low-income households. About 28 per cent of beneficiaries would 
be fuel poor on an LIHC basis. Our estimates suggest that both policies could result in a reduction 
in the extent and depth of fuel poverty. £500 million spent on energy bill rebates could result in a 
reduction of up to 110,000 in the number of fuel poor households and a £40 million – £70 million 
reduction in the fuel poverty gap that year. These impacts would not be sustained unless the policy 
were sustained. However, policies that directly subsidise energy costs increase carbon emissions 
and, therefore, potentially conflict with GHG mitigation objectives. An overall cost-benefit analysis 
suggests that – on an equity-weighted basis – benefits would exceed cost by £500 million – 
600 million (or by £50 million – 100 million on an unweighted basis).
7.2 Thermal efficiency
24. The thermal efficiency archetypes consist of policies 
supporting households to improve the thermal 
efficiency of their homes through the delivery 
of insulation and heating measures. Evidence 
presented in Chapter 2 of the interim report 
suggested that low-cost insulation and heating 
measures were the most cost-effective ways of 
improving household SAP ratings. The analysis 
examines four basic variations:
a. An Exchequer-funded, narrowly-targeted 
scheme that would deliver fully subsidised 
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the next best technology. See the Annex to this 
Chapter for further discussion on how the supplier-
funded archetype has been modelled.
27. For Exchequer-funded options we assume that 
the policy would operate through the provision 
of grants for heating and insulation work for 
households coming forward for support (in this 
way, this resembles the Warm Front Scheme). The 
modelling additionally assumes that all heating 
and basic insulation measures would be carried out 
within the homes of those households that came 
forward for support. This would result in a ‘whole 
house’ approach, meaning that an Exchequer-
funded archetype would not deliver the same mix 
of measures as a supplier-funded policy. What is 
more, because the mix of measures delivered would 
depend on the types of households coming forward 
for support, it would not necessarily be the case 
that all of the most cost-effective measures would 
be carried out. Instead, the Exchequer-funded policy 
would deliver a mix of heating systems and a range 
of insulation measures (low-cost loft and cavity-
wall insulation and some more expensive solid-wall 
insulation).
28. As before, to allow comparison, the modelling 
assumes that the policies have a budget of £500 
million. For the supplier-funded variant, this would 
equate to the total amount of cost passed through 
to energy bills. As was the case with the prices 
archetypes, the modelling of the thermal efficiency 
archetypes assumes that the policy is implemented 
in 2016 for a single year.
Fuel poverty impacts
29. Figures 7.4 and 7.5 show the proportion of 
households receiving support under the thermal 
efficiency archetypes that are LIHC and the 
proportions that are in other quadrants. Targeting 
measures at low SAP dwellings means that the 
support would be predominantly delivered to high-
cost households across all of the archetypes. As 
we would expect, both the archetypes targeted at 
insulation and heating measures to households 
receiving means-tested benefits living in 
dwellings with a SAP of 55 or less;
b. An Exchequer-funded, broadly-targeted scheme 
that would deliver fully subsidised insulation 
and heating measures to households living in 
dwellings with a SAP of 55 or less.
c. A supplier-funded narrowly-targeted scheme 
that would deliver fully subsidised insulation 
and heating measures to households receiving 
means-tested benefits living in dwellings with a 
SAP of 55 or less.
d. A supplier-funded broadly-targeted scheme 
that would deliver fully subsidised insulation 
and heating measures to households living in 
dwellings with a SAP of 55 or less.
25. Comparing archetype (a) with archetype (b) and 
archetype (c) with archetype (d) will help show the 
sensitivity of the LIHC indicator to narrow targeting 
(i.e. support for at low-income households in poor 
quality dwellings) and broad targeting (i.e. support 
targeted at poor quality dwellings irrespective of 
household income).
26. The way in which the policies are funded clearly 
affects the distribution of costs across households. 
However, our modelling also assumes that the 
funding source could affect the mix of measures 
delivered. Where the policy is supplier-funded, 
we assume that the Government would set 
an obligation on energy suppliers to deliver a 
certain level of heating cost reduction in eligible 
households but would leave energy suppliers free 
to determine how to meet the obligation. In this 
way, this is analogous to the proposed Affordable 
Warmth Obligation under the ECO. It is assumed 
that competitive pressure to minimise the amount 
of cost passed through to energy bills would 
result in energy suppliers delivering the most 
cost-effective set of measures. That is, they would 
exhaust opportunities to install the most cost-
effective insulation measures before moving on to 
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less than a fifth of the beneficiaries would have low 
incomes and high costs.
means-tested benefit recipients would result in the 
majority of benefits being targeted at low-income 
households. In the broadly targeted interventions 
High-incomeLow-income
Low
costs
High
costs
20% 11%
55% 14%
Figure 7.4a: Distribution of households that would receive 
support under the exchequer-funded thermal efficiency 
archetypes (narrowly targeted), 2016, England
Source: Fuel Poverty Review
High-incomeLow-income
Low
costs
High
costs
7% 21%
18% 54%
Figure 7.4b: Distribution of households that would receive 
support under the exchequer-funded thermal efficiency 
archetypes (broadly targeted), 2016, England
Source: Fuel Poverty Review
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30. Unlike energy bill support, upgrading the thermal 
efficiency of dwellings would have persistent 
impacts: providing a dwelling with a new heating 
system would reduce household energy costs for 
the period that the system is operational.113 This 
means that the impact of policies could change 
over time. Specifically, a thermal efficiency policy 
funded through energy suppliers could increase the 
113 Our analysis assumes 12 years.
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High
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18% 10%
55% 17%
Figure 7.5a: Distribution of households that would receive 
support under the supplier-funded thermal efficiency 
archetypes (narrowly targeted), 2016, England
Source: Fuel Poverty Review
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Figure 7.5b: Distribution of households that would receive 
support under the supplier-funded thermal efficiency 
archetypes (broadly targeted), 2016, England
Source: Fuel Poverty Review
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targeted policies would perform significantly worse 
than their narrowly-targeted equivalent and both 
would result in a small increase in the number 
of fuel poor households. Furthermore, a broadly 
targeted supplier-funded policy would increase the 
aggregate fuel poverty gap.
34. Although the archetypes are not directly 
comparable to any existing policy approach, these 
results can be seen to have a read-across to the 
policy development that is underway on the Green 
Deal. As discussed in Chapter 5, the Green Deal and 
ECO consultation document and Impact Assessment 
set out the proposed split of the Green Deal and 
ECO between affordable warmth (which delivers 
heating and insulation measures to low-income 
households) and carbon objectives (which delivers 
mainly solid wall insulation across all households). 
The Government’s proposal is for around 25 per 
cent of ECO funding to be for Affordable Warmth. 
The results presented in this section – as well 
as the policy impacts presented in Chapter 6 – 
highlight the significance of the share of support 
that is delivered to low income households from 
a fuel poverty perspective. While these results 
should not be seen as a definitive answer to the 
question of the appropriate balance within ECO, 
they nevertheless point to the fact that a failure to 
ensure that the share is at least equitable would be 
liable to constrain the Government’s ability to make 
progress towards fuel poverty goals.
level of fuel poverty during the period of the policy’s 
operation (as some households would receive 
heating and insulation measures but all households 
would see higher energy prices as energy suppliers 
looked to recoup the costs) but could result in 
a reduction in fuel poverty once the policy had 
finished (as households that received support would 
continue to benefit but energy suppliers would no 
longer have costs to recoup).
31. For the purpose of the modelling we assume that, 
where a household has been removed from fuel 
poverty due to an improvement in the thermal 
efficiency of the dwelling, that household remains 
out of fuel poverty (with a consequent reduction 
in the headcount and fuel poverty gap) for as long 
as the measure lasts. Clearly this is a simplification 
because the fuel poverty status of a household 
depends on factors other than the thermal 
efficiency of the dwelling.114 However, making this 
assumption allows us to compare the relative cost-
effectiveness of the different archetypes.
32. Table 7.5 shows the impact that the different 
thermal efficiency archetypes could be expected to 
have on fuel poverty indicators in 2016.
33. The results suggest, unsurprisingly, that policies 
targeted at low-income households would result 
in better fuel poverty outcomes – as these are the 
options that most improve the relative position 
of fuel poor households. Both of the broadly-
114 In reality, whether a household remains out of fuel poverty depends 
on future movements in the cost and income thresholds. For example, 
a household could potentially be moved out just of fuel poverty after 
receiving energy efficiency measures but could subsequently fall back 
into fuel poverty if the energy cost threshold fell. As such, the long-run 
impact on fuel poverty could be smaller. 
156
CHAPTER 7 MAKING FURTHER PROGRESS
that the supplier-driven policy could have the 
greatest impact on reducing the numbers of fuel 
poor pensioner households. However, the broadly 
targeted supplier-driven policy would increase the 
number of families with children in fuel poverty.
35. Figures 7.6 and 7.7 show how the fuel poverty 
impacts of these policies would be spread across 
household types. The distribution reflects a 
combination of the targeting of the policy and the 
type of households where opportunities exist to 
upgrade a property (e.g. an unfilled wall cavity or 
the lack of a heating system). The results suggest 
Table 7.5: Short-term fuel poverty impacts of the thermal efficiency archetypes, 2016, England
Effect of policy on the 
number of households 
in fuel poverty (000s 
households)
Effect of policy on the 
aggregate fuel poverty 
gap (£ million)
2016 central projection (inc. climate and energy policies) 2,860 1,700
Exchequer-funded, narrowly-targeted -30 -70
Exchequer-funded, broadly-targeted +6 -20
Supplier-funded, narrowly-targeted -10 -50
Supplier-funded, broadly targeted +20 +20
Source: Fuel Poverty Review
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Figure 7.6a: Short-term fuel poverty impact of the 
Exchequer-funded energy efficiency archetype by household 
type (narrowly targeted), 2016, England
Source: Fuel Poverty Review
Change in fuel poverty (000 households)
other
multi
person
households
single
without
children
single
with
children
couple
without
children
couple
with
children
pensioner
single
pensioner
couple
TOTAL
–40
–30
–20
–10
0
10
20
30
Figure 7.6b: Short-term fuel poverty impact of the 
Exchequer-funded energy efficiency archetype by 
household type (broadly targeted), 2016, England
Source: Fuel Poverty Review
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Figure 7.7a: Short-term fuel poverty impact of the 
supplier-funded energy efficiency archetype by household 
type (narrowly targeted), 2016, England
Source: Fuel Poverty Review
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Figure 7.7b: Short-term fuel poverty impact of the 
supplier-funded energy efficiency archetype by household 
type (broadly targeted), 2016, England
Source: Fuel Poverty Review
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archetypes presented in Section 7.1. This is driven 
by the fact that the policies would deliver a 
significant number of low-cost measures (e.g. cavity 
wall insulation) and, more importantly, that the 
effects of these measures would be long-lasting 
(e.g. insulation would continue to provide benefits 
for over 40 years). Notably, investments of £500 
million in narrowly targeted energy efficiency 
measures (however funded) would result in lifetime 
fuel poverty gap reduction of over £2.5 billion.
Cost-effectiveness
36. Energy efficiency interventions – unlike rebates or 
income measures – have long-term benefits. Table 
7.6 sets out how the thermal efficiency archetypes 
score against the cost-effectiveness indicators. 
The results suggest that – with the exception of 
the broadly targeted policy variants which would 
increase fuel poverty headcounts – the thermal 
efficiency archetypes would be significantly more 
cost-effective in the long run than the prices 
Table 7.6: Cost-effectiveness of the thermal efficiency archetypes, England115
Lifetime change in fuel poverty  
(000 household-years)
Lifetime change in the fuel  
of subsidy (£m)
Exchequer-funded, narrowly-targeted -1,070 -2,630
Exchequer-funded broadly targeted +140 -680
Supplier-funded, narrowly-targeted -1,230 -2,930
Supplier-funded, broadly targeted +310 -390
Source: Fuel Poverty Review
Note: Negative numbers imply an decrease in fuel poverty.
115 The cost-effectiveness of the thermal efficiency archetypes is driven by the assumption that the impacts of measures are persistent. The results should 
therefore be interpreted as the aggregate impact of the policy over time (i.e. over the working lifetime of the measures that are installed) rather than 
representing the annual impact of the policies.
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Cost-benefit analysis
39. Table 7.8 sets out the NPVs of the thermal efficiency 
archetypes. The results suggest that, for all of the 
archetypes, the aggregate benefits considerably 
exceed the costs even without equity-weighting – 
resulting in highly positive NPVs. The NPVs for the 
thermal efficiency policies are significantly higher 
than for the prices archetypes. This is because 
each of the policies would deliver a number of 
cost-effective measures with persistent impacts (on 
energy costs, GHG emissions, thermal comfort, etc.) 
for a one-off cost.
40. As we would expect, the supplier-funded policies 
would have the highest NPVs (because they would 
deliver the most cost-effective package of measures) 
and the broadly-targeted policy shows the lowest 
equity-weighted NPV (which reflects the fact that 
households across the income distribution would 
benefit through the policy). With equity-weighting 
each of the archetypes would have gross benefits 
that are more than twice their costs – in the case 
of a supplier-funded narrowly targeted intervention 
benefits exceed costs by four to five times.
Greenhouse gas impacts
37. Table 7.7 shows the estimated impact of the policies 
on GHG emissions. Discussion of the elasticities 
used in the analysis is set out in the Annex to this 
Chapter. As discussed in Box 5.1 in Chapter 5, a 
policy delivering new and replacement heating 
systems makes hitting current carbon targets 
more difficult (as, from the perspective of carbon 
budgets, it results in a transfer of emissions from 
the traded sector to the non-traded sector). 
However, such a policy does reduce emissions 
overall. Further, insulation measures certainly reduce 
carbon emissions. 
38. The results suggest that all of the archetypes 
would drive reductions in carbon emissions which 
we would expect to persist. The supplier-funded 
archetypes would be the best from a carbon 
perspective – this results from the fact that the 
supplier-funded policies are assumed to deliver 
significantly higher amounts of the lowest cost 
insulation measures compared to the Exchequer-
funded policy. The broadly targeted supplier-funded 
intervention has a greater impact than the narrowly 
targeted one.
Table 7.7: Impact of the thermal efficiency archetypes on greenhouse gas emissions, 2016, England
Impact on GHG emissions (MtCO2)
Traded sector Non-traded sector Total
Exchequer-funded, narrowly-targeted -2.26 -1.14 -3.40
Exchequer-funded, broadly-targeted -1.94 -1.82 -3.76
Supplier-funded, narrowly-targeted -0.88 -4.03 -4.92
Supplier-funded, broadly targeted -0.70 -6.06 -6.76
Source: Fuel Poverty Review calculations based on DECC IAG Guidance
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Table 7.8: Net Present Values of the thermal efficiency archetypes, England (2011 prices)
Net present value (£ million, 
discounted)
Equity-weighted net present 
value (£ million, discounted)
Exchequer-funded, narrowly-targeted 310 1,730
Exchequer-funded, broadly-targeted 360 860
Supplier-funded, narrowly-targeted 590 1,900
Supplier-funded, broadly targeted 990 1,360
Source: Fuel Poverty Review
We have modelled four thermal efficiency archetypes that vary both according to the funding stream 
(i.e. we look at an Exchequer-funded scheme that resembles Warm Front and a supplier-funded 
scheme that resembles current supplier obligations) and in terms of targeting (i.e. we look at narrowly 
and broadly targeted policies).
Naturally, the narrowly targeted policies focusing support on LIHC households would have the greater 
impact in terms of reducing fuel poverty. More than half of beneficiaries of narrowly-targeted policies 
would have low incomes and high costs, but fewer than a fifth of those who benefit from broadly 
targeted policies would be fuel poor. Our modelling also suggests that a supplier-funded option 
would result in a slightly better outcome in terms of lifetime fuel poverty headcount. The narrowly 
targeted supplier funded policy worth £500 million is estimated to reduce fuel poverty – by around 
1.2 million household-years compared with around 1.1 million household-years for the narrowly 
targeted, Exchequer-funded policy. This difference is driven by the assumption that a supplier-led 
scheme would deliver a more cost-effective mix of measures. 
Based on the assumption that they would deliver low-cost insulation and heating measures the 
thermal efficiency archetypes would be highly cost-effective policies for reducing fuel poverty gaps. 
Notably, investments of £500 million in narrowly targeted energy efficiency measures (however 
funded) would result in a lifetime reduction worth over £2,500 million in fuel poverty gaps. This is 
because improving the thermal efficiency of a dwelling can result in a large and sustained reduction in 
household energy costs.
Policies to improve the thermal efficiency of the housing stock also reduce net carbon emissions. As 
such, they offer a win-win against fuel poverty and carbon objectives. Overall cost-benefit analysis 
suggests that the aggregate benefits would considerably exceed the costs. On an equity-weighted 
basis a supplier-driven narrowly targeted intervention would have benefits of nearly five times 
the costs.
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43. It is assumed that both of these policies would 
be financed through the Exchequer, requiring an 
increase in both direct and indirect taxation. See the 
Annex to this Chapter for more information on how 
the burden of additional taxation would fall across 
households. As was the case for the prices and 
thermal efficiency archetypes, the modelling that 
follows assumes that the policy is implemented in 
2016 for a single year.
Fuel poverty impacts
44. Figures 7.8 and 7.9 show the proportion of 
households receiving support under both 
archetypes that are LIHC and the proportions that 
are in other quadrants. As we might expect, more 
of the benefits under the MTB archetype would be 
targeted at low-income households. In this case 
28 per cent of the beneficiaries would be LIHC, 
compared to only 10 per cent for the Winter Fuel 
Payment-type intervention.
7.3 Income archetypes
41. We model two income archetypes, both of which 
consist of an increase in the level of existing 
benefit payments. The two different archetypes 
are: (a) a means-tested benefits (MTB) archetype 
– an increase in the rate of existing means-tested 
benefits; and (b) a Winter Fuel Payment (WFP) 
archetype – an increase in the rate of Winter Fuel 
Payment.
42. The WFP archetype assumes that the rate of WFP is 
increased by around 30 per cent. This would mean 
households containing someone aged between 60 
and 79 receiving an additional annual payment of 
£59 and households with someone 80 or above 
receiving an additional annual payment of £89. This 
would have a cost of £500 million per year.
High-incomeLow-income
Low
costs
High
costs
37% 22%
28% 13%
Figure 7.8: Distribution of households that would receive 
support under the Means Tested Benefits archetype, 
2016, England
Source: Fuel Poverty Review
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the Winter Fuel Payment, which pushes some non-
pensioner households below the income threshold.
47. It is striking – but not unexpected – that the income 
archetypes would have only a very small impact 
on the numbers of fuel poor households. This is 
because many households have an income that 
falls significantly below the income threshold. For 
these households, a relatively large increase in 
income would be required to move them across the 
income threshold.116
116 Note that the findings for Winter Fuel Payments result from their 
treatment as an addition to income. If they were instead seen as – 
at least partially – equivalent to a contribution to bill reductions, their 
impact on fuel poverty would be somewhat greater.
45. Table 7.9 shows the impact of the different income 
archetypes on fuel poverty and the fuel poverty gap 
in 2016. As was shown in Chapter 4, a policy that 
increases household income can move households 
out of fuel poverty (and reduce the aggregate fuel 
poverty gap) where receipt of the benefit moves the 
household across the income threshold.
46. The modelling results show that the MTB archetype 
would reduce the number of fuel poor households 
in 2016, while the WFP archetype would result in 
a very small increase. This increase is the result of 
the increase in taxation required to fund an uplift to 
Table 7.9: Short-term fuel poverty impacts of the incomes archetypes, 2016, England
Effect of policy on the 
number of households  
in fuel poverty  
(000 households)
Effect of policy on the 
aggregate fuel poverty 
gap (£ million)
2016 central projection (inc. climate and energy policies) 2,860 1,700
Increase in means-tested benefits -6 -3
Increase in Winter Fuel Payments <+1 <-1
Source: Fuel Poverty Review
High-incomeLow-income
Low
costs
High
costs
13% 34%
10% 43%
Figure 7.9: Distribution of households that would receive 
support under the Winter Fuel Payment archetype,
2016, England
Source: Fuel Poverty Review
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removed from fuel poverty in the year in which the 
rebates were paid. The level of fuel poverty would 
revert to its previous level once the policy had 
stopped.
50. Figures 7.10 and 7.11 show how the fuel poverty 
impacts would be felt across different household 
types. As can be seen, reductions in fuel poverty 
would be concentrated among pensioners and 
families (i.e. the main recipients of mean-tested 
benefits) for the MTB archetype and among 
pensioners for the WFP archetype. Both archetypes 
show that some households would be pulled into 
fuel poverty through the policy – this would result 
from the increase in taxation pulling households 
below the income threshold.
48. Both archetypes would also have a negligible 
impact on the fuel poverty gap. While additional 
benefit payments would move some households 
across the low income threshold (and out of fuel 
poverty), thereby reducing the fuel poverty gap, 
this would appear to be almost entirely offset 
by the impact of the increase in taxation that is 
required to pay for the policy. As we saw above, this 
would move households to the left in the matrix 
and would increase the fuel poverty gap for those 
households that are close to the income threshold.
49. As was the case with the prices archetypes (and 
unlike the energy efficiency archetypes) the fuel 
poverty impacts of the income archetypes would 
not be persistent. Households would only be 
Figure 7.10: Short-term fuel poverty impact of the means-tested 
benefit archetype by household type, 2016, England
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cost-effective than the WFP archetype – removing 
more households for fuel poverty for a given 
cost – although both policies are significantly 
less cost-effective than most of the prices and 
efficiency archetypes.
Cost-effectiveness
51. Table 7.10 sets out how the income archetypes 
score against the cost effectiveness indicators. The 
results suggest that the MTB archetype is more 
Table 7.10: Cost-effectiveness of the income archetypes, England
Lifetime change in  
fuel poverty per  
£500 million of subsidy  
(000s household-years)
Lifetime change in the 
fuel poverty gap per 
£500 million of subsidy 
(£ million)
Increase in means-tested benefits -6 -3
Increase in Winter Fuel Payments <+1 <-1
Source: Fuel poverty statistics (DECC), English Housing Survey
Figure 7.11: Fuel poverty impact of the Winter Fuel Payment 
archetype by household type, 2016, England
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Table 7.11: Impact of the income policy archetypes on greenhouse gas emissions, 2016, England
Impact on greenhouse gas emissions (MtCO2)
Traded sector Non-traded sector Total
Increase in means-tested benefits <+0.01 <+0.01 <+0.01
Increase in Winter Fuel Payments 0.15 0.43 0.58
Source: Fuel Poverty Review
Greenhouse gas impacts
52. Table 7.11 sets out the estimated GHG impact of 
the income archetypes. The results suggest that the 
increase in the Winter Fuel Payment would have the 
larger impact on increasing energy consumption 
and GHG emissions. In fact, the results suggest that 
the MTB archetype would have a negligible impact 
on GHG emissions. This reflects the assumptions 
made about how receiving an ‘energy-linked 
benefit’ would affect responsiveness of demand. 
See the Annex to this Chapter for further discussion 
on how this has been modelled. It is likely that 
these increases would be shared across the traded 
and non-traded sectors. The GHG impacts would 
only occur in the year in which the additional 
benefits were paid – both energy consumption and 
GHG emissions would revert to previous levels once 
the policy had finished.
Cost-benefit analysis
53. Table 7.12 provides NPVs of the incomes 
archetypes. The results suggest that, for both 
policy archetypes, the aggregate benefits would 
exceed the costs even without equity-weighting. 
On the basis of the conventional cost-benefit 
analysis, the WFP archetype is preferable. This is 
because it is assumed to have a stronger impact 
on the behaviour of recipient households (which 
results in welfare gains as households turn up their 
heating). Conversely, the MTB archetype (which is 
better targeted at low-income households) has a 
better equity-weighted NPV. On an equity-weighted 
basis the two interventions have benefits that 
are about double their costs. This is similar to the 
results for the interventions based on discounts 
examined in Section 7.1, but much less favourable 
than the energy-efficiency archetypes examined in 
Section 7.2.
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Table 7.12: Net Present Values of the income archetypes, England (2011 prices)
Net present value 
(£ million, discounted)
Equity-weighted 
net present value 
(£ million, discounted)
Increase in means-tested benefits <10 550
Increase in Winter Fuel Payments 60 420
Source: Fuel Poverty Review
We have modelled two income archetypes: an increase in the level of means-tested benefits and 
an increase in the rate of Winter Fuel Payments. Our estimates suggest that both policies would 
have a very small impact on the extent and depth of fuel poverty. Only 28 per cent of means-
tested beneficiaries would be LIHC – this figure is only 10 per cent for the Winter Fuel Payment 
interventions. The MTB archetype would result in a fall of around 6,000 households whereas the 
WFP archetype results in a small increase. Both would have small – and temporary – effects on the 
fuel poverty gap. Income-based measures appear to be significantly less cost-effective in terms of 
alleviating fuel poverty than either price or energy efficiency policies
As is the case with the prices archetypes, providing additional benefits increases energy usage and 
carbon emissions. As such, these policies would potentially be in conflict with GHG objectives. An 
overall cost-benefit analysis suggests that benefits would narrowly outweigh costs without equity-
weighting, but would do so considerably on an equity-weighted basis. This net benefit would be 
much less than the energy-efficiency based interventions however.
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7.4 What can we learn from 
the policy archetypes?
54. In this section, we consider some of the key results 
from the analysis in order to draw some conclusions 
about how Government can make further progress 
against its fuel poverty objectives.
55. The results give an illustration of the impacts 
of spending £500 million across the different 
archetypes of policy interventions. It should be 
noted that whilst some of the results are scalable – 
for example, twice the amount spent on rebates or 
benefits would result in an approximate doubling 
of the NPV and GHG impacts – this is unlikely to 
be the case in terms of the fuel poverty impacts. 
The impact of a policy on fuel poverty would be 
driven (among other things) by the distribution 
of incomes and costs within the population of 
fuel poor households. For example, a policy could 
have a significant impact on the numbers in fuel 
poverty if there were a large number of households 
near to the reasonable costs boundary. For these 
households, it would only take a small amount 
of support to take them out of fuel poverty (this 
would also be reflected by a modest reduction in 
the fuel poverty gap). However, further reductions 
in fuel poverty numbers would become increasingly 
expensive to achieve as policies would have to 
address households that were further away from 
the reasonable costs threshold. As such, it is unlikely 
that there would be a linear relationship between 
the costs of a policy and the impact on numbers 
in fuel poverty. This is one reason for paying most 
attention to relative impacts on the fuel poverty 
gap (although we would not expect the relationship 
with costs to be linear for that either).
56. Non-scalability is especially true in the case of 
policies that aim to increase the thermal efficiency 
of dwellings, where a larger programme could 
result in more expensive measures being delivered 
only when the opportunities to install cheaper 
measures had been exhausted. This is particularly 
true of the results we show for supplier-driven 
energy efficiency programmes, where the modelling 
assumes that the most cost-effective interventions 
are made first. For Exchequer-funded interventions, 
where we assume a different mix of measures, this 
problem would be somewhat smaller.
57. Table 7.13 compares the archetypes in terms of 
the proportion (and number) of households that 
would receive support and how these households 
would be spread across different quadrants within 
the costs/income matrix. In terms of immediate 
targeting efficiency, the policies based on narrowly 
targeted energy efficiency perform best, with more 
than half of the beneficiaries having low incomes 
and high costs. Winter Fuel Payments and broadly 
targeted supplier-driven efficiency programmes 
perform least well, with fewer than 15 per cent of 
beneficiaries in the target group.
58. Table 7.14 compares the archetypes in terms of their 
impact on fuel poverty and the fuel poverty gap. 
It also shows the fuel poverty cost-effectiveness 
indicators. These give a sense of which policies 
would be likely to make the largest contribution to 
reducing the scale of the fuel poverty problem. Here 
the key indicator is the lifetime reduction in the fuel 
poverty gap. Again, the narrowly targeted energy 
efficiency programmes would be most effective, 
with lifetime reductions in the fuel poverty gap of 
over £2,500 million for each £500 million invested. 
The income transfers would have little effect.
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Table 7.13: Distribution of households that receive support across policy archetypes, 2016, England
Archetype Proportion (%) of recipients that are:
LIHC LILC HIHC HILC
Exchequer-funded, narrowly-targeted energy efficiency policy 55 20 14 11
Supplier-funded, narrowly-targeted energy efficiency policy 55 18 17 10
Supplier-funded rebate policy 28 37 13 22
Exchequer-funded rebate policy 28 37 13 22
Increase in means-tested benefits 28 37 13 22
Exchequer-funded, broadly-targeted energy efficiency policy 18 7 54 21
Supplier-funded, broadly targeted energy efficiency policy 13 9 50 28
Increase in Winter Fuel Payments 10 13 43 34
Source: Fuel Poverty Review
Table 7.14: Fuel poverty impacts of policy archetypes, England
Archetype Short-term 
change in 
fuel poverty 
(thousands of 
households)
Short-term  
change in fuel 
poverty gap  
(£ million)
Life-time change 
in fuel poverty 
(thousands of 
household-years)
Life-time  
change in fuel 
poverty gap  
(£ million)
Supplier-funded, narrowly-
targeted energy efficiency policy
-10 -50 -1,230 -2,930
Exchequer-funded, narrowly-
targeted energy efficiency policy
-30 -70 -1,070 -2,630
Exchequer-funded, broadly-
targeted energy efficiency policy
+6 -20 +140 -680
Supplier-funded, broadly targeted 
energy efficiency policy 
+20 +20 +310 -390
Exchequer-funded rebate policy -110 -70 -110 -70
Supplier-funded rebate policy -110 -40 -110 -40
Increase in means-tested benefits -6 -3 -6 -3
Increase in Winter Fuel Payments <+1 <-1 <+1 <-1
Source: Fuel Poverty Review
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the interventions emerge as socially valuable, 
the narrowly-targeted efficiency programmes 
particularly so, whether Exchequer-funded or 
supplier-driven.
62. The results point to some important conclusions. 
First, funding policies through general taxation 
rather than through a levy on energy supply means 
that higher-income households would tend to bear 
a greater share of the cost of policies, resulting in 
some desirable characteristics – for example, greater 
reductions in the fuel poverty gap and a better 
distributional outcome. However, our modelling 
suggests that, in the case of thermal-efficiency 
policies, the incentive to ensure cost-effective 
delivery of targets could mean that supplier-funded 
policies would result in a better lifetime outcome 
in terms of reducing the number of households in 
fuel poverty.
63. Second, policies that deliver low-cost insulation 
and heating systems would be the most cost-
effective means of making sustained reductions in 
fuel poverty. This is partly because the measures 
59. Table 7.15 compares the GHG and NPV results. 
While these factors are not the primary concern of 
this review, they are potentially limiting factors and 
would involve trade-offs for decision-makers. For 
example, it would be problematic to implement a 
fuel poverty policy that made it difficult for the UK 
to live within its statutory carbon budgets.
60. Here rebate-based policies and Winter Fuel 
Payments would lead to increases in GHG emissions 
– as low income households would be able to keep 
warmer. The biggest reductions would come from 
supplier-driven efficiency programmes.
61. In terms of overall social welfare, it should be 
noted that the cost-benefit analysis suggests 
that all of the interventions would have positive 
net present values, even without giving extra 
weight to benefits for lower-income households. 
For the supplier driven energy efficiency policies 
the £500 million investments would yield gross 
benefits of between £1.1 billion and £1.5 billion 
without equity-weighting. Allowing for the greater 
value of benefits for low-income households all 
Table 7.15: Greenhouse gas emissions and Net Present Value impacts of policy archetypes, England
Archetype Change in greenhouse gas 
emissions (MtCO2):
NPV (£ million):
Traded sector Non-traded sector Non-equity-
weighted
Equity-weighted
Supplier-funded, narrowly-targeted 
energy efficiency policy
-0.88 -4.03 590 1,900
Exchequer-funded, narrowly-
targeted energy efficiency policy
-2.26 -1.14 310 1,730
Supplier-funded, broadly targeted 
energy efficiency policy 
-0.70 -6.06 990 1,360
Exchequer-funded, broadly-targeted 
energy efficiency policy
-1.94 -1.82 360 860
Exchequer-funded rebate policy +0.16 +0.42 50 600
Increase in means-tested benefits +<0.01 +<0.01 <10 550
Supplier-funded rebate policy +0.09 +0.26 100 490
Increase in Winter Fuel Payments +0.15 +0.43 60 420
Source: Fuel Poverty Review
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short to medium term, perhaps especially for 
the vulnerable; and
b. While low-cost insulation and heating measures 
appear to be the most cost-effective options, 
this conclusion is unlikely to hold for all types of 
measures that improve the thermal efficiency of 
dwellings. The evidence presented in Chapter 
2 of the interim report showed that the costs 
of improving household SAP rating begin to 
increase rapidly once a property has basic 
insulation and a central heating system. More 
expensive insulation, renewable heat and micro-
generation technologies are likely, at least in the 
short to medium term, to be significantly less 
cost-effective options.
64. Our analysis also shows the importance of ensuring 
that policies delivering thermal efficiency measures 
are geared towards the needs of the fuel poor if 
fuel poverty is to be reduced. Policies that did not 
focus support on the group of households that 
face both low incomes and unreasonable energy 
costs would be less effective in terms of improving 
the relative position of the fuel poor and would be 
of only limited help to address the problem as we 
understand it. It is vital, therefore, for low-income 
high-cost households to be a central focus of 
energy efficiency policies in the household sector. 
As we have argued elsewhere in this report, this is a 
key question for the Government in developing the 
Green Deal and ECO.
would provide on-going reductions in energy costs 
(compared to the one-off impact that is provided 
by a bill or income subsidy) but also because such 
policies would tend to be delivered to those living 
in poor quality dwellings (i.e. less of the support 
under these policies would be directed at low-
income low-cost households who would typically 
receive support under bills and incomes policies). 
This suggests that low-cost insulation and heating 
systems should be the central component of efforts 
to tackle fuel poverty. However, there are two 
important qualifications to this result:
a. Thermal efficiency measures typically require 
significant up-front costs, which means that 
relatively few households can be supported for 
a given budget. For example, our £500 million 
thermal efficiency, Exchequer-funded archetype 
assists around 0.5 million households per year 
compared to 5.7 million households assisted 
under the rebates policy. Unless there were a 
very significant increase in the level of resource 
devoted to the problem, upgrading of the 
housing stock would be a gradual process. As 
such, there would be a case for income and bill 
support to offer more immediate help in the 
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The analysis of the archetypes allows us to draw some conclusions about the relative effectiveness 
and cost-effectiveness of different policy approaches. This suggests that policies to improve the 
thermal efficiency of the housing stock would tend to be the most cost-effective. They would have 
persistent benefits in reducing fuel poverty, would reduce greenhouse gases, and would have very 
substantial net societal benefits. Narrowly targeted supplier-driven policies would have the largest 
effects on fuel poverty, on the assumption that suppliers reacted to their incentive to maximise cost-
effectiveness. However, broadly targeted supplier-based interventions – while being the most effective 
in reducing greenhouse gas emissions – could worsen fuel poverty numbers because of the impact of 
higher prices on low-income households, although they would have positive effects on fuel poverty 
gaps in the long run (albeit more modest than the narrowly targeted variants).
By analogy increasing the share of Affordable Warmth within ECO could therefore be expected to 
have positive effects on fuel poverty, favourable effects on greenhouse gas emissions and significant 
net societal benefits on an equity weighted basis.
However, upgrading the thermal efficiency of the housing stock will be a gradual process. Other 
short-term interventions such as price subsidies may therefore need to continue to be part of the 
policy mix. In terms of making the fastest progress towards fuel poverty objectives, the analysis shows 
that policies should be focused on LIHC households.
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Chapter Summary
In this Chapter we have built on the analysis of the current policy package presented in Chapters 
5 and 6 to determine how it might be possible to make further progress in tackling fuel poverty. 
We have analysed three broad types of interventions: policies that tackle energy prices, through 
delivering bill rebates; policies that aim to improve thermal efficiency through delivering subsidised 
insulation and heating systems to certain households; and policies that act on incomes by delivering 
direct income support. We have tested these against a number of key criteria: their immediate impact 
on fuel poverty; their long term cost-effectiveness; their impact on carbon emissions; and their net 
associated benefits as measured by official cost-benefit analysis approaches. We have distinguished 
between policies that are Exchequer-funded (similar to Warm Front) and those that are supplier-
funded through additions to bills (similar to Warm Home Discount or ECO). We have also compared 
those that are narrowly targeted on low-income households with high costs (analogous to Affordable 
Warmth) or are more broadly targeted on all high costs households (similar to the Carbon Obligation 
in ECO).
For each of these – which between them cover all of the drivers of fuel poverty – we look at the 
short- and long-term impacts in 2016 of interventions with standard costs of £500 million. This allows 
us to compare and contrast the impact of the range of policies on both the LIHC headcount and fuel 
poverty gap indicators, and so their cost-effectiveness.
This analysis is, of course, abstract. However it allows us to draw some conclusions about the relative 
impact and cost-effectiveness of alternative policy approaches. It suggests that policies that improve 
the thermal efficiency of the housing stock would be the most cost-effective. They would have 
persistent benefits in reducing fuel poverty, they would reduce greenhouse gases, and they would 
have very substantial net societal benefits. Narrowly targeted supplier-driven policies would have 
the largest effects on fuel poverty, on the assumption that suppliers reacted to their incentive to 
maximise cost-effectiveness. However, broadly-targeted supplier-based interventions – while being 
the most effective in reducing greenhouse gas emissions – would have much more limited effects on 
fuel poverty, and would worsen it for some, because of the impact of higher prices on low-income 
households.
By analogy increasing the share of Affordable Warmth within ECO could therefore be expected to 
have more positive effects on fuel poverty while still having favourable effects on greenhouse gas 
emissions and significant net societal benefits on an equity weighted basis. 
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3. Our analysis suggested that the definition of fuel 
poverty as set out in the Warm Homes and Energy 
Conservation Act 2000 correctly identified the core 
of the problem: we should be concerned about 
individuals in households “living on a lower income 
in a home that cannot be kept warm at reasonable 
cost.” With this in mind we put forward a new 
framework for measuring fuel poverty, based on 
twin indicators to capture both the extent and 
depth of the problem. For the former, we described 
a headcount indicator capturing the number of 
households and individuals failing two thresholds 
relating, respectively, to required energy costs – 
set at the contemporary median – and incomes 
– set at the after housing costs poverty line plus 
the household’s modelled bill. For the latter, we 
developed the idea of a fuel poverty gap – the 
difference between a given household’s required 
costs and the median level for a typical household.
4. We held a consultation on our interim report. 
Responses were broadly very positive about the 
essential framework of our proposed Low Income 
High Costs (LIHC) measure. They were also 
supportive of the way in which we proposed that 
an income threshold for defining ‘low income’ 
should be set. However, there were concerns 
expressed about the way in which the cost 
threshold in particular had been set, including how 
required energy bills were adjusted for household 
size and composition in order to compare them 
1. Our interim report, published in October 2011, 
focused primarily on establishing the causes and 
impacts of fuel poverty, assessing the ways in which 
fuel poverty is a distinct problem and considering 
the implications of this for measurement. We 
concluded that fuel poverty was a serious national 
problem which is of concern from at least three 
perspectives – those of health and well-being, 
poverty, and carbon emissions reduction. We 
argued that measuring the problem accurately was 
important to underpin progress in tackling fuel 
poverty, to identify priority households and to assess 
the effectiveness of different policy options.
2. We made an assessment of the current official 
indicator of fuel poverty which is based on the 
number of households with required energy 
spending exceeding a threshold of 10 per 
cent of income. We argued that, while it has 
some strengths, this indicator also has serious 
weaknesses, including its undue sensitivity to 
energy prices and to technical considerations 
within the calculation, such as precise temperature 
standards and accuracy of income reporting. The 
trends it reports do not well reflect changes in 
the underlying problems, and its definition can 
encompass households that clearly are not poor. 
Part of the difficulty is that although a single 
indicator, it attempts to reflect both the extent and 
the depth of the problem.
CHAPTER 8 
Conclusions
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effects of this are controversial. In particular we 
recognise that the relative nature of our preferred 
indicator makes the literal eradication of fuel 
poverty extremely challenging. Some might argue 
that this is a problem that could contribute to policy 
inertia: if the problem cannot literally be eliminated, 
why bother trying? However, we believe that our 
approach offers a more sophisticated interpretation 
of the way in which ambition can be set. While the 
relative approach could mean that there are always 
some low-income households with costs above the 
threshold, we suggest that the key indicator should 
be the scale of the aggregate fuel poverty gap. If 
this is reduced to a low level then no low-income 
households can be left very far above the threshold.
8. Our approach also has other advantages, not least 
in terms of ensuring a focus on improvements in 
lower-income households. There is a very large 
degree of consensus that those households with 
the largest fuel poverty gaps are the priorities for 
action. Regardless of where and how the threshold 
is drawn, our approach provides an incentive to 
focus resources in that direction.
9. Good measurement is only one step on the way to 
addressing the problem of fuel poverty. There needs 
to be consistency between measurement and the 
impacts of action on the ground. This is currently 
absent: one of the problems identified with the 
current indicator of fuel poverty is that it does not 
easily lend itself to being used for targeting the 
fuel poor. This is always a complex exercise and no 
system will allow for great precision. Very narrowly 
defined criteria can in some ways be undesirable. 
In practical terms offering assistance to households 
outside the strict interpretation of fuel poverty can 
still have important benefits.
10. One major advantage of the LIHC indicator 
we recommend is that it provides a bridge to 
targeting the fuel poor based on an understanding 
of dwelling and household characteristics. For 
example, we show in Chapter 3, that any low-
income household living in an E, F or G Energy 
Performance Certificate rated home is highly 
CHAPTER 8 
to the threshold. Based on our own analysis and 
the responses to the consultation, in this report 
we have proposed an adjusted way of allowing for 
family size and composition in this element of the 
calculation. We discuss the reasons for this choice 
and its effects in Chapter 2.
5. We also re-examined the way in which the level 
of the threshold for reasonable costs could be set, 
examining a number of alternative options and 
proposals. However, we found that each of these 
had shortcomings when compared with our original 
proposal. While no way of setting the threshold 
will be without some problems, we have retained 
our view that the median contemporary modelled 
energy requirement is the most robust level at 
which to set the boundary between ‘reasonable’ 
and ‘unreasonable’ costs.
6. These decisions lead to the following recommended 
measurement framework:
The Government should adopt a new indicator of 
the extent of fuel poverty under which households 
are considered fuel poor if:
•	 They have required fuel costs that are above the 
median level; and
•	 Were they to spend that amount they would 
be left with a residual income below the official 
poverty line.
The Government should also count the number of 
households in this position as well as the number of 
individuals living within those households.
The Government should also adopt a new indicator 
of the depth of fuel poverty as represented by the 
average and aggregate ‘fuel poverty gap’, defined 
as the amount by which the assessed energy needs 
of fuel poor households exceed the threshold for 
reasonable costs.
7. This relative approach creates a ‘moving target’, as 
energy efficiency standards improve for the stock 
as a whole. For some stakeholders some of the 
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tackled, as such a policy could otherwise have an 
adverse impact on precisely the households we 
most wish to help.
14. We looked at the potential distributional effects 
of the ECO as currently proposed. With only one 
quarter of the policy going to Affordable Warmth, 
the package would be regressive overall. We cannot 
calculate precisely what the balance would need 
to be to avoid this, but it appears that over half of 
ECO would need to go to Affordable Warmth to 
avoid this.
15. We have also looked at what will happen to 
fuel poverty levels in the future. These inevitably 
contain large uncertainties and are subject to 
methodological limitations. Nonetheless it is clear 
that even allowing for these uncertainties, fuel 
poverty will not have been eradicated by 2016, 
however it is defined. Under our preferred indicator, 
our projections of fuel poverty in 2016 suggest that 
between 2.6 million and 3.0 million households will 
be fuel poor, and the fuel poverty gap will rise on 
our central projection from £1.1 billion in 2009 to 
£1.7 billion in 2016. This depth of fuel poverty is, 
as one would expect, greatly affected by the level 
of fuel prices. Only at the most optimistic end of 
the range will the fuel poverty gap remain close 
to its 2009 level. The report also looks at what the 
situation would be if there were no Government 
policies in place, showing that the policy package 
is expected to help keep fuel poverty levels lower 
than they would be, albeit only by about a tenth 
(looking at the fuel poverty gap). This is profoundly 
disappointing. While the current policy package will 
have some beneficial effects, its scale is clearly not 
enough to even to ensure that fuel poverty, as we 
think it should be measured, will be lower in 2016 
than it was in 2009, let alone be eliminated.
16. For comparative purposes, we also set out 
projections for the current indicator, which showed 
a range extending from 3.1 million to 9.2 million 
households (43 per cent of the total in England) 
in fuel poverty by 2016, highlighting the great 
sensitivity of the indicator to changes in fuel prices. 
likely to be fuel poor and is certainly an obvious 
candidate for assistance. We also showed how 
a very simple set of proxies could allow for the 
identification of households accounting for about 
half of the overall problem, as measured by the fuel 
poverty gap. However, getting at the remaining half 
of the fuel poverty gap is much harder. For instance 
38 per cent of LIHC households have lower incomes 
but do not receive means-tested benefits and are 
therefore relatively difficult to identify without more 
detailed screening.
11. In terms of priorities for action those facing the 
deepest fuel poverty gaps are clearly of high priority, 
but so are those in fuel poverty who are likely to be 
most vulnerable to its effects on health, particularly 
the most elderly, infants, and those with particular 
long-term illnesses or forms of disability.
12. The approach we propose also provides a 
framework within which policy-makers and those 
involved in this debate can identify the trade-
offs between different kinds of policy. This could 
colour imminent decisions in the field of domestic 
energy efficiency policy in terms of the Green Deal 
and ECO. In Chapter 4 we showed how this kind 
of framework could apply in principle, while in 
Chapter 5 we examined the main elements of the 
current policy package offered by Government in 
this light, spanning the three drivers of fuel poverty: 
thermal efficiency (e.g. Warm Front, Green Deal); 
incomes (e.g. Winter Fuel Payments) and energy 
bills (e.g. Warm Home Discount). These have a 
variety of impacts on both the extent and depth of 
fuel poverty, depending on the source of funding 
and targeting.
13. This policy package could be supplemented by 
a range of additional policies. We discuss the 
potential roles of policies such as those related to 
minimum standards of energy efficiency (including 
the public provision of key related information), 
or for equity release schemes (but only in limited 
circumstances). We examine the impact of rising 
block tariffs but conclude that they would help only 
once the core problem of fuel poverty has been 
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19. It is clear that the problem of fuel poverty is both 
serious and widespread. Our preferred indicator 
shows that it affects more than seven million people 
living in nearly three million homes. Our projections 
suggest that far from being eliminated by 2016 as 
the 2000 Act requires, it is likely to be substantially 
worse than it was in 2009. Current policies are 
expected to have a positive impact on the level of 
fuel poverty, as measured by our indicator, so that 
it is less bad than it might otherwise be, but this 
impact is a limited one.
20. Effective future action requires a reinvigorated fuel 
poverty strategy. We believe that the case for this is 
very strong. First, the framework for measurement 
underlying the 2001 strategy is inappropriate and 
does not effectively support policy-making and 
delivery. Second, on current trends and policies, fuel 
poverty will not be eradicated by 2016, however it 
is measured. Third, the context has changed since 
2001, with combating climate change a still more 
urgent national priority, while the economic and 
fiscal crisis leaves more households vulnerable to 
the effects of energy prices that have risen, rather 
than fallen as was assumed in 2001.
21. The scale of the challenge is daunting. Within 
Government, although DECC has the clearest 
interest in fuel poverty, tackling it cannot be the 
task of a single Department. The problem is one 
affecting health, poverty, communities, and climate 
change. Tackling it successfully will require many 
parts of Government to be involved.
22. Our analysis shows that interventions, targeted on 
the core of the problem, can make a substantial 
difference. We hope that the framework we have 
developed provides some of the tools that will allow 
this to be done most effectively.
We also show that the number of low-income 
households with energy efficiency or costs below 
absolute standards would fall more slowly over the 
years after 2009 than before then.
17. Against this perturbing background we then went 
on, in Chapter 7, to look at how additional policy 
effort could contribute to tackling fuel poverty. 
We analysed three broad types of interventions: 
policies that tackle energy prices, through delivering 
bill rebates; policies that aim to improve thermal 
efficiency through delivering subsidised insulation 
and heating systems to certain households; and 
policies that act on incomes by delivering direct 
income support. We then tested these against a 
number of key criteria: their immediate impact on 
fuel poverty; their long term cost-effectiveness; 
their distributional impact; their impact on 
carbon emissions; and their net associated 
benefits as measured by official cost-benefit 
analysis approaches.
18. The analysis suggests that policies to improve the 
thermal efficiency of the housing stock that are 
targeted on those with low incomes and have 
energy-inefficient homes would be the most 
effective at reducing the level of fuel poverty. 
Policies analogous in some ways to Warm Front or 
the Affordable Warmth component of ECO would 
have the greatest focus on fuel poor households 
and would be the most cost-effective in achieving 
long-term reductions in the fuel poverty gap. They 
would also lead (along with the Carbon Reduction 
part of ECO) to the greatest reductions in carbon 
emissions. They would have very substantial net 
societal benefits in relation to cost, particularly 
when their distributional impact is allowed for.
Recommendation: The Government – not just DECC but also other Departments – should set out a 
renewed and ambitious strategy for tackling fuel poverty, reflecting the challenges we lay out in this 
report and the framework we have set out for understanding them.
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Association for the Conservation of Energy
Action with Communities in Rural England (ACRE)
Act on Energy 
Age UK
Beat the Cold
Blackburn with Darwen Borough Council
Dr Brenda Boardman
Bolton NHS
Bromford Group
Carillion
Dr Noel Cass
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Cumbria Affordable Warmth
Department for Social Development in Northern Ireland
EDF Energy
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Donald Hirsch
Greater London Authority
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Islington Council
Keeping Warm in Later Life Team
Leeds City Council
Macmillan Cancer Support
Maidstone Borough Council
Marmot Review team
Peter Matejic
Beryl Metcalf
Milton Keynes Council
National Housing Federation
National Pensioners Convention
National Energy Action
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Sefton Council
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Allan Whitehead MP
Zaccheus 2000
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1. This Annex contains technical analysis relating to 
a range of issues that are relevant to Chapter 2. 
The structure is as follows:
•	 Part A: Applying an income threshold to the 
current official indicator of fuel poverty;
•	 Part B: Understanding equivalisation of 
modelled bills under the Low Income High 
Costs (LIHC) approach;
•	 Part C: Setting out the unit costs approach put 
forward by stakeholders and comparing this to 
our approach based on equivalisation;
•	 Part D: Looking at potential absolute indicators 
for fuel poverty measurement.
Part A: Applying an income 
threshold under the 10 per 
cent indicator
2. As explained in the summary of responses to the 
consultation on the interim report (see Chapter 
1), one suggestion made was to add an income 
threshold to the current indicator of fuel poverty 
(the 10 per cent indicator). Higher-income 
households would not be counted as fuel poor 
even if their ratio were above 10 per cent. 
3. This suggestion amounts to a proposal to capture 
the overlap of low income and high costs without 
making any major modification to the current 
indicator. Those households with relatively high 
income would be automatically ruled out from 
being identified as fuel poor. This would be an 
advantage. Applying a low income threshold to 
the 2009 data, whereby a household could only be 
fuel poor if, as well as having a modelled energy 
requirement representing more than 10 per cent 
of its income, it had an income in the lowest 30 
per cent of incomes (bottom three income decile 
groups), would reduce fuel poverty from 4.0 million 
to 3.4 million households.
4. However, this kind of approach has a number of 
disadvantages. These centre around the fact that 
merely adding an income threshold to the indicator 
addresses only one of its fundamental weaknesses 
as summarised in Chapter 1 and described in 
more detail in Chapter 5 of the interim report. The 
indicator would remain a ratio indicator at heart, 
prone to an oversensitivity to price changes, to 
technical decisions taken within the methodology 
(such as temperature standards) and to the 
misreporting of low incomes. An income threshold 
would not address the way in which the arbitrarily 
chosen 10 per cent threshold cuts off the tail of 
the distribution of fuel poverty ratios. It would 
not mean the indicator told us more than before 
about the depth of fuel poverty – and we believe 
it would not be meaningful to use a fuel poverty 
gap indicator alongside the 10 per cent fuel poverty 
ratio measure since this would compound the 
Ann x to Chapter 2
to Chapter 2
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sensitivity to fuel prices. It would help in targeting 
the fuel poor to some extent, if higher income 
households can be identified, but that would still 
require some form of screening.117
Part B: Equivalisation of 
modelled bills under LIHC
How household bills are adjusted in 
the calculation
5. As set out in Chapter 1, we use equivalisation 
factors for both income measurement and modelled 
bills in our Low Income High Costs indicator, as 
proposed in the interim report.
6. The original equivalisation factors we used in the 
interim report are set out in Table A2.1
7. As a reminder, this is how the calculations are 
made. The reference household – to which others 
are standardised – is a couple without children 
(equivalisation factor of 1.00). As an example, the 
equivalisation factor used by DWP (for after housing 
cost income calculations) for a single-person 
household is 0.58. That is, a single person with an 
after housing costs income of £11,600 is taken 
to have the same standard of living as a couple 
with £20,000. 
8. Under the LIHC indicator, the costs threshold is 
calculated by equivalising all bills and then finding 
117 The full background to these criticisms of the current indicator is not set 
out here. For some detail, please see Chapter 1. For the full picture, we 
refer readers to Chapter 5 of our interim report.
the median bill.  Let’s assume this is shown to 
be £1,200, which therefore becomes the costs 
threshold to which individual households can 
be compared.
9. To work out the fuel poverty status of an individual 
household, the equivalised bill is added to the 
official poverty line to give a specific household 
threshold.  For a couple without children with 
a modelled bill that is identical to the median, 
this would mean adding £1,200 to the income 
threshold. For a single person with a modelled bill 
of £1,200, equivalisation using the factors used in 
our interim report gives a modelled bill of £2,069 
(=£1,200/0.58) which should be added to the 
equivalised poverty line for that household.
10. Whether an individual household’s modelled costs 
are above or below the costs threshold can be 
judged in two ways. Either:
•	 by comparing the modelled bill, without 
adjusting it for household size and type, to an 
adjusted threshold; or
•	 by comparing the modelled bill, after adjusting 
it for household size and type, to an unadjusted 
threshold.
11. Therefore, if the equivalised median modelled bill is 
£1,200 and a single household has an unadjusted 
bill of £1,100, one can either compare (again using 
the factors from our interim report):
Table A2.1: Fuel cost equivalisation factors used in the low income high costs indicator in the interim report
Household types 1 adult 1 adult
1 child
1 adult
2 chldn
2 adult 2 adult
1 child
2 adult
2 chldn
3 adult 3 adult
1 child
4 adult
DWP adjusted equivalence 
factor
0.58 0.78 0.98 1 1.2 1.4 1.42 1.62 1.84
Source: Hills Fuel Poverty Review interim report
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14. The difficulty with using an approach based on 
average modelled costs is that spending patterns 
may be distorted by different groups having 
unequal standards of living. For example, modelled 
spend data for lone parents with two children 
would suggest that they have very different needs 
from two adult households with two children. This 
is most likely to reflect the fact that lone parents are 
on average much poorer, and live in more energy-
efficient and smaller social housing.
15. To overcome this problem, we have examined the 
average modelled expenditure of those households 
of all types whose (equivalised) income is within 20 
per cent either side of the national median. In this 
way, we can base our equivalisation scale only on 
households with fairly typical incomes, and avoid 
any skew that including particularly high or low 
income households might introduce. This generates 
the values given in Table A2.2.
16. Our equivalisation factors relate to a more limited 
range of household types than presented in Table 
A2.7. This is because it is difficult to distinguish 
between the numbers of children in households 
in a robust way (because of small sample sizes). 
Therefore deriving equivalisation factors based on 
the number of children in households would not 
only add complexity, but would also potentially 
jeopardise the accuracy of our equivalisation scale. 
We also drop the differentiation between pensioner 
and non-pensioner households. The prime reason 
for this decision is that we are not convinced that it 
is ‘reasonable’ for a single pensioner to spend more 
•	 £1,100 to an adjusted threshold of £696 
(=£1,200*0.58; the difference of £404 is the 
fuel poverty gap if the household falls below the 
income threshold); or 
•	 £1,897 (=£1,100/0.58) to an unadjusted 
threshold of £1,200 (the difference of £697, once 
unequivalised to £404, is the fuel poverty gap).
Developing alternative factors
12. As we discussed in Chapter 2, respondents to 
the consultation suggested that the use of these 
equivalisation factors – based on those used by 
DWP for adjusting after housing costs income – for 
adjusting the fuel costs in relation to the threshold 
was incorrect. They do not reflect the role that 
energy plays in the household basket of goods, 
whose economies of scale are less than for other 
goods (apart from housing). The question is then, 
how could one develop appropriate alternative 
equivalisation factors? This section sets out the 
approach we have now taken.
13. Our starting point was the modelled spending 
patterns discernible in the 2009 English Housing 
Survey data. From this one can identify the average 
requirements of different household types. The data 
used are presented below (see Table A2.7 below) in 
relation to the alternative proposal made to us by 
Dr Richard Moore to use a unit costs approach. For 
instance, couples with two children have average 
modelled fuel cost requirements that are 18 per 
cent higher than those of couples without children 
(see table A2.7).
Table A2.2: Index of average fuel costs by household size and composition, based on households with AHC 
equivalised income within 20 per cent of the median AHC equivalised income, 2009
couple with 
dependent 
child(ren)
couple, 
no dependent 
child(ren)
lone parent with 
dependent 
child(ren)
one person other 
multi-person 
households
1.13 1.00 0.93 0.82 1.08
Source: Fuel Poverty data, 2009 (DECC)
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19. One way of testing these factors is to compare 
them with one’s expectations. We believe that, on 
balance, these factors are sensible and appropriate: 
they suggest that a single person typically needs 
to spend 82 per cent of the spending of a 
couple without children and that having children 
in a household adds some 12-15 per cent to 
requirements.118
Effects on composition
20. The major impact of adjusting the equivalisation 
factors is in terms of the breakdown of households 
classified as fuel poor. The data are given in Table 
A2.5 and represented graphically in Figure A2.1, 
with a comparison made between the current 
indicator and the Low Income High Costs indicator 
from our interim report.
118 It can also be noted that these give the same ratio between single people 
and couples as that for total modelled energy costs across the whole EHS 
sample shown in Table A2.7 below. The adjustment factors for couples 
with children and lone parents are also consistent given the biases we 
expect in the raw data. The adjustment factor for multi-adult households 
is perhaps lower than one might expect, however. If the approach we 
recommend were adopted for official fuel poverty measurement this is 
an area which could be investigated further.
on fuel than a single non-pensioner. A distinction 
between pensioner and non-pensioner households 
is not made by DWP (or internationally) in adjusting 
income to measure relative living standards. Such 
a distinction would also add complexity to our 
equivalisation scale.
17. In order to ensure the robustness of the factors, we 
have also calculated them based on the 2007 and 
2008 English Housing Surveys, to see whether they 
fluctuate markedly over time. The results are given 
in Table A2.3.
18. As can be seen, there are minor discrepancies 
between the three years of data.  We believe that 
these differences should be taken into account, and 
we therefore propose taking the average of these 
three years as the final equivalisation factors, as set 
out in Table A2.4.
Table A2.3: Index comparing average modelled fuel costs by household composition, based on households 
with AHC equivalised income within 20 per cent of median AHC equivalised income, 2007 and 2008
couple 
with dependent 
child(ren)
couple, 
no dependent 
child(ren)
lone parent 
with dependent 
child(ren) one person
other 
multi-person 
households
2008 1.13 1.00 0.93 0.82 1.08
2007 1.16 1.00 0.97 0.82 1.06
Source: Fuel Poverty data, 2007 and 2008 (DECC)
Table A2.4: Index comparing average fuel costs by household composition, based on households with AHC 
equivalised income within 20 per cent of median AHC equivalised income, 2007-2009 (average)
 
couple with 
dependent 
child(ren)
couple, no 
dependent 
child(ren)
lone parent 
with dependent 
child(ren) one person
other 
multi-person 
households
Average of 2007, 
2008, 2009 1.15 1 0.94 0.82 1.07
Source: Fuel Poverty data, 2007-2009 (DECC)
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Table A2.5: Composition of fuel poor households, and numbers of individuals, under three different 
indicators, 2009
Total 
households
Couple with 
dependent 
children
Couple, no 
dependent 
child(ren), 
aged 60 or 
over
Couple, no 
dependent 
child(ren) 
under 60
Lone 
parent with 
dependent 
child(ren)
One 
person 
aged 60 
or over
One 
person 
under 60
Other 
multi-
person 
households
Total 
individuals
New 
proposed 
LIHC
2,695 661
(25%)
406 
(15%)
219
(8%)
555
(21%)
277
(10%)
361
(13%)
215
(8%)
7,842
Original 
LIHC
2,716 216
(8%)
394
(15%)
172
(6%)
415
(15%)
555
(20%)
836
(31%)
128
(5%)
4,763
Current 
indicator
3,964 381
(10%)
733
(18%)
281
(7%)
347
(9%)
1,184
(30%)
763
(19%)
275
(7%)
7,374
Source: Fuel Poverty data, 2009 (DECC)
Figure A2.1: Composition of fuel poor households, under 
three different indicators, 2009
Number of households
(millions)
Current indicator
Interim report LIHC indicator
Proposed LIHC indicator
0
0.2
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0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
couple with
dependent
child(ren)
couple, no
dependent
childr(ren)
aged 60
or over
couple, no
dependent
child(ren)
under 60
lone parent
with
dependent
child(ren)
one person
aged 60 or
over
one person
under 60
other multi-
person
households
Source: Fuel poverty statistics 2009 (DECC)
21. As can be seen, the two versions of the low income 
high costs indicator give very different results in 
terms of overall household composition, but not 
total household numbers. The big difference is that, 
of the fuel poor identified under the new version 
of the indicator, far more of them are accounted 
for by couples with dependent children and far 
fewer by single people (both over and under 60). 
There are also differences between the current 
indicator and the new version of the low income 
high costs indicator, although they find very similar 
numbers of individuals to be fuel poor. The biggest 
differences are in the proportion of fuel poor 
households accounted for by couples with children 
(higher under the new version of our indicator), 
lone parents (higher under the new version of our 
indicator) and single pensioners (higher under the 
current indicator). The reduction in the proportion 
of older households within the total is common to 
other approaches, such as the unit cost approach 
discussed in Part C of this Annex.
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Table A2.6: Index comparing modelled fuel cost requirements by household size and composition
Household 
types
1 adult 1 adult
1 child
1 adult
2 chldn
2 adult 2 adult
1 child
2 adult
2 chldn
3 adult 3 adult
1 child
4 adult
Space heating 0.88 0.80 0.78 1 0.90 1.03 1.03 1.10 1.11
Water heating 0.71 0.94 1.13 1 1.13 1.30 1.20 1.36 1.40
Lights and 
appliances
0.71 0.90 1.12 1 1.15 1.42 1.23 1.47 1.48
Cooking 0.90 1.04 1.15 1 1.13 1.25 1.12 1.26 1.26
Total fuel costs 0.82 0.85 0.93 1 1.00 1.18 1.11 1.24 1.25
Average floor 
area
0.77 0.73 0.82 1 0.92 1.11 1.06 1.20 1.19
Unit costs (Fuel 
cost per m2)
1.06 1.10 1.08 1 1.05 1.05 1.03 1.05 1.03
Average SAP 
rating
53.3 57.3 58.9 52.2 55.7 53.9 52.2 53.2 52.4
Source: Research commissioned by Consumer Focus and carried out by Dr Richard Moore.
Part C: Alternatives to 
equivalisation
Measuring unit costs (£/m2)
22. A specific alternative approach put forward by 
stakeholders during the consultation on our interim 
report was, within the overall LIHC framework, 
to measure required spending in terms of unit 
costs, measured in £ per m2, rather than total costs 
adjusted for household size.
23. The case for this approach centres around the 
observation that analysis of the 2009 English 
Housing Survey data shows that modelled unit 
energy costs do not vary substantially by household 
size. In his detailed analysis provided to the review, 
Dr Richard Moore shows that unit fuel costs are 
relatively unaffected by the size and composition 
of the household, varying from the average for 
households comprising two adults by typically only 
3-5 per cent and by no more than 10 per cent. This 
can be seen in Table A2.6.
186
ANNEX TO CHAPTER 2 
Threshold setting and composition
27. If the unit costs approach were taken a decision 
would be needed in relation to the threshold 
representing the boundary between ‘reasonable’ 
and ‘unreasonable’ costs.  There are various options 
and the documentation relating to this proposal 
sent to the review set many of these out. Some of 
them emulated approaches we discussed in Chapter 
2 above, for example the idea of setting a threshold 
at 60 per cent of median unit costs. Of course, 
it would also be possible to apply our preferred 
threshold – the contemporary median – under the 
unit costs approach.
28. The decision on the threshold would affect the 
scale of the problem identified by the indicator and 
therefore the composition of households in fuel 
poverty. The option we use to understand what the 
unit costs approach would show in practice is to 
draw the threshold at the level of the median unit 
costs of all households, as this allows us to compare 
the approach with our own (where we used median 
total costs of all households). However, some 
stakeholders suggested that we should use a cost 
threshold based on the median costs of homes 
at the boundary between an C rating on the EPC 
scale and a D rating. Conceptually, this would 
mean comparing everyone’s costs to those faced by 
households living in the best seventh of homes – 
only 14 per cent of households in England have an 
A, B or C rating. 
29. We have set out in Chapter 2 the compositional 
breakdown of fuel poor households under our 
preferred LIHC indicator. This is compared below, 
in Table A2.8 and Figure A2.2, to the breakdown 
that results from the current official indicator, the 
original LIHC indicator (from the interim report) and 
the unit costs approach.
24. Under this needs-based approach, reflecting current 
accommodation patterns, couples have total energy 
needs represented by the factor 1.00 in the fifth 
line of the table. Couples with one child have the 
same total needs. This reflects lower space heating 
requirements as their accommodation is smaller on 
average, but higher requirements for water heating, 
lights and cooking. Single adult households have a 
factor of 0.82; lone parents with one child a factor 
of 0.85. Note that for these different household 
types variations in dwelling sizes and the SAP 
ratings of the homes occupied affect the average 
spending needs as well as the number of people.
25. From the table, it can be seen that average 
modelled costs per m2 are relatively similar between 
household types, just six per cent more for single 
adults than couples, for instance, or ten per cent 
more for lone parents with one child. A common 
threshold across all household types expressed in  
£/m2 would therefore have roughly consistent 
results on average between household types, 
without any need for equivalisation.
26. One concern of some stakeholders is that the 
assessment of fuel poverty should not be unduly 
driven by under-occupancy, which can lead to 
high modelled costs per person. Dr Moore argued 
that the current fuel poverty model allows for 
this (by giving a half-heating regime where there 
is under-occupancy, the results of which are also 
allowed for above) so the cost of space heating is 
made dependent on the size and composition of 
the household as well as on the energy efficiency 
and size of the home. Under this approach this 
reduced need for fuel is then compared with the 
single national threshold. In commentary on the 
unit costs approach, Dr Brenda Boardman argued 
that with a single unit costs threshold there 
should be no adjustment to half-heating regimes 
when calculating the energy needs of under-
occupying households.
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is considerably more than under the total costs 
approach (2.7 million), despite setting the threshold 
at the median level of unit costs. However, 
compared to the official indicator, both the revised 
LIHC indicator and the unit costs indicator find 
smaller proportions of fuel poor households to be 
pensioners that the current definition.
30. Figure A2.2 shows the proportion of households 
under each indicator.
31. Basing the fuel threshold on unit costs rather than 
total costs has a large effect on the number of fuel 
poor households, with nearly 3.5 million households 
in fuel poverty under a unit cost approach. This 
Table A2.7: Breakdown of fuel poor under households by type under various indicators, 2009, England
couple with 
child(ren)
(%)
couple, no 
child(ren) 
aged 60 or 
over (%)
couple, no 
child(ren) 
under 60
(%)
lone parent 
with 
child(ren)
(%)
one person 
aged 60 or 
over
(%)
one person 
under 60
(%)
other multi-
person 
households
(%)
TOTAL
(000s)
Current indicator 
(full income)
9.6 18.5 7.1 8.8 29.9 19.2 6.9 3,964
Interim report 
LIHC
8.0 14.5 6.3 15.3 20.4 30.8 4.7 2,716
Proposed LIHC 24.5 15.1 8.1 20.6 10.3 13.4 8.0 2,695
Unit costs £/m2 27 13 9.0 19 8.0 15 9.0 3,496
Source: Fuel Poverty data, 2009 (DECC)
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Figure A2.2:  Breakdown of households under various 
indicators, by household type, 2009, England
Source: Fuel Poverty data, 2009 (DECC)     
other multi-person households
couple with child(ren)
lone parent with child(ren)
couple, no child(ren) under 60
one person under 60
couple, no child(ren) aged 60 or over
one-person aged 60 or over
188
ANNEX TO CHAPTER 2 
Comparing the equivalisation 
approach with the unit costs 
approach
32. We have considered this alternative very carefully, 
in particular comparing its results with our LIHC 
indicator based on total household needs, adjusted 
using the equivalisation factors derived as set out 
in Part B of this Annex. Our conclusion is, however, 
that the equivalisation approach described in the 
previous section is more effective at reflecting 
relative needs than the £/m2 approach.
33. One key feature of the proposed £/m2 approach 
is that the threshold used is independent of the 
number of people living in a household. However, 
the required energy costs will be larger for a 
bigger household, reflecting the additional water 
heating and lights and appliance consumption 
that they will require, and benefit rates and gross 
incomes are generally larger for bigger households 
reflecting these needs. This means that for a 
particular property, a larger household will be more 
likely to be assessed as having needs that exceed 
the threshold. It is not obvious that this is always 
appropriate.
34. As an example, consider a pensioner couple living in 
a particular home. The husband dies and his widow 
continues to live in the same home. Under either 
approach, whether she ends up above or below the 
income threshold will be approximately reflected 
in the equivalisation of incomes before and after 
she became a widow. Her actual income is likely to 
be lower, but whether this pushes her into poverty 
will depend on whether the drop is greater than 
the reduction in her needs. We believe her changed 
circumstances should also be reflected in our 
understanding of what constitutes a reasonable bill.
35. Her energy costs as a single person living in the 
same dwelling would be expected to fall somewhat 
and this will be reflected in her calculated energy 
requirement. But under the unit costs approach 
this lower energy requirement is compared with 
the same costs threshold as before. It could be 
that the couple were previously considered to 
have high costs under this approach – and so 
were in fuel poverty – but that her reduced costs 
as a widow now put her below the threshold – 
and so no longer in fuel poverty as a result of her 
husband’s death. This would be even more likely if 
the modelling incorporated a ‘half house’ standard 
in her new circumstances. By contrast, under the 
approach outlined in the previous section, the key 
issue would be whether her required energy costs 
fell by more or less than the 18 per cent implied 
by our revised equivalisation factors. This seems 
more appropriate.
36. In effect the unit costs approach implies that 
those in this situation will move to smaller 
accommodation (and so keep their required costs 
constant per m2). This may be true on average 
comparing all single people and all couples, but 
it clearly does not always happen and it is not 
necessarily appropriate to assume it should.
37. Given the imperfections of any assessment of this 
kind it is, of course, always possible to find counter-
intuitive illustrations. But the general point is that, 
in essence, the unit costs approach would seem 
to require homes perfectly suited to needs and 
to penalise householders who are not in such a 
situation.
38. In a nutshell while we agree that the equivalisation 
approach set out in the interim report made 
much too great an adjustment to the effective 
costs threshold, it seems wrong to make no 
adjustment at all, which is what is implied by the 
£/m2 alternative. Our initial proposal did make it 
too likely that under-occupying households would 
be counted as having high costs. But part of the 
root of the fuel poverty problem is that people 
– particularly those on low incomes – do have 
difficulty in moving to new accommodation, and 
therefore may face genuine difficulties through the 
energy needs of a property they continue to live in. 
Our revised approach makes some allowance for 
this and the results appear reasonable. At the same 
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equivalisation factors. Figure A2.5 shows the 
relationship between SAP and unit fuel costs.  
Although the relationship is not by any means 
linear, there is a much better correlation under the 
equivalisation approach (Figure A2.4) than under 
the unit costs approach (Figure A2.5).119 In effect, 
whether a household has reasonable costs is more 
strongly associated with energy efficiency under 
our approach than under the unit costs approach 
(where the number of people in the household 
will be a much more important factor). The former 
seems more appropriate. It also suggests that a SAP 
proxy will be a better guide to fuel poverty status, 
when combined with income information, under 
our LIHC proposal than in the unit costs approach.
42. Given this discussion, we conclude that an approach 
using equivalisation has more merits than a unit 
costs approach. An approach using equivalisation 
gives a flavour of the impact of bills on individual 
households compared to all other households, 
reflecting needs as far as possible. In order for 
119 A correlation coefficient of -1 would represent a perfect (negative) 
correlation between increasing SAP and decreasing bills/costs. 
A correlation coefficient of -0.755 is therefore very strong.
time the ‘half house’ regime within the underlying 
methodology already reduces the weight given to 
the needs of ‘under-occupying’ households.
39. The way in which different kinds of energy needs 
vary by household size is shown in Figure A2.3. 
This sets out average 2009 modelled energy bills 
for each of the four main components of a bill, 
expressed relative to the average bill of a two 
person household.
40. This figure shows that the relationship between 
three of these factors (water heating, lights and 
appliances and cooking) is strongly correlated with 
the number of people in the dwelling. These three 
components account for more than 40 per cent of 
average modelled bills. This means that modelled 
bills will – unsurprisingly – relate quite strongly 
to the number of people in the household. One 
effect of this is that costs measured in £/m2 vary 
significantly between properties with equal energy 
efficiency ratings.
41. Figure A2.4 shows the relationship between SAP 
and equivalised modelled bill, using our new 
Source: Fuel poverty data, 2009 (DECC)
Number of people in household
Figure A2.3: Modelled expenditure on space heating, 
water heating, lights & appliances, and cooking by number 
of people in household, 2009, England
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Figure A2.4:  Relationship between SAP rating and AHC 
equivalised fuel bill under the proposed LIHC indicator, 
2009, England
Source: Fuel poverty data, 2009 (DECC)
90
80
70
60
40
30
20
10
0
10
SAP rating
0 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Unit costs (£/m2) Correlation coefficient = 0.531
Figure A2.5:  Relationship between SAP rating and unit 
fuel costs under the unit fuel costs indicator, 2009, England
Source: Fuel poverty data, 2009 (DECC)
this preference to be reflected in practice, the 
key question is whether factors can be derived 
which allow this approach to be taken forward. 
The analysis in Part B of this Annex suggests that 
they can be, although further refinements would 
certainly be possible.
43. Ultimately both the approach we have adopted 
(as set out in Chapter 2) and the unit costs 
approach are aimed at establishing the same 
thing: which low-income households have high 
relative energy needs. To do this, households of 
different sizes need to be compared in some way. 
The unit costs approach assumes this will happen 
through differences in the floor area occupied. 
Our approach makes an explicit adjustment for 
household size. Neither approach is perfect, but we 
believe that our proposal gives a better focus on the 
underlying problem.
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Part D: Options for thresholds 
using fixed energy standards
44. We recognised in Chapter 2 that our preferred 
approach to setting the threshold for reasonable 
costs – based on median contemporary 
requirements – represents a challenge in terms of 
literal eradication of fuel poverty. One way around 
this fact – which is seen as a problem by some 
stakeholders who believe it is vital to measure fuel 
poverty in a way that lends itself to eradication 
given the wording of WHECA – would be to use an 
absolute threshold. 
45. We have considered two possible ways of setting 
an absolute threshold to supplement our preferred 
indicator. First, the use of the low income low fixed 
SAP indicator examined (and rejected in favour of 
the LIHC approach) in our interim report. Second, 
a version of the LIHC with a fixed energy standard 
based on 2009 norms.
Option A: a low income low fixed 
SAP approach
46. One option we have reconsidered is the low income 
low SAP indicator we examined in our interim 
report (see Section 6.5 of that document).
47. To recap this approach, a low income threshold 
would need to be calculated. The most straight-
forward way of doing this would be to choose a 
particular proportion of median income. By parallel 
with the DWP measure of child deprivation, we 
have modelled this approach using an income 
threshold of 70 per cent of median income. We 
would also need a SAP threshold – effectively an 
(imperfect) proxy for reasonable costs.  A fixed 
threshold could be taken as median SAP for a given 
year. The choice of year would be to some extent 
arbitrary. We have modelled this approach using 
a SAP threshold of median SAP for 2009. A fuel 
poor household is one that falls below the income 
and SAP thresholds. This is shown conceptually in 
Figure A2.6.
SAP
threshold
Income
threshold
Increasing income  
Increasing
SAP
Fuel
poor
 
Figure A2.6: Fuel Poverty defined as the overlap between 
low income and low SAP
192
ANNEX TO CHAPTER 2 
is currently used by Government for policy delivery. 
For example, the current rules for eligibility for 
Warm Front are linked to having a SAP lower 
than 55 and being receiving certain means-tested 
benefits. (Incidentally, median SAP for 2009, at 
54.96, is virtually identical to this Warm Front 
criterion.) 
50. Figure A2.7 therefore shows the results of 
modelling of this indicator.
51. As can be seen, the number of households counted 
by this measure would have fallen between 
1996 and 2009 by 41 per cent, reflecting the 
improvement in some of our most energy-inefficient 
homes lived in by some of our poorest families.121 
We previously identified this trend in Figure 1.2 
in Chapter 1: between 1996 and 2009, there 
was a considerable reduction in the proportion 
of households in the bottom three income decile 
groups living in E, F or G rated homes (from 76 per 
cent in 1996 to 46 per cent in 2009).
121 We do not have data allowing us to model a reliable data point for 
2000. Assuming a straight-line reduction between 1996 and 2003, fuel 
poverty fell by about 35 per cent under this measure between 2000 and 
2009 (from 4.3 million households to 2.8 million households).
48. We argued in our interim report that this 
approach has limitations as a basis for fuel poverty 
measurement since it ignores two key aspects of 
fuel poverty problem as seen from first principles:
a. SAP does not reflect prices faced by particular 
households (e.g. if they are on pre-payment 
meters) or price changes, meaning that this 
indicator would be essentially impervious 
in headcount terms to changes in relative 
bill levels;120
b. SAP does not reflect household needs. A single 
person going out to work each day from a low 
SAP home has much lower energy needs than a 
house-bound pensioner couple in the same type 
of home, yet both would be treated the same 
under this approach.
49. At the same time, there is a simplicity to this 
measure that is attractive. Furthermore, it correlates 
well with the practical approach to targeting that 
120 As and when SAP is updated, changes in relative energy prices are 
reflected. A consultation on an update to SAP was launched by DECC 
in January 2012, closing on 28 March 2012. The next SAP update is not 
expected until 2015.
Number of
households in fuel
poverty (millions)
Source: Fuel poverty data, 1996 and 2003-2009 (DECC)
Note: Income threshold set at 70 per cent of median income.
Figure A2.7:  Trend in the number of fuel poor households 
under the proposed low income high costs measure, 
compared with low income low SAP measure with a fixed 
threshold of the median 2009 SAP, 1996 and 2003-2009, 
England
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threshold), to give a threshold for each year that 
reflects only price changes between that year and 
2009 (and not any changes in energy consumption). 
56. In fact, if this sort of approach were used, a choice 
would have to be made in terms of reference 
year for the median equivalised bill. The choice 
would dictate numbers, but not trends. There is 
an argument that, for the purpose of assessing 
progress under WHECA, the reference year should 
be 2000 – the year of the Act’s adoption. However, 
we do not have data for this year. Choosing the 
nearest year for which we have good data – 2003 
– has no clear basis. We therefore suggest that, 
if an approach of this kind were taken forward 
for progress measurement and target setting, the 
reference year should be 2009, the latest year for 
which we have official data.
57. Taking 2009 as our base year for these reasons, 
we have compared average energy prices across all 
fuels (weighted by modelled expenditure from the 
fuel poverty data and payment method) in each 
year to the 2009 level, to give the proportional 
change in energy prices over time.
58. In Table A2.8, the median equivalised modelled 
fuel bills reflect changes in prices and consumption, 
whereas the relative energy prices column shows 
changes in prices only. For example, the table 
shows that fuel prices in 2006 were 66 per cent 
of the 2009 level. If one applies this to the median 
equivalised fuel bill for 2009 (£1,270), this gives a 
fuel costs threshold of £843 for 2006, accounting 
only for changes in prices over time. As can be 
seen, the median equivalised bill is always higher 
than the bill that is adjusted only for price changes.
59. Under this absolute threshold, which gives this 
lower value for 2006, more households would 
have low incomes and high costs than when 
using the relative threshold. This is because the 
relative threshold takes into account general 
52. This shows the main attraction of this measure: it 
would establish a clear reference framework against 
which to judge progress towards eradicating fuel 
poverty. Under this kind of measure, eliminating 
fuel poverty would be a direct matter of ensuring 
that no low-income people live in homes with a 
worse SAP than the threshold.
53. Aside from the failure to reflect prices or need 
another key objection is the need to identify a SAP 
threshold to use. Our modelling is based on the 
2009 median SAP because that is the latest year 
for which we have data. Conveniently, the value of 
54.96 is virtually identical to the boundary between 
an EPC rating of D and one of E. SAP 55 is also a 
qualifying criterion for Warm Front assistance.122 
However, it would, of course, be possible to set a 
different threshold. We show both past trends and 
future projections against alternative thresholds in 
Figure 6.5 in Chapter 6.
A variant of the LIHC indicator with 
a fixed energy costs threshold
54. The relative costs threshold within our preferred 
framework changes as the consumption patterns 
of all households change over time, including as a 
result of general improvements in energy efficiency. 
The framework could be used to incorporate a 
threshold that is instead fixed on the basis of the 
stock composition in a particular year. In effect, 
the threshold moves each year in line with changes 
in fuel prices. This gives an alternative kind of 
absolute threshold to the low income low fixed SAP 
indicator, but one that takes account of the wider 
range of factors that affect energy costs. 
55. There are a number of ways in which an absolute 
fuel costs measure of this kind can be produced. 
The measure we have developed involves 
calculating how energy prices change over time and 
then applying these changes to the 2009 median 
equivalised energy bill (i.e. the 2009 fuel costs 
122 It would, of course, be possible to set a different threshold, such as SAP 
81 – the value that has been identified by some as the level required to 
effectively ‘fuel poverty proof’ a domestic property.
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way fuel poverty data is constructed by merging 
two consecutive years of data together. The figures 
for the years before 2004 are not therefore fully 
comparable with those for the years since 2006, 
which is why we show a break in the series.
62. These changes do not affect the relative approach 
in the same way, because the methodology change 
is applied to both the threshold and the bills of 
individual households. For the absolute approach 
they affect the bills of individual households but 
not the threshold (which is only sensitive to price 
changes).
63. Figure A2.8 shows that it would be possible 
to construct a version of the LIHC indicator 
incorporating a threshold that was in some senses 
absolute, and did not become more stringent over 
time as national energy standards improved. Using 
this approach would still include a wider range of 
factors affecting household needs than the low 
income low fixed SAP indicator set out as Option 
A above. It is, however, more complex and, as we 
have seen, is sensitive to methodological changes in 
a way that makes producing a consistent time series 
harder. 
energy consumption changes due to efficiency 
improvements from 2006-2009, whereas the 
absolute threshold does not. One would therefore 
expect a faster fall in the number of households 
with low incomes and high costs with the absolute 
threshold than the relative one, as can indeed be 
seen by Figure A2.8.
60. There are two key differences in the trend shown by 
these indicators. First, the absolute threshold gives 
a much sharper drop in fuel poverty numbers from 
1996 to 2003. This is because general consumption 
needs decreased during this period. However, these 
affect only the relative threshold, not the absolute 
one. Where households are living in properties that 
have become more energy-efficient their costs are 
more likely to fall below the absolute threshold. 
61. The second key feature is that the number of 
low income households below the absolute 
threshold was higher in 2006 than in 2004. This 
is largely a result of methodology changes that 
were introduced into the modelling of fuel bills 
at that time, which assume a substantial increase 
in consumption for all households. The impact is 
spread across both 2005 and 2006, because of the 
Table A2.8: The trend in fuel prices and the median equivalised fuel bill, 1996 and 2003-2009
Year Median equivalised modelled 
fuel bill (£)
Energy prices relative  
to 2009
Adjusted median equivalised 
fuel bill – taking into account 
price changes prior to 2009 
only (£)
1996 784 0.54 686
2003 656 0.50 640
2004 674 0.52 661
2005 761 0.57 721
2006 953 0.66 843
2007 1,066 0.77 980
2008 1,135 0.89 1,130
2009 1,270 1.00 1,270
Source: Fuel Poverty datasets 1996, 2003-2009 and Quarterly Energy Prices, 1996-2011 (both DECC)
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Number of
households in fuel
poverty (millions)
Source: Fuel poverty data, 1996 and 2003-2009, with adjustments made using 
Quarterly Energy Prices, 1996-2011 (both DECC)
Figure A2.8:  Trend in the number of households in fuel 
poverty under a relative and absolute fuel threshold 
approach where only prices vary, 1996 and 2003-2009, 
England
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Projections methodology
1. This Annex sets out in more detail the approach, 
data and assumptions used to estimate levels of 
fuel poverty over the medium term, both with and 
without the current Government policy package. 
This comprises the combination of three sets of 
projections: a) changes in household income; b) 
changes in energy prices; and c) the impact of the 
Government’s policies on household energy bills.
2. Each of these projections is based on the 2009 
English Housing Survey (EHS) dataset, drawing 
from a range of official and published data to 
inform the main assumptions for each key factor. 
We describe these in turn below, and list all of 
our assumptions in Table A6.1. We also list upper 
and lower bounds for testing the sensitivity of our 
results to changes in each key factor in Tables A6.2 
and A6.3. All assumptions relating to the impact 
of Government policies are drawn from published 
impact assessments.
3. It also discusses in a short final section the gross 
impact of policies that will have costs associated 
with them in 2016.
Part A: Projecting changes in 
household income
4. Changes in disposable household income, as used 
under the LIHC indicator, will be dependent on 
two main factors overall: household income and 
housing costs.123 Data on both of these factors are 
drawn exclusively from the 2009 EHS and translated 
into net disposable income in ways consistent with 
the official DECC Fuel Poverty Methodology.124 
Housing costs are deducted as described in Section 
6.1 of our interim report. The process of estimating 
disposable household income involves combining 
information on a number of alternative income 
sources, including earnings, interest from savings 
and investments and benefit receipt. Amounts of 
income from each of these sources are expected 
to change at different rates in the period to 2016. 
Earned income, for example, depends on activities 
in the labour market, whereas interest from savings 
depends more on interest rates set by banks.
5. Each component is adjusted in real terms (net of 
inflation) in line with the projections published 
in the Office for Budget Responsibility’s (OBR) 
Economic and Fiscal Outlook report published in 
123 As we noted in our interim report, housing costs in the EHS are restricted 
to mortgage repayments and rent. We do not include water rates, 
community or council water charges, structural insurance premiums or 
ground rent and service charges.
124 DECC (2011). Fuel Poverty Methodology Handbook, Figure 1. Available 
at: http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/Statistics/fuelpoverty/614-fuel-
poverty-methodology-handbook.pdf 
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6. Private sources of income comprise:
a. Earnings: we increase earned income 
reported for each household in the EHS by 
the percentage increases in average earnings 
published by the OBR (2011). The OBR 
figures for average earnings are in nominal 
terms (i.e. include the effect of inflation), 
therefore to estimate real changes in earned 
income we deflate the OBR figures using the 
November 2011.125 Our income projections are 
made in real terms, as this allows us to estimate 
changes in a household’s ability to use that income 
to purchase items or services. A summary of the 
different OBR figures applied to each income 
source, before the deduction of taxes and national 
insurance, is shown in Figure A6.1. Profiles of the 
annual figures applied to 2016 are listed in Table 
A6.1.
125 Office for Budget Responsibility. (2011). Outlook Report. Available at: 
http://budgetresponsibility.independent.gov.uk/economic-and-fiscal-
outlook-november-2011/ 
Figure A6.1 – Summary of the adjustments applied to income sources and housing costs
Private Sources of Income Public Sources of Income
Earnings
Investments/
Savings interest Other private
Benefits &
Tax Credits
Housing Related
Benefits
Average
Earnings
Forecast
(adjusted for
inflation)
Real Gross
Domestic
Product Forecast
Unchanged
in real terms
(linked to CPI)
Unchanged
in real terms
(linked to CPI)
Unchanged
in real terms
(linked to CPI)
Housing Costs
Rent payments
(Private/Social Tenures)
Uncertain,
assumed
unchanged
in real terms
Uncertain,
assumed
unchanged
in real terms
Mortgage repayments
and interest
Source: Fuel Poverty Review. 
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wider state benefits and tax credits whereby 
no change is applied to these forms of income 
reported in the EHS.
8. Housing costs, which we deduct from household 
income to arrive at net disposable income under the 
LIHC indicator, consist of:
a. Mortgage repayments and interest (for owner-
occupiers): housing costs for those householders 
who own their homes will be predominantly 
made up of mortgage repayments and interest. 
How these repayments vary over time depends 
on the terms of the mortgage (for example some 
households have fixed-rate mortgages whereas 
others have variable-rate mortgages), as well as 
factors in the mortgage market. The combined 
uncertainty of these factors makes it difficult 
to estimate how repayments might change over 
time. As a result, we assume that there are no 
real terms changes in mortgage repayments 
to 2016.
b. Rent payments (for those in the private-rented 
or social housing sectors): for those living 
in private or social rented accommodation, 
housing costs relate primarily to their rent 
payments. Changes in these payments over time 
depend on developments in the private rental 
market and the decisions of social landlords. 
How rent levels could change over time is 
therefore highly uncertain. As such we assume 
no real terms increase in rent payments to 2016.
9. Applying the different rates of change to 
individual components of both household income 
and housing costs results in a modified income 
distribution in 2016 compared to 2009 (see Figure 
A6.2). We project a small increase in median 
income, which results in a reduction in relative 
poverty in the period to 2016 – the estimates 
suggest that the proportion of households with an 
income that is less than the low income threshold 
we use within the Low Income High Costs indicator 
falls from 22 per cent to 21 per cent.
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) deflator series 
published by HM Treasury.126
b. Investments/savings interest: financial returns 
on investments depend on the nature of 
specific investment and the performance of 
the sector invested in. Given that there is a 
diverse range in the types of investments made 
by English households we use the OBR’s real 
GDP forecasts as a broad proxy for how these 
returns could change in the medium term. 
This is based on the premise that returns on 
investments are likely on average to reflect the 
overall performance of the economy. Interest 
from savings depends on the rates set by the 
financial institutions in which they are invested, 
which are ultimately determined by the Bank 
of England base rate. In the absence of official 
projections of the base rate, we also use the 
OBR GDP forecasts for increases in income from 
savings interest.
c. Other private: private income from other 
sources includes a wide range of relatively small 
income sources, for example income from other 
family members (i.e. children), and cash gifts 
from other family members. The nature of these 
income payments means that they are unlikely 
to vary significantly over time, therefore we 
assume that they do not change in real terms.
7. Public sources of income comprise:
a. Benefits and tax credits: as the levels of benefit 
receipts and tax credits are indexed to the 
Consumer Prices Index (CPI), a measure of 
inflation, we assume that they do not change in 
real terms to 2016. We therefore do not apply 
any change to benefit or tax credit income 
reported in the EHS.
b. Housing related benefits: payments related to 
housing costs, such as housing benefit and 
council tax benefit, are treated the same as 
126 HM Treasury. (2012). Gross Domestic Product Deflators: a user’s guide. 
Available at: http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/data_gdp_index.htm 
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show that the ILO unemployment rate128 had 
risen from 7.1 percent in the first quarter of 
2009 to 7.7 percent in the first quarter of 
2011. OBR expect that the rate will rise to 
above 8 percent for much of the forecast 
period. Allowing for this within the fuel 
poverty projections would require some form 
of reweighting of the EHS dataset between 
employed and unemployed households; and
b. assumptions about benefits: the fuel poverty 
projections also effectively freeze the tax and 
benefit system as it was in 2009 and up-rate 
the level of benefits income by the CPI. This 
approach ignores the changes that are expected 
to take place over the forecast period such as 
the move to Universal Credit and changes to 
other personal taxes and benefits (e.g. Housing 
Benefit) – the IFS and others expect these 
to have negative impacts on lower income 
households on average.
128 Defined as people without a job who have been recently seeking work 
and are available to start work if a job is offered. 
10. We noted in Chapter 6 that our projections of 
changes in incomes across all households vary from 
more sophisticated income forecasts, many of which 
suggest an increase in relative poverty between now 
and 2016. For example, recent work by the Institute 
of Fiscal Studies127 (IFS) suggests that relative child 
poverty is expected to rise from 19.7 per cent in 
2009 to 22.2 percent in 2015. Working age relative 
poverty amongst adults without children is forecast 
to increase from 17.1 per cent in 2009 to 18.5 per 
cent in 2015.
11. The key factors that appear to drive this divergence 
are:
a. assumptions about unemployment: the 
approach we take in projecting fuel poverty 
with the 2009 EHS database implicitly assumes 
that the level of participation in the labour 
market and unemployment is fixed at 2009 
levels. However, we know that unemployment 
has already risen since 2009. Official estimates 
127 For more details see: http://www.ifs.org.uk/comms/comm121.pdf. IFS 
estimates are based on BHC equivalised income.
AHC equivalised income group
Source: English Housing Survey
Figure A6.2: Average AHC equivalised income by AHC 
equivalised income decile group, 2009 vs 2016, England
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with Government policies. The estimates suggest 
that between 2011 and 2016 domestic electricity 
prices will increase in real terms by 18 per cent and 
domestic gas prices will increase in real terms by 28 
per cent. This comes on top of a real increase of 23 
per cent for electricity prices and 28 per cent for gas 
prices between 2009 and 2011. The price of other 
fuels (i.e. coal, heating oil & LPG) is assumed to 
track fossil fuel prices. The projections for these are 
based on DECC assumptions.131
16. The application of observed price increases from 
2009 to 2011 is consistent with the official DECC 
Fuel Poverty Methodology, which recognises 
differences in regional and payment type costs. 
When projecting from 2011 to 2016, year-on-
year percentage increases in the price of each 
fuel are only available at national average level. 
We therefore implicitly assume that while prices 
increase overall, regional differences in prices  
and the relative costs of each payment method  
(e.g. direct debit, standard credit or pre-payment 
meter) remain fixed as in 2009.
Part C: Projecting the impact 
of the Government’s policies 
on energy bills
17. The Government’s policy package affects household 
bills in two ways. First through increased gas 
and electricity prices as a result of the costs of 
obligations on energy suppliers, captured as part 
of the projected prices increases above. Second 
through a reduction in energy bills for those 
households that receive support through these 
policies. The majority of these policies are expected 
to reduce bills through improving energy efficiency, 
for example through installing insulation, while 
others can reduce bills through the generation of 
renewable energy (and the receipt of any associated 
subsidies) or through a direct energy bill reduction.
131 See: http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/about/ec_social_res/
analytic_projs/ff_prices/ff_prices.aspx
12. There is no robust way in which a change in 
unemployment can be reflected in the EHS 
dataset.129 Furthermore, detailed modelling of 
changes to the tax and benefits system is complex 
(and beyond the scope of this report as well as the 
data available in the EHS). Both of these factors 
suggest that the income assumptions that are used 
in our fuel poverty projections could, if anything, 
overstate the likely growth in incomes that would 
be experienced by poor households. As a result, our 
baseline projections are likely to be over-optimistic 
in terms of the future trends in fuel poverty rates as 
they may understate the size of the ‘at risk’ group. 
If we could allow for these factors, the position 
would be likely to be worse than we show in this 
report.
13. We list the upper and lower bounds used to 
estimate the sensitivity of our projections to both 
higher and lower income growth scenarios in 
Table A6.2.
Part B: Projecting changes in 
energy prices
14. The energy price changes applied to the EHS 
dataset are a combination of observed changes 
between 2009 and the end of 2011 and DECC’s 
most recent projected changes in gas, electricity and 
non-metered fuel prices, published alongside the 
2011 Annual Energy Statement.130 The proportional 
increase in each fuel from 2011 to 2016 are 
outlined in Table A6.1.
15. The central prices scenario projects continued 
strong growth in energy prices in the medium 
term – driven by a combination of fossil fuel 
prices, the costs of transmission and distribution 
and pass-through costs for suppliers associated 
129 The problem is that there is no information available about the energy 
efficiency standards of households that we know have been affected by 
rising unemployment since 2009.  We cannot therefore judge the extent 
to which their standards correspond to either the energy efficiency 
characteristics of unemployed households in 2009 or a random cross-
section of employed households in that year.
130 See: http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/11/about-us/economics-social-
research/3593-estimated-impacts-of-our-policies-on-energy-prices.pdf
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and heating fuels used by each household. In 
order to fully capture the range of interactions 
between the measure installed and the 
individual dwelling/household characteristics 
we would need use the BREDEM model to 
re-estimate the required energy use for every 
dwelling to which a measure(s) was assigned. 
This goes beyond the scope of this review. 
Instead, we assign percentage reductions to 
the bills of households to which a measure 
or package of measures are assigned. These 
percentage reductions are based on averages 
of detailed estimates of the savings from 
a measure(s) for a range of representative 
dwelling types, and are consistent with DECC’s 
analysis of energy efficiency measures. While 
these averages do not account fully for all 
differences between dwellings, a different 
percentage reduction is applied depending 
on a dwelling’s wall type, level of existing loft 
insulation, heating fuel and whether it is a 
house or a flat.134
d. Estimating improvements in SAP ratings from 
measures installed. Simulating the impact of 
installing measures on an individual dwelling’s 
SAP rating depends on the characteristics of the 
dwelling. As with bill modelling this effect for 
each household saving estimates is beyond the 
scope of this review. Instead, we apply average 
SAP improvements for a dwelling depending 
on some of its key characteristics, such as fuel 
type, whether or not it already has wall and/
or loft insulation and whether it is a house or a 
flat. Again, these averages are consistent with 
DECC analysis of energy efficiency measures on 
SAP scores.
134 For example, a house with an insulated loft and gas central heating 
would experience a different percentage reduction in their bill from 
installing cavity wall insulation than a flat with no loft insulation and 
electric storage heaters.
18. The projected reductions in bills from policies 
delivering energy efficiency measures132 are undertaken 
in four stages:
a. Estimating the number of measures to be installed. 
For policies that have delivered measures to 
date, such as CERT, we have collected observed 
delivery statistics for the major energy efficiency 
installations.133 For policies which will deliver 
measures in the future, we have collected 
projected installation numbers for each of 
the major measures from the relevant impact 
assessments (see Table A6.1 for references to these 
sources).
b. Assigning estimated measures installations to 
households. In order to estimate which households 
receive these measures, each household in the 
EHS is assigned to either an ‘eligible group’ or 
‘ineligible group’ for each policy that is modelled. 
For example, when modelling which households 
receive measures under Warm Front, households 
which report receipt of a benefit which meets 
the Warm Front eligibility criteria are assigned to 
the ‘eligible group’ and all other households to 
the ‘ineligible group’. Households in the ‘eligible 
group’ are then randomly selected and if there is 
the technical potential to install a measure (e.g. a 
dwelling has an unfilled cavity wall which could 
be insulated) then that dwelling is assigned that 
measure under that particular policy. This process 
is repeated until all measures are assigned to 
households in the ‘eligible group’. The process 
of assigning measures is repeated around 1,000 
times for each policy, with the most representative 
(modal) allocation taken forward for analysis.
c. Estimating bill savings from measures installed. 
The reduction in modelled energy needs from 
the installation of a measure(s) under a policy 
varies according to the dwelling characteristics 
132 The policies modelled here that deliver energy efficiency measures are: CERT 
(2009-2011) and the CERT Extension (2011-12), Warm Front (2009 – 2013), 
CESP (2009-2011), and the Green Deal and Energy Company Obligation 
(2013 – 2016).
133 We collect delivery statistics for: cavity wall insulation, loft insulation, solid 
wall insulation, and new and replacement central heating systems.
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same assumptions as the central scenario. However, the 
impact of measures that alter the thermal efficiency of 
dwellings varies between scenarios (since a measure 
that results in a household using less energy has a 
larger absolute impact on energy costs in a scenario 
where energy prices are higher).
Table A6.1 below outlines the central assumptions used 
in the projections we outlined in Chapter 6. Tables 
A6.2 and A6.3 set out the high and low sensitivity 
assumptions for the key factors. Policy assumptions 
in terms of what is delivered (i.e. the number of 
households that receive support and the mix of 
measures) in the high and low scenarios retain the 
Modelling assumptions
Table A6.1: modelling assumptions for the baseline scenario 
Source: see footnotes
£bn, 2011 prices Comment Source 2009-2016
Incomes:
Gross Domestic Product 
(real terms)
Percentage increase from 2009 
to 2016
Office of Budget Responsibility1 12%
Average earnings (nominal 
terms)
Percentage increase from 2009 
to 2016
Office of Budget Responsibility1 23%
Prices:
Gas (excl. policies) Growth in domestic gas prices 
from 2009 to 2016 excluding 
the price impact of climate and 
energy policies2
DECC3 60%
Gas (incl. policies) Growth in domestic gas prices 
from 2009 to 2016 including 
the price impact of climate and 
energy policies2
DECC3 63%
Electricity (excl. policies) Growth in domestic electricity 
prices from 2009 to 2016  
excluding the price impact of 
climate and energy policies2
DECC3 35%
Electricity (incl. policies) Growth in domestic electricity 
prices from 2009 to 2016 
including the price impact of 
climate and energy policies2
DECC3 46%
Coal/solid fuels Percentage increase from 2009 
to 2016
DECC4 61%
Heating oil Percentage increase from 2009 
to 2016
DECC4 77%
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Modelling assumptions for 
the high and low sensitivities
19. The assumptions underpinning the high and low 
scenario are constructed to give a sense of possible 
best and worst case scenarios for fuel poverty. The 
‘high’ scenario combines assumptions about higher 
energy prices with low income growth assumptions, 
which would combine to worsen the outlook 
against both the headcount and fuel poverty gap 
indicators. The following tables set out the range of 
assumptions on: (1) incomes; (2) energy prices; and 
(3) policies.
Incomes
20. The high and low assumptions for growth in GDP 
are based on the range presented by the OBR in its 
November Outlook 2011. Trends in other variables 
are Fuel Poverty Review assumptions based on two 
hypothetical states of the economy:
a. High growth: strong growth in demand, 
productivity, earnings and commodity prices. 
Limited spare capacity in labour market. 
Inflation persistently above target.
b. Low growth: weak growth in demand, 
productivity, earnings and commodity prices. 
Significant slack in labour market. Low inflation 
throughout period.
Table A6.2: High and low sensitivity assumptions for income projections 
Source: see footnotes
Comment Source 2009- 2016
Central scenario
Gross Domestic Product 
(real terms)
Percentage increase from 2009 
to 2016
Office of Budget Responsibility1 12%
Average earnings 
(nominal terms)
Percentage increase from 2009 
to 2016
Office of Budget Responsibility1 23%
High scenario
Gross Domestic Product 
(real terms)
Percentage increase from 2009 
to 2016
Fuel Poverty Review assumptions 28%
Average earnings 
(nominal terms)
Percentage increase from 2009 
to 2016
Fuel Poverty Review assumptions 40%
Low scenario
Gross Domestic Product 
(real terms)
Percentage increase from 2009 
to 2016
Fuel Poverty Review assumptions -4%
Average earnings 
(nominal terms)
Percentage increase from 2009 
to 2016
Fuel Poverty Review assumptions 1%
1 http://cdn.hm-treasury.gov.uk/2011budget_complete.pdf 
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Table A6.3: high and low sensitivity assumptions for price projections 
Source: see footnotes
Comment Source 2009-2016
Central scenario
Gas (excl. policies) Growth in domestic gas prices 
from 2009 to 2016 excluding 
the price impact of climate and 
energy policies2
DECC3 60%
Gas (incl. policies) Growth in domestic gas prices 
from 2009 to 2016 including 
the price impact of climate and 
energy policies2
DECC3 63%
Electricity (excl. policies) Growth in domestic electricity 
prices from 2009 to 2016  
excluding the price impact of 
climate and energy policies2
DECC3 35%
Electricity (incl. policies) Growth in domestic electricity 
prices from 2009 to 2016 
including the price impact of 
climate and energy policies2
DECC3 46%
Coal Percentage increase from 2009 
to 2016
DECC4 61%
Heating oil Percentage increase from 2009 
to 2016
DECC4 77%
High scenario
Gas (excl. policies) Growth in domestic gas prices 
from 2009 to 2016 excluding 
the price impact of climate and 
energy policies2
DECC3 70%
Gas (incl. policies) Growth in domestic gas prices 
from 2009 to 2016 including 
the price impact of climate and 
energy policies2
DECC3 73%
Electricity (excl. policies) Growth in domestic electricity 
prices from 2009 to 2016  
excluding the price impact of 
climate and energy policies2
DECC3 39%
Electricity (incl. policies) Growth in domestic electricity 
prices from 2009 to 2016 
including the price impact of 
climate and energy policies2
DECC3 50%
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Comment Source 2009-2016
Coal/solid fuel Percentage increase from 2009 
to 2016
DECC4 96%
Heating oil Percentage increase from 2009 
to 2016
DECC4 90%
Growth in domestic gas prices 
from 2009 to 2016 excluding 
the price impact of climate and 
energy policies2
Low scenario
Gas (excl. policies) Growth in domestic gas prices 
from 2009 to 2016 excluding 
the price impact of climate and 
energy policies2
DECC3 -17%
Gas (incl. policies) Growth in domestic gas prices 
from 2009 to 2016 including 
the price impact of climate and 
energy policies2
DECC3 -10%
Electricity (excl. policies) Growth in domestic electricity 
prices from 2009 to 2016  
excluding the price impact of 
climate and energy policies2
DECC3 -7%
Electricity (incl. policies) Growth in domestic electricity 
prices from 2009 to 2016 
including the price impact of 
climate and energy policies2
DECC3 11%
Coal/solid fuel Percentage increase from 2009 
to 2016
DECC4 35%
Heating oil Percentage increase from 2009 
to 2016
DECC4 53%
1 http://cdn.hm-treasury.gov.uk/2011budget_complete.pdf 
2 DECC price and bills modelling includes only policies that are in place or those that have been planned to a sufficient degree of detail. The policy 
package therefore includes the following: better billing, CERT, CERT extension, CESP, EMR, EU ETS (inc. CPF), FITs, Green Deal and ECO, products 
policy, RO, smart metering and WHD.
3 Based on a combination of the Quarterly Energy Prices (see: http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/statistics/publications/prices/prices.aspx) and 
‘The estimated impact of energy and climate change policies on energy prices and bills: November 2011’ (see: http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/
decc/11/about-us/economics-social-research/3593-estimated-impacts-of-our-policies-on-energy-prices.pdf)
4 http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/about/ec_social_res/analytic_projs/ff_prices/ff_prices.aspx
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benefits are relevant because both arise in the 
projected year (i.e. 2016). The estimated policy 
impacts for this group of policies are therefore 
effectively a ‘net’ impact, capturing the benefits 
of the policies offset by their costs.
23. Table A6.4 shows how the results change when we 
estimate the impacts of the group of policies under 
(b) on a ‘gross’ basis. This can be done by stripping 
out the costs of the policy and simply looking at 
the impact of the measures that are delivered (that 
is, the benefits). While this takes us away from the 
real impacts of these policies this approach gives us 
a set of figures that can be more readily compared 
with the estimated impacts of policies listed under 
(a) above.
24. As we would expect, the removal of the price 
impacts improves the fuel poverty impacts of all 
of the policies. In the case of the ECO carbon 
obligation, the impact becomes positive overall. 
The reason for this is primarily the fact that 
removing the price impacts of these policies from 
the equation translates into lower costs across the 
board. This has the same effect as a fall in fuel 
prices – that is, the removal of some households 
from fuel poverty. Unsurprisingly, stripping out 
energy prices also has a significant impact on the 
fuel poverty gap.
The ‘gross’ impact of policies
21. In Section 6.3 we showed how the fuel poverty 
impact of the climate change and energy policy 
package in 2016 is broken down between different 
policies. We argued that there are a number of 
impacts and interactions that were affecting the 
estimates and, as such, some care needed to be 
taken in comparing the results across different 
policies.
22. In particular, we noted it is difficult to compare the 
relative impacts of different policies:
a. Policies with no costs in 2016 such as CERT and 
CESP. These policies are due to finish by the 
end of 2012/13, so that the costs associated 
with them will no longer be feeding through 
to consumer bills by the year projected (i.e. 
2016) However, the measures delivered under 
these policies will continue to provide benefits 
to households. The estimated policy impacts for 
this group of policies are therefore effectively 
a ‘gross’ impact, capturing the benefits of the 
policies without the costs.
b. Policies with no costs in 2016 such as the 
Green Deal ECO and the Affordable Warmth 
Obligation. For these policies the costs and 
Table A6.4: gross and net fuel poverty impacts of the Green Deal and Warm Home Discount policies 
LIHC indicator, 2016 
Green Deal: 
carbon
Green Deal: 
AW WHD
Net impact of policies in 2016 (as presented in section 6.3)
Change in LIHC households (thousand) 9 -23 -40
Change in Fuel Poverty Gap (£ million) 2 -31 -5
‘Gross’ impact of policies in 2016 (excluding price impacts)
Change in LIHC households (thousand) -25 -35 -61
Change in Fuel Poverty Gap (£ million) -72 -53 -30
Source: Fuel Poverty Review
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25. One of the most striking results is the ‘gross’ 
estimate for the Green Deal carbon obligation. 
Our estimate suggests that the measures installed 
through this policy would reduce fuel poverty 
by 25,000 households in 2016 under the LIHC 
indicator before allowing for its costs (compared 
to increasing it by 9,000 after allowing for them). 
It is interesting to compare this with the ‘gross’ 
estimate of CERT that was presented in Section 
6.3 – there we showed that CERT increased the 
level of fuel poverty by around 11,000 households. 
This divergence is at first sight surprising since both 
ECO Carbon Obligation and CERT deliver insulation 
measures to households across the income 
distribution. However, the results show that CERT is 
more effective at reducing the fuel poverty gap than 
the ECO carbon obligation, although CERT increases 
the headcount measure by slightly more. While 
both policies result in a reduction in the reasonable 
costs threshold (bringing some households into 
fuel poverty), the reduction is 50 per cent larger 
for CERT. CERT delivers more measures to a wider 
range of households and reduces bills for many 
households in each quadrant. As well as reducing 
the costs threshold, it moves some households 
that receive measures below it. However, since it 
reduces the threshold by more than the ECO carbon 
obligation, it also has the tendency to bring more 
households that do not receive measures into the 
LIHC quadrant. These results show the importance 
of considering the fuel poverty gap alongside the 
headcount measure.
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1. This section sets out in more detail the 
methodologies and assumptions behind the results 
presented in Chapter 7. The following sections cover:
•	 Part A: fuel poverty modelling;
•	 Part B: estimating energy and GHG impacts; and
•	 Part C: cost-benefit analysis. 
Part A: Fuel poverty 
modelling 
Energy prices
2. The prices archetypes assume that each eligible 
household – encompassing all households receiving 
a means-tested benefit – receives an energy bill 
rebate of £88. There are some additional costs 
associated with the policy including the costs to 
Government of running a data-matching and 
sweep-up mechanism and the administrative costs 
to energy suppliers of complying with the scheme. 
These costs are based on estimates in the Warm 
Home Discount Impact Assessment.135 The cost 
to energy suppliers (which equals £500 million) is 
assumed to be recouped through higher energy 
prices for the supplier-funded archetype. The cost 
to Government (which equals £6 million) results 
in a small increase in the tax take, which reduces 
135 http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/Consultations/warm-home-
discount/1308-warm-home-disc-impact-assessment.pdf 
household incomes by a very small amount. This 
would have a negligible impact on the LIHC 
indicator, and we therefore do not model it. 
3. Table A7.1 shows the average impact (excluding the 
impact of rebates paid) on household energy costs 
and incomes from each of the archetypes. The costs 
of the supplier-funded policy increases energy costs. 
The Exchequer-funded option affects household 
incomes.
Thermal efficiency
4. The thermal efficiency archetypes assume that 
insulation and heating measures are delivered to 
households (see the Annex to Chapter 6 for a 
more detailed explanation of how energy efficiency 
measures are modelled). The costs of the policies 
(along with the administrative cost for energy 
suppliers) are recouped through higher energy 
prices or through higher taxation. Table A7.1 how 
the costs fall across households.
5. The modelling assumes that the measures are 
delivered randomly to households within the target 
group, which is either:
a. For the narrowly targeted archetype: households 
receiving a means-tested benefit and in a 
dwelling with a SAP rating of 55 or below; or
Annex to Chapter 7
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any household that comes forward for assistance is 
provided with measures. Assuming that a random 
selection of target group come forward this means 
that a cross-section of the group have measures 
installed, regardless of the cost-effectiveness. 
8. The amount of reduction in a households energy 
bill from installing energy efficiency measures 
will depend on the characteristics of the 
dwelling and the household that occupies the 
dwelling (see the Annex to Chapter 6 for a more 
detailed explanation). Dwelling and household 
characteristics vary between income decile groups 
and therefore different levels of bill reduction will 
be achieved in each group. Further, the length of 
time over which the bill is reduced depends on the 
package of measures installed. For example, cavity 
wall insulation is expected to last for around 40 
years on average whereas a new central heating 
system is expected to last for around 12 years on 
average.
9. Table A7.2 sets out the total number of 
opportunities to deliver energy efficiency and 
heating measures alongside the measures that are 
delivered through the thermal efficiency archetypes. 
The opportunities represent the potential to install 
measures after the impact of the current DECC 
policy package. As would be expected, due to the 
assumed focus on minimising the costs of meeting 
b. For the broadly targeted archetype: households 
in a dwelling with a SAP rating of 55 or below.
6. Measures are delivered only to those households 
where opportunities for improvement exist. In the 
case of insulation, this means that the household 
has an unfilled loft or cavity wall, or a solid wall 
that has not been insulated. In the case of heating 
systems, this means either a household that has no 
central heating system or is a household where the 
heating system has reached the end of its working 
life.136 The estimates of the number of opportunities 
to deliver measures in each of the eligible groups 
are based on the English Housing Survey.
7. The modelled mix of measures delivered under 
supplier-funded and tax-funded thermal efficiency 
archetypes varies significantly. This is primarily 
down to the delivery mechanism modelled. A 
supplier-funded archetypes assumes that suppliers 
will focus primarily on delivering the most cost-
effective energy efficiency measures for which 
there are opportunities. The modelling suggests 
that this would mean a focus on the most cost-
effective insulation measures such as cavity wall 
insulation. The tax-funded archetypes are assumed 
to adopt a different delivery mechanism, whereby 
136 Boilers are assumed to have a working lifetime of 12 years – so, in any 
given year, it is implied that one-twelfth of boilers in the eligible group 
will reach the end of their life. We apply a more conservative assumption 
that one-fourteenth of boilers in the eligible group reach the end of their 
life each year.
ANNEX TO CHAPTER 7 
Table A7.1: Average annual effects on the energy prices policy archetypes on the income and fuel bills of all 
households by AHC equivalised income group
AHC equivalised income group
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Supplier-funded energy rebate policy:
Average increase in modelled energy bills £30 £30 £29 £31 £30 £30 £31 £32 £31 £33
Average reduction in household income £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0
Exchequer-funded energy rebate policy:
Average increase in modelled energy bills £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0 £0
Average reduction in household income £4 £10 £12 £15 £18 £21 £24 £29 £37 £62
Source: Fuel Poverty Review
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we have used ONS data137 to estimate the share of 
benefit income that is means-tested for different 
household types (set out in Table A7.3) and applied 
an increase to just the derived means-tested 
element. The level of the increase is set at the level 
required for the total standardised funding envelope 
to equal £500 million. 
11. The modelling assumes that, because the 
archetypes simply increase the rate of existing 
benefit payments, there are no additional 
administrative costs. Table A7.4 shows how the 
137 The effect of taxes and benefits on household income 2009/10, ONS
the obligation, the supplier-led policy results in 
a larger number of low-cost insulation measures 
being delivered than the Exchequer-funded policy. 
Incomes
10. The impact of changes to the benefit system 
on recipient households is estimated using a 
combination of EHS and ONS data. The EHS does 
not hold robust data on the level of income from 
means-tested benefits. However, it does contain 
data on income derived from all benefits. In 
constructing the means-tested benefit archetype, 
Table A7.2: Opportunities to install measures and measures installed through the thermal efficiency 
archetypes, 2016
Exchequer-funded 
measures policy 
targeted at 
low-income/ 
high cost 
households 
Supplier-funded 
measures policy 
targeted at 
low-income/ 
high cost 
households
Exchequer-funded 
measures policy 
targeted at 
high cost 
households 
Supplier-funded 
measures policy 
targeted at 
high cost 
households
Opportunities:
Loft insulation 680,000 680,000 3,920,000 3,920,000 
Cavity wall insulation 215,000 215,000 1,220,000 1,220,000 
New/replacement 
heating system
280,000 280,000 1,125,000 1,125,000 
Delivery:
Loft insulation 270,000 515,000 345,000 13,000
Cavity wall insulation 85,000 120,000 96,000 415,000
New/replacement 
heating system
111,000 33,000 89,000 13,000
Source: Fuel Poverty Review
Table A7.3: Proportion of household benefit income derived from means-tested benefits, England
Equivalised income decile groups (BHC)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Non-retired with children 61% 74% 69% 59% 40% 32% 27% 20% 2% 1%
Non-retired without children 54% 51% 30% 24% 19% 15% 13% 5% 4% 0%
Retired 7% 8% 15% 17% 20% 15% 15% 11% 14% 4%
Source: ONS (see footnote 137)
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This means that a greater share of the costs will 
be borne by high-use households. Average energy 
use increases as household income rises, which 
means that higher-income households typically 
face a greater share of the total costs compared to 
a lower-income households. However, there are a 
significant number of low-income, high energy use 
households (e.g. households where electricity is the 
main heating fuel, pensioners/young families that 
are in the home for long periods) that would also 
face a large proportion of the overall costs.     
15. Where a policy is funded through the Exchequer, 
the modelling assumes that: (a) this requires an 
increase in the overall tax burden; and (b) this 
results in an increase in both direct (e.g. income tax) 
and indirect (e.g. VAT) taxes. 
16. Precise modelling of how an increase in taxation 
would affect on different types of households is 
complex (and beyond the scope of this review). 
However, data from the Office of National Statistics 
show the average impact of taxation for households 
across income groups – see Table A7.5. As we 
might expect, lower-income households pay a 
smaller share of their income in direct taxes and a 
larger share in indirect taxes. The figures suggest 
that the lowest and highest-income households pay 
a larger share of their income as taxation compared 
to households in the middle of the income 
distribution. 
17. The modelling of policy archetypes funded by 
the Exchequer assumes that the increase in 
costs fall across different households – which are 
identical for the means-tested and winter fuel 
payment archetypes.
The impact of the funding decision
12. Whether a policy is funded by the Exchequer or 
through a levy (or obligation) on energy supplier has 
implications in terms of how the costs fall across 
different households.
13. Where a policy is funded through a levy or 
obligation on energy suppliers, we would expect 
suppliers to recover those costs through higher 
prices. In a competitive market, we would expect 
costs to be passed on in the same way that 
they are levied. For example, if the share of an 
obligation that is allocated to a particular supplier is 
determined by the number of customers that each 
supplier serves, then the costs should be passed 
on as a flat rate per customer account (i.e. the 
same charge would be added to each account). 
Conversely, where an obligation is allocated on 
the basis of units of energy sold, we would expect 
costs to be passed on through an increase in the 
price of each unit of energy sold. In this case, a 
greater share of the overall costs would be borne 
by high-use households. This is how the archetypes 
discussed later are modelled. 
14. For each of the archetypes delivered through 
an obligation or levy on energy suppliers, the 
modelling assumes that the costs are passed on 
through an increase in the unit cost of energy. 
Table A7.4: Average annual impact of the cost of income archetypes on all households (excluding the impact 
of the additional benefit payments) on incomes (2011 prices)
Equivalised income decile groups (BHC)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Increase in mean-tested benefits
Average reduction in household income £4 £10 £12 £15 £18 £21 £24 £29 £37 £62
Increase in Winter Fuel Payment
Average reduction in household income £4 £10 £12 £15 £18 £21 £24 £29 £37 £62
Source: Fuel Poverty Review
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19. The responsiveness of energy demand to a change 
in energy costs or income depends on household 
characteristics and the way in which costs fall on 
households. Modelling the impact of policies on 
energy use and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is 
based on a set of income and price elasticities. 
20. As set out in Chapter 7, households that receive 
an energy bill rebate or an increase in the level 
of Winter Fuel Payment are assumed to spend a 
significant proportion of the additional income 
on energy. There is some evidence to suggest 
that households increase energy consumption 
significantly as a result of receiving benefits that are 
labelled as support for household energy costs.139 
The elasticities applied to households in receipt of a 
labelled income transfer in the analysis are therefore 
based on the recent findings of the Institute for 
Fiscal Studies on the way in which households use 
the Winter Fuel Payments. These elasticities describe 
the relationship between an increase in household 
income that is intended (and labelled) for fuel use 
and energy expenditure. For example, the elasticity 
of demand for fuel for a household in receipt of a 
Winter Fuel Payment or energy bill rebate results 
139 Beatty, T., Blow, L., Crossley, T. & O’Dea, C. (2011). Cash by any other 
name? Evidence on labelling from the UK Winter Fuel Payment. Available 
at: http://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/5603 
taxation results in an equi-proportional reduction 
in disposable income across all households 
(i.e. a reduction of 0.1 per cent is applied to all 
households income in order to raise the required 
revenue for the policy under consideration). 
Clearly, this is a simplification as it ignores the true 
impact of taxation at the extremes of the income 
distribution. However, it does provide a reasonable 
approximation of the impact of tax-based revenues 
on household incomes.        
Part B: Estimating the net 
energy and GHG impact of 
measures 
18. We would generally expect a household that 
experiences a reduction in energy costs or an 
increase in income to increase the amount 
of energy it consumes. On the other hand, a 
household that experiences an increase in energy 
costs or a fall in income would be expected to 
reduce energy usage.138 
138 We have not modelled energy demand responses in the baseline for 
increases in prices between 2011 and 2016. The elasticities applied 
for the analysis of policy archetypes are marginal elasticities that are 
unlikely to be appropriate to estimate the cumulative impact of changes 
in energy prices over multiple years. For this reason and for simplicity, 
we therefore do not adjust baseline energy consumption for changes 
in prices.
Table A7.5: Summary of the effect of taxes and benefits by quintile group 2009/10
BHC equivalised quintile groups for all households
Income, tax and benefits (£pa) Bottom 2nd 3rd 4th Top
Original income £4,847 £10,853 £23,088 £37,937 £77,896
Plus cash benefit £6,863 £8,280 £6,139 £3,949 £1,992
Gross income £11,730 £19,133 £29,227 £41,886 £79,889
Less direct tax and NIC £1,195 £2,200 £4,850 £8,403 £19,500
Disposable income £10,535 £16,933 £24,377 £33,483 £60,389
Less indirect taxes £2,965 £3,466 £4,459 £5,386 £7,441
Post tax income £7,570 £13,467 £19,918 £28,097 £52,948
Taxes as a share of gross income 35.5% 29.6% 31.9% 32.9% 33.7%
Source: ONS (see footnote 137)
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23. We discussed above evidence that as the WFP is 
labelled it has a significant impact on the amount 
of the income transfer that is spent on energy – it 
is suggested that around 41 percent of the WFP 
is spent on energy. We might expect, therefore, 
households in receipt of an energy bill rebate to 
make a similarly large increase in their energy 
consumption. That being the case, we would expect 
a rebate policy to result in an aggregate increase 
in energy consumption (and, therefore, in GHG 
emissions). 
24. Energy expenditure is assumed to be less responsive 
to changes in the general tax burden (i.e. where 
archetypes are assumed to be funded through the 
Exchequer)  or changes in benefits that are not 
related to energy use (i.e. changes to means-tested 
benefits). The elasticities used in the analysis to 
assess the impact on energy demand as a result of 
increasing tax revenues to fund a thermal efficiency 
archetype are detailed in Table A7.6 above and 
are the same as those used for modelling demand 
changes as a result of increasing the level of means-
tested benefits. 
25. Where a policy affects the unit price of energy 
(which occurs where a policy is funded through 
energy suppliers), the modelling uses a price 
elasticity which shows the relationship between the 
price and demand for a particular product in order 
to assess the impact on energy consumption. Once 
again, the elasticities used are taken from work 
by Jamasb and Meier (2010) for different income 
brackets and are mapped onto income decile 
groups. The values used are shown in Table A7.7, 
and can be interpreted as the percentage change 
in expenditure on gas and electricity in relation to 
a 1 percent increase in the price of each fuel. For 
example, a 1 percent increase in the price of gas 
would on average lead to a 0.748 percent increase 
in gas expenditure in income decile group 1. This 
implies that expenditure does not increase as fast as 
prices and therefore consumption of gas reduces. 
In contrast, on average in the top income decile 
group consumption of gas stays virtually constant 
in 41% of the payment being spent on fuel. As a 
result, we model a net increase in energy demand 
and in GHG emissions from an increase in Winter 
Fuel Payments.
21. Existing means-tested benefits are designed to 
support incomes and have no direct link to energy 
usage. As such, we would not expect households to 
treat these payments in the same way as a Winter 
Fuel Payment – in other words, it is unlikely that 
households would spend such a large proportion 
of the additional income on energy. However, we 
might still expect a tax-funded increase in means-
tested benefits to increase aggregate energy 
consumption. The elasticities we apply to a general 
(un-labelled) change in household income are those 
published in Jamasb and Meier (2010)140, mapped 
on to individual income decile groups and detailed 
in Table A7.6. They translate as a percentage 
change in expenditure on energy as the result of a 
1 percent change in income. For example, average 
expenditure on electricity in the bottom income 
decile group  would change by 0.033 per cent for 
every 1 per cent increase in income, compared 
to a 0.087 per cent increase in expenditure for a 
household in the top income decile group. Overall, 
the analysis assumes, therefore, that energy 
demand in lower and higher income households is 
relatively unresponsive to changes in income. This 
means that an increase in means-tested benefits 
would tend to result in an a relatively small increase 
in energy demand and resulting GHG emissions.
22. The elasticities also suggest that lower income 
households are less responsive to changes in income 
than in higher income households. This may reflect 
the fact that a greater proportion of an increase 
in income for low-income households would 
support spending on other necessities, whereas 
it is more likely that an increase in income for a 
wealthier household would lead to more energy 
consumption. 
140 Jamasb, T. and Meier, H. (2010). Household Energy Expenditure and 
Income Groups: Evidence from Great Britain; Working paper CWPE 1011 
& EPRG 1003.
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the knock-on effect on other key factors. We 
summarise these key differences for each archetype 
first, before providing an overview of the elements 
common to both polices. We show a high level 
summary of the two approaches in Figure A7.1.
Prices archetype 
28. The prices archetype models the impact of 
providing direct reductions in energy bills for eligible 
households, thus reducing the cost of achieving 
a set level of energy use for beneficiaries in that 
group. We define the eligible group as those 
claiming a means-tested benefit (MTB). The policy is 
modelled both as funded through general taxation 
and through a levy on the suppliers, to illustrate 
the impact of the differences arising from funding 
mechanism. Where the approach differs for each 
funding mechanism this is highlighted in each of 
the following sections. 
after a price increase, hence expenditure increases 
by nearly 1 percent for a 1 percent increase in the 
price of gas.
Part C: Cost-benefit analysis
26. As was set out in Chapter 7, all of the cost-
benefit analysis for the policy archetypes was 
carried out on the basis of HM Treasury Green 
Book methodology.141 The following sections set 
out some of the details of the methodology and 
assumptions used in the analysis.
Prices and Income Archetypes
27. For the prices and income archetypes we use a 
common approach to modelling a number of 
key outputs for the cost-benefit analysis, such as 
changes in GHG emissions and valuing changes 
in energy consumption. This approach differs, 
however, in relation to how the benefits are 
delivered to recipients under each policy and 
141  http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/data_greenbook_index.htm
Table A7.6: Income elasticities for changes in energy expenditure from an un-labelled cash transfer or increase 
in tax
BHC Income  
Decile Group
Electricity Gas Heating Oil/Solid Fuel (based 
on ‘all energy’ expenditure)
1 0.033 0.046 0.053
2 0.051 0.05 0.05
3 0.051 0.05 0.05
4 0.051 0.05 0.05
5 0.051 0.05 0.05
6 0.096 0.076 0.061
7 0.096 0.076 0.061
8 0.167 0.151 0.141
9 0.167 0.151 0.141
10 0.087 0.098 0.08
Source: Fuel Poverty Review, based on Jamasb & Meier (2010)
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Transfer Impact
31. Under the rebate archetype a reduction in energy 
bill occurs only for those eligible individuals who 
are both eligible and can be identified. The policy 
is assumed to deploy a data-matching exercise to 
combine information on households claiming a 
means-tested benefit and their energy account. 
32. Following the discussion above regarding evidence 
labelled transfers in relation to the Winter Fuel 
Payment, we assume that 41 percent of a labelled 
fuel related payment is spent on fuel whilst 59 
percent is spent on other goods. We apply these 
elasticities uniformly across all households in receipt 
of the energy bill reduction regardless of their 
income. In this case consumers can be expected 
to increase their energy use but also increase their 
spending on other goods as demands on their 
income change.  
Net impact on energy consumption
33. The effect of the payment and of the funding 
mechanism are combined to obtain the net impact 
on energy consumption for each income group. The 
Funding
29. When a policy is delivered through energy suppliers 
it is assumed that the suppliers recoup the cost 
from the consumer. As a result the policy increases 
the price per kWh of metered fuels (electricity 
and gas) paid by all households with gas and/
or electricity accounts. As demonstrated in Part B 
above, a price increase reduces consumption via the 
gas and expenditure elasticities outlined in Table 
A7.7. The costs of the policy are recouped by only 
those consumers on metered fuels and those on oil 
and coal face no direct increases in energy costs.
30. When a policy is tax funded we assume that there 
is an increase in the overall tax burden to meet 
the costs of the policy. All households fund the 
policy, regardless of whether they are eligible or 
not to receive an energy bill rebate. This reduces 
disposable income available to spend on all goods. 
A proportion of this decrease in spending is 
attributable to energy consumption. This change in 
energy consumption is calculated using the income 
elasticities of energy expenditure described above in 
Table A7.6.  
Table A7.7: Price elasticities for expenditure on electricity and gas
BHC Income Decile Group Electricity Gas
1 0.536 0.748
2 0.684 0.768
3 0.684 0.768
4 0.684 0.768
5 0.684 0.768
6 0.709 0.939
7 0.709 0.939
8 0.772 0.972
9 0.772 0.972
10 0.742 0.965
Source: Fuel Poverty Review, based on Jamasb & Meier (2010). 
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significant implications for changes in energy 
consumption and the costs and benefits that arise. 
Funding
35. The income archetype is assumed to be funded 
through a small increase in the tax rate across all 
households in England and as a result there is no 
change in energy prices. Disposable incomes will 
decrease by a small amount across all households 
as a result of increasing tax revenues. The decrease 
in income will reduce expenditure on all goods, 
including energy (via the income elasticities of 
energy expenditure in Table A7.6).
Payment Impact
36. Eligible households are modelled as the Winter 
Fuel Payment group under one variation of the 
archetype, and households claiming a means-
tested benefit under the other. Under both 
net impact of funding and payments is modelled 
to be a reduction in energy consumption for the 
ineligible group, as a result of contributing towards 
the funding of the archetype but without receiving 
a reduction in their bills. For the eligible group 
consumption increases in response to 41 percent 
of their bill reduction used for additional fuel. The 
remaining 59 percent is counted as additional 
income and does not affect domestic energy 
consumption.
Income archetype
34. The income archetype models increases in both 
mean-tested benefits (unlabelled income transfer) 
and in the Winter Fuel Payment (labelled income 
transfer). While the impact of each of these is 
similar in many respects, they key difference is 
whether the transfer is labelled or not as this has 
Figure A7.1: Summary of approach to valuing costs and benefits of prices and income archetypes
Policy data:
Household income,
tax burden, current
energy demand,
elasticities
Funding for £0.5bn
policy
Decrease in demand
for energy due to 
Tax/Levy
Increase in demand as
a result of
payment/rebate
Policy data: Eligible
households, tax
burden, current
energy demand,
elasticities
Net change in energy
demand for ineligible
Change in Household
Energy Demand
Apply energy prices
Apply emission factors
and relevant prices
Net change in energy
demand for eligible
Administration costs Income transfer and
comfort taking
Change in value of
Carbon emissions and
air quality
Change in GHG
emissions
Social value of 
comfort taking
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administration costs as they are effectively increases 
in funding for existing policies, for which much 
of the administrative costs will be ‘sunk’ and are 
assumed to not increase significantly as a result of 
increasing the level of payments made.
Policy Costs
40. The cost of the policy is consistent across all 
scenarios at £500 million. In standard cost-benefit 
analysis this cost is simply a transfer from all 
households, either through their energy bills or 
through taxation, to fund a policy for a smaller 
group of eligible households. When equity-weights 
(see below) are applied, however, we place a 
different value on these transfers depending on 
where these costs fall in terms of the income 
distribution.
Energy Use Cost
41. The different changes in energy consumption for 
each archetype described above would have an 
impact on society, by either using up resources that 
could be employed in alternative ways (if energy 
use increases) or freeing up resources to be used 
elsewhere (if energy use decreases). The cost of 
changes in energy consumption and the benefits 
of reduced use are valued at the variable domestic 
price for the relevant fuel in 2016, as published 
in the DECC Interdepartmental Analysts Group 
guidance on valuing energy use and greenhouse 
gas emissions.142
Air Quality and GHG Emission Valuation
42. Changes in energy consumption as a result of 
the archetypes would lead to changes in emission 
levels, which have a detrimental impact on society. 
Changes in the level of emissions would have social 
impacts which are valued by using a combination 
of market and ‘shadow’ prices. Emissions have two 
valuation-relevant elements; air quality and GHG 
cost of those emissions (traded and non-traded). 
142 DECC (2011). Valuation of energy use and greenhouse gas emissions 
for appraisal and evaluation. Available at: http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/
content/cms/about/ec_social_res/iag_guidance/iag_guidance.aspx 
variations households receive a cash transfer, 
which will increase expenditure (and as a result 
increase consumption) on energy across all fuel 
types. The effect, however, is different between 
making a labelled payment (WFP) and increasing 
a unlabelled payment (MTB). A labelled payment 
will have a greater impact on increasing fuel use 
than an unlabelled payment, due to the significant 
differences in elasticities assumed.        
Net impact on energy consumption
37. The combined effect of reduced consumption from 
an increase in tax and increased consumption as 
a result of the payments under both archetypes 
would lead to a change in the overall consumption 
pattern of energy in the domestic sector. We would 
expect the net effect of an increase in means-tested 
benefits to be relatively neutral, as unlabelled 
income transfers tend to result in small increases 
in energy consumption, which would to some 
extent be cancelled out by the small reduction in 
consumption resulting from the tax increase. We 
would expect an increase in Winter Fuel Payments 
to lead to a larger overall increase in energy 
consumption as a result of a greater proportion of 
the income transfer being used on additional fuel.
Common approaches to prices and 
income archetype modelling
38. The income and prices archetypes share a number of 
common features, particularly in relation to the costs and 
benefits that they generate. Each key cost and benefit 
and its underlying assumptions is described in turn.
Costs
Administration Costs
39. Administration costs for the prices archetype 
relate primarily to the setup and running costs of a 
supplier obligation, and the costs to Government 
of implementing a mechanism of data matching. 
We estimate these costs consistently with DECC 
estimates for the Warm Home Discount scheme. 
The income archetypes assume no additional 
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Comfort Taking – Social Benefit 
45. Increased thermal comfort resulting from an income 
transfer or energy bill reduction is primarily a private 
benefit. However, as support under the prices and 
income archetypes is targeted at relatively low-
income households, a social value is derived from 
those in the eligible group increasing their energy 
consumption, primarily through increased levels 
of warmth. The increase in energy consumption 
of these group is valued using the retail price for 
the relevant fuel consumed, in line with the IAG 
guidance.
Equity weighting
46. Following the methodology set out in the Green 
Book143, we apply equity-weights to our cost-
benefit analysis in order to try and value the 
distributional impacts of each archetype. Equity 
weighting accounts for the difference in value that 
a household in a lower income group places on £1 
compared to a household in a higher income group. 
Equity weighting places a greater value on £1 given 
to (or taken away from) the lower income group 
and a lower value of £1 given to (or taken away 
from) a higher income group. 
47. Equity-weighted models calculate the appropriate 
weight for each income group by dividing the 
additional value of adding £1 to income of each 
group by the additional value of adding £1 of 
income to the average income. In economic terms, 
the marginal utility of consumption of the income 
group is divided by the average marginal utility of 
consumption of the population. Marginal utility 
of consumption is calculated as one divided by 
income. For example, Table A7.8 below, based on 
the EHS, shows an average income of the English 
population of £27,851 and the average income of 
Income Decile Group 1 of £7,257.
143 HM Treasury (2003). The Green Book: Appraisal and Evaluation in 
Central Government. Available at: http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/
data_greenbook_index.htm 
The changes in air quality are valued following 
IAG guidance on prices per kWh of consumption 
(e.g. 0.04p/kWh for gas). The cost of the emissions 
are valued using the ‘traded’ price for emissions 
resulting from electricity use (based on the price 
set by the EU Emissions Trading System listed in 
the DECC IAG guidance) and non-traded emissions 
price for all fuels other than electricity.  
Benefits
Income Transfer
43. Payments/bill reductions made under both the 
income and prices archetypes involve a component 
that is assumed to be used for increased energy 
consumption (which implies a degree of ‘comfort 
taking’) and the remainder that is taken as a simple 
increase in income. The impact of comfort taking 
is discussed below. The part of the transfer taken 
as income is a simple transfer, which does not 
attract a value in standard cost-benefit analysis. 
However, if we choose to value the effects of re-
distributing resources from some income groups 
to others, through the use of equity-weights, we 
value the societal benefit of increasing the incomes 
of relatively poorer households positively (see below 
for more detail on equity-weighting).
Comfort Taking – Private Benefit
44. The part of a bill reduction or income payment that 
is used for increased energy consumption will relate 
in the main to increased internal temperatures – or 
‘comfort taking’. The amount spent on additional 
fuel will vary depending on the income distribution 
of the eligible group. It is calculated by applying 
the appropriate expenditure elasticity value to 
the payment/bill reduction made. Comfort taking 
values are lower with an unlabelled payment than 
a labelled payment. The private benefit plus the 
pure income transfer value will net off in non-
equity weighted models to the policy cost (here 
£500 million). 
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Changes in energy demand
53. The archetypes alter household energy demand in 
three ways. The first relates to the costs of funding 
the policy. In the same way as the prices and 
income archetypes, any reduction in income as a 
result of raises tax revenues or increase in the price 
of gas and electricity from a supplier obligation 
will result in a reduction in energy demand via the 
income and price elasticities shown in Tables A7.6 
and A7.7 respectively. This will be smaller under the 
tax-funded archetypes than the obligation-based 
archetypes given the relatively small responses 
to changes in income versus the relatively larger 
responses to changes in energy prices across income 
groups.
54. The second relates to energy changes generated 
from the installation of measures. Installing 
insulation will reduce the amount of energy 
required to heat a home to the same level as 
pre-installation. This will typically be a reduction 
in consumption of the household’s existing 
heating fuel (if a household uses gas for heating 
then typically installing insulation will reduce 
their consumption of gas). Installing a central 
heating system where there was no previously will 
typically move a household from using secondary 
heating (e.g. plug-in electric heaters) to central 
heating (e.g. from mains gas boiler). In such cases, 
installing heating will reduce consumption of the 
fuel previously used for secondary heating (e.g. 
electricity) and increase consumption for the new 
central heating fuel (e.g. gas). In most cases this will 
result in an increase in end user energy use (typically 
fewer kWh of electricity are required to meet a set 
temperature than of gas), but a reduction in energy 
bills (as gas prices are typically lower per kWh than 
electricity).
48. The calculated equity weighting for income 
decile group 1 means that if £100 is added to the 
spending power of a household in that group, it is 
worth the equivalent of providing a household with 
average income with £384.  Further information for 
all groups is contained in Table A7.8 below.
49. Equity weights are applied to the pure income 
transfer and social benefit of comfort taking benefit 
but not the private benefit of comfort taking. 
50. As a result of applying equity weights a progressive 
policy which gives a proportional or greater share of 
the benefits to the lower income groups will return 
a higher NPV than if it was not equity weighted. 
Thermal efficiency archetypes
51. In the thermal efficiency archetypes we model the 
installation of heating and insulation measures in 
two target groups and estimate the differences 
in impact when each of these is funded through 
taxation or through an obligation on energy 
suppliers. As outlined above, the two target groups 
are i) all households in receipt of a means-tested 
benefits below a SAP threshold of 55; and ii) all 
households below a SAP threshold of 55.
Funding
52. We outlined above the differences assumed for 
the delivery mechanism for tax-funded thermal 
efficiency archetypes versus obligations on energy 
suppliers, and the effect this has on the profile 
of measures delivered. The funding method also 
affects the nature of the costs generated by the 
policy. Supplier obligations, for example, create a 
market for the installation of measures to meet 
the obligation target, which generates economic 
rent (see Box A7.1). We assume that a tax-funded 
thermal efficiency archetype would not create 
such a market but would adopt an approach of 
delivering grants to cover the cost of measures for 
households that come forward for assistance.
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Costs of the thermal efficiency 
archetypes
Administration costs
57. Administration costs are restricted in our analysis 
to the time cost of running the policy and any 
associated costs of processing enquiries and 
household referrals. Estimates for the supplier-
obligation archetypes adopt an approach where an 
assumed level of personnel resource is required to 
administer the scheme for each obligated supplier, 
to which estimated full-time equivalent costs are 
applied. Costs of processing enquiries and referrals 
are estimated using DECC estimates based on 
previous schemes of a similar nature. 
58. For the tax-funded archetypes, a fixed 
administration and management cost is estimated, 
based on estimates of previous schemes.
55. The third change relates to any decision by the 
household to increase temperatures at home as 
a result of having had a measure installed. For 
example, installing insulation will reduce the cost 
of achieving a set temperature, but the household 
may also choose to offset some part of that energy 
saving by increasing internal temperatures to more 
comfortable levels – ‘comfort taking’. Comfort 
taking reduces the savings achieved from installing 
measures, but also generates a benefit to the 
household in terms of improved thermal comfort 
levels, which generates a benefit to society valued 
at the retail price for the relevant fuel, in line with 
IAG guidance.
56. We summarise the high level approach to modelling 
the thermal efficiency archetypes in Figure A7.2.
Table A7.8: Equity weights used for the archetype modelling, 2009
BHC Income  
Decile Group
Average Unequivalised 
Income (2009)
Marginal Utility of 
Consumption
Equity Weight
1 £7,257 0.00014 3.84
2 £11,112 0.00009 2.51
3 £13,992 0.00007 1.99
4 £17,089 0.00006 1.63
5 £20,718 0.00005 1.34
6 £24,827 0.00004 1.12
7 £29,619 0.00003 0.94
8 £35,679 0.00003 0.78
9 £44,438 0.00002 0.63
10 £73,770 0.00001 0.38
Average Income: £27,851
Average Marginal Utility of Income:        4.00E-05
Source: Fuel Poverty Review
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Box A7.1 – the costs of energy company obligations
Under a supplier obligation, energy companies are set a target to be delivered in the household sector 
– in the case of the thermal efficiency archetype, this is a specified reduction in notional heating costs. 
This creates an additional cost associated with the supply of energy. In a competitive market, energy 
suppliers would be expected to seek to meet the obligation at the lowest possible cost.
This effectively establishes a market for units of compliance (i.e. for £s of reduction in notional 
heating costs), where installers indicate how much they would charge to deliver heating cost 
reductions through certain measures. This establishes a supply curve (see illustration below).
Cost per £ bill saving
Aggregate Notional Heating Cost Reduction
Replacement
Boilers 
CWI
New
CH 
Demand curve = Target
SWI
Heat
Pumps
Rent
Market price
The level of the obligation sets the total heating cost reduction that needs to be provided (shown 
above by the vertical broken line). The interaction of supply and demand generates a market price for 
units of compliance. In a competitive supply market, all energy suppliers pass through the cost of the 
obligation into energy prices on the basis of this market price. 
Some measures can be installed at a lower cost that the market price – as is shown by both cavity-
wall insulation and new central heating  in the illustration above – thus generating some ‘rent’ 
(shown by the hatched area in the above diagram). This is defined as the payment beyond the 
amount needed to bring about supply of a good. This rent could be captured by installers (e.g. an 
installer could deliver some cheap insulation measures and sell the compliance to the energy supplier 
at the market price), the supplier or the household (or could be shared between the three). The 
existence of rents within a suppler obligation model serves to reduce the total amount of measures 
that can be delivered for a given level of overall cost.
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as time spent supervising the installation and re-
decorating afterwards. We apply different costs 
depending the type of measure installed based on 
a published report by ECOFYS.145 We also apply 
equity-weights where appropriate.
Benefits of the thermal efficiency 
archetypes
Reductions in energy use
62. Energy savings resulting from the installation of 
measures (net of comfort taking) free up energy 
resources to be used elsewhere. These are valued at 
the variable price per kWh for each relevant fuel, in 
line with IAG guidance.
Changes in GHGs and air quality
63. The changes in energy demand resulting 
from measures being installed have knock-on 
implications for the levels of GHG emissions from 
the domestic sector and air quality. We apply the 
emissions factors for each fuel published in the IAG 
guidance to estimate the changes in GHGs, before 
applying the non-traded carbon value to changes in 
gas, heating oil, solid fuel and LPG and the traded 
price to changes in emissions arising from electricity 
consumption. Air quality damage factors are 
applied to each kWh of energy demand change, for 
each relevant fuel.
Comfort taking
64. Comfort taking is estimated separately for heating 
and insulation measures. For insulation, an average 
15 percent of full energy savings from a measure 
is assumed to be taken in comfort. Comfort taking 
in relation to heating is based on evidence from 
the Warm Front Study Group findings that before 
receiving heating and/or insulation, on average 
lower income households tend to heat their 
living room and bedrooms to 17.9°C and 15.9°C 
145 ECOFYS (2009). The hidden costs and benefits domestic energy 
efficiency and carbon saving measures. Available at: http://www.
decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/what%20we%20do/supporting%20
consumers/saving_energy/analysis/1_20100111103046_e_@@_
ecofyshiddencostandbenefitsdefrafinaldec2009.pdf 
Capital costs of measures and economic 
rents
59. The £500 million raised to fund the thermal 
efficiency archetypes is allocated differently under 
the tax-funded and supplier obligation approaches. 
Under the former, we assume that the full £500m 
is available for expenditure on measures. Under 
the latter, and as discussed in Box A7.1, part of 
the £500 million will consist of economic rent. We 
would expect, therefore, less than £500 million to 
be spent directly on measures. The component that 
is rent is a simple transfer from bill payers to either 
installers, suppliers, households, or all three. As a 
result of being a transfer, we count rent as both a 
cost and a benefit, which cancel each other out in 
our non-equity weighted cost-benefit analysis.
60. When valuing the distributional costs and benefits 
of these archetypes we apply equity-weights 
to account for the social value of placing costs 
on households in certain income groups and 
delivering benefits to other income groups. Under 
the tax-funded thermal efficiency archetypes each 
household pays the same proportional amount of 
additional tax, therefore no additional social costs 
or benefits are generated. Under the supplier-
obligation approach, costs are assumed to be 
recouped from households based on how much 
energy they use. While households in lower income 
groups also tend to be relatively lower consumers of 
energy,144 on average households in lower income 
groups are estimated to pay a greater proportion 
of their income towards funding the archetype 
than under a tax-funded approach. This means that 
when equity-weights are applied, a greater value 
is attached to costs paid by lower income groups, 
increasing the social cost of the policy overall.
Hidden installation costs
61. Installing thermal efficiency measures is expected 
to incur hidden costs in relation to activities such 
144 For example see White, I., Roberts, S. & Preston, I. (2010). Understanding 
‘High Use, Low Income’ Energy Consumers. Available at: http://www.cse.
org.uk/downloads/file/understanding_high_use_low_income_energy_
consumers.pdf  
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efficiency archetypes are targeted at lower income 
groups, we value the benefit that society gains from 
assisting poorer households with their energy costs. 
This is estimated as the difference between equity-
weighted bill savings and non-equity weighted 
bill savings (i.e. we only value the equity-weighted 
uplift of the bill savings, but not the savings 
themselves).
Rent capture
66. We outlined above that any supplier-funded 
thermal efficiency archetype would generate 
economic rent. Some of this rent may be captured 
by households receiving measures. For example, 
given the hidden costs associated with installing 
loft insulation (such as clearing out the loft), a 
household may require an additional incentive 
(other than an implied reduction in energy bills) 
to agree to have a measure installed. This could 
be in a number of different forms. We assume, 
consistently with recent published analysis, that 
respectively, whereas after receiving measures they 
on average heated these same rooms to 19.6°C and 
18.3°C.146 We broadly apply these changes in our 
estimates of comfort taking from installing heating 
systems as the difference between heating a home 
to around 18°C before measures and around 19°C 
afterwards. The difference in kWh is then valued 
using the retail prices of the fuels involved.
Societal benefits from bill savings
65. Reducing household energy demand through 
installing measures will also reduce energy bills. 
Energy bill savings are a private benefit experienced 
by the household, and the benefit to society of 
reduced energy use is valued as a freeing up of 
energy resources for other uses. We therefore do 
not value private bill savings in our non-equity 
weighted cost-benefit analysis. However, as the bill 
savings generated under a number of the thermal 
146 Green, G., Gilbertson, J. & The Warm Front Study Group (2008). Warm 
Front Better Health. Available at: http://www.apho.org.uk/resource/view.
aspx?RID=53281 
Figure A7.2: Summary of approach to valuing costs and benefits of the thermal efficiency archetypes
Funding for £0.5bn
policy through tax/levy
Budget for
measures/Target
for suppliers
Measures
installed in 
target group
Administration
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Energy resource
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Source: Fuel Poverty Review. 
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Income archetypes
70. The income archetype has the same cost and 
benefit components associated as with the tax-
funded prices archetype. However the comfort 
taking impact seen in the prices archetype is not 
mirrored in the means tested benefits archetype. 
The discounted results from the income archetype 
show that increasing winter fuel payment by 
£0.5bn is more effective than increasing means-
tested benefits by the same amount. The returns 
however for both policies are very low when not 
equity weighted. Equity weighting the results show 
that the means tested benefits increase provides a 
more equitable redistribution on income. 
50 per cent of rent is captured by households. The 
remaining 50 per cent is assumed to be captured 
by installers and suppliers. This would be a simple 
transfer of rent and therefore is cancelled out by 
the cost of raising the rent to make the transfer 
in our non-equity weighted cost-benefit analysis. 
However, when applying equity-weights we value 
the social benefit of the economic rent captured by 
low-income households by taking the difference 
between equity-weighted and un-weighted rent 
captured by households.
Detailed Archetype Results
67. Discounting the costs and benefits of each 
archetype has been undertaken in line with Green 
Book methodology. The detailed results breakdowns 
are shown below. 
Prices archetypes
68. There are several costs and benefits associated with 
the price archetypes. The main costs associated 
with such a scheme are: (a) the additional GHG and 
air quality impacts associated with greater energy 
consumption; (b) the cost of supplying additional 
energy supply due to increased consumption; and 
(c) the administrative costs to Government and 
energy suppliers of running the policy. From a 
cost-benefit perspective, the key benefit of a prices 
archetype is the household welfare gain associated 
with comfort-taking (i.e. the benefit enjoyed by the 
household from higher internal temperatures as a 
result of receiving the rebate).
69. The elasticities associated with energy use discussed 
early in this Annex mean that the exchequer funded 
version of this archetype shows higher emission 
levels than the levy funded archetype. 
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its assumed delivery mechanism – where suppliers 
seek to install the most cost-effective measures only. 
This leads to a higher Net Present Value and equity-
weighted NPV for the supplier-funded archetype. 
72. Owing to the different mixes of measure delivered 
under each, we observe different patterns of 
changes in energy consumption and comfort taking 
(although when discounted over time the value of 
comfort taking is broadly the same across both). 
We observe a greater reduction in non-traded 
GHGs under the supplier archetype, as there is a 
greater proportion of insulation (which reduces 
Thermal efficiency archetypes
71. The thermal efficiency archetypes targeted at 
households in receipt of a means-tested benefit 
living in a dwelling with a SAP rating of 55 or 
below both generate much larger benefits than 
costs. The supplier-funded archetype generates the 
largest benefits primarily because of the nature of 
Table A7.9: Discounted outputs from the prices archetype by levy and tax funded (millions)
£2011 prices Funded by Levy Funded by Tax
Benefits
Income Transfer Value 421 421
Comfort Taking 173 173
Total Benefits 594 594
Costs
Tax/Levy cost 421 421
Increase in energy use 54 90
Increase value of greenhouse gas emissions (non-traded) 13 21
Increase value of EU Allowances required 1.5 3
Reduction in air quality 1 2
Administration costs 5 5
Total Costs 496 541
Net Present Value 98 52
Equity Weighted NPV 485 595
GHG Emission Changes (MTCO2e)
Traded 0.09 0.160
Non-Traded 0.263 0.421
Net Change in GHG Emissions 0.353 0.581
Source: Fuel Poverty Review
Note: The £421 million cost in line 4 is the 2011 value of £500 million spent in 2016 after discounting.
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73. The thermal efficiency archetypes targeted at 
any household with a SAP rating of 55 or below 
show similar relative patterns to those targeted at 
households claiming a means-tested benefit. The 
greater focus on the most cost-effective measures 
under the supplier obligation leads to a greater 
value of benefits generated. Further, targeting 
a broader group of households than just those 
in receipt of a means-tested benefit widens the 
scope for installing more of the most cost-effective 
measures (such as cavity wall insulation), therefore 
the net present value for the supplier-funded 
consumption of the main heating fuel) in the 
measure mix, whereas the tax-funded archetype 
involves a greater level of switching households 
from electric secondary heating to (predominantly 
gas) central heating. Hidden costs are higher for 
the tax-funded archetype as a greater proportion 
of measures installed is new central heating, which 
incurs higher hidden costs than basic insulation, 
which is more prominent in the measure mix under 
the supplier-funded archetype. 
Table A7.10: Discounted outputs from the income archetype, funded by tax (£ millions)
£2011 prices Increase in Winter 
Fuel Payment
Increase in Means 
Tested Benefits
Benefits
Income Transfer Value 421 421
Comfort Taking 173 2
Total Benefits 594 423
Costs
Tax/Levy cost (discounted) 421 421
Increase in energy use 91 0*
Increase value of greenhouse gas emissions (non-traded) 22 0*
Increase value of EUAs required 3 0*
Reduction in air quality 2 0*
Administration costs 0* 0*
Total Costs 538 421
Net Present Value 55 2
Equity Weighted NPV 416 547
GHG Emission Changes (MTCO2e)
Traded 0.153 0*
Non-Traded 0.433 0.001
Net Change in GHG Emissions 0.586 0.001
*rounded to the nearest million
Source: Fuel Poverty Review
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archetype targeted at all households is greater than 
when measures are targeted only at households 
on means-tested benefits. However, the equity-
weighted NPVs show that targeting measures at 
lower income groups generates a greater level of 
net social benefit than installing measures across all 
income groups.
Table A7.11 Discounted costs and benefits of the thermal efficiency archetypes, targeted at households 
receiving means-tested benefits in dwellings with SAP 55 or below (£ millions)
£2011 prices Tax Funded Supplier Obligation
Benefits
Reduction in energy use 479 513
Reduction in value of GHG emissions 143 249
Improvement in air quality 27 40
Comfort taking 157 157
Societal benefit from bill savings for low-income households - - 
Consumer rent capture - 51
Installer/supplier rent capture - 51
Total Benefits 806 1,060
Costs
Capital cost of measures (and rent generated) 421 421
Hidden costs of installation 60 45
Administration costs 19 1
Total Costs 499 467
Net Present Value 307 593
Equity Weighted NPV 1,731 1,902
GHG Emission Changes (MTCO2e)
Traded -2.257 -0.888
Non-Traded -1.143 -4.034
Net Change in GHG Emissions -3.400 -4.293
Source: Fuel Poverty Review
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Table A7.12: Discounted costs and benefits of the thermal efficiency archetypes, targeted at all households in 
dwellings with SAP 55 or below (£ millions)
£2011 prices Tax Funded Supplier Obligation
Benefits
Reduction in energy use 489 636
Reduction in value of GHG emissions 168 350
Improvement in air quality 31 62
Comfort taking 160 200
Societal benefit from bill savings for low-income households  - - 
Consumer rent capture  - 85
Installer/supplier rent capture  - 85
Total Benefits 848 1,419
Costs
Capital cost of measures (and rent generated) 421 421
Hidden costs of installation 52 11
Administration costs 19 1
Total Costs 491 433
Net Present Value 356 986
Equity Weighted NPV 855 1,362
GHG Emission Changes (MTCO2e)
Traded -1.944 -0.703
Non-Traded -1.823 -6.055
Net Change in GHG Emissions -3.766 -6.758
Source: Fuel Poverty Review
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